Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today
Is there a connection?
The case of the United Kingdom

David Feldman and Ben Gidley
This report derives from a five-nation study commissioned by the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (EVZ), based in Berlin, and led by the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London.

The full set of reports for this study is available to download:

- Foundation EVZ www.stiftung-evz.de
- Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk

### About the authors

**David Feldman** is Director of the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism and a Professor of History at Birkbeck, University of London. His research interests have focused on the history of minorities, particularly Jews and immigrants, and their place in British society. His UK policy work includes the reports *Integration, Disadvantage and Extremism* (2014) and *Sub-Report on Antisemitism for the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism* (2015). He is a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Expert Group on Education Policy, advising on its initiative ‘Turning Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism’.

**Ben Gidley** is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London. Formerly he was an Associate Professor at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford. He has researched and written extensively on migration, diversity and integration. His most recent book, co-edited with James Renton, is *Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe: A Shared Story?* (2017).

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Foundation EVZ
Friedrichstraße 200
10117 Berlin
www.stiftung-evz.de

Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism
Birkbeck, University of London
26 Russell Square
London WC1B 5DQ
www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk

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David Feldman and Ben Gidley
With assistance from Jan Davison, Rachel Humphris and Ieisha James
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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADL</td>
<td>Anti-Defamation League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Annual Population Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BICOM</td>
<td>British Israel Communications and Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Campaign Against Antisemitism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td>Community Security Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWP</td>
<td>Department for Work and Pensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVZ</td>
<td>Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung and Zukunft (Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’)</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
<td>European Agency for Fundamental Rights</td>
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<td>IHRA</td>
<td>International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Passenger Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPR</td>
<td>Institute for Jewish Policy Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
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Preface

There is a persistent claim that new migrants to Europe, and specifically migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA migrants), carry antisemitism with them. This assertion is made to different degrees in different countries and can take different forms. Nevertheless, in Europe, the association of rising antisemitism with migrants from the MENA is widespread and needs to be evaluated.

MENA migrants have been symbolically central to the migration debate since 2011. These years have been framed by the Arab spring and its aftermath and by Europe’s crisis of refugee protection. This research project has focused specifically on MENA migrants,¹ in response to the intensity of this debate and in accordance with the brief from Foundation EVZ. The central concern of the research project has been to investigate whether the arrival of MENA migrants since 2011 has had an impact on antisemitic attitudes and behaviour in Western Europe. This report deals with the case of the United Kingdom. The report also considers whether government and civil society agencies have identified a problem of antisemitism among MENA migrants. The findings are based on an extensive survey of the existing quantitative and qualitative evidence. Additionally, new qualitative research has been undertaken to investigate the experiences and opinions of a range of actors.

This national report contributes to a larger research project conducted in 2016/2017 across five European countries – Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A final report, Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today: is there a connection? Findings and recommendations from a five-nation study, draws out common trends, makes comparisons and provides recommendations for civil society organizations and for governments.

¹ This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. See under Definitions.
Executive Summary

Context

Jews constitute a small minority in Britain, numbering a quarter of a million. Increasingly, both Jews and non-Jews express apprehension and concern in the face of a perceived rise in antisemitism.

Britain today is a diverse society in both its religious and ethnic dimensions. This diversity is one outcome of immigration. The integration – or want of integration – among immigrants and subsequent British-born generations has been a recurrent point of controversy, debate and enquiry. In recent decades much of this debate has focused on Muslim minorities.

This is the context in which immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are sometimes pinpointed as a source of particular risk to the Jewish population.

Findings

Immigration and demography

Over the last 25 years the number of immigrants in Britain has grown rapidly. The size of the foreign-born population more than doubled between 1993 to 2014, from about 3.8 million in 1993 (7% of the population) to over 8.3 million (13%) in 2014.

In the context of this report, it is important to note that MENA migrants have made only a small contribution to the growth of the immigrant population. Today, they compose just 7% of the foreign-born population living in Britain. The MENA population in the UK is heterogeneous and the people within this category exhibit different migration histories, dynamics, flows, characteristics and legal statuses. The main sending MENA countries are Turkey and Iran (with a female-skewed gender profile) and the Gulf states (with a male-skewed gender profile). Migrants from some MENA countries also figure prominently among applications for asylum.

Immigration has changed the ethnic and religious composition of the population. In 1945 Jews were the largest non-Christian minority in the country. Now the Jewish minority is one relatively small group, of approximately 250,000 people, in a multi-faith and multicultural society. Whereas the Jewish population in Britain is undergoing a slow decline in numbers, the Muslim population in England and Wales grew from 1.5 million in 2001 to 2.7 million in 2011. Muslims (mainly of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin) now constitute the largest non-Christian religious group in the country.

Antisemitism: trends and fears

Attitudes to Jews in British society are broadly favourable. The most recent research proposes that 5% of the general population can be described as antisemites. The antisemitism which does exist is widely distributed. It cannot be attributed to religious, ethnic or political minorities. At the same time, some groups are more likely than others to carry antisemitic attitudes. These groups
Executive Summary

include Muslims and people who, at one time, supported the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).

In contrast to the generally positive picture provided by attitudinal surveys, there has been a sustained rise in the number of antisemitic incidents recorded annually by the Community Security Trust (CST). In 2000 this figure stood at 405 incidents and by 2016 it had reached 1309. This increase has been most marked in recorded incidents involving ‘abusive behaviour’. Police figures indicate a rising level of antisemitic hate crime since 2014. This occurred in the context of a steep rise in the broad category of hate crime in these years, from 42,434 in 2013/2014 to 62,518 in 2015/2016.

Several factors have contributed to the increased number of recorded antisemitic incidents. The total has risen, in part, as a result of a series of international and domestic events which have served to encourage offenders. Flashpoints of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, such as Operation Cast Lead in 2009 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014, had this effect; the controversy over antisemitism in the Labour Party since 2015 may have had a similar influence. At the same time the rise in recorded antisemitic incidents also reflects greater efficiency in recording incidents and crimes, and a growing propensity to report them.

Reported incidents represent the tip of a proverbial iceberg. The Crime Survey of England and Wales suggests that the actual level of hate crime experienced is more than four times the number of recorded incidents. For this reason, it is difficult to determine whether recorded increases reflect a growing volume of incidents and crimes, whether more incidents and crimes are being reported or whether the increases reflect the influence of both these phenomena.

Nevertheless, it is possible to reach some significant conclusions.

- British Jews perceive antisemitism to be rising. At the same time, they are divided in their perception of how pervasive antisemitism is. In this regard, the most recent survey, undertaken by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2012, preceded recent flashpoints and controversies. This survey found that approximately half of respondents believed antisemitism was ‘a fairly big problem’ or ‘a very big problem’ while the other half believed it was ‘not a very big problem’ or ‘not a problem at all’. It is likely that perceptions of antisemitism have changed for the worse over the last six years.

- Within public debate some voices identify the problem of antisemitism with Muslim minorities.

- The development of social media has greatly increased the opportunities to broadcast antisemitic abuse.

- More antisemitic incidents are categorized by the CST as ‘anti-social’ than as ‘political’ in motivation.

- With the exception of the years 2009 and 2014, among antisemitic incidents that exhibit a political motivation it is those which emanate from the far right that have been the most numerous and have gradually increased in number.

- Incidents which exhibit a connection to anti-Israel and Islamist ideologies are generally in a minority and their occurrence fluctuates in line with trigger events in the Middle East.
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- Conflict in the Middle East has a significant impact on Jews in the UK and leads them to feel less safe.

- There is no evidence to suggest that immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East contribute in any significant way to the rise in recorded antisemitic hate crime.

- MENA migrants figure in the qualitative evidence gathered for this report as potential victims rather than perpetrators of prejudice and hate crime.

Integration

The anxiety sometimes expressed in the face of migration from North Africa and the Middle East emerges alongside concerns at the weakness of integration among Muslim minorities more broadly. In fact, the evidence on integration reveals a mixed picture.

Educational outcomes for minority ethnic and religious groups, including Muslims, converge over time with the White British majority. However, Muslim minorities experience disadvantage in other fields such as income, employment and rates of unemployment: 26% of the Muslim population live in the top 10% of deprived areas in the country.

Civic participation, respect for law and commitment to the society of settlement is high among Muslim minorities. These facets of integration, however, run alongside a sense of grievance and injustice in the face of unequal outcomes in the labour market and the economy.

Processes of integration into UK society unfold among the majority of second generation Muslims but a significant minority become alienated. This could provide fertile ground for politicized antisemitism.

State and civil society monitoring and responses

A series of initiatives to monitor and combat antisemitism in Great Britain have been driven forward by cooperation between government and other organizations, most notably the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Antisemitism and the CST. These provide an important basis for future work.

Neither state nor civil society organizations target MENA migrants as they seek to monitor and combat antisemitism. MENA migrants have not been identified by these organizations as a problematic group.
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Conclusions

• Attitudes to Jews in the UK are largely positive.

• Since 2000, recorded antisemitic incidents and statistics for antisemitic hate crime have shown a rising trend. Spikes in recorded incidents have been related temporally to conflict in the Middle East. This association was broken, however, in 2016 when recorded antisemitic incidents reached a record level.

• Among those incidents that are categorized as politically motivated the greatest number stem from far-right sources. In comparison, few incidents show an Islamist motivation.

• The number of MENA migrants in the UK is small. The Annual Population Survey in 2015 estimated that the UK population stood at 64.2 million, of whom 599,000 are MENA migrants.

• The UK population of Muslims has grown significantly and is now the largest non-Christian religious group in the UK, the main ethnic groups being of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins. Within public discourse there are concerns about antisemitism among UK Muslims. These concerns are easily projected on to MENA migrants.

• We draw the conclusion that the rise in recorded antisemitic incidents and crimes in the UK should not be linked to the arrival of MENA migrants.

Recommendations

Policy

• Policy responses and public discussion should reflect that antisemitism arises within society as a whole and not only among immigrant or religious minorities.

• Policy makers and civil society organizations should take account of the limitations and problems of interpretation presented by different survey methods and by statistics that seek to measure hate crime and antisemitic incidents. In doing so, they will be able to safeguard against both complacency and alarmism.

• Government should do more to promote the economic and social integration of Muslim minorities in ways that extend beyond the issue of ‘security’.

Practice

• Current examples of good practice should be extended and built upon. These examples include the response of government to parliamentary investigations of antisemitism, the liaison between the CST, Tell Mama and the police, and the effort of a Syrian refugee organization to promote political discussion and democratic values.

• There is an urgent need in the UK for substantive interaction between Jews and Muslims to provide a counterweight to negative stereotypes and political discourses that generate mutual suspicion.

• All sectors of society have a duty to speak responsibly on issues around immigration, antisemitism and Islamophobia.

• Politicians, policy makers and journalists should promote a balanced, evidence-based discussion of the relationship between immigration and antisemitism.
Executive Summary

Research

• We need a representative survey of attitudes among MENA migrants.

• We need to know more about the attitudes and ideologies that develop among alienated second-generation Muslim minorities.

• The data on antisemitic incidents demands attention:
  • Members of ethnic minorities are over-represented in the tally of incidents recorded. Should this be taken at face value or is it best explained by other factors?
  • The large number of incidents categorized as ‘anti-social’ requires investigation so we can better understand the motives and intentions of offenders.

• We need to examine attitudes to religious and ethnic difference among both Jews and Muslims.
Introduction

Here we summarize some of the most salient features of the UK context.

- Since the 1990s there has been a sharp increase in the number of immigrants coming to the UK. The size of the foreign-born population increased from about 3.8 million in 1993 to more than 8.3 million in 2014. Migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have not greatly contributed to this increase (in 2015 the figure stood at 599,000). However, in the context of the debate on MENA migrants it is relevant to note that from 2001 to 2011 the Muslim population of the UK grew by 72% to number 2.8 million.

- Some prominent UK political figures, policy makers and commentators express concern at the impact of immigration on social cohesion. The weakness of integration, they argue, leaves the Muslim population in the UK vulnerable to the appeal of extremism. In this way, the idea that the immigration of Muslims carries a threat to Jews is gaining credibility among some audiences (Prime Minister’s Office and Rt Hon. David Cameron 2015; DCLG 2016; Murray 2017).

- Individuals and institutions that carry authority and prestige have, on occasion, expressed the idea that ‘radical Islam’ is the ‘central generator’ of antisemitism in Europe (Rocker 2016) or that immigrants and refugees from Syria, Iraq and elsewhere carry a potential antisemitic danger to Jews in Europe (Axelrod 2016; Baker 2016). Some of these statements have been well reported in the Jewish press in the UK (Rocker 2016; Axelrod 2016). British writers, too, have expressed their concern at Muslim antisemitism, which, the journalist Melanie Phillips reports, is ‘the default position among Muslim youth’ (Phillips 2014, 2016). These claims have been bolstered by revelations, accusations and confessions of antisemitism and anti-Jewish sentiment in the British Labour Party, which in some cases have focused on members of the Party who identify as Muslim (Fisher 2016).

- Jews’ perceptions of their insecurity have increased. This was one conclusion from the European Agency for Fundamental Rights report entitled Discrimination and Hate Crime Against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of Hate Crime (2013).

- There has been a steady and at times rapid rise in the number of recorded antisemitic incidents since 2000. The number of incidents recorded by the Community Security Trust, a widely respected Jewish communal body responsible for monitoring and combatting antisemitism, rose by more than a factor of four in these years.
Methodology

This report is based on a review of existing quantitative and qualitative data and new qualitative research. The work proceeded in the following stages.

**Review Stage 1 – Background literature and quantitative data search**
We identified the most up-to-date quantitative data on migration and integration in the UK, focusing on data relating to Muslim minorities, Arab ethnic groups and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries of origin. At the same time, the ‘grey literature’ – official publications, policy documents, etc. from public agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – on antisemitism and hate crime (and strategies to combat these) was reviewed, using the search function on relevant organizations’ websites. Where appropriate, grey literature studies were subjected to a quality appraisal framework, adapted from the UK Cabinet Office framework for qualitative studies (Spencer et al. 2003).

**Review Stage 2 – Bibliographic searches and hand searches**
We reviewed the existing secondary and scholarly literature to identify what academic work had already been undertaken to address our research question. A series of searches were conducted in the principal social science bibliographic databases. These were then screened for relevance and quality.

