Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today
Is there a connection?
The case of Germany

Mathias Berek
This report derives from a five-nation study commissioned by the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (EVZ), based in Berlin, and led by the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London.

The full set of reports for this study is available to download:
- Foundation EVZ www.stiftung-evz.de
- Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk

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Mathias Berek
With assistance from Patricia Piberger
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AfD</strong></td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AAS</strong></td>
<td>Amadeu-Antonio-Stiftung (Amadeu Antonio Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADL</strong></td>
<td>Anti-Defamation League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AJC</strong></td>
<td>American Jewish Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AZR</strong></td>
<td>Ausländerzentralregister (Central Register of Foreigners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BKA</strong></td>
<td>Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BMFSFJ</strong></td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BMJV</strong></td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz (Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CDU</strong></td>
<td>Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CSU</strong></td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Socialist Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUMC</strong></td>
<td>European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVZ</strong></td>
<td>Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft (Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FDP</strong></td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRA</strong></td>
<td>European Agency for Fundamental Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GMF</strong></td>
<td>Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit (Group-Focused Enmity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KιgA</strong></td>
<td>Kreuzberger Initiative gegen Antisemitismus (Kreuzberger Initiative against Antisemitism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LGBTI</strong></td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bi, Trans, Intersex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIB</strong></td>
<td>Liberal-Islamischer Bund (Liberal Islamic League)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MENA</strong></td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGO</strong></td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NPD</strong></td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German National Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PMK</strong></td>
<td>Politisch motivierte Kriminalität (politically motivated crime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RIAS</strong></td>
<td>Recherche - und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (Antisemitism Research and Information Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPD</strong></td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UEA</strong></td>
<td>Unabhängiger Expertenkreis Antisemitismus (Independent Group of Antisemitism Experts)</td>
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Preface

There is a persistent claim that new migrants to Europe, and specifically migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA migrants), carry antisemitism with them. This assertion is made to different degrees in different countries and can take different forms. Nevertheless, in Europe, the association of rising antisemitism with migrants from the Middle East and North Africa is widespread and needs to be evaluated.

MENA migrants have been symbolically central to the migration debate since 2011. These years have been framed by the Arab spring and its aftermath and by Europe’s crisis of refugee protection. This research project has focused specifically on MENA migrants, in response to the intensity of this debate, and in accordance with the brief from Foundation EVZ. The central concern of the research project has been to investigate whether the arrival of MENA migrants since 2011 has had an impact on antisemitic attitudes and behaviour in Western Europe. This report deals with the case of Germany. The report also considers whether government and civil society agencies have identified a problem of antisemitism among MENA migrants. The findings are based on an extensive survey of existing quantitative and qualitative evidence. Additionally, new qualitative research has been undertaken to investigate the experiences and opinions of a range of actors.

This national report contributes to a larger research project conducted in 2016/2017 across five European countries – Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A final report, Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today: is there a connection? Findings and recommendations from a five-nation study, draws out common trends, makes comparisons and provides recommendations for civil society organizations and for governments.

1 This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. See under Definitions.
Executive Summary

Context

Germany is an immigration country. More than a fifth of the German population has a migration background, and about 14% are immigrants themselves. Among the former, the largest group has a Turkish background (about 17%), followed by people from the former Soviet Union and Poland. Among first-generation migrants, those from Turkey are the second largest group (about 12%), after those from the former Soviet Union and closely followed by those from Poland. The stock of immigrants from countries in the Middle East and North Africa other than Turkey is at a lower level, although this now comprises the largest group currently migrating to the country.

With regard to religious affiliation and belief, the population of Germany is predominantly Christian (about 60%). The second largest group is composed of non-religious people (about 32%) and the third largest group is composed of Muslims who comprise 6% of the population. Members of Jewish congregations account for 0.12% of the population (about 100,000 people).

Findings

Immigration pre-2011

Between 1990 and 2011, immigration to Germany stemmed largely from countries of the former Soviet Union, from other former Warsaw Pact countries and from the former Yugoslavia. Other significant immigrant groups were asylum seekers (mostly from Yugoslavia, Romania, Iraq and Afghanistan), Jews or descendants of Jews from successor states of the former Soviet Union, and seasonal or temporary workers.

Despite the high immigration numbers of the early 1990s, the population in Germany with a migration background mainly consisted of former ‘guest workers’ and their families, those from Turkey forming the largest group.

Antisemitism pre-2011

After the end of the Second or Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000–2005, antisemitism in Germany slowly receded but remained at a high level. Although traditional antisemitism diminished in Germany, among some non-Muslim, non-migrant Germans it was now articulated as secondary or Israel-related antisemitism, both of which increased in this period. Identification with the nation and authoritarian attitudes influenced the emergence of antisemitic attitudes more than ethnicity, the presence or absence of a migration background, or religion. After 2000 a growing number of antisemites acted openly and did not use the protection provided by anonymity.

Criminal offences of an antisemitic nature were perpetrated mostly by right-wing, non-Muslim, non-migrant Germans. Nevertheless, Muslims were among the offenders of antisemitic crimes.
In surveys undertaken before 2011 young Muslims showed deeper antisemitic attitudes than non-Muslims of the same age group, depending on their region of origin and degree of religiosity and conservatism. Almost all reports recorded that Muslims gave voice to fragmentary, traditional antisemitic slogans or stereotypes that they had picked up, rather than expressing a fixed and ideological antisemitic worldview. For a vast majority of Muslims, a feeling of personal sympathy for the Palestinians’ situation was connected with a feeling that they were victims of discrimination as Muslims.

The term ‘imported antisemitism’ has been applied not only to Muslims but also to migrants from the former Soviet Union.

**Immigration since 2011**

Immigration numbers from MENA countries have been rising since 2011, with a steep climb in 2014 (21% of all immigration) and an even steeper one in 2015 (about half a million people, 44% of all immigration). Since 2011 the main countries of origin have been Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Net migration with Turkey remained negative in 2015. The percentage of MENA migrants among all non-citizens has been stable and even slightly falling since 2011, mostly due to an increasing number of EU citizens having migrated to Germany.

The age and gender composition of MENA migrants in Germany vary widely depending on their country of origin.

More than three-quarters of Turkish citizens in Germany have permanent resident status and only a few are under threat of deportation. The rest of the MENA migrants have a much more precarious legal status.

Asylum seekers in 2015 were predominantly Muslim, but almost half of the Iraqis were Yazidis, and 72% of the Eritreans were Christians.

**Antisemitism since 2011**

About 10% of the German-speaking population in Germany openly express negative attitudes to Jews. Traditional antisemitism is receding, but other forms are on the rise: in this regard, there is a shift from secondary to Israel-related antisemitism, with the latter at a level of at least 20%. While level of income bears no relation to antisemitic attitudes, the closer one moves to the right through the political spectrum the greater the incidence of such attitudes.

With regard to politically motivated criminal offences, the rate of immigration is not a key determining factor. Antisemitic acts have not increased in relation to immigration but to events in the Middle East and as part of the explosion of right-wing racist violence after the beginning of Willkommenskultur (the supportive attitudes and actions of many Germans in relation to refugees, mostly from Syria) in 2015. Perpetrators are still predominantly non-migrant, non-Muslim Germans with a right-wing background. The presence and frequency of antisemitism among Muslims in Germany is not connected to recent immigration but to events outside of Germany.

With regard to hate crime and negative attitudes towards minorities in Germany, antisemitism is a continuing and violent threat. However, racism, especially racism directed against refugees and Muslims, is more widespread today.
There is an increased feeling of insecurity among Jews. This is mostly on account of threats and attacks by young Muslims since the Gaza mobilization in 2014. Recent MENA refugees are also perceived as a threat both directly and indirectly, because of the general rise in hostility towards minorities.

Many studies show that antisemitic attitudes are more widespread among German Muslims than among German non-Muslims. Germans with a Muslim migration background express their views in an uncoded and more open manner than non-migrant, non-Muslim antisemites who more readily adapt to accepted speech norms.

Many studies discuss at least an indirect correlation, but not an automatic causality, between antisemitic attitudes and discrimination against Muslims in Germany. Discrimination prepares the ground for antisemitism and serves as legitimation. Conversely, it can also lead to higher awareness of the discriminatory character of antisemitism and to its rejection.

Antisemitism must be understood as a problem of German society as a whole and should not be ascribed to a single group such as Muslims. Non-Muslim Germans often use this ascription to evade responsibility for, and to externalize, their own antisemitic attitudes and to legitimize anti-Muslim racism.

MENA refugees, according to some interviewees, face discrimination and numerous difficulties establishing a viable life in Germany. Most would not dare to harm their status through statements that they know are undesirable in Germany. There is little doubt that a certain percentage of MENA migrants harbour antisemitic attitudes, but none of our interviewees could provide reliable figures. Interviewees reported cases of single antisemitic events or classrooms with an antisemitic majority, but they also reported open-mindedness and the absence of prejudice among migrants. As is the case with the German majority population, researchers have found some diehard antisemites among MENA refugees, quite a few who expressed certain antisemitic stereotypes, but also secular atheists ‘without a trace of prejudice’. Several interviewees regarded Arab nationalism rather than Islam as the source of antisemitic attitudes. Some interviewees expressed surprise that the refugees they met had demonstrated less antisemitism than they had anticipated. This illustrates the presence of negative assumptions regarding MENA refugees. A recent study in Bavaria, however, found that about 55% of Muslim refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq supported the traditional antisemitic assertion that Jews had too much power in the world.

How easily refugees with antisemitic or anti-Zionist attitudes change their viewpoint will depend on how German society deals with its own antisemitism. Ill-considered antisemitic attitudes, which are expressed even by some teachers or people working in refugee aid, as well as politicians paying mere lip-service to statements against antisemitism, can encourage antisemitic attitudes among refugees. This dynamic makes it impossible to assess whether the refugees’ antisemitism comes from their country of origin or from Germany.

In view of the diversity of MENA refugees, it is misleading to regard them as a homogeneous group. It is misleading, too, to equate recent MENA refugees and Germans with a Muslim migrant background. Both groups show different characteristics, have different racism experiences and different antisemitic attitudes.
Executive Summary

Among German Muslim associations and congregations there is a strong tendency to deny the existence of antisemitism among Muslims. This has been criticized by representatives of liberal Islam who suggest that German Muslim associations and congregations fear antagonizing the ranks of their organizations where latent and unconsidered antisemitism is a widespread phenomenon.

Public discourse
Social media plays an important role in the dissemination, amplification and consolidation of antisemitic thought, but not in its formation. It is widely used by antisemites, racists and other hate groups for recruitment and mobilization. However, it can equally be used as a means for counteracting and networking against prejudice.

Since 2015 in the context of growing numbers of immigrants to Germany from Syria and other Muslim countries in 2015, German media and political culture have been dominated by the topic of migration. Public discourse reflects the deep divide between the liberal Welcome Culture and the rising anti-Muslim, racist, anti-immigration, white supremacist, anti-liberal and nationalist movement reaching from parts of established conservative parties to the far right of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Pegida and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD).

Many interviewees complained about the media’s polarizing effects and their adoption of emotive and biased terms terms such as ‘refugee wave’, ‘refugee crisis’ or ‘imported antisemitism’. Antisemitic stereotypes are rarely found in the German mass media, but what can be found there more often is a focus on Israel as a placeholder for ‘the Jews’.

Islamist terror attacks and crimes perpetrated by people with a Muslim migration background have fostered homogenizing and essentializing characterizations of Muslims and Muslim refugees. These characterizations strengthen arguments which construct a dichotomy between Germans and Muslims.