**Generation of new empirical data**
The project researcher conducted interviews with workers from 15 state and civil society organizations, which represented three different groups of stakeholders: government departments and agencies; refugee and migrant organizations; race equality groups and Jewish civil society organizations. The interview table and full topic guide is included in the Appendix. The duration of the interviews ranged from 30 to 90 minutes. Some 13 interviews were conducted in person in a location chosen by the interviewee. These interviews were recorded and transcribed in full. Two interviews took place over the telephone. These interviews were not recorded but detailed notes were written throughout the telephone interview. Thematic analysis was used to determine the recurring and salient themes from the interview data.

One section of this report is devoted to analysis of this new data. Additionally, the data is used throughout the report to illustrate or illumine particular points. The value of this data is heuristic. We do not claim it is representative.

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2 This framework is constituted by the following criteria:
• Did the study include clearly focused research questions, appropriate methods selected to answer questions, appropriate sample design and ethical recruitment?
• Was the data collection strategy detailed and rationale provided?
• Was the analysis detailed and a rationale provided?
• Did the study include an awareness of its limitations in terms of design and methods and the implications of these limitations for the findings presented?
Definitions

MENA (Middle East and North Africa)

This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. These three countries are included because of their profile either in the migration/refugee statistics or in current public debates in some European countries.

We have taken the widest possible definition of MENA migrants in order not to miss any causal relationships that could be overlooked using more restrictive delineations.

The full list of countries included in this study is as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank & Gaza, Western Sahara Territory, Yemen.

Refugee

The UN 1951 Refugee Convention (Article 1.A.2) adopted the following definition of ‘refugee’ to apply to any person who:

- owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (United Nations 1951)

The concept of a refugee was expanded by the Convention’s 1967 Protocol to remove time limits and geographic limitations. Regional conventions in Africa and Latin America included displaced persons who had fled war or other violence in their home country. Similarly, the European Union’s (EU) minimum standards for qualification as a refugee, Directive No. 2004/83/EC, extends the definition to render persons who have fled generalized violence caused by war, under certain conditions, eligible for a complementary form of protection, called subsidiary protection (European Union 2004). The same form of protection is foreseen for displaced people who, without being refugees, are nevertheless exposed, if returned to their countries of origin, to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatments.

Migrant

There is no consensus on a single definition of a ‘migrant’. There is also no legal definition. Migrants can be defined by foreign birth, by foreign citizenship, or by their movement into a new country to stay temporarily (sometimes for as little as a year) or to settle for the long term. In some scholarly and everyday usage, people who move internally within national boundaries are also called migrants.
A migrant might most usefully be defined as an individual who is subject to immigration controls. In this case, a key distinction should be made between those who have the ‘right of abode’ and those who do not have this right. *This report defines the migrant population as the foreign-born population.* However, in what follows the demographic data does not separate between migrants and refugees except where expressly stated.

**Antisemitism**

There is no generally agreed understanding in the UK of what antisemitism is. In 2015, the Populus survey for the APPG Against Antisemitism found that only a small majority of respondents (55%) were confident in their ability to explain to someone else what antisemitism means, and this figure fell dramatically in younger groups. Fewer than 40% of those aged between 18 and 34 felt they could explain what is meant by antisemitism (Populus 2015).

Political debate in the UK has featured diverse and sometimes divergent uses and definitions of the term antisemitism. In December 2016 the British government adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism. The same definition has also been adopted by other bodies in the United Kingdom, including the Labour Party, the Greater London Assembly and the National Union of Students. Nevertheless, the definition arouses opposition and controversy. In October 2016 the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee recommended that the definition requires amendment to protect freedom of speech. More recently, the definition has been criticized by legal authorities as ‘unclear and confusing’ and intolerant of opinion that is critical of Israel in ways that ‘are themselves contrary to the law’ (DCLG 2016; House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 2016; Tomlinson 2017; Sedley 2017).

In this report we have not attempted to impose our own definition but instead take the view that the meaning of the term is found in its many varied uses.
1 Historical Context

Immigration and Antisemitism
Pre-2011
1.1 Immigration

Migration to the UK broadly reflects the UK’s history of postcolonial connections and global relationships, and, with some exceptions, mirrors global geopolitical trends. Figure 1 breaks down foreign-born residents in the 2011 Census by year of arrival, showing a gradual shift from the predominance of former colonies to the predominance of labour migrants from rising powers in the global South and European Union (EU). As with subsequent uses of the 2011 Census, the data covers England (where the UK’s migrant population is concentrated) and Wales only, and not Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Figure 1: Top 20 countries of birth for foreign-born residents in England and Wales, 2011

Source: ONS (2016a), 2011 Census aggregate data, Table: CT0263

Only three Muslim majority countries make the top 20 list of sending countries depicted in Figure 1 - Pakistan and Bangladesh, both former British colonies with strong cultural ties to the UK, and Somalia which also was subject to British sovereignty for part of the 19th and 20th centuries. In addition, according to some measures, Muslims constitute the largest religious group in Nigeria though they constitute less than 50% of the population. The total absence of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries in the top 20 countries of birth of foreign-born residents in the UK is notable in the context of this report.
The historical flows of MENA migrants to the UK are depicted in Figure 2. This shows people normally resident in the UK in 2011 and breaks them down by their year of arrival, giving a picture of flows into the country.\textsuperscript{3} It provides an indication of several trends. Before 1981, the largest flows came from Iran and Egypt. However, flows dramatically decreased for Egypt after 1981, but increased from Iran between 1981 and 2000. The largest number of MENA migrants has been from Turkey. Of the Turkish migrants usually resident in the UK, more than 45,000 arrived between 1981 and 2000. Another 25,000 arrived between 2001 and 2006. Turkish migration is extremely heterogeneous (D’Angelo et al. 2013).

Migration from Iraq similarly increased between 1981 and 2000 but peaked between 2001 and 2006, the period of the most intense conflict there. The largest flows from Afghanistan were also between 2000 and 2006. These flows largely map on to patterns of asylum-seeking, including ethnic Kurdish refugees (in the 1981–2001 period) and those fleeing the violence of the war on terror (in the post-2001 period).

The largest recent increase in migration from a MENA country is from Saudi Arabia. The rate of arrival of Saudis resident in the UK almost doubled between 2007 and 2011, with arrivals overtaking those from Turkey.

The total number of MENA migrants in England and Wales at the time of the 2011 Census is shown in Figure 3. Just four countries – Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan – accounted for 58% of all MENA migrants enumerated that year.

\textsuperscript{3} The figure does not account for emigration, e.g. shorter-term migrants, such as students, who arrived and left again before 2011.
Historical Context

Figure 3: MENA foreign-born residents in England and Wales in 2011

Source: ONS (2016a), 2011 Census aggregate data, Table: CT0263

1.2 Antisemitism

This section reviews data on attitudes to Jews and on antisemitic incidents: we focus on the years between 2000–2011. Our aim is to provide a review of antisemitism before recent immigration from the Middle East and North Africa.

In a series of surveys undertaken since 2004, the Pew Research Centre has measured attitudes towards Jews. Respondents have been asked whether they have a ‘very favourable’, ‘somewhat favourable’, ‘somewhat unfavourable’ or ‘very unfavourable’ opinion of Jews. The results, shown in Figure 4, suggest that attitudes to Jews were overwhelmingly favourable. The proportion of respondents reporting unfavourable views held steady, fluctuating within a narrow band of between 6% and 9%.

Figure 4: Attitudes towards Jews in the UK, 2004–2010

Source: Pew Research Centre (2017), Global Attitudes and Trends
Antisemitic incidents recorded by the Community Security Trust (CST) display a notably different pattern. Their number has shown a rising trend since 1989, peaking in 2009, as shown in Figure 5, when a sharp increase in recorded antisemitic incidents coincided with the conflict in Israel and Gaza in January of that year. The CST has proposed that the overall upward trend was related to critical incidents such as this. The level of recorded incidents fell significantly once the trigger event had passed. However, the number of recorded incidents did not fully return to its preceding level (All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism 2015).

Figure 5: Incidents of antisemitism recorded by CST, 1984–2010

The return to a lower level of recorded ‘incidents’ immediately after 2009, revealed by the CST data, is reproduced in the hate crime data collected by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). In 2009, ACPO recorded 703 antisemitic hate crimes. In 2010 the figure dropped to 488 (True Vision, 2017).

The CST figures also suggest that between 2001 and 2010 the rise in reported antisemitic incidents was unevenly distributed between the different incident categories. The rise was most marked in incidents involving ‘abusive behaviour’ and ‘assault’ (see Figures 6 and 7). In 2009 there was a sharp increase across all categories with the exception of ‘extreme violence’.

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4 CST data is cited extensively in this report. In 2001 the CST was accorded ‘Third Party Reporting’ status by the police, which allows it to report antisemitic incidents to the police. Since 2015 the CST and police share antisemitic incident reports. See section 8, State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses, for more information on this arrangement. More information on the protocols each uses for collecting data is given in section 4.3, Incidents of antisemitism.

5 A definition of hate crime and the Crown Prosecution Service policy on prosecution are available at: www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime. In the case of the ACPO an antisemitic hate incident is any incident which has been perceived as such by the victim or any other person. However, not all hate crimes become criminal offences and it is only at this point that they are recorded as hate crimes. In the case of the CST an ‘antisemitic incident’ refers to an incident which, after examination, demonstrates antisemitic motivation, language or targeting, see Community Security Trust (2011).
Among the total number of antisemitic incidents recorded by the CST, only a minority had an explicit political motivation. This proportion stood at 32% in 2008 and at 37% in 2010 and peaked at 47% in 2009, an exceptional year on account of Operation Cast Lead. In most years the ideological motivation came predominantly from the far right (Figure 8). In 2009, incidents that displayed an anti-Israel motivation peaked at 175 incidents and also saw the highest recorded level of incidents (totalling 106) with an Islamist motivation. In 2010 these figures returned to pre-2009 levels, with 53 incidents exhibiting anti-Israel motivation and 32 showing evidence of Islamist motivation or belief. However, incidents linked to the far right remained high, with 149 recorded.
Figure 8: Antisemitic incidents that showed evidence of political/ideological motivation, 2007–2010


1.3 Summary

1.3.1 MENA migration to the UK

- MENA migration to the UK partly reflects broader geopolitical events, such as conflicts in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq.
- MENA countries were not in the UK’s top 20 migrant sending countries in 2011.
- The largest numbers of MENA migrants are from Turkey and arrived between 1981 and 2000.
- Recently, the largest numbers of MENA migrants are from Saudi Arabia.

1.3.2 Antisemitism in the UK

- In the years between 2000 and 2010 there was a rising trend of reported antisemitic incidents, most of which involved ‘abusive behaviour’ and assault.
- This trend precedes recent patterns of immigration.
- Among reported antisemitic incidents showing evidence of political motivation, those stemming from the far right were most numerous and rose during this period. The number of incidents that exhibited anti-Israel or Islamist ideologies fluctuated markedly in line with trigger events in the Middle East.
- In this period, reported antisemitic hate crime reached a peak in January and February 2009. Yet this was also a year in which the Pew Research Centre recorded a decrease in the combined total of ‘somewhat unfavourable’ and ‘very unfavourable’ attitudes to Jews. This divergence suggests that the relationship between fluctuations in hate crime and societal attitudes is mediated and complex.
2 Current Demographics
Current Demographics

This section provides a snapshot of the current demographic profile of the UK to contextualize new migration from MENA countries.

2.1 Migrants

The Annual Population Survey (APS) and Labour Force Survey (LFS) provide the most up-to-date picture of the population between census points, although, as surveys rather than counts, they are less accurate than the census, and in particular undercount some kinds of migrants. At the time of writing, the latest data in these surveys is from 2014. According to LFS, the size of the foreign-born population in the UK increased from about 3.8 million in 1993 (7% of the total population) to over 8.3 million in 2014 (nearly 13.1%). During the same period, the share of recent migrants (residing in the UK for less than five years) increased from 1.4% to 2.7%.

2.2 Ethnicity

We turn now to the ethnicity of the migrant and non-migrant population, for which the only robust data source is the 2011 Census (which covers England and Wales only, as noted above). The majority of the population, 48.2 million people (86% of the population), reported their ethnic group as White in the 2011 Census. Indian was the second largest ethnic group (1.4 million people - 2.5%) followed by Pakistani (2%). There were two new tick boxes in the 2011 Census: Gypsy or Irish Traveller, and Arab. Gypsy or Irish Traveller accounted for 58,000 usual residents (0.1% of the population), making it the smallest ethnic category (with a tick box) in 2011. Arab accounted for 240,000 usual residents (0.4% of the population). Of these, 64,000 are UK-born (0.1% of the native population) and 167,000 are foreign-born (2.2% of the migrant population).

Different ethnic groups have different migration histories. Figure 9 shows what proportion of each ethnic group in 2011 are new (post-2007) arrivals. Arab, along with Chinese and Other White (the ethnic group selected by most Central and Eastern Europeans) groups are dominated by new arrivals.

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6 The APS combines results from the LFS and the English, Welsh and Scottish Labour Force Survey boosts. The APS aims to provide enhanced annual data for England, covering a target sample of at least 510 economically active persons for each Unitary Authority Local Authority District and at least 450 in each Greater London Borough. The survey provides estimates for a range of indicators down to Local Education Authority and Local Authority District level across the United Kingdom. The LFS and the APS both have limitations for estimating the dynamics of migrants in the UK. First, they do not measure the scale of irregular migration. Second, they do not provide information on asylum seekers. Third, they exclude those who do not live in households, such as those in hotels, caravan parks and other communal establishments. Both surveys are therefore likely to underestimate the UK population of recent migrants. Asylum seekers and irregular migrants may also include MENA migrants.
When looking at the trends in migration over time among each ethnic group, as shown by Figure 10, patterns emerge. The profile of the Arab migrant population in 2011 is similar to that of some of the other newer migrant groups, such as Africans and White Other (the category mainly used by Eastern and Central Europeans) – that is, small numbers among the long-settled (pre-1981 arrivals) and larger numbers among recent (post-2007) arrivals.
2.3 Religion

We turn now from ethnicity to religion, for which again the 2011 Census is still our most robust source. Figure 11 compares the stated religion of the UK-born and foreign-born population of England and Wales, showing that Muslims make up 2.6% of the native-born population (third after Christian and no religion) but 19% of the migrant population (second after Christian). Jews make up less than 1% of both groups – less than 0.5% of the native population and 0.7% of the migrant population.

Figure 11: UK-born and migrant population in England and Wales by religion, 2011

Source: ONS (2011), Country of birth by religion, Table DC2207E

Focusing only on the foreign-born in the 2011 Census, we see different profiles for different religious groups (Figure 12). Muslim migrants peaked between 1981 and 2000, while the largest number of Jewish migrants arrived before 1981, as did the Sikhs and Hindus.

Figure 12: Religion of foreign-born in England and Wales by period of arrival

The significance of different religious groups within the population has shifted over time as the UK has become increasingly religiously diverse, largely due to migration. Some 50 years ago, Judaism, at less than 1% of the population, was the largest non-Christian religion in the UK. Now it is the fourth largest non-Christian religion with 269,000 people identifying as Jewish in the 2011 Census behind Islam (2.8 million people), Hinduism (833,000) and Sikhism (432,000). The Jewish minority has become one (small) religious minority in a much more diverse society.

The increase in people identifying as Muslim has been particularly noticeable, with 1.2 million more (a 72% rise) in the 2011 Census than the 2001 Census, attributable mainly to immigration and higher birth rates (ONS 2013). While this has been the most significant increase in any faith community, Muslims are religiously and ethnically diverse, including people from Sunni, Shia and Ahmadi denominations and originating from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, among many other regions and countries – and with just under half of British Muslims born in the UK. The majority of Muslims in the UK belong to the broad Sunni denomination, while the two largest ethnic groups within the overall Muslim population in England and Wales are of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins, accounting for around 38% and 15% of Muslims in England and Wales respectively (ONS 2013).

Different age and gender profiles characterize Britain’s different religious populations, a point that is significant for this report because specific age and gender profiles (particularly young men and minors) are more likely to be perpetrators of hate crimes and because media attention on MENA migrants has often focused on young men. Although still comprising less than 10% of the population, minority religious groups have younger age profiles than the largest Christian groups and can be expected to grow as the latter decline (ONS 2013).

2.4 Migrant age and gender profile

According to the LFS, although the numbers of both female and male migrants have increased over time, women have constituted a small majority of the UK’s migrant population stock since at least 1993. In 2014, 54% of the foreign-born population were women.

The LFS also provides the distribution of foreign-born by age, including children (those aged 0–15), youths (aged 15–25), adults (aged 26–60 for men and 26–64 for women), and retired (aged 61+ for women, and aged 64+ for men). According to the LFS, the vast majority of male foreign-born are adults (71%), while 8.5% are children, 11% are youths and 10% are retired. Similarly, the vast majority of female foreign-born are adults (67%), 8% are children, 9% youths and 15.1% are retired.

Estimates from the APS 2014 (see Figure 13) indicate that, on the whole, there are more female foreign-born across all age groups. In short, the migrant population is a young population, but not a young male one.
Current Demographics

2.5 Summary

- The size of the foreign-born population in the UK increased from about 3.8 million in 1993 to over 8.3 million in 2014, from 7% to nearly 13.1%.

- During the same period (1993 to 2014) the share of recent migrants increased from 1.4% to 2.7%.

- A relatively large portion of the Arab ethnic population comprises recent arrivals in the UK. This is similar to some other ethnic groups, such as Chinese and ‘Other White’.

- The Jewish minority has become one small religious minority in a diverse society.

- The Muslim population of the UK grew by 72% between 2001 and 2011. Muslims constitute the largest non-Christian religious group in the UK and the largest non-Christian group within the migrant population.

- The majority of foreign-born and foreign citizens are female.

- The vast majority of migrants are aged between 15 and 44 years old.
3 Immigration
Since 2011
3.1 Context

Net migration to the UK in the years 2012–2016 was 1,280,000, according to the estimates generated from the International Passenger Survey (Migration Observatory 2017). Immigration to the UK continues trends already visible in the 2011 census, towards a greater diversity of sending countries away from the traditional sending countries linked to the UK by colonial history which dominated the pre-1981 period and also away from the refugee-sending countries which dominated the 1981–2001 period. In particular, the rising powers of the global South, particularly among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries, along with EU accession states, have become more prominent. As we see in Figure 14 the main sending countries in the population are now Poland, India, Pakistan, Ireland, Germany, Romania, Bangladesh, South Africa, Nigeria and China, while the main non-EU countries for new applications for National Insurance Numbers (an indicator of new long-term settlement) are India, Australia, China, Pakistan and the USA (ONS 2017).

Figure 14: Top 20 countries of birth for foreign-born residents in the UK, 2015


3.2 MENA migrants

In 2015 the Annual Population Survey estimated that the UK population stood at 64.2 million of whom 8.6 million were migrants. MENA migrants amounted to just 7%, 599,000. Among the MENA countries, only Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey were represented among the top 60 countries of birth: Iran, at number 27, was ranked the highest (ONS 2016c). Figure 15 shows that four countries, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey, make up 57% of the total of MENA migrants in England and Wales. However, there has been a significant change within this grouping since 2011: the number of migrants from Turkey now lags behind the growing numbers from the other three countries. Moreover, the number of migrants from Syria has increased from 9,000 to 21,000 in the four years from 2011. These changes reflect how migration flows have been affected by war, political violence and repression in the Middle East.
To look at post-2011 flows, we turn to the International Passenger Survey (IPS), for which the most recent full data comes from 2014, although it is important to note that the sample here is small, especially for minor countries of origin, which includes most MENA countries. The gender profile of post-2011 MENA migrants in the UK indicates a different pattern from the profile of migrants in general introduced in the previous section. Whereas for the whole migrant population the majority of arrivals are female, for most MENA countries the majority are male. However, as Figure 15 shows, this is not uniform across countries of origin.

Figure 15: Resident population born in MENA countries, England and Wales, 2015

Source: ONS (2016d), Annual Population Survey, 2015, Table 1.3

Figure 16: Gender of MENA migrants

Source: ONS (2015b) International Passenger Survey, 4.01, 2014

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7 Immigration figures are not available for Djibouti or Mauritania.

8 This figure is based on nationality rather than country of birth. There is no data for Djibouti, Eritrea, Mauritania and Western Sahara.
Arrivals from the Gulf states are overwhelmingly male, and these make up a very large element of MENA migrant flows (Figure 16). In 2014, the largest number of male MENA migrants were from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and aged between 25 and 44 years old. The biggest groups in the 15–24 age category were also from United Arab Emirates, followed by young men from Kuwait. Migrant arrivals from Syria, Turkey, Israel and Iran, in contrast, are overwhelmingly female. Thus the public perception of new MENA migrants as young and male is not inaccurate, but it is inaccurate when focusing on refugee sending countries such as Syria.

The profile of male MENA migrants can be seen in more detail in Figure 17.

**Figure 17: Age of male MENA migrants**

![Figure 17: Age of male MENA migrants](image)

Source: ONS (2015b), International Passenger Survey 4.01, 2014

A slightly different picture emerges when female migration of MENA migrants is analysed, as shown by Figure 18. The majority of women travelling to the UK in 2014 were also between 25 and 44 years old but the vast majority were from Turkey. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were also key sending countries. A significant number of women also arrived from Israel and Libya. They were also between the ages of 25 and 44 years old.

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9 This figure is based on nationality rather than country of birth. There is no data for Djibouti, Eritrea, Mauritania and Western Sahara.
There is very little accessible data for the period after 2011 on the legal status of MENA migrants. However, reliable statistics are regularly published on asylum applications and refugee status determination. The recently released headline statistics for 2016 show that MENA countries are in the list of top sending countries for asylum seekers, although not for other migration routes. The top countries of origin for asylum applications in 2016 were Iran (4,792, an increase of 1076 since 2015), Pakistan (3,717), Iraq (3,651 – an increase of 1,003), Afghanistan (3,094) and Bangladesh (2,234) (ONS 2017).

3.3 Summary

- Net migration to the UK in the years 2012–2016 was 1,280,000.
- MENA migrants comprise 7% of the migrant population of the UK.
- Migration from MENA countries has a different age and gender pattern to overall migration to the UK, with more men migrating from MENA countries than women. In total, there were 19,500 male migrants compared with 17,400 female migrants.
- Migration from MENA countries is heterogeneous and different countries exhibit different migration histories, dynamics, flows, characteristics and legal statuses.
- The main MENA sending countries of migrants now arriving in the UK are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (with a male-skewed gender profile) and Turkey (with a female-skewed gender profile).
- Migrants from some MENA countries figure prominently among applications for asylum and, more broadly, reflect conditions of war, political violence and repression.

Notes: This figure is based on nationality rather than country of birth. There is no data for Djibouti, Eritrea, Mauritania and Western Sahara.
4 Antisemitism Since 2011
This section reviews the existing quantitative data, addressing negative attitudes to Jews in the United Kingdom; Jews’ perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in the UK; and the reasons for spikes in recorded antisemitic incidents.

4.1 Attitudes to Jews

Reports from the Pew Research Centre provide longitudinal data on respondents’ general attitude to Jews. Since 2004 the organization’s surveys have asked the same question at varying intervals: ‘Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of Jews’. Figure 19 depicts the results from 2004 to the most recent poll in 2015.

**Figure 19: Attitudes towards Jews in the UK, 2004–2015**

In the last three surveys – in 2011, 2014 and 2015 – the proportion of respondents holding favourable opinions of Jews has shown an upward trend, with 86% holding ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ favourable opinions in 2015, the highest recorded figure since the question was introduced. Those holding ‘mostly’ and ‘very’ unfavourable opinions about Jews has held steady at 7%. This finding is broadly confirmed by a YouGov survey published in June 2015 which also found that 7% of British adults had either a ‘fairly negative’ or ‘very negative’ opinion about Jews, and by a JPR survey published in September 2017 which concluded that ‘about 5% of the general population can justifiably be described as antisemites’ (Dahlgreen 2015; JPR 2015; Staetsky 2017).

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These surveys have been undertaken either by telephone or face-to-face interviews. The mode of interview, sampling design, margin of error and design effect are available for each country and generally considered to be representative. In most countries the N size is 1,000 which is considered an acceptable standard in polls of this nature. They have an average margin of error of around 5% which is acceptable in most cases. They do admit the following: ‘It should be noted that practical difficulties in conducting multinational surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls. In some countries, the achieved samples suffered from imbalances in the number of women or men interviewed, while in some countries a lack of adequate, national-level statistics made it difficult to assess the accuracy of educational characteristics among the sampled population.’ However, the reports compensate for these imbalances by releasing their estimates as to how representative the poll is for the adult population.
However, a significantly different picture emerges from surveys that focus on particular issues and explore them by asking respondents to evaluate one or more negative statements about Jews. Surveys conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) present respondents with a series of negative assertions: for example, ‘Jews have too much power in the business world’ and ‘Jews are more loyal to Israel than the countries in which they live’. Since 2014 the ADL survey has presented respondents with 11 negative statements of this sort. In those cases in which respondents class six or more statements as ‘probably true’, the ADL categorizes respondents as ‘individuals harbouring antisemitic views’. The ADL reports that in 2015 12% of adults in the United Kingdom qualify for this category, a four-point increase from the previous year (Anti-Defamation League 2015).

Other surveys which similarly employ leading questions also elicit higher measurements of antisemitism. A poll carried out by Populus in January 2015 as part of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism found that 11% of respondents believed ‘Jews have too much power in the UK media and politics’ and that 15% agreed with the statement that ‘Jews talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust’ (Populus, 2015). The YouGov survey commissioned by the Campaign Against Antisemitism (CAA) and carried out in December 2014 and January 2015 presents similar evidence: 17% of those interviewed agreed that it was either ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ true that Jews have too much power in the media and 13% agreed it was ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ true that Jews ‘talk about the Holocaust too much in order to get sympathy’ (CAA 2015a). The ADL survey conducted in 2015 found that 26% of respondents believed it was ‘probably true’ that Jews talk too much about the Holocaust and 12% believed it was ‘probably true’ that Jews exert too much control over global media.

Surveys that address specific issues but do so without providing a negative prompt suggest antisemitism is less prevalent. The difference between the results returned by the different survey questions can be illustrated by the following divergent findings. A YouGov survey conducted in May 2016 found that one in ten voters in the UK believe that Jewish people have too much influence in the UK. However, only 6% disagree that ‘A British Jew would make an equally acceptable Prime Minister as a member of any other faith’; and 7% would be less likely to vote for a political party if its leader was Jewish (YouGov 2016). Clearly, the different ways in which surveys formulate questions has a considerable effect on the findings.

Other survey data illumines attitudes to Jews among different sections of the population. Polls indicate that a higher proportion of British Muslims endorse antisemitic statements than the British population as a whole. In a poll undertaken by the polling company ICM Unlimited in April and May 2015, 34% of British Muslims polled agreed with the statement ‘Jews don’t care about what happens to anyone else apart from their own kind’, compared with 11% of all respondents, and 34% agreed that ‘Jews have too much control over global affairs’ compared with 10% of all Britons (CAA 2016; see also Ridley 2016). In a study published in 2017 the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) also examined attitudes

12 However, the survey has been subject to criticism. Muslims and non-Muslims were questioned in different ways: the former face-to-face and the latter in telephone interviews. Further, the Muslim sample was skewed to areas where Muslims constituted more than 20% of the population, selecting a sample that was likely to contain a disproportionate number from deprived neighbourhoods.
to Jews among Muslims and found that none of the antisemitic ideas presented to respondents received agreement from more than 28% of the Muslims polled. At the same time, however, it found that antisemitic attitudes are between two and four times more likely to be found among Muslims than among the general population. The category of ‘Muslim’ contains a diversity of ethnic backgrounds, differences in place of birth and citizenship, as well as variations in religiosity. One of the strengths of the JPR study is that it attempts to make differentiations within the Muslim population, concluding that while the Muslim population as a whole exhibits elevated levels of antisemitism, these were most associated with political Islamism. These are suggestive findings and align with some of the findings on integration (see below section 7, Integration of Second and Subsequent Generations of MENA Migrants) (Staetsky 2017).