Integration of second and further generations of MENA migrants
Germany has the largest number of migrants of all European countries. At the same time, it exhibits reluctance in acknowledging itself to be an immigration country. All migrants, but especially those from non-European, non-Western countries, and those who are not white and who have a Muslim background, are subject to discrimination and exclusion by individual non-migrant Germans, as well as by the country’s social structures. Despite legislative and structural improvements since the end of the 1990s, immigration is still seen as a challenge, with any benefits viewed from an economic perspective only.

Muslim migrants are not a homogeneous group. However, along with Germans of Turkish descent who have been living in the country for decades, they are generally less integrated than other migrants with regard to socio-economic, cultural and social criteria. This pattern extends to the second and third German-born generations. These differences correlate with perceived discrimination. While in public discourse the tendency to segregation is often attributed to Muslims, surveys reveal that non-Muslims more often than Muslims favour self-segregation through the exclusion of others. Migrants with a Muslim background, even in the third generation, are not considered to be Germans
by many non-migrant Germans, although this attitude is receding with younger generations. Even academic studies continue to use the essentializing construction of ‘Muslims’ as distinct from ‘Germans’. The rejection of Muslims is rising.

Segregation makes it increasingly difficult for Muslims to maintain hyphenated identities such as ‘German-Muslim’. The vast majority of German Muslims long for integration, but a rising number of them, especially among the younger generations and as a reaction to exclusion, insist on being accepted as culturally different.

**State and civil society monitoring and responses**
The new categories for registering politically motivated crime have been criticized for not being able to fully recognize antisemitism. Meanwhile, some courts have repeatedly refused to identify antisemitism as such and have misdescribed and excused it as criticism of Israel.

Federal ministries and civil society actors have begun to monitor online hate crime which they report to providers and/or the authorities. In some cases they have had success in getting hate content removed. There is a wide net of monitoring projects for group-focused enmity in general and, additionally, two regional initiatives for monitoring antisemitic incidents have been established in Berlin and Kassel.

Since 2001, the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth has funded a large number of model projects against radicalization, racism and antisemitism. Recently, it also created institutions with a long-term perspective which have the same remit. Antisemitism is a topic of rising relevance in these contexts.

Monitoring and prevention programmes towards Islamist radicalization (which also include antisemitism) are currently being strengthened with large resources from the state, observed one interviewee. But their top-down construction and proximity to the state has already led to ill-considered suspicions directed against all Muslims.

A general problem that besets educational initiatives directed against antisemitism is that many of the research results and best practice recommendations yielded by model projects have not been implemented.

Most major German organizations such as parties, churches, unions and corporations (including Muslim bodies) do not undertake critical self-reflection – existing antisemitism within them is often projected onto others.
Conclusions

- Neither the survey of data nor the interviews conducted for this research project have generated conclusive evidence of a rise in antisemitism caused by recent immigration.

- Antisemitism remains a continuing problem in Germany, both as an attitude and a threat to Jews. The decrease of traditional antisemitism can in part be attributed to its articulation (by non-Muslim, non-migrant Germans), as a form of “detour communication”, as Israel-related and secondary antisemitism. Israel-related antisemitism is now espoused by at least 20% of the population, making it the main problem in respect of antisemitic attitudes in Germany. It also prepares the ground for antisemitic violence based on traditional stereotypes because perpetrators can feel legitimized by the opinions of a large section of the population.

- At the same time, the possible impact of education and prevention programmes as a partial explanation for the decrease of traditional antisemitism should not be completely rejected.

- Antisemitism is a problem across much of German society, including among migrants and Muslims, but it is not restricted to these groups. The externalization of non-migrant German antisemitism, by ascribing antisemitism to Muslims, is a widespread problem. Antisemitic immigrants respond to the antisemitism (or anti-antisemitism) of the receiving society in which they live. For these reasons antisemitism among Muslims in Germany cannot be addressed without reflecting on antisemitism among the majority (including right-wing antisemitism) as well as the relationship between antisemitism and racism.

- The struggle against antisemitism suffers from double standards. For as long as teachers, social workers, civil servants, the police and judges refuse to tackle their own antisemitic (and racist) stereotypes or feelings of resentment, for as long as political statements on Holocaust remembrance day are not followed by committed action and, especially, for as long as refugees or Germans with a Muslim migration background or German Muslims in general are not granted full and equal rights, it will be hard for minorities to respect demands from the German majority that they follow German norms regarding toleration.

- Many refugees from MENA countries visit mosques in Germany, for religious as well as social reasons. Given that Turkey under Erdoğan is increasingly veering towards authoritarianism, Islamism, anti-pluralism and even outright antisemitism, it is a matter of concern that most mosques in Germany are still under the direct influence of the Turkish government.
Recommendations

Policy

• To be successful in combatting antisemitism, declarations by politicians denouncing antisemitism should be followed by committed action. The antisemitism of the majority has to be addressed, in its traditional, secondary and Israel-related versions. It should be addressed as it manifests in German organizations and institutions. At the same time, minority antisemitism should also be addressed.

• Effective opposition to antisemitism requires more resources for documentation of the problem, research, consulting, education, empowerment and prevention.

• Recommendations from research and from past model projects to combat antisemitism should be implemented. Successful projects should be rolled out nationwide.

• Germany should no longer leave most of the religious structures and religious education for Muslims in the hands of the Turkish government. This policy reinforces the idea that Muslims are somehow foreign. Religious education offered by state schools should include Islamic education and mosques should be independently funded by the congregations and believers themselves, as in the case of other religions. This would require granting Muslims the same right to form statutory bodies as other religious groups.

Practice

• Israel-related antisemitism should be understood and treated as the main form of antisemitism in Germany today.

• The campaign against antisemitism among Muslims has to be fought together with Muslims. This requires less restraint in talking about antisemitism among Muslims within Muslim organizations. Toleration should be applied consistently and not selectively. For this reason, the diverse forms of discrimination against minorities, including Muslims, immigrants and refugees, have to be addressed. It should be acknowledged that Muslims are also Germans. Generalizing characterizations of Muslims which construct a dichotomy between them and Germans should be avoided.

• Muslim organizations should promote more critical self-reflection on antisemitism among Muslims.

• In view of the finding that antisemitism is a problem within German society as well as among refugees, long-term education programmes for refugees and for Germans in refugee aid and education alike are needed. Teachers should focus on self-reflection and respect for all students. There should be diversity within teams, integrating minorities. School curricula should reflect the reality of Germany as a migration society.

• There should be more respect for refugees, better opportunities for them to remain in Germany and greater appreciation of their history and contribution. This is a prerequisite for any successful attempt to provide education about antisemitism.
Executive Summary

• Work against antisemitism in Germany can only be successful if it follows a combined anti-racist and anti-antisemitic approach. It should focus on antisemitic attitudes rather than seek to expose individuals as antisemites. At the same time, it should hold individuals responsible for their actions. It should not stereotype, homogenize or essentialize Muslims and Jews but, instead, respect and acknowledge the diversity among them. It should give due emphasis to the commonalities between groups. It should reflect on the social processes that generate prejudices. Finally, it should strengthen responsibility and self-reflection.

Research

• With regard to research, a representative survey of attitudes among MENA refugees is needed. The survey should be methodologically sophisticated and take account of the possibility that respondents’ answers may reflect what they think is socially desirable rather than their real opinions.
Introduction

In Germany, the number of antisemitic incidents since 2011, as registered by the police, has fluctuated in relation to events in the Middle East, particularly in summer 2014. For that year and the following, monitoring bodies and the police also registered increasing numbers of such incidents. Since then, the Jew-hatred displayed at the Gaza rallies, in public discourse and in the form of harassment, assault and attacks has led to an increased feeling of insecurity among German Jews. Such feelings had already been at a high level due to a number of public debates since 2000 that showed a disturbingly widespread support for antisemitic attitudes throughout society.

In the same period, since the Islamist terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the term ‘Muslim’ has spread in German public discourses when discussing people who in previous decades had been largely described as ‘guest workers’, ‘foreigners’ or ‘German Turks’.

Against this background, the exponential increase in refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq since 2014, but especially in 2015, in combination with a failure of state authorities to handle the immigration, was met with a split reaction by German society. While many welcomed the refugees and started to get involved in refugee support projects, others, mirroring the 1990s, responded to the refugees and others considered foreign, including Muslims, with fear, hatred and violence. Most media and politicians called the crisis in refugee protection a ‘refugee crisis’, and 1992-style terms like ‘refugee surge’ and ‘wave’ contributed to the construction of a threat that also strengthened the older trend of rising anti-Muslim racism. This situation made possible the ascent of the Pegida Movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) and the AfD party (Alternative für Deutschland) after its völkisch-nationalist radicalization. A number of politicians from established parties pandered to the new anti-refugee movement, especially those from the conservative Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) and Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU), but even some from the Green Party and the Left. Attempted and successful Islamist terror attacks and events such as the mass sexual harassment and assaults in Cologne conducted largely by North African immigrants further radicalized the anti-refugee movement.

2 ‘Islamism’ is not to be confused with Islam but in this report is understood as those radical political movements that refer to a fundamentalist Islam; that reject all forms of society that are not formed according to their orthodox understanding of Islamic rule; that strive to reshape societies and states in their reach according to these rules.
In public discourse, the idea of ‘imported antisemitism’ – whereby refugees from Muslim-dominated countries import antisemitism to Germany – is widespread, although not unchallenged. Some proponents suggest that *Willkommenskultur* invites antisemites and that refugees from the Middle East are all Islamists, a view that generates an anti-immigration and anti-*Gesinnungsethik* (ethics of conviction) resentment (Tibi, 2016). Others challenge such generalizations, often pointing to existing German antisemitism, but at times also rationalizing antisemitism among Muslims. It is not possible to determine whether the belief in ‘imported antisemitism’ is mainstream, but it is definitely not marginal. How dominant and pressing it is as a question has been demonstrated by the fact that a counselling service combating Islamist radicalization refused to take part in this study because they had been receiving requests like ours almost on a daily basis for more than two years.

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4 www.bassamtibi.de/?p=2909#more-2909.

Methodology

To date, there is no overall quantitative survey among MENA refugees in Germany that either substantiates or refutes the claim of ‘refugee-imported antisemitism’. Only for one state, Bavaria, did a recent survey among MENA refugees reveal antisemitic attitudes, showing that a majority of 55% of (predominantly Muslim) refugees from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan agreed with the statement that the Jews had too much influence in the world (Haug et al., 2017: 68). There are surveys of the German population in general and among non-migrant Germans that investigate group-focused enmities including antisemitism. The small number of MENA migrants in general samples such as these, however, do not allow the drawing of statistically reliable conclusions. There are also surveys dating from the time after Al-Qaeda’s attacks on New York when the claim of ‘imported antisemitism’ emerged for the first time. They mostly addressed the antisemitism of migrants who had been living in Germany for longer or even belonged to the second or third generations. ‘Import’ in this case referred not to persons but to media such as Arab satellite TV stations.

Regarding MENA refugees, recently some smaller, qualitative studies have been conducted with a regional focus (Arnold/König, 2016; KlGA, 2017; Freytag, 2016). A large quantitative survey focused mainly on the refugees’ reasons for flight, their flight experiences, their economic situation and their mental and emotional state. Attitudes towards other groups only play a marginal role and antisemitism is not mentioned in the 400+-statement questionnaire (Gostomski et al., 2016).

This report examines existing studies for the light they can shed on our research question. Comparing results of different surveys raises problems of methodology, since surveys vary in terms of the questions, response scales and questioning techniques employed in constructing their ‘antisemitism indices’. As a consequence, this study focuses on single statements that are comparable between surveys. While such statements are not always indicative of specific attitudes, many surveys use more than one question for each variant of antisemitism (traditional, secondary, Israel-related), and in some cases the same questions are incorporated into different questionnaires.