The presence or absence of antisemitism within the Muslim population has been the subject of a great deal of debate and commentary. Yet Muslims are not the only social group disproportionately likely to hold antisemitic attitudes. The 2015 Eurobarometer survey investigated respondents’ degree of comfort with a hypothetical Jewish work colleague, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is totally comfortable. In the United Kingdom the group who were the least comfortable with a Jewish colleague were those who identified as ‘upper-middle class’ (7.3 average). This is significant because, as we shall see, neither MENA migrants nor Muslims more generally are well represented within this group. Other groups who were relatively less comfortable with the prospect of a Jewish colleague were those ‘who do not have friends of other religious beliefs’ (8.7 average); those ‘who never use the internet’ (8.8 average); and those ‘who do not think that LGBT people should have rights’ (8.8 average). The average score among all other demographic and socio-economic groups was between 9.1 and 9.6 (EU 2015).

Attitudes to Jews vary, to some degree, according to political affiliation. There has been a great deal of attention given to antisemitism within the British Labour Party; however, survey data suggests that supporters of another political party, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), have been unusually prone to antisemitic attitudes. The YouGov survey of May 2016 found that UKIP supporters were much less likely than supporters of other political parties to agree that a Jewish Prime Minister would be as acceptable as a member of any other religion: 81% of Liberal Democrat voters were most likely to agree, followed by Labour voters (74%) and Tory voters (67%); UKIP voters (51%) were noticeably less likely to agree. The vast majority of respondents, 83%, said that knowing a party leader was Jewish would make no difference to their voting intentions. Only 6% of voters said it would make them less likely to vote for that party; however, this figure rises to 13% among UKIP voters (Bale 2016).

The ICM survey also suggests that Muslims who are older and born abroad are more likely to hold antisemitic attitudes. Homeowners, by contrast, were less likely to hold such attitudes. (CAA 2016).
4.2 Jews’ perceptions and experiences of antisemitism

The European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) report entitled, *Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism* was published in 2013 and provides the most comprehensive overview to date of Jews’ perceptions and experiences of discrimination, hate crime and antisemitism. The sample was self-selecting and 1,468 respondents in the UK completed the online survey. Having assessed the data and having implemented ‘survey weights’, adjusting the sample composition in terms of age, sex and synagogue affiliation, Daniel Staetsky and Jonathan Boyd conclude that the ‘findings reliably reflect the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among British Jews’.14

The FRA survey explored the question of whether respondents felt antisemitism is a problem in the United Kingdom. As Figure 20 illustrates, respondents were divided on the issue, with approximately half feeling it is either at least ‘a fairly big problem’ or a ‘very big problem’, and the other half feeling that it is ‘not a very big problem’ or ‘not a problem at all.’

![Figure 20: British Jews’ perceptions of antisemitism in the UK, 2012](source: FRA (2013), p. 16)

However, two-thirds of respondents believed that antisemitism had increased in the past five years, and more than a quarter said that it had increased ‘a lot’. Only 5% of respondents said that antisemitism in the United Kingdom had decreased in the past five years (Figure 21).

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14 The survey was conducted between 3 September and 8 October 2012. The survey data collection was managed by a joint team from Ipsos MORI and the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR), based on the data collection methodology developed with the FRA. The survey collected responses from self-identified Jewish people in eight EU Member States including the United Kingdom. The survey was open to all respondents who considered themselves Jewish, were 16 or older and living in one of the survey countries. The sample of 1,468 UK respondents did not mirror the Jewish population in relation to age, sex and education and, additionally, strictly orthodox Jews and Jews unaffiliated to any synagogue were under-represented. Staetsky and Boyd (2014); FRA (2013).
There was significantly less agreement on the sources of rising antisemitism, as shown in Figure 22. Antisemitism on the internet and in the media are the arenas in which antisemitism is most often thought to be a problem, but it is only with regard to the internet that there is anything like a consensus. With regard to the media, 52% of respondents perceived antisemitism to be ‘a very’ or ‘fairly big’ problem, while as many as 40% believed antisemitism in the media is ‘not a very big problem’ or ‘not a problem at all’. A majority, 53%, believed the same with regard to political life.\footnote{In view of the public debate over antisemitism in the Labour Party which has raged since 2015 it is likely that this figure would be different were the same survey undertaken today.}

The results of the FRA survey also suggest that many Jews’ perceptions of antisemitism are influenced by conflict in Israel/Palestine (Figure 23). This influences the feeling of safety of most Jews living in the UK.
A significant minority of respondents (36%) reported that they felt accused or blamed for something done by the Israeli government either ‘frequently’ or ‘all the time’. A further 42% of respondents reported that they felt this occasionally.

Within the population as a whole there is disagreement over whether these experiences reflect antisemitism. A survey undertaken by Populus in October 2016, on behalf of the Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM) suggests there is no consensus regarding the relationship between antisemitism, Israel and Jews. A majority (57%) stated that criticism of Israel does not in itself constitute antisemitism, and although 48% agreed that hating Israel and questioning its right to exist is antisemitic 20% of those surveyed did not (Populus 2016).

4.3 Incidents of antisemitism

Incidents of antisemitism are recorded by the Community Security Trust (CST) and police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The police figures are consolidated by the Home Office. The CST and the police keep records according to different protocols. The CST records ‘incidents’ not ‘crimes’. It only records those incidents that it determines are ‘antisemitic’. If an incident is reported to the CST but shows no evidence of antisemitic motivation, language or targeting it will not be recorded in the organization’s antisemitic incident total.16 In the case of the police, the alleged actions of the perpetrator must amount to a crime under normal crime recording rules. When this is the case, it is the perception of the victim, or any other person, that determines whether the crime is recorded as a hate crime.17

The level of reported antisemitic incidents in the UK has risen unevenly but progressively since 2000 and, as Figure 24 illustrates, this trend has continued in recent years. Dramatic upturns in the figures coincide with trigger events in the Middle East: Operation Cast Lead in late December 2008 and January 2009.

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16 In 2016, The CST received 791 reports of potential incidents that were rejected for this reason. This is a 15% increase from 2015. This increase lags behind the overall rise in antisemitic incidents but is suggestive nonetheless and underlines the extent to which Jews have been victims of anti-social behaviour uninflected by any clear antisemitic element. CST (2017), p. 10.

17 The agreed definition of ‘Monitored Hate Crime’ can be accessed here: www.report-it.org.uk/hate_crime_data1.
and Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014. In the years between these trigger events there was a significant, though incomplete, recovery of incident levels. In 2014, 1,182 antisemitic incidents were recorded by the CST. At the time this constituted a record high, but the figure was exceeded in 2016 when the CST recorded 1,309 antisemitic incidents. The upward leap in 2016, unlike previous peaks, did not coincide with an easily identifiable trigger event in the Middle East.

**Figure 24: Incidents of antisemitism recorded by CST, 2011–2016**


Police recorded figures for antisemitic hate crime also show a sharp rising trend since 2014, without a dip in 2015, as indicated in Figure 25.

**Figure 25: Incidents of antisemitic hate crime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 2011–2015/16**

Source: True Vision (2017) *Hate crime data*

The most common single type of antisemitic incident is abusive behaviour. In 2016, this accounted for just over three-quarters (77%) of incidents recorded by the CST. Figure 26 shows that there has been a marked increase in recorded antisemitic abusive behaviour since 2011, continuing an upward trend from 2001.

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18 Recorded antisemitic hate crime from police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In 2012 the recording period changed from 1 January–31 December to 1 April–31 March. Each period still represents 12 months.
Antisemitism Since 2011

(see Figure 6). In 2011 there were 413 recorded incidents of abusive behaviour, rising to 1,006 in 2016. Direct threats to people or property have also risen significantly over this period (Figure 27). Other types of antisemitic incident remain at similar levels to those recorded pre-2011.

Figure 26: Antisemitic incidents: abusive behaviour, 2011–2016


Figure 27: Antisemitic incidents by category (excl. abusive behaviour), 2011–2016


The extent to which the rise in recorded antisemitic incidents reflects real changes in antisemitic behaviour and the extent to which they reflect changing reporting and recording habits is complex and is explored below.

There are good reasons to believe that there is an increased propensity to report and record antisemitic incidents in the UK. Growing attention to antisemitism in the media and in the Jewish community may have led to a greater willingness to report incidents. A worker with a Jewish communal organization states that: ‘our kind of working theory is that it is because antisemitism and Jewish things have been in the news so much, basically more people are reporting, but it is hard to work out where to draw the line between the two’ (NG.01). It may also be that the police and the government have encouraged a similar process, in some
cases inadvertently, deliberately in others. A member of the police force noted that increases in reporting may also be due to an increased threat from terrorism, which leads to more patrols of Jewish areas. He surmised that as people see more police on patrol they may be more likely to report (G.04). A government representative also stated that increases in reporting were viewed as positive: ‘there has been increased reporting of crime by the orthodox Jewish community. So there is a change in attitude there in terms of perhaps thinking ‘we should report it’, and there has been a steady increase in reporting, so that is good news’ (G.01).

The changing relationship between the Jewish community and the state has led to new recording and reporting practices. Before 2014 the police did not inform the CST of most antisemitic incidents that came to their notice, and information was shared on an ad hoc basis. Now information is shared (see section 8, State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses). In 2016, 451 (34%) of the 1,309 antisemitic incidents recorded by the CST were reported to the organization by the police. The CST advises that these new and significant sources of statistics must be taken into account when comparing incident totals since 2011. Further, the increased security presence at Jewish buildings may have contributed to higher levels of recorded incidents. The increased presence both reflected raised concern about terrorism, following attacks in France and Denmark, and government funding for security guards at Jewish communal buildings. There were 59 antisemitic incidents reported in 2016 by CST security guards or officers at Jewish locations. This compares with 33 such incidents in 2015 and 20 in 2014. Taken together, these considerations suggest that a part of the increase in recorded levels in recent years arises from changes in administrative practices and in resources (CST 2017, pp. 14–15).

The complex relationship between antisemitic behaviour and its statistical representation is highlighted by local variations in the figures for hate crime. Much antisemitic hate crime and antisemitic incidents is opportunistic (see section 4.4, Sources of Antisemitism) and these opportunities arise unevenly in different places and at different times. However, it is also possible that these variations relate to differing propensities to report antisemitic hate crime as well as the recording practices of different police forces.

The variability of recording practices spatially and over time should lead us to question what the data means, but not to dismiss the underlying phenomenon. A large body of antisemitic incidents goes unreported. The FRA survey of Jewish experiences and perceptions of antisemitism found that 71% of British Jews who had experienced antisemitic harassment over the previous five years had not reported it to the police or any other organization. The equivalent figures for antisemitic violence (or threats of violence) and vandalism were 57% and 46% respectively. These figures should be treated cautiously. The threshold in these cases was the understanding of the individual victim. This is not a guarantee that either the police would have recorded the incident as a crime, nor that CST would have recorded it as an antisemitic incident (Staetsky and Boyd 2014, p. 26). Nevertheless, it is suggestive that there is a submerged statistically invisible body of antisemitic incidents.

19 These figures, which apply to all police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, relate to ‘recordable crimes’ under Home Office recording rules which means that the victims or other persons have perceived an offence as a hate crime. The data however excludes non-crime antisemitic incidents which are recorded and monitored locally. On the distinction between a hate crime and a hate incident, see: www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Support/Equality/Documents/Hate-Crime-Operational-Guidance.pdf, p. 3.
4.4 Sources of antisemitism

The most characteristic offender recorded by the CST is an adult male. In 54% of the antisemitic incidents recorded by the CST in 2016 the sex of the offender was noted. Offenders were described as male in 81% of these cases, 3% arose in mixed groups and only 16% of offenders were female. This gender difference is consistent with figures for other years.

Of the 436 incidents in 2016 in which the age of the offender is known, 81% were adults and 19% were minors. The CST notes that minors were disproportionately likely to be involved in violent incidents and less likely to be present in incidents involving abusive behaviour or threats (CST 2017, pp. 24–5).

In 62% of the antisemitic incidents recorded by the CST in 2016 there is no physical description of the offender. In the minority of cases in which this information exists, the majority of offenders (59%) were classed as ‘White’ and ‘European’.20 Of the rest, 75 offenders (15%) were described as ‘Black’, 96 offenders (19%) were described as ‘South Asian’, 31 (6%) were described as North African and two (0.4%) were described as from the ‘Far East’ or ‘South East Asian’ (CST 2017, p. 24). The great majority of offenders are White and European; however, ethnic minority groups are over-represented in recorded incidents if compared with their presence in the population as a whole.

For the entire period since 2011, the most common type of antisemitic incident recorded by the CST was characterized by verbal abuse directed at Jewish people in public spaces. The organization notes this ‘is a form of antisemitism that is more commonly associated with anti-social behaviour or local patterns of street crime than with ideologies’ (CST 2017, p. 6).21

By contrast, those antisemitic incidents recorded by the CST as having a political motivation comprised 236 of the total of 1,308 in 2016. This exhibits only a slight numerical increase over the 229 such incidents recorded in 2015 and a fall in the proportion of incidents showing ideological motivation or belief, from 24% of the total in 2015, to 18% in 2016. In 2009 and 2014 spikes in antisemitic incidents were accompanied by spikes in incidents that showed a political motivation. However, this pattern did not apply in 2015 and 2016 when high levels of reported incidents are accompanied by a significant fall in the number of incidents that showed a political motivation (Figure 28).

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20 The CST divides these into ‘North European’, 274 offenders, 55%, and ‘South European’, 21 offenders, 4%. But it is hard to invest confidence in this subjective and arbitrary division.

21 In just under half of these incidents the victims were wearing religious or traditional clothing, school uniform or jewellery bearing a Jewish symbol, and so were visibly Jewish.
As Figure 29 illustrates, it is notable that out of the total of antisemitic incidents in 2016 that showed a clear ideological motivation, the great majority, 162, exhibited beliefs or motivation stemming from the far right; 62 showed anti-Israel motivation and 12 incidents were of an Islamist character (CST 2017, p. 8).
4.5 Trends

Since 2000 there has been a marked increase in the total number of antisemitic incidents. The CST acknowledges that this may, in part, reflect greater awareness within the Jewish population of the organization’s work. There have been spikes in incident levels which also appear to have led to an increase in the level of antisemitic incidents reported in ‘normal’ years. Between 2010 and 2013 the absence of a trigger event in the Middle East led to a notable decrease in the level of antisemitic incidents (see Figures 24, 25). This interlude came to an end in 2014 when Operation Protective Edge provided a further trigger event; and there was a further leap in 2016.

In the period from July 2014 to the end of 2016, the CST recorded an average of 105 antisemitic incidents per month, whereas the figure for the equivalent period leading up to July 2014 was 50 incidents per month. The Gaza War of summer 2014 was followed by terrorist attacks on Jewish targets in Denmark and France that are likely to have led to greater awareness of antisemitism and a higher level of reporting. 2016 itself produced a series of events that may well have led to an increase in antisemitic incidents and also to have generated a greater propensity to report those incidents to the police or the CST. There were persistent and headline-grabbing controversies over antisemitism in the Labour Party. Public debate leading up to EU referendum generated a climate of xenophobia, and the poll itself was followed by an increase in recorded religious and racial hate crime.

The crucial point for this report is that none of these explanations for the rise in antisemitism has a connection with the arrival of MENA migrants in the UK.

4.6 Comparative data

Antisemitic hate crime can be placed within the UK national picture of hate crime offences. Police forces across the UK have been collating data for five strands of hate crime (race, religion, sexual orientation, transgender and disability) since April 2008. In 2009 there were 51,920 hate crimes recorded of which 87% (45,509) were related to race or religion. Table 1 shows the breakdown for these strands.
As we can see from Table 1, the level of antisemitic hate crime rose by 11.8% between 2009 and 2015/16. This is a significant increase, but it is lower than the rise in hate crime overall (20.4%) and lower than the increase in hate crime offences related to race and religion (18.3%). The most striking increase is in the number of religious hate crimes (111.2%) which probably reflects the rising number of hate crimes that have targeted Muslims (Press Association 2013). However, because hate crime figures were at an unusually high level in 2009, that start date minimizes the increase in all recorded hate crime across the period, but it especially has that effect on the increase in antisemitic hate crime which was particularly elevated that year. If we take 2010 as our starting point we find that antisemitic hate crime increases over the period by 61.1%, a significantly steeper increase than for all religious and race hate crime which rose by 30.3% between 2010 and 2015/16. Nevertheless, it remains the case that if we take a 2010 start date, it is religious hate crime, and probably anti-Muslim hate crime, that has increased most rapidly over this slightly shorter period, by 119%.

**4.7 Summary**

- Survey data on antisemitism in the UK has generated a range of results. Attitudes to Jews are more positive when questions are formulated without a negative prompt. When questions invoke negative attitudes, they are more likely to receive an answer that confirms disapproval. However, even in these cases negative attitudes are restricted to a minority of respondents.

- Fluctuations in responses to particular questions do not relate to the rise in the number of MENA migrants since 2011. For example, the question ‘Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust’ has been asked by the ADL poll since 2009. In 2009, 20% believed this was probably true, increasing to 24% in 2012, but dramatically dropping to 10% in 2014 before rising again in 2015 to 26%.

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22 In 2012 the recording period changed from 1 January–31 December to 1 April–31 March. Each period still represents 12 months.
• Muslims, the upper-middle class and those who have supported UKIP are among the groups disproportionately likely to hold antisemitic attitudes. There is a pressing need for more research to determine which of these correlations are predictive and which are merely artefacts or reflect the force of other social positions.

• British Jews perceive antisemitism to be rising but are divided over how large a problem this is.

• Jews are divided in their perception of how pervasive antisemitism is and the sorts of behaviour and social spaces that are most problematic for them. With the exception of the internet, Jews do not agree on where antisemitism is most likely to be found. At the same time, there is broader agreement that the problem is getting worse and that it is related to the politics of the Middle East.

• Increases in antisemitic incidents recorded by the CST and hate crime recorded by the police reflect, at least in part, a greater propensity to report incidents and crimes and a greater efficiency and willingness to record them.

• Reported incidents represent the tip of a proverbial iceberg.

• More antisemitic incidents are categorized by the CST as ‘anti-social’ than as ‘political’ in motivation.

• Among political incidents, those emanating from the far right are the most numerous and show a gradual rising trend. Incidents stemming from anti-Israel and Islamist ideologies fluctuate in line with trigger events in the Middle East and fall sharply once they have passed. Notably this applies to 2016 when there was a sustained rise in recorded antisemitic incidents but no increase in incidents with an anti-Israel or Islamist motivation.

• Antisemitic hate crime rose significantly over the period under consideration but at a slower rate than religious hate crime overall.
5 New Empirical Data
5.1 Perspectives and responses to the research question

Our core research question: ‘what (if any) has been the impact of MENA migrants, both immigrants and refugees, on antisemitic attitudes and behaviour in the UK since 2011?’ provoked divergent but generally negative responses from interviewees. Scepticism was widely expressed. A senior police officer with wide experience of policing hate crime said that the question did not resonate with him. None of the police, community groups or citizens with whom he interacts have raised a concern that MENA migrants are leading to an increase in antisemitism or antisemitic incidents [G.04]. One representative from a Syrian migrant organization stated that the research question did not resonate with her experience: ‘I never thought of that before, honestly, like that is really – like right now all I can say is: it is interesting. It is just you wouldn’t have thought that this was going on’ [NG.11]. A senior civil servant, whose responsibility is for domestic issues, expressed concern regarding the effects and function of a focus on MENA migrants:

*I mean my nervousness with any kind of research like this is that it can be used for the wrong reasons, so that would be my real nervousness that increase in antisemitism equals increase in certain types of migrants coming to the UK and we just do not have evidence for that at all ... it is all very well to talk about incoming migrants and changing attitudes; there is a latent antisemitism in British society anyway and I just find it a bit rich that we are looking elsewhere for it, when actually it exists in and of itself. I have lost count of the amount of times, because I have worked on this agenda, that I must be Jewish, you know because I have an interest and I fight the good cause so I must be – or you know attitudes are like, ‘oh well they are Jews after all blah blah blah’. That is across the piece, that is within government, the civil service. [G.01]*

In short, the suggestion made by this respondent is that a focus on MENA migrants deflects attention from domestic, home-grown antisemitism which exists not only on the streets but also within government.

Parallel to this scepticism, however, one civil servant, whose brief covers post-Holocaust issues as well as antisemitism outside the UK, thought the premise is a plausible starting point for research:

*I am quite involved in education; education about religious tolerance and looking at education systems in different religions and quite a lot of schools of Islam do teach a very exclusivist interpretation of Islam, so in lots of parts of the world Muslim children are brought up to believe that they are superior I guess, and the status that is accorded to people in various parts of the world. Now all of those things lead me to think that it is logical to assume that yes there will be an increase in antisemitism and also anti-Christian feeling and anti-Yazidi, anti-whatever as a result of a large Muslim population coming here. So that is just from background research in the other part of my job. [G.02]*

Nevertheless, this respondent was not able to provide evidence to support this presumption:
New Empirical Data

5.2 Antisemitism in the UK

Interviewees reflected the findings of UK government documents and Community Security Trust (CST) statistics on antisemitic hate crime. A senior policeman recognized that there have been year-on-year increases in recorded antisemitic hate crime, ‘in terms of abuse, graffiti and on social media’. However, he noted that the increase in antisemitism is not exceptional and increases in line with the general trends in hate crime across race and religion [G.04].

Several interviewees stated that identifying the perpetrators of hate crime is difficult and open to a wide range of interpretation. One government representative conceded that, ‘as to the nature of the perpetrators that is quite hard to know, we don’t really have a handle on that’ [G.01]. A representative of the criminal justice system noted that his organization is unclear about the origins of people concerned in perpetrating hate crime but that it ‘tends to be home grown’ [G.03]. In general, interviewees drew attention to sources of antisemitism other than MENA migrants.

Some interviewees regarded antisemitism and antisemitic hate crime as one part of a broader phenomenon. One worker for a Jewish monitoring centre reflected that there was a large element of opportunism in antisemitic hate crimes: ‘The kind of people who are likely to carry out hate crimes against Jews, most of them tend to be the kind who will carry out hate crimes against all sorts of other groups. And if
Jews are in the news, if antisemitism is in the news we are at the forefront of their minds, not Muslims that week or that month’ [NG.01]. A worker for another Jewish organization suggested that antisemitic incidents are bound into the wider debate about immigration and xenophobia and a fear that ‘the whole culture is falling apart and Brexit obviously exacerbated all those things’ [NG.02].

Interviewees identified antisemitism with a strikingly diverse range of offending groups. One respondent had previously worked with Chilean refugees and noted that she had encountered undertones of antisemitism in her interactions with them:

I was resettling Chileans and then other Latin Americans and then moving on and doing housing and so on. And so that was a huge amount of very close contact with Chilean refugees. Frankly speaking, yes a bit of antisemitism mainly from people from the more rural southern areas .... And it is interesting to compare it with meeting up with up with other Chileans because there was a very strong antisemitic bent to the Argentine dictatorship, there was a bit of cosying up to the Pinochet [regime] from sections of the Jewish community. So obviously refugees were more likely to associate Jews with being rich and powerful people who supported the dictatorship. [NG.07]

Other respondents identified antisemitic incidents with immigrants from Poland and Eastern Europe. ‘We get increasing numbers of incidents where the offenders are Polish or Eastern European. That is the thing that is starting to feed through’, one Jewish communal worker reported [NG.01]. A worker for an organization that works with migrants also commented that ‘we have issues here that are you know racism within the Polish community and antisemitism’ [NG.05]. Other groups mentioned were ‘White British’ [G.04], ‘young White men and women’ [NG.09] as well as the settled British Muslim population [G.03, G.04, NG.05]:

We have had some experiences in the past but those were I would say rather stupid incidents, mostly settled Muslim communities, like second generation, Moroccans who were – they would send those stupid emails you know the kind of Jewish conspiracy against the world ... It was very interesting because they sent it to their mailing list by mistake and so a lot of people received it including some council officers and they didn’t react, whereas I did reply to all and I said, ‘This isn’t acceptable’... I mean this was many, many years ago, this was like maybe we are talking 2007. [NG.05]

5.3 MENA migrants and antisemitism

There was no consensus regarding new migrants’ feelings towards Jews and whether they were antisemitic. Some interviewees connected with refugee organizations stated that because refugees had often been persecuted for their beliefs they would be more tolerant towards others:

Yes, I mean I can say that I have never heard anybody say anything antisemitic. You know I am with the young people all the time and they hang around in the office. I have never heard them say anything. They have a great sense of justice and right and wrong. We have never had any hostility and ... I can categorically say I have never heard anybody say anything that is antisemitic or anything at all about Jewish people or the Jewish community in London. [NG.10(b)]

23 However, it was noted by the police and a government representative that although hate crime in general had increased because of Brexit, there was no corresponding increase in antisemitic hate crime.
One respondent noted a tendency to positive attitudes to Jews among refugees from South Sudan and Ethiopia [NG.07]. A Kurdish worker for a refugee organization expressed an identification with Jews as experiencing a similar position to Kurds because ‘they were a nation without a state’ [NG.04]. However, a worker for a different migrant organization stated that she was sceptical about any attempt to homogenize refugee attitudes [NG.05].

Among interviewees there were few references to prejudice or aversion to Jews among MENA migrants. A third-party reporting centre for antisemitic hate crime noted that ‘in terms of incidents that get reported to us, I am not aware of us having any where the offender is identified as a recent migrant from one of the [MENA] countries we are talking about’ [NG.01]. One Jewish worker for a Jewish aid agency reported he encountered some anti-Jewish responses from MENA refugees outside the UK but also stressed the heterogeneity of attitudes he encountered:

They might then ask where we were from and we might say – they could tell immediately we were an NGO but they wouldn’t necessarily know who we were, and we were XXXX. Some of them I have to say like glazed over, why are you telling me that, it is not of interest? Some of them were, oh that is very interesting, I’m a Christian or I’m religious, or I’m a Muslim or whatever. And that was [the] interesting thing that we had in common that we were all people of faith. Some of them, this was tricky, were distinctly uncomfortable once we dropped in the J word. They were people who had been brought up on a diet of antisemitism and certainly anti-Israel sentiments and that is tough. [NG.02]

In addition, a mental health therapist whose clients are new migrants primarily from MENA countries rebuffed any suggestion that MENA migrants were prone to antisemitism but nevertheless offered the following anecdote:

I think that – I mean one boy … Ahmed … So he is Palestinian from Gaza and he used to go round saying you know XXXX is run by a Jewish woman and that is why I don’t get as much money as other people. And it was kind of completely – he used to say things like that and I don’t know … so it does happen occasionally but it is always, always based on ignorance. Real ignorance and some young people haven’t had an education, but I would say it is microscopic compared to the others who are just the opposite, who are really, really trying to understand differences between people. [NG.10(a)]

She reflected that there is ignorance ‘across the world’, including the UK and MENA countries about the difference between a Jew and a Zionist. She was keen to stress that any antisemitic comments she had heard were based on ignorance and not a hatred of Jews. From her experience, most new migrants were surprised and fascinated by visibly Jewish people as well as by the wider social diversity evident in London. She did not think that antisemitism was an issue [NG.10 (a)]. In these passages it is notable that the interviewee seeks to diminish the immigrants’ personal responsibility for antisemitism, which is seen as a product of ‘ignorance’ or of the society the migrants have left behind.

None of the interviewees believed that the refugees from Syria were impacting significantly on terrorist attacks or increases in hate crime towards particular groups, including Jews. An interviewee from a Jewish reporting centre noted that:
Some of the people involved in terrorism in Europe over the last couple of years have travelled to and from, between Europe and Syria via some of these refugee networks, but I’m not aware of a huge amount of cases of people who have arrived as genuine refugees and then been recruited and radicalized into terrorism. There is maybe one or two but not as a significant phenomenon ... if there are people who are coming and who are part of this problem of spreading these ideas and are becoming operational in this political activity then likely as not they are not actually coming as genuine refugees. They are coming actually for this purpose. [NG.01]

However, among some respondents who rejected the premise of this study there was an acknowledgment that there might be a problem to examine. The civil servant who expressed ‘nervousness’ about the project also commented as follows:

Issues have been raised about the Syrian refugees coming here with views, through no fault of their own, it is what they have been taught back in Syria, but you know how can you tackle that? You don’t tackle that by saying all Syrians are antisemites, you tackle it by saying okay let’s educate, let’s empower them to know that if hate crime is committed against them, and then at the same time, ‘Oh by the way do you know that your attitudes that you had at home about homosexuals and this that and the other, are not the same here.’ [G.01]

A prevailing view concerned the challenges and difficulties that new migrants face in the UK. One refugee support worker observed: ‘they are so consumed by what is happening to them within their asylum process that really I think that takes up all their time’ [NG.10(b)]. In addition to the challenges posed by navigating the UK’s migration and asylum system, it was noted by another migrant organization that new migrants may not have the confidence to speak out about their beliefs [NG.05].