In interpreting the figures that follow, one has to bear in mind that some surveys, such as the Bielefeld group-focused enmity (GMF) research group around Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Andreas Zick in the ‘Deutsche Zustände’ panel (and some associated surveys), included only Germans without a migration background, thus excluding 11.1% of their interviewees (those with a migration background up to the third generation) (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 4, 38).

In addition to existing data, new empirical data has been generated through expert interviews (Meuser/Nagel, 2009). Within the available resources and time frame, quantitative surveys among refugees were out of the question, but it seemed feasible to map knowledge and opinions among people in direct proximity to asylum seekers.

For Saxony, first results of a pilot study in ‘Flucht und Integration’ (flight and integration) have been published: www.uni-leipzig.de/service/kommunikation/medienredaktion/nachrichten.html?fab_modus=detail&fab_id=7244. For an overview on projects about flight and migration in Germany see https://flucht-forschung-transfer.de.
Methodology

institutional contact with recent refugees, doing research on antisemitism, working in education and prevention programmes or representing German Jews as well as Muslims.\(^7\) In addition, we opted against a qualitative survey among refugees because a similar study was already under way (Arnold/König, 2016), and the need for translators and the preparation and administration of contact and interviews would have extended beyond the time frame and resources of this survey. Because we wanted to gather insights based on expertise beyond what has already been published, we chose the method of semi-structured expert interviews.

As we were not probing for attitudes but asking for expert knowledge we chose a direct approach, both in the invitations and in the interviews themselves. This meant that, in contrast to focus group interviews, our interviews did not avoid bringing up our main research questions. Bearing in mind that antisemitism is not easily separable from racism or from social and political contexts, these were embedded into introductory and contextualizing questions. At the same time, the emotive, polarizing and supercharged nature of the topic ‘immigration and antisemitism’ required that invitations to prospective interviewees were crafted with particular care. The main problem with the open and direct approach was that potential interviewees might assume that the survey was biased from the beginning – that it would either contribute to the racist projection of antisemitism upon migrants and Muslims or deny antisemitism among Muslims and blame Jews for the public presence of the problem. In the end, those prepared to be interviewed showed no sign of any of these suspicions. The interview guidelines are to be found in the appendix to this report.

We chose our 29 interview subjects out of two distinct groups: people working with recent migrants (abbr. RM, 5 interviews); and people involved with state and civil society organizations. The latter is divided into subgroups: public authorities (SCA, N=5); NGOs (SCN, 3); research and education (SCR, 8); Jewish organizations/institutions (SCJ, 4); Muslim organizations/institutions (SCM, 2); and representatives from politics (SCP, 2). The division into groups is not intended to be fixed, as they occasionally overlap – for example, people working in refugee projects based at educational institutions, Jewish or non-government organizations (NGOs); or research projects based at Jewish or Muslim organizations. Within the groups and sub-groups, we used existing networks, literature and further research in order to establish a list of potential partners. The list was finalized after some prioritization (e.g. to avoid a too-strong over-representation of Berlin) and according to positive responses. The tight schedule rendered some appointments impossible in the end.

As expected, more than a few of those invited declined. Several refused to react at all, even after repeated enquiries. Others frankly replied that they would have nothing to contribute because they had either not faced any antisemitic incidents or did not feel competent in addressing the subject. And some excused their negative response with a lack of time. Those prepared to be interviewed cooperated throughout the whole process. Problems mostly related to lack of understanding, for example about the relation between discrimination and antisemitism.

\(^7\) We are aware of the problem of using the tool of expert interviews in relation to people who are affected by the problem under scrutiny, such as Jews and antisemitism. However, we did not interview Jewish individuals as persons affected by antisemitism but as representatives of Jewish organizations, in order to integrate the knowledge of these institutions.
Methodology

The interviews were conducted and recorded in person (in the case of interviewees residing in Berlin) or via telephone. In some cases email was used due to time issues or where interview partners so requested.

The data collection took place between November 2016 and February 2017. The interviews were only partly transcribed, clustered along the main questions of the survey and summarized as follows in the respective sections of this report.
Definitions

Migrant
A person who has moved to another country (having been born abroad).

People with migrant background
Migrants, or children of migrants in the second or third generation.

Refugees
Migrants forced to flee war, persecution, discrimination or other circumstances threatening their life or health.

MENA (Middle East and North Africa)
This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. These three countries are included because of their profile either in the migration/refugee statistics or in current public debates in some European countries. We have taken the widest possible definition of MENA migrants in order not to miss any causal relationships that could be overlooked using more restrictive delineations. The full list of countries included in this study is as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank & Gaza, Western Sahara Territory, Yemen.

Communication latency (Kommunikationslatenz)
Restraint in openly expressing attitudes and convictions (here: traditional antisemitic) because they are socially proscribed (Bergmann/Erb, 1986). A common way of circumnavigating these restrictions (apart from expressing such attitudes and convictions only within groups of supposedly like-minded people) is detour communication.

Detour communication (Umwegkommunikation)
A method of circumventing established anti-antisemitic communication rules, by which antisemitic attitudes and convictions are expressed in forms that are not socially proscribed, for instance by referring to anti-Zionism, Israel-criticism or Shoah-remembrance-criticism. A very simple example is to replace the term ‘Jew’ with ‘Zionist’ (Bergmann/Erb, 1986; Beyer, 2015: 585f.).
1 Historical Context

Immigration and Antisemitism Pre-2011
1.1 Immigration from MENA and elsewhere before 2011

Prior to 2011, immigration to Germany originated mostly in countries of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Central and Eastern Europe. The biggest group was made up of the so-called Spätaussiedler (migrants from successor states of the former Soviet Union that had become naturalized via the ethnic ius sanguinis definition of German citizenship). Other relevant immigrating groups, apart from the massive inner-German economy-driven migration from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), were asylum seekers, mostly refugees from the wars in Yugoslavia, Romania, Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by Jewish Kontingentflüchtlinge (Jews or descendants of Jews from successor states of the former Soviet Union, except the Baltic states, which were allowed a certain quota of migrants to Germany, a relic of the last GDR government) and seasonal or temporary guest workers (Bade/Oltmer, 2004).

Immigration from Turkey had taken place in earlier decades, since 1955. Like that from Italy, Greece, Portugal and other European states, it resulted from Germany’s invitation to admit guest workers. After the halt in recruitment in 1973, immigration was restricted mostly to political asylum seekers and migrants joining their families, which produced significant numbers per year. So despite the peak in refugee and Spätaussiedler immigration in the early 1990s, the population with a migration background in Germany at that time consisted largely of former guest workers and their families.

Figure 1: Net migration to Germany, 1990–2011

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Wanderungsstatistik (=Fachserie 1, Reihe 1.2), available at www.destatis.de/GPStatistik/receive/DESerie_serie_00000016. See also Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2011

Note: MENA includes Afghanistan, Turkey and Eritrea; no data is available for Westbank/Gaza, Western Sahara Territory; for Djibouti, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar not before 2000; 1990: Westbank & Gaza; 2008–2009: there has been an extensive clearing up of population registers resulting in decreasing numbers, especially of foreigners, to an unknown extent. That makes the interpretation of the numbers for 2008 and 2009 difficult. Numbers for 1990–1999 not available online but have been provided by the Statistisches Bundesamt.

8 Migrants from states of the former Soviet Union who, according to German ius sanguinis (because of German ancestors), were considered Germans and received citizenship.
Immigration has been declining since 2002; after 2006 more people left Germany for Turkey than vice versa. Immigration from other MENA countries was mostly related to the wars, civil wars and oppression in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, but Germany also saw a constant flow of immigration from Morocco and Tunisia.\(^9\)

Regardless of immigration and emigration numbers, the total number of foreigners in Germany also declined through naturalization (with its peak in 2000: 186,700: Saleh, 2008: 52).

### 1.2 Antisemitism before 2011

#### 1.2.1 General characteristics

Some German researchers increasingly see antisemitism as a postmodern phenomenon that grows in response to certain characteristics of modernity, particularly ambivalence, uncertainty, insurmountability, invisibility and change. It makes complex processes that are perceived as threatening comprehensible in a simple way, and it serves to construct a self-image of clarity, straightforwardness and stability (Rensmann, 2004: 497; Weyand, 2010: 85) – a characterization that applies to antisemitism even as early as the 19th century.

Although antisemitism in Germany still correlates with political authoritarianism and jingoistic and homogenizing (völkisch) narratives of national identity (Frindte/Wammetsberger, 2008), there are new antisemitic mobilizations that unite the radical right, the anti-Zionist left and Islamists.\(^10\) As an international phenomenon that combines open antisemitism, anti-globalization, anti-US and anti-Israel positions, it aims at a ‘social-structural defence’ against processes of modernization understood as universal norms and democratic promises of freedom. Within that framework, Jews and migrants become stigmatized symbols of globalization (Rensmann, 2004: 495ff).

Antisemitic attitudes in Germany continue to be detached from real-world interactions with Jews: only 21% of German interviewees in a 2002 survey personally knew anyone Jewish (AJC, 2002).\(^11\)

#### 1.2.2 Traditional antisemitism

Open expressions of traditional antisemitism are still generally condemned and discouraged in public, but antisemitic stereotypes persist, even among people who do not consider themselves antisemites (Scherr/Schäuble, 2007: 14, 23).

For all surveys it is important to note that due to an awareness of discursive restrictions and social norms among the interviewees (a phenomenon known as social desirability bias), the results understate actual support for antisemitic attitudes. In a follow-up study on the Bielefeld sample, the motivation to answer according to the norm of prejudice-free behaviour influenced responses to all antisemitism statements – except the equation of National Socialism and Israel (Leibold et al., 2012: 192f.).

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10 However, some studies found no correlation between the indices of Israel-critique and antisemitism among left-wing interviewees (Bergmann, 2008).

11 N=1250, representative face-to-face survey in October 2002.
Historical Context

Traditional antisemitism (measured by the statement that Jews had too much power in Germany and that they had brought persecution upon themselves through their behaviour) slowly receded since 2002 (in the Bielefeld polls from 12.7% in 2002 to 8.4% in 2006 where it has stayed until 2014, followed by a further drop to 5.8% – Zick et al., 2016: 50). In 2002, 16.6% supported the statement that the Jews had brought persecution upon themselves through their behaviour (Heitmeyer, 2003: 21). Support for the statement ‘Jews have too much influence in Germany’ in the same poll decreased from 21.7% in 2002 to a stable level of around 15% between 2006 and 2010 and 13% in 2011 (Leibold et al., 2012: 186; Heitmeyer, 2012: 38; Zick/Küpper, 2011: 21). These findings are also supported by a Europe-wide survey by the Bielefeld group in 2008 where 19.7% of interviewed Germans agreed with that statement (Zick et al., 2011: 65). The decrease, however, is attributed by some authors less to a real decrease in antisemitic attitudes than to a changed articulation strategy. In order to circumnavigate the communicative restriction on expressing traditional antisemitism publicly, these attitudes are channelled into more acceptable forms such as secondary and Israel-related antisemitism (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 10–13). Another possible explanation for a part of the decrease, especially in younger generations, is the impact of education and prevention programmes, which are not discussed in any study.

1.2.3 Secondary antisemitism

Secondary antisemitism is widespread. In the 2006 ALLBUS survey, 49.9% of the Germans interviewed agreed that ‘many Jews try to profit from events of the Third Reich and let the Germans pay for it’ (West Germany 52.2%, East Germany 39.9%) (calculation by Scherr/Schäuble, 2007: 7). According to the Bielefeld group’s ‘Deutsche Zustände’ survey, the statement ‘many Jews try to profit from events of the Third Reich’ found agreement among more than 50% of the interviewees in 2002/03 (2003: 54.5%), but found declining support in subsequent years, down to about one third in 2007, then stabilizing at slightly less than 40% between 2008 and 2011 (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 22). In a 2002 AJC poll, 52% of the German interviewees agreed with the statement that ‘Jews are exploiting the memory of the Holocaust for their own purposes’ – only 30% disagreed (AJC, 2002). Since 2008, a (rising) majority even agrees with the statement that Israel is waging a Vernichtungskrieg (extermination war) against the Palestinians: 68.4% in 2004, 41.9% in 2006, 49.2% in 2008, 51.1% in 2009 and 57.3% in 2010 (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 23; Leibold et al., 2012: 186). In its equation of National Socialism and Israel and its implicit downplaying of the Shoah, such a statement forms a special category of secondary antisemitism.

12 The result for 2002 is supported by the AJC survey: too much Jewish influence in Germany: 20% (but with a suspiciously high amount of ‘not sure’ answers, the highest of the groups asked for in this item). The result for ‘too much influence on world events’ is higher, though: only 38% disagree, 40 agree (AJC, 2002). According to the ALLBUS survey in 2006, still 32.8% of all Germans agreed on ‘the Jews have too much influence in the world’ (24.2% in East Germany, 34.8% in the West) (calculation by Scherr/Schäuble, 2007: 6).

13 In a 2008 survey the item was supported by 48.9% of German interviewees in a European poll (Zick et al., 2011: 65).
1.2.4 Israel-related antisemitism
The Vernichtungskrieg statement can be interpreted as a sign of Israel-related antisemitism as it demonizes Israel by equating genocide (the term ‘extermination’ being most prominently associated with the Shoah and German warfare in Eastern Europe in World War II) with Israeli occupation politics, which may be disputable and unjust but are not genocidal (Pallade, 2008; Bergmann, 2008). Others, however, claim that equating Israel with National Socialism is not necessarily antisemitic because National Socialism stands only as a general symbol for evil. Animal rights activists also use it for their purposes. Moreover, it is argued, the inexplicably high support rates for this claim (up to two-thirds of the interviewees), further weaken its reliability as an index of antisemitism (Pfahl-Traughber, 2015). The first part of this argument is not convincing since the demonization of Israel as absolute evil remains, whoever else uses this equation, and in itself qualifies the statement as antisemitic. The second part of the argument is similarly questionable. Just because a statement generates more agreement than others does not make it invalid. It could very well also mean that an extraordinary number of people really support a subtle new form of antisemitism. One might just as readily argue that, in a European and German context, the term ‘Zionist’ when used negatively can be a form of detour communication: a replacement for ‘the Jew’, a disguise for traditional antisemitism in order to circumnavigate social norms prohibiting its overt expression.

Pfahl-Traughber’s objection nevertheless reminds us not to generalize. There might be people who do not associate the term ‘extermination’ with National Socialism. Without any doubt, Israel-related antisemitism is a ‘grey area’ (Unabhängiger Expertenkreis Antisemitismus [UEA], 2017: 27) where a clear distinction between criticism and antisemitism is not easy to draw. But there are categories that help to identify the latter. First, a statement is antisemitic when it expresses enmity against Jews as Jews by means of ascribing negative traits (Pfahl-Traughber, 2015: 294). According to the authors of the Mitte study, Israel-related antisemitism infuses Israel-criticism with antisemitic stereotypes and Nazi equations and characterizes Israeli politics as typically Jewish (Zick et al., 2016: 38). Stereotypes often used in this context are those of a supposedly Jewish thirst for revenge, conspiracy, maliciousness and greed. Probably the most typical claim in Israel-related antisemitism is the equation of Israel and Jews. Between 30% and 40% of the German interviewees ‘can understand’ that people do not like Jews because of Israeli policies: 2004: 44.4%, 2006: 29.9%, 2007: 32.8%, 2009: 33.9%, 2010: 38.4% (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 22). Those who subscribe to Israel-related antisemitism blame the actions of Israeli institutions on ‘the Jews’, equate Jews and Israel and, directly or indirectly, challenge Jewish life (literally the life of Jews) in the Middle East by way of questioning the existence of Israel.14 The prevalence of double standards against Israel can be demonstrated by the mere existence of the term Israelkritik (Israel-criticism), a construction applied only to one country in the world (UEA, 2017: 66).

In sum, Israel-related antisemitism can be defined as enmity or hatred against Jews as Jews while referring to the state of Israel and its policies. It blames all Jews everywhere for Israeli policies, it infuses criticism of Israel with traditional

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14 See also the ‘3D-test’ about double standards, demonization and delegitimization, according to Natan Sharansky, see UEA, 2017: 27f.
antisemitic stereotypes and it characterizes Israeli policies as typically Jewish. Through an equation of Israel and National Socialism, it demonizes Israel as the ultimate evil in our times, a judgement rife with double standards that ultimately questions Israel’s right to exist.

Empirically (within the ethnic restriction of their sample), the Bielefeld group stated that Israel-criticism without statistical association with antisemitic statements in other parts of the survey is theoretically possible but in practice extremely rare (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 29–32).

Studies also documented how German mainstream media reported about Israel in a biased and antisemitic way (Jäger/Jäger, 2003, 2004; also recently UEA, 2017: 124–7).

A study on antisemitism and Israel-criticism in 2010 claims that Israel-criticism cannot be simply attributed to antisemitism because 38% of the interviewees criticized Israel and supported Palestine out of a pacifist human rights position while rejecting antisemitism. That could be an explanation for the difference between the National Socialism–Israel equation and other claims for Israel-related antisemitism. The survey also identified a group of heavily antisemitic supporters of the Palestinian cause (26% of the overall sample) who exhibited not only antisemitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israel but, surprisingly, anti-Muslim-racist resentment (Kempf, 2015).