However, when asked about hate crime and new migration the majority of respondents were concerned about new migrants being the victims of hate crime, not the perpetrators. A police officer noted that there had been a growth in hate crime directed at new migrants, not due to them. He observed that newly arrived migrants are much more concerned about their own safety rather than the situation of the Jewish people around them [G.04].

A person of Syrian heritage who works for an organization that seeks to improve the lives of Syrians in the UK felt strongly affected by Brexit: ‘There is a general sentiment that changes, there is like a mood change – and the triggering events, so Brexit was obviously one of them – terrorist attacks when they happened in Brussels and Paris and you know all these other issues – they definitely create a mood change and I think they create distrust on both sides’ [NG.11]. Another observed: ‘The British community becomes more distrustful of those who are the alleged perpetrators and Muslims become aware that there is a potential backlash and they become more scared and introverted and cautious’ [NG.11]. They reported that, ‘When you have a terrorist attack, you will find a lot of Muslim women will choose not to leave the house unless they have to’ [NG.11]. However, the same fear of a backlash is also reported among young men: ‘A lot of the kids have described, whenever there is a terrorist incident people will make remarks in the street to people who are obviously Muslim, and people very quickly generalise from a few terrorists to all Muslims’ [NG.10(a)]. Another interviewee suggested
that hate crime against MENA migrants was under-reported and, further, observed that many Syrians are afraid of the police, owing to their experiences before arriving in the UK, and therefore would not be forthcoming in reporting hate crime [NG.11].

The overall impression from the interviews is that antisemitism arises from diverse sources of which the Muslim population is just one and to which the MENA migrant population does not contribute significantly.

5.4 Summary

• In general, the research question was received with scepticism; however, to some extent it does resonate within the Jewish population.

• The new qualitative research confirms and adds to our knowledge of the variety of sources of antisemitic prejudices and hate crime.

• The interviews revealed scattered, anecdotal evidence of antisemitism, ignorance and prejudice among MENA migrants.

• In general respondents placed greatest emphasis on MENA migrants’ own vulnerability to hate crime and prejudice, and the economic and administrative difficulties they encounter establishing a new life in the UK.
6 Public Discourse
6.1 The role of social media in generating antisemitism

The growth of social media has changed how many individuals experience or observe abuse, whether motivated by race, religion, gender or sexuality. In the UK 87% of the population are active online and more than 75% use social media sites or apps (Ofcom 2016). Twitter has around 310 million active users every month.

In 2015 the Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 185 antisemitic incidents involving the use of social media, comprising 19% of the total number of incidents that year. In 2016 these figures had risen to 287 and 22% respectively (CST 2017, pp. 13–14). It should be noted that the CST does not trawl social media and only records incidents that have been reported to it, where the offender is based in the UK, or that targets a UK victim.

In addition there have been virtual assaults on Jewish public figures. For example, Lucian Berger, Labour MP for the Liverpool Wavertree constituency, received a torrent of antisemitic abuse in 2014: these included death threats and 2,500 tweets in just three days, some using the hashtag ‘filthyjewbitch’. This onslaught was linked to a campaign against Ms Berger run by a neo-Nazi website based in the USA. Others who have been targeted include John Mann MP, a prominent campaigner against antisemitism, and the Labour Party activist Rhea Wolfson (House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 2016, pp. 22–3; Mortimer 2016).

All the interviewees to whom we spoke for this study agreed that the characteristics of social media exacerbate existing problems of hate crime and create new ones. Representatives of the police and government made specific points. First, social media has the effect of restricting the number of different perspectives to which a user is exposed: ‘When you get situations like the war in Gaza for example, two years ago, people tend to live inside information silos on social media … and that intensifies the strength of feeling on all sides which therefore is then more likely to be expressed through hate’ [NG.01]. Second, social media allows users to view hate and become victims of hate from a wider number of people [NG.01]. Third, social media is said to embolden people to participate in hate crime, and acts as an amplifier for abuse: ‘for someone who has got more extreme views it is an easy way and it is like using a megaphone isn’t it? Social media helps you to make your views louder than if I just went out into the street and shouted’ [NG.06]. Fourth, social media provides the tools through which to organize targeted and pernicious campaigns against individuals:

> What we have seen in the last year or so are organized campaigns of harassment and abuse; very focussed organized campaigns. It will be directed at particular individuals, for a 24 hour, 48-hour period, where a high profile Jewish MP or student or other person in the news that week will get literally thousands and thousands of antisemitic tweets, because it is usually on Twitter, in a very short space of time, coming from dozens and dozens of different accounts. Some based here, some based overseas, usually coordinated by far-right websites. And these campaigns can only happen because of social media. They couldn’t happen otherwise. [NG.01]

These points indicate that social media can amplify fear of hate crime, as well as provide new avenues through which users might experience hate crime.
It was noted by a number of interviewees that the law is lagging behind the issues:

_The problem is exacerbated by the fact that between the police, the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service], and social media companies, and community organizations like ourselves, none of us have yet come up with a system that can really get on top of the problem quickly and effectively and there is still a lot of misunderstanding, a real disconnect between the police and the CPS and social media companies about what the other two parts of that triangle will and won’t do, can and can’t do, what they expect from the other ones._ [NG.01]

Specifically, several interviewees noted that virtual hate speech has a higher threshold for prosecution than hate crime. The law regarding online hate speech was seen as unfit for purpose: ‘I have got quite a lot of respect for what the police are doing, but the most they are doing is often just giving a caution to someone’ [NG.06]. This sentiment was reiterated by a government representative: ‘I think it is one of the biggest problems that we have is that we are in a good position to take down illegal content across Europe: we have an agreement to take down illegal content within 24 hours. But it is not the illegal content that is the problem; it is the sort of stuff that is you know, which is offensive but not breaking the law’ [G.01].

Social media has contributed to an evolution of hate crime and added a new dimension to create an atmosphere of tension and fear. It was noted: ‘the general atmosphere of how Jewish people feel when they see all the social media and comments is what impacts on them. You don’t have to be a victim yourself but you can read about it and see things on Twitter and that makes you less sure’ [G.01].

There is widespread agreement concerning the role of social media in increasing hate crime and creating an environment in which more people are exposed to it. Nevertheless, there is little research that has systematically examined antisemitic abuse online. Research has been undertaken by a team at Lancaster University who analysed 11 million tweets broadcast during July 2014. The Israel-Gaza Conflict broke out on 8 July and lasted until 26 August. The researchers downloaded 11 million tweets that contained either the word ‘Israel’ or ‘Gaza’ and found that 0.9% contained words or phrases that invoked the Nazi era.24 An analysis of 22 million tweets commissioned in 2015 for the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism concluded that the sentiments in tweets about Jewish people were more hostile or accusatory than those about Muslims, with words such as ‘Nazi’, ‘Hitler’ and ‘Holocaust’ featuring in the top 35 key words mentioned. The Report concluded: ‘The volume of communication is too vast to describe in detail but suffice to say we were all shocked by the ferocity and vulgarity of the antisemitism and the ease with which it was spread.’ (All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism 2015, p. 53).

There is no research that we are aware of which examines whether online hate crime against Jews is more likely to be committed by new migrants than by members of other groups. We should note, however, that none of the interviewees believed that new migrants were responsible for hate crimes on social media.

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have contacted the police, providing links to antisemitic material on Facebook and Twitter pages but ‘none of them have been from recent migrants, but from White British and Muslim settled communities’ [G.04]. A representative from the Crown Prosecution Service also noted that: ‘Social media has educated offenders and it is the far right pumping out the information. But there is nothing, as yet, about newer migrants being involved in this’ [G.03].

6.2 The role of media and politicians

Politicians and news media can have an impact on both the incidence of antisemitism and also on whether people perceive and/or report antisemitism.

There is some evidence that recent controversies over antisemitism in the Labour Party have led to heightened perceptions of anti-Jewish prejudice. Asked about the level of prejudice against Jews in the UK, in a survey in 2016, 29% of respondents said there is ‘a great deal or a fair amount’ – an increase of five percentage points since 2014 (YouGov 2016).

Since the beginning of the current century the issue of immigration has become a central issue of political debate in the UK. This has been reflected in a number of ways: in the hardening policies on immigration taken by the main political parties and also by the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the years preceding the 2016 referendum on EU membership. In the European Parliament election of May 2014 UKIP finished in first place with 4.3 million votes, 26.6% of all votes cast. In 1999 the party had won just 7% of the vote in elections for the European Parliament. The party’s appeal was based not only on Euroscepticism but also on strong opposition to immigration and frustration with the ways the mainstream political parties had handled both immigration and the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Its support was based on the mobilization of ‘older, working-class White voters’ without the educational qualifications and skills to thrive in the modern post-industrial economy, those who have been characterized as ‘the left behind’. In this regard, it is notable that negative attitudes to immigration, racial difference and a narrow conception of national identity that places weight on having British ancestors and espousal of Christianity is strongly associated with cohorts above the age of 50 (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Nevertheless, opposition to immigration is widely distributed throughout British society.

The 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey indicated that 77% of respondents wanted to see immigration reduced, and a poll taken in May of that year revealed that 34% of respondents saw immigration as one of the most important issues facing the country – twice as many as those that identified education as one of the most important issues (Geddes 2014).
Although the share of the vote taken by UKIP in the general election of 2015 fell to 12.6%, opposition to immigration was expressed widely in political debate as parties sought to respond to public opinion and the competition posed by UKIP. In June 2015, for example, the Prime Minister David Cameron referred to ‘a swarm of people’ crossing the Mediterranean (Robinson et al. 2015). This was but one moment in a longer history in which the political elites tried to incorporate the electorate’s anti-immigrant sentiment into their rhetoric and policies. In 2007, just before he became Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown promised to privilege ‘British workers for British jobs’ (Parkinson 2007) and in 2015 Labour placed a commitment to control immigration as one of its five election pledges.

UKIP connected issues associated with the radical right – immigration and hostility to elites – to the Eurosceptic agenda that had led to the party’s formation. In this context it is not surprising that the debate on the EU referendum led to further stigmatization of immigrants. One notorious expression of this was the ‘Breaking Point’ poster depicting Syrian migrants on the Slovenian border in 2015, unveiled by the then UKIP leader Nigel Farage in June 2016 (Stewart and Mason 2016).

Interviewees expressed the view that leading politicians and the tabloid press have legitimized intolerance in the UK (Somers 2016): ‘The two together, political discourse and the media headlines have kind of – to people who have racist feelings but in the past have never really vented them in public, only in private – actually feel that if politicians can do it and the newspapers can say it, then so can I in the street’ [NG.06]. Nevertheless, the CST reports that the EU referendum and its aftermath did not have an impact on the number of antisemitic incidents recorded (CST 2017, p. 13).

6.3 Summary

- The development of communication on social media has greatly increased the opportunities to broadcast antisemitic abuse.
- The rise of social media has led to an escalation of fear of hate crime.
- There is little research on the extent, content and effects of online antisemitic abuse.
- It is possible that the public debate over the incidence of antisemitism leads to heightened perceptions of the problem.
- The years since 2000 have seen immigration move to the centre of political argument in the UK. Competition between political parties over immigration policy may have had the effect of legitimizing intolerance.
Integration of Second and Subsequent Generations of MENA Migrants
Given the lack of evidence described above for antisemitism among new MENA migrants, we turn now to the children and grandchildren of migrants, providing a framework for exploring whether such communities might be vulnerable to intolerance, extremism and antisemitism.

The importance of examining the integration of the second generation emerged as a clear theme in the interviews conducted for this research. Interviewees portrayed a stark contrast between new and second- and third-generation migrants. A prevailing view from the interviewees concerned the many challenges and difficulties that new migrants face in the UK. Therefore, it was suggested that antisemitism might be a greater issue within the second or third generation [NG.05]. Accordingly, this section reviews the existing data to consider integration of second- and third-generation migrants within mainstream society. We define integration as the processes of interaction between migrants and the individuals and institutions of the receiving society that facilitate the socio-economic, cultural, social and civic participation of migrants and an inclusive sense of identity and belonging.

This definition emphasizes the multi-directional nature of integration: it is not a one-way street, not something that migrants do, but rather about interaction. Second, it emphasizes that integration is not a singular thing, but rather a series of processes, occurring across a number of related but ultimately autonomous domains, at a range of different scales. These domains include: socio-economic integration (e.g. labour market participation, housing, educational levels); civic participation (e.g. participation in mainstream politics at local or national level); social integration (e.g. inter-ethnic contacts); identity and belonging (e.g. reported sense of national belonging); cultural integration (e.g. social attitudes, religious attitudes, attitudes to toleration/tolerance).

Thinking about integration enables us to understand how patterns of disadvantage impact on feelings or dispositions towards intolerance over time, as well as to understand the context within which new migrants are starting to build a life in the UK. In addition, the academic literature increasingly emphasizes the temporal nature of integration, since integration processes evolve over time, and not in a linear fashion from ‘not integrated’ to ‘integrated’ (Phillimore 2012). They occur for both those who have recently arrived and migrants who have long settled in a country, or may occur over generations. Indeed, according to the theory of segmented assimilation, structural barriers such as poor-quality schooling in disadvantaged urban areas with high concentrations of immigrants can lead to sequential disadvantage over a number of generations (Portes and Zhou 1993). Spatial concentration can effectively cut off immigrants from further educational and employment opportunities and effectively trap subsequent generations into an underclass. Processes of integration may thus also be disrupted, reversed or may never be complete. It is known that refugees in particular face difficulties: for example, a survey of new refugees in the UK found employment rates low (49%) 21 months after arrival, compared with 80% for the working age population (Cebulla et al. 2010). Part of this relates to differences between migrant and refugee integration with distinctions between migrants who move on a planned basis and those who make more unplanned moves (Da Lomba 2010).

It should be noted that in the UK the focus of the integration debate has been on long-settled Muslim populations and in particular residents of South Asian ethnicities (Bangladeshis and Pakistanis). The evidence and research generated
on integration, therefore, has tended to focus on these groups, underpinned by the availability of robust data on ethnicity in the UK. Concomitantly, there is a lack of data addressing the integration of MENA migrants - new or settled. Evidence on new migrants’ integration outcomes and values is scarce, while considerable research has been conducted on Muslims’ attitudes and values. Here, then, we can offer a tentative picture of the integration of MENA migrants by drawing on the data on Muslims as whole, as well as some data on larger MENA country of origin groups.

### 7.1 Socio-economic integration

The evidence shows that in the field of education - a foundation for integration in the socio-economic domain - many minority ethnic and religious groups, including Muslims, have outcomes which converge over time with the White British majority:

*The 1.5 and second generations have taken full advantage of the educational opportunities available to them. In other research we have also found that the large gender gap in education which characterized Muslims brought up in South Asian countries has completely disappeared among the second-generation, who have fully assimilated to the British pattern where girls fare rather better than boys educationally.* (Heath 2014)

However, despite this strong foundation, many minorities, and all predominantly Muslim minorities in the UK, experience significant disadvantage in almost all other fields in the socio-economic domain. People living in households headed by someone from an ethnic minority are more likely to live on a relatively low income. Additionally, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic populations and Muslims live disproportionately in the most deprived areas in England compared with other ethnic or religious groups. By ethnicity, 31% of people with a Pakistani background live in the 10% most deprived areas, followed by 28% of people with a Bangladeshi background, compared with 9% of people from White groups. Similarly, by religion, 26% of the Muslim population live in the 10% most deprived areas in England (compared with 10% of all people holding a religion, 10% of people with no religion, 9% of Christians and Sikhs, and 3% of Jews). In particular, where there are high concentrations of either Muslim or Bangladeshi and Pakistani populations at ward level, these are mainly in particularly deprived wards (Casey 2016).

Despite a narrowing in the attainment gap at GCSE level and relatively high participation in further and higher education among most minority ethnic groups, with some outperforming the White British majority, almost all ethnic minority groups still have unemployment rates around double the national average (DWP 2016). People from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are still around three times more likely than those from White groups to be unemployed.

As well as a South Asian and Arab ‘ethnic penalty’ in the labour market, there is emerging evidence of a ‘Muslim penalty’ (Heath 2014). Analysis of the Census and Labour Force Survey conducted by Demos in 2015 suggests that Muslims are under-represented in ‘top professions’ in England and Wales compared with other
religious groups and non-religious Britons (Reynolds and Birdwell 2015). Muslims in England and Wales are also disproportionately likely to be unemployed and economically inactive. There is also a notable gender gap within the Muslim population, with economic inactivity particularly high among women. The Equalities and Human Rights Commission 2015 report Is Britain Fairer? found that Muslims had experienced the highest unemployment rates, lowest employment rates and lowest (and decreasing) hourly pay rates between 2008 and 2013 (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2015). Therefore the economic crisis of 2007/2008 has disproportionally impacted on the economic situations of Muslims in the UK.

From the limited data available in the 2011 Census, the profile of the Arab population in terms of socio-economic integration is similar to that of the South Asian groups. Arabs, along with Gypsy or Irish Travellers, have the highest rates of economic inactivity (50%), more than double the average rate. For men, the Arab group has the highest rate again (40%), along with Chinese (40%) and Gypsy or Irish Traveller ethnic groups (39%). Rates of economic inactivity for women are even higher in the same groups: the highest rates are also Arab (64%), exceeding Bangladeshi (61%), Pakistani (60%) and Gypsy or Irish Traveller (60%); Arab and Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups give care obligations as reasons for economic inactivity. Arabs have low employment rates (50% for men and 29% for women) (ONS 2014).

7.2 Social integration

The 2016 Casey Review highlighted a number of trends in social integration (Casey 2016). It found that the likelihood of having an inter-ethnic friendship increases over time across the UK, with 46% of first-generation migrants having only friends of the same ethnicity, reducing to 28% in the second generation (Muttarak 2014). Close inter-ethnic friendship is more likely for people who are younger, more educated, have a higher income and are proficient in English. According to the Citizenship Survey for 2010–2011, 82% of people said they mixed socially at least once a month with people from different ethnic or religious backgrounds, with similar levels of mixing reported in the prior two years (DCLG 2011). This is crucial for addressing our research question because those with no friends from a different religious group have been shown to be less comfortable with a Jewish colleague (Eurobarometer survey 2015). The same survey also illustrated that a lack of social mixing was felt to be a key barrier to getting on with people from different backgrounds, with one in four people who disagreed that they lived in a cohesive area, citing lack of social contact and mixing as the reason (DCLG 2009). There is also evidence that spatial segregation impacts on inter-ethnic friendship, with people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity least likely to have friends from outside their neighbourhood (Finney, Kapadia and Peters, 2015).

The lack of spaces for meaningful contact was also noted as a key concern in the qualitative research undertaken for this report. One interviewee argued that since the economic recession and austerity measures, civil society and community groups have been unable to support activities that might lead to greater social cohesion [NG09].

25 The definition of ‘top professions’ includes the top two National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) categories ‘higher managerial and professional occupations’ and ‘lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations’.
7.3 Civic participation

The evidence on political participation among long-standing minority groups in the UK has shown that there are consistent patterns across most ethnic groups. In the first generation, civic participation (especially voting turnout) is low while positive attitudes to British democracy and trust in British institutions are particularly strong. However, while participation increases, trust declines markedly in second and subsequent generations – eventually converging to the low levels found in the White majority. An exception to this pattern of convergence is trust in the police, which is substantially lower among minorities, perhaps reflecting negative experiences (Heath et al. 2013).

7.4 Identity and belonging

Studies have consistently shown high levels of national (British) identity and belonging among ethnic minorities in the UK. While there is some variation across ethnic groups and different national origins, increasing association with Britain and Britishness follows the length of stay in the UK and rises across generations. Studies of feelings of belonging, which have often had a particular focus on Muslim and South Asian minorities, have shown a similar picture. Overall, they have demonstrated high levels of commitment to the society of settlement, increasing in the second generation. Muslim groups (compared, for example, with Black Caribbeans) have been shown to have especially high rates of belonging and identification in the UK, which tends to accompany rather than contrast with commitment to ethnic and religious identity. These generational changes occur despite the fact that senses of grievance and injustice, potentially influenced by greater exposure, as well as greater expectations of equal treatment, also increase over generations, a finding Anthony Heath describes as ‘the paradox of integration’ (Heath 2014).

Reviewing the literature for the UK Department of Communities and Local Government, scholar Lucinda Platt argues that, in general, the evidence suggests that minority ethnic and national identity are not opposed to each other, though across generations the former tends to decline as the latter increases. Platt notes that indicative research on new migrant flows from Eastern Europe suggests that they are less committed to either origin or destination society identities than older migrants. This may stem from their greater mobility, ease of entry and lower salience of specific identities. However, it is too early to say how that might develop over generations (Platt 2013, Nandi and Platt 2014).

7.5 Cultural integration

Evidence from several opinion polls and surveys suggests a consistent level of support among the public for a set of core ‘British’ values (including tolerance and respect for all religions.) The 2008 Citizenship Survey noted that people from majority and minority ethnicities were equally likely to cite respect for the law as an important value, though White people were less likely and other ethnic groups more likely to mention equality of opportunity, respect for all faiths and respect for people from different ethnic groups. Similarly, Muslim (61%) respondents in the 2008 Citizenship Survey were more likely than Christians (32%) to mention respect for all faiths as an important value for living in Britain.
7.6 The second generation and the integration paradox

The above sections show a consistent picture for most minority ethnic groups in the UK, and for British Muslims in particular: the migrant generation faces significant barriers to integration but report very positive feelings towards the country of settlement; for subsequent generations, educational attainment and integration in civic, social, identity and cultural domains converge with the majority, but these generations continue to experience unequal outcomes in the labour market and economy. This pattern of disadvantage cannot be explained by other dimensions of integration, and it is likely that prejudice and discrimination, whether ethnic or religious or both, plays a part in generating a ‘Muslim penalty’. In this context, it is not surprising that the second generation, with higher expectations of British society, should also experience a decrease in trust. Some commentators argue that this pattern of disadvantage generates grievances which might drive radicalization (see Kundnani 2015), while other commentators have linked radicalization to antisemitism among British Muslims (see Rich 2014). However, as we show in the following section, the empirical picture is more complicated.

7.7 Values of Muslims in the UK

The cultural integration of British Muslims, and in particular their relationship to ‘British values’, has been foregrounded in both debates about integration and debates about Muslim antisemitism, so we will spend more time on this aspect than on the other domains of integration.

A number of surveys have been carried out that try to assess the values of Muslims in the UK in particular. It is important to bear in mind that the majority of Muslims in the UK are from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups, and not MENA countries. Analysis of the views of Muslim respondents on values in the 2008 Citizenship Survey shows stronger support among Muslims for respect for all faiths, respect for people from different ethnic groups, freedom of religious choice and for the importance of voting; while showing weaker support for the importance of pride in country/patriotism, freedom of speech/expression, speaking English, justice and fair play, and responsibility towards others in the community.

ComRes polling of Muslims for the BBC in February 2015 found that 95% felt loyal to Britain and 93% believed Muslims in Britain should always obey British laws (ComRes 2015). A poll published in April 2016 (based on data gathered in June 2015) by Channel 4 and ICM Unlimited examined a range of attitudes among Muslims in Britain compared with attitudes of the general population (ICM 2016). The reported survey results included the findings (among others) that British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to their local area (91%) and to Britain (86%): 88% of British Muslims think that Britain is a good place for Muslims to live.

The most recent survey of British Muslims, conducted by Policy Exchange and ICM, claims to represent one of the most extensive polls of British Muslims ever conducted (Policy Exchange 2016). The polling has been criticized, including over limitations in its methodology. The survey oversampled in areas with populations of 20% or more Muslims (so could not be said to be representative of the attitudes of the whole Muslim population in Britain), and did not examine the attitudes of any other minority groups (who might also hold different views to the general population) to contextualize its findings. However, it concluded
that British Muslims comprise a sub-set of the UK population that is more religiously devout than the whole. This is reflected in personal assessments of an individual’s own level of devotion and in the fact that an overwhelming majority identifies with their mosque and sees it as representing their views (71%).

This poll also found that some respondent views did not correspond to those of the majority of British respondents. A proportion of British Muslims deny the existence of extremism altogether (26%). In addition, it seems as though a significant proportion of British Muslims are susceptible to conspiracy theories and expressed a belief that these were often grounded in truth (approximately 40%). The report found that certain conspiracy theories do seem to resonate more with a Muslim audience, chiefly those that relate to narratives of Muslim victimhood. The prevalence of such conspiracy theories is demonstrated by views towards the terrorist attacks against America on 11 September 2001. Some 31% said the American government was responsible for 9/11: 7% claimed that the Jews were behind the attacks and 4% said it was the work of al-Qaeda or some analogous organization.

The report distinguished between Muslims who had been born in the UK and those who had not, and between older and younger cohorts. On some topics, first-generation Muslims appeared to adopt more extremist views, but on other topics the opposite was the case. Three questions point to more radical views among the second generation:

- 71% of those who sympathized with political violence and 53% of those who sympathized with terrorism were born in the UK – as compared with 47% of the overall sample
- Muslims born in Britain were more likely (than those born outside the UK) to say they felt no sense of belonging to the country
- Those born in the UK were more likely than those born outside Britain to blame the American government for 9/11 (37% of UK-born respondents blamed the US government, as compared with 26% of those born outside Britain).

However, other responses show the second generation to be less religiously conservative:

- Those born in Britain were less likely to agree with the idea that the local mosque represented their views than those born outside the UK (67% as opposed to 75%)
- Those born in the UK were also relatively less likely to support Sharia provisions than those not born in Britain (39% as compared with 46%)
- Those born in Britain were much less likely to favour gender-segregated schooling than the latter (28% versus 50%)
- The older rather than the younger cohort seemed to be less tolerant in general
- Those in the 55–64-year-old bracket were most likely to blame Jews for 9/11 (10% of respondents in this cohort did so).

Different understandings of the extent of extremism also emerge. The eldest cohorts and those born outside the UK were far more likely to say that extremist views do not exist (around a third), a view held by only 19% of those born in the UK. Those born in Britain also more often felt that mainstream and moderate
views are being drowned out (41% of those born in the UK said this, as compared with only 29% of those who were not).

Many of these findings nuance the picture of the ‘integration paradox’ outlined above (Heath 2014). Further research is needed to clarify this, but the evidence suggests that if the first generation brings negative attitudes, these decline as the processes of integration unfold in subsequent generations. However, if a substantial minority of second- and subsequent-generation Muslims become alienated from Britain, negative attitudes towards Jews might remain, and become linked to a more politicized form of antisemitism.

### 7.8 Summary

- Most data on integration does not derive from MENA migrants or their descendants but from long-settled Muslim populations, especially of South Asian ethnicities.
- Educational outcomes for minority ethnic and religious groups, including Muslims, converge over time with the White British majority.
- Muslim minorities experience disadvantage in fields such as income, employment and rates of unemployment.
- Inter-ethnic friendships increase from first-generation migrants to their children but this may lag among groups, such as those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity, where there is greater spatial segregation.
- Civic participation, respect for law, and commitment to the society of settlement are high among Muslim minorities but run alongside a sense of grievance and injustice, particularly in the second generation, in the face of unequal outcomes in the labour market and economy. This is what Anthony Heath has termed ‘the paradox of integration’.
- Muslim minorities show strong support for respect for all faiths and for different ethnic groups but weaker support for patriotism and freedom of speech.
- Recent survey data suggests that the balance of opinion among British Muslims diverges from that among the population as a whole. Most notably it was found that a large minority of British Muslims are susceptible to conspiracy theories. However, these theories are more likely to focus on the malign influence of the United States than on Jews. An antisemitic understanding of 9/11 was more likely to be found among an older cohort that included fewer British-born Muslims.
- Among Muslims in the UK those who sympathize with political violence and terrorism were more likely to have been born in the UK. There is a similar bias towards the British-born among those who report they feel no sense of belonging to the country.
- The sense of alienation among the second generation is exacerbated by securitization and the government’s ‘Prevent’ agenda, which stigmatizes Muslims as a suspect community.
- Overall the evidence suggests that processes of integration unfold among the majority of second-generation Muslims in the UK but that a significant minority of the second generation become alienated and this could provide fertile ground for politicized antisemitism.
State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses
8.1 Government policies and programmes

The UK does not have a specific law against antisemitism. Instead, offences may be covered by the ‘Stirring up of Hatred’ sections within the Public Order Act 1986 (which in 2006 was extended to cover religion as well as race) (Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006), or by other public order laws, anti-discrimination laws, human rights law or the civil law. The Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales defined a religious incident as ‘Any incident which is believed to be motivated because of a person’s religion or perceived religion, by the victim or any other person’ (Racist and religious crime [n.d.]).