At the same time, about two-thirds of the supporters of Israel – while rejecting antisemitism generally – showed a tendency to support secondary antisemitic statements and expressed anti-Zionist and anti-Israel attitudes. The authors thus attributed their Israel-support mainly to anti-Muslim racism (viewing all Muslims as terrorists) (Kempf, 2015: 80f.).

A recent incident in Berlin may illustrate the phenomenon of Israel-related antisemitism. In a Friedenau primary school, a Jewish boy had been antisemitically assaulted and even physically attacked by schoolmates reported to have a Turkish or Arab family background. The parents took him out of this school and made the case public. This was followed by intensive nationwide media coverage. Subsequently, parents of other children at the same school complained in an open letter about the media destroying the reputation of the school. At the same time they introduced the Arab-Israeli conflict: in the Middle East there had been a decade-long ‘conflict between Arabs and Jews’ and a diverse city like Berlin with people from ‘both religions and cultures’ could not be saved from the excesses of international conflicts. A multinational school could not ‘be immune to religiously motivated quarrels between them’. They replayed here one of the core elements of Israel-related antisemitism: they belittled and relativized the antisemitic attack by German Muslims against a Jew as a mutual conflict and legitimized it as if the Jewish boy were an Israeli soldier.

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1.2.5 Influencing variables
Antisemitic attitudes directly correlate to age (the older the individual, the more likely he is to exhibit antisemitism; the effect is weaker for secondary antisemitism) and inversely to education level (the better educated the individual, the less likely she is to exhibit antisemitism; the effect is weaker for Israel-related antisemitism). For traditional and secondary antisemitism men show slightly more hostility than women, while for Israel-related antisemitism there is no gender difference. The difference between East and West Germany in antisemitic attitudes had vanished by 2010 (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 34–8).

Political attitudes, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation (the will to control and dominate), the feeling of being collectively disadvantaged (as Germans), the feeling of being politically powerless and the general trend of assessing humans by their economic usefulness: all these strengthen traditional and secondary antisemitism, but have less impact on Israel-related antisemitism. While respondents’ own financial situation did not have any effect on antisemitic attitudes, the feeling of being economically threatened by migration did (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 40–50, 55).

1.2.6 Trends
Zick and Küpper observed a general decline in antisemitism after 2002 but since 2007 there has been a stabilization, in some aspects even a rise, without returning to the level of 2002 (Zick/Küpper, 2011: 20). Generally, since the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, the weight of antisemitic resentment among the German public has increasingly shifted from secondary antisemitism in the sense of hating Jews for raising memories of the Shoah (as manifested in the discourses about compensations or the Berlin Holocaust memorial) to Israel-related antisemitism.

What can be regarded as new in antisemitism since 2000 is that, although open Jew-hatred is still condemned in democratic public culture, the codes and images of Jews are changing and the threshold for what one is allowed to say is constantly being lowered. This trend is also fostered by opaque political decision-making processes that have increased the general disenchantment with politics (Rensmann, 2004; Pallade, 2008). It is widely perceived that growing numbers of antisemites are putting anonymity aside: public antisemitic expressions, hate mail and threatening letters now tend to be signed (Bergmann/Wetzel, 2003: 49).

1.2.7 Muslims and antisemitism
In the influential and widely publicized Deutsche Zustände survey by Heitmeyer et al. antisemitism is understood as part of the ‘group-focused enmity’ syndrome. The core of this syndrome is the ideology of Ungleichwertigkeit (difference of value) and its seven elements: racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, heterophobia (against homosexuals, homeless people, disabled people and others differing from an assumed norm), ‘Islam-phobia’, the primacy of the long-established population, and sexism. These seven elements strongly correlate with each other (Heitmeyer, 2003). Heitmeyer, however, has been criticized for methodological nationalism (excluding people with a migration background from the sample), for describing differences as existing instead of being constructed and for overlooking the impact of social structure by understanding racism and so on as mere attitudes or prejudices of individuals (Attia, 2013). Others have criticized the many gaps in the surveys: the neglect, for instance, of adolescents and of individuals with a migrant background (Möller, 2012).
Since 2000, Muslims appear as antisemitic perpetrators in Germany as in other countries. But the numbers of criminal offences show very clearly that non-Muslim, extreme right-wing, white Germans remain the main offender group. In the case of Berlin, however, Muslims have committed a disproportionate number of acts of antisemitic violence (Kohlstruck/Ullrich, 2015: 89). Some authors remind us that these figures have to be checked for the statistical effects of generally higher rates of violent offences among male adolescents with a Turkish migration background (Möller, 2012: 249). In a recent survey among German Jews, those affected by antisemitic incidents were far more likely to identify Muslims as perpetrators than they were to cite unidentified, left- or right-wing persons. The authors of this report have no explanation for the difference between this finding and the numbers from crime statistics (UEA, 2017: 41).

Among young people, the level of antisemitic attitudes and opinions seems to be higher among Muslims than among non-Muslims (Kohlstruck/Ullrich, 2015: 89; for Israel-related antisemitism: Frindte et al., 2011: 219). Yet smaller surveys sometimes seem to contradict this finding – for example a 2008 group discussion with Jewish school children in northern Germany who stated that their experience of antisemitism resulted mostly from actions by (extreme right-wing) non-migrant Germans or teachers, and that they considered Muslim students largely to be allies (Follert/Stender, 2010).

A qualitative study of youth groups in 2006 classified four contexts for decisive hostility towards Jews (which in general young people encountered only rarely, largely in the form of fragmentary stereotypes):

- groups with an extreme right-wing identity
- groups of self-defined Germans who aim for a positive national identity and therefore complained about being forced to reflect on the Shoah and being forbidden to criticize Israel
- groups of self-defined Germans