Since 2014 the police in the UK have used the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) working definition of antisemitism to help officers decide what could be considered antisemitism (College of Policing 2014). In December 2016, the UK government adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, which is very similar to the EUMC working definition. The IHRA, an intergovernmental group comprising 31 nations, adopted the definition of antisemitism on 26 May 2016 (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance 2016). This definition asserts that antisemitism is ‘a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews’. The statement goes on to give a number of examples that ‘could, taking in to account the overall context’ constitute antisemitism in public life. These include accusing Jews as a people of responsibility for real or imagined wrongs, holocaust denial, accusations of double loyalty, denying Jewish people their right to self-determination and applying double standards to the State of Israel. We can note that the scope of the definition is potentially sweeping, and in October 2016 the Home Affairs Select Committee urged that, in order to protect freedom of speech on Israel/Palestine, it should be adopted only after amendment (House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 2016, pp. 12-13). Nevertheless, the definition has been adopted by a number of institutions including the Scottish government, the Greater London Assembly, the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and the National Union of Students.

Much of the UK government’s specific work on antisemitism has been supported by the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism, led by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). The Working Group brings together civil servants from across Whitehall, including DCLG, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice and representatives from major Jewish community organizations. Its activities have been largely shaped by the two reports emerging from the 2006 and 2015 All-Party Parliamentary Inquiries into Antisemitism, which made a number of recommendations for the government and civil society.

The national collection of antisemitic hate crime data by the police began in 2009, in response to a recommendation from the first All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism which reported in 2006 (All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism 2006). The same years have seen a progressive integration of the Community Security Trust’s (CST) incident figures into the police’s data gathering. In 2001 the CST was accorded ‘Third Party Reporting’ status by the police. This allows the CST to report antisemitic incidents to the police and to act on behalf of victims who are unwilling or unable to report directly to the police. This was followed a decade later by local data sharing agreements.
with Greater Manchester Police in 2011, with the Metropolitan Police Service (London) in 2012 and Nottinghamshire Police in 2014. In 2015 the Association of Chief Police Officers (now National Police Chiefs’ Council) signed a national information sharing agreement with the CST. This allows for systematic sharing of antisemitic incident reports between both organizations. Both organizations now have sight of incidents that would not otherwise be reported to them (CST 2017, pp. 8, 10).

The state provides funds to improve security at Jewish schools and synagogues; an additional £13.4 million was announced in March 2016. It is notable that these funds are administered by the CST and are an example of government policy being pursued in partnership with a Jewish communal organization. In a speech in November 2016, the home secretary, Amber Rudd, recommitted the government to providing extra security for Jewish schools, synagogues and other community buildings. Referring to the threat both from Islamist militancy and from a renewed surge in right-wing extremism, she said: ‘We take the security of the Jewish community seriously, and we will continue to put in place the strongest possible measures to ensure the safety of this community and all other communities too’ (Walker 2016).

The government has also taken measures to ensure the compulsory teaching of the Holocaust in schools in England as part of the national curriculum. In 2010 the foreign secretary appointed Sir Andrew Burns as the UK Envoy for Post-Holocaust issues. His successor, Sir Eric Pickles, took office in 2015. A former Minister at the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Pickles’ appointment signalled a stronger connection between international issues concerning the legacy of the Holocaust and contemporary concerns with domestic antisemitism. Sir Eric has been a forceful advocate of the IHRA definition of antisemitism and of bringing it to bear on some criticisms brought against Israel (DCLG 2016; Turner 2017).

Antisemitism also falls within the range of generic government action to combat hate crime. In July 2016 the government published its *Hate Crime Action Plan* and acknowledged that ‘antisemitism has not always been taken as seriously as other hate crimes in some parts of our society’ (Home Office 2016). More broadly, the Crown Prosecution Service has sought to review and improve its work to prosecute hate crime (Crown Prosecution Service 2016).

Central government funds are given to the Interfaith Network which, working together with local authorities, faith communities and others, leads on interfaith week activities of which there were 350 in 2013.

**8.2 Best practice**

Government policy has been driven forward by the fruitful interaction of three bodies: the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Antisemitism, the DCLG and the Cross Government Working Group on addressing antisemitism.

The police and the CST have developed data sharing agreements as detailed in other sections of this report. Police forces state that they work closely with the CST to protect Jewish communities, including operating joint patrols in predominantly Jewish areas, sharing data and delivering training and exercises. At the request of serving police officers, the CST has produced ‘A Police Officer’s
Guide to Judaism’, which explains traditions and customs regarding dietary laws, death and burial matters, and practical issues such as observance of the Sabbath (CST 2010). In 2014, the College of Policing published its Hate Crime Operational Guidance including information on how to deal with antisemitic hate crime.

The CST has also cooperated with and advised Tell Mama (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) as the latter organization seeks to provide a reporting mechanism for Muslims who have suffered abuse or physical violence (Amin 2013).

We also found some good practice in relation to the integration of MENA migrants. One Syrian migrant organization is running seminars and film screenings to discuss political issues such as federalism and freedom of speech. One representative from the organization explained:

*It is quite interesting that you know you get a large range of viewpoints, but we set the rules so that everyone respects everyone else’s opinions and we just have a discussion, and that is the building block to a democracy or representative government. So like our premise I guess is we want to rebuild Syria, we want to have a stake in rebuilding Syria, but in order to do that we have to, as a society, we have to reconfigure our thinking. When you live under a dictatorship for decades that will do something to your mentality and you will not be able to internalise freedom and democracy and representative government the same way as you have practised it your whole life. So we need to understand as a community what is democracy and what does it mean? It is not just freedom it is about responsibility as well. It is about limits such as does hate speech qualify as freedom of speech? There are boundaries to any freedom that you want to give. So yes it is just about setting a platform from which to rebuild our collective thoughts.* [NG.11]

The organization also has a strong advocacy remit and considers solidarity with other groups outside Syrian, refugee and Muslim organizations to extend its work: ‘when you are an outside group and what is at stake is the rights of another outside group you have to build these networks of solidarity, otherwise you can’t survive on your own as a community. There are 25,000 Syrians in the UK, we are not enough to make any policy change so we rely on these networks of solidarity and where we benefit from them we also have to reciprocate them’ [NG.11].

**8.3 Summary**

- Neither state nor civil society organizations target MENA migrants as they seek to monitor and combat antisemitism. This is unsurprising since MENA migrants have not been identified as a problematic group.
- A series of initiatives to monitor and combat antisemitism have been driven forward by cooperation between government and other organizations, most notably the CST and the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism.
9 Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions

- Attitudes to Jews in the UK are largely positive. However, some groups are more likely than others to hold negative views about Jews: these include Muslims, the upper middle class and voters who have supported the United Kingdom Independence Party.

- Recorded antisemitic incidents and statistics for antisemitic hate crime are rising. The relationship between antisemitic behaviour and recorded incidents and crimes is mediated and complex. Nevertheless, some clear trends are apparent. In general, spikes in recorded incidents have been related temporally to conflict in the Middle East. This association was broken, however, in 2016 when recorded antisemitic incidents reached a record level.

- Antisemitic incidents are more likely to be categorized as ‘anti-social behaviour’ than as politically motivated. Among those incidents that are categorized as politically motivated the greatest number stem from far-right sources. The smallest number of politically motivated incidents is consistently attached to those showing an Islamist motivation.

- The number of MENA migrants in the UK is small. The Annual Population Survey in 2015 estimated that the UK population stood at 64.2 million, of which 599,000 are MENA migrants. However, the UK population of Muslims has grown significantly since 2001 and is the largest non-Christian religious group in the UK, with the main ethnic groups being of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins.

- Within public discourse there are concerns about antisemitism among UK Muslims. It appears that these concerns are easily projected on to MENA migrants. We should note that concerns about Muslims in the UK are based on an assumption, which may or may not be correct, that negative Muslim attitudes translate into antisemitic behaviour. This assumption is all the more striking in view of the small number of incidents that have an Islamist motivation. In the case of MENA migrants the presumption of antisemitism is not based on credible evidence.

- Other than a few anecdotes, this research found no evidence to substantiate a connection between MENA migrants and antisemitic behaviour or attitudes.
Recommendations

Policy

- Policy responses and public discussion should reflect that antisemitism arises within society as a whole and not only among immigrant or religious minorities.

- Policy makers and civil society organizations should take account of the limitations and problems of interpretation presented by different survey methods and by statistics that seek to measure hate crime and antisemitic incidents. In doing so, they will be able to safeguard against both complacency and alarmism.

- Government should do more to promote the economic and social integration of Muslim minorities in ways that extend beyond the issue of ‘security’.

Practice

- Current examples of good practice should be extended and built upon. These examples include the response of government to parliamentary investigations of antisemitism, the liaison between the CST, Tell Mama and the police, and the effort of a Syrian refugee organization to promote political discussion and democratic values.

- There is an urgent need in the UK for substantive interaction between Jews and Muslims to provide a counterweight to negative stereotypes and political discourses that generate mutual suspicion.

- All sectors of society have a duty to speak responsibly on issues around immigration, antisemitism and Islamophobia.

- Politicians, policy makers and journalists should promote a balanced, evidence-based discussion of the relationship between immigration and antisemitism.

Research

- We need a representative survey of attitudes among MENA migrants.

- We need to know more about the attitudes and ideologies that develop among alienated second-generation Muslim minorities.

- The data on antisemitic incidents demands attention:
  - Members of ethnic minorities are over-represented in the tally of incidents recorded. Should this be taken at face value or is it best explained by other factors?
  - The large number of accidents categorized as ‘anti-social’ requires investigation so we can better understand the motives and intentions of offenders.

- We need to examine attitudes to religious and ethnic difference among both Jews and Muslims.
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Appendices

List of interviewees

Interviews were held with workers from 15 state and civil society organizations as shown in Table 1. Anonymity was offered to all those taking part: quotations used in the report are therefore coded.

Table 1: Interviews

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Approach to the interviews

This research project addressed sensitive and potentially highly emotive issues. In conducting the interviews, the researcher used different strategies with different organizations to suit the context and tone of the interview.

With representatives from national stakeholders and Jewish organizations, whose primary concerns include tackling antisemitism, the researcher explained at the outset how the project had emerged and how it was funded. They described the rising issue in public debate regarding MENA migrants importing antisemitism to Europe and made it clear that the aim of the research was to explore why this claim might be gaining resonance and for whom.

On sharing the brief, it was apparent that interviewees often felt uncomfortable with the research question. On some occasions the researcher reassured interviewees that they were aware of the sensitivities of the research and were cognizant with the complex nature of the topic, emphasising that the interviews...
were not a sufficient basis from which to draw conclusions but rather the aim was to map the available evidence. Where interviewees still appeared to be uncomfortable, the researcher added that they were not partisan; rather the aim of the research was to explore whether the research question had any basis. They explained that a debate was taking place across Europe. This approach enabled interviewees to explore the premise, without feeling they had to support or negate any of the issues being discussed. It also opened up further lines of enquiry regarding perceptions of other countries or comparisons between countries.

With regard to representatives of organizations working with migrants, the researcher found that in most cases it was more productive to begin the interview with general questions regarding migrants’ experiences and attitudes to racism and prejudice. When rapport and trust has been developed, it was possible to move to more specific questions relating to antisemitism. Referencing issues of intercommunity tensions and offering examples such as those between Kurdish and Turkish people, Ahmedi and other Muslim groups, and Jews and Muslims helped frame the question.

There were drawbacks to this approach. For example, in one interview, while issues of race and racism were discussed, the interviewee did not mention antisemitism. Hate crime was addressed only in terms of anti-Muslim hate. When prompted again to include antisemitism, this did not create discussion but seemed to stifle and interrupt the flow of conversation. However, this in itself is an interesting finding: antisemitism in this case seemed to be seen as distinct from other forms of discrimination. In other cases where the researcher directly brought up issues regarding MENA migrants and issues of antisemitism, the interviewee proceeded to list equality legislation dating back to the 1960s. This was also an interesting finding. The researcher engaged with this response and sought to bring the conversation back to different forms of discrimination.

**Topic guide**

**Question areas for recent migrants/those working with migrant groups**

The intention is to explore experiences of racism and attitudes to racism in general.

- Have you/your clients experienced prejudice in this country?
- In your community/your client’s community are there prejudices that are directed against you or others – sectarian or national?
- And what about prejudices your community may have to the receiving society [country]
  - Mainstream society?
  - Are there any specific groups your community is negative towards?
- How seriously do you think the receiving society:
  - Treats discrimination you experience?
  - How does this compare with other groups in society?
- How much compassion/attention/support do you think your cause/group will get in the receiving country
Appendices

• How important is your diasporic network as for e.g.: Muslim/Syrian
• Views of other diasporic/displaced groups
• How do you see attitudes to politics in your part of the world e.g.
  • Iraq and Afghanistan
  • Israel and Palestine
  • And will this continue?
• What do you think are the main differences between politics in this country and the one from which you came?
• Do you think this will influence how you think and act? Will you act or think differently? If yes/no – why?

Topics to raise with state and civil society groups/actors

• An assessment of the degree to which recent immigrants and refugees accept the norms of toleration in the societies they have entered: do recent immigrants accept that even those with whom they disagree and towards whom they may feel aversion or contempt are entitled to equal rights and security?
• Do recent immigrants have anti-Jewish prejudices?
• Is there a relationship between Islam and antisemitism?
  • Has antisemitism been driven by the politicization of Islam, and by Middle Eastern and North African immigrants, and to what extent have other sources been significant?
  • Is the experience or perception of Islamophobia ever used to justify antisemitic prejudices
  • In the context of recent immigration are there ways in which antisemitism and Islamophobia interact and feed off each other?
• What is the role of social media in generating antisemitism and other forms of racism?
• What is the role of the media and politicians in promoting open, balanced discussion on migrants, refugees and antisemitism? And on the relationship between them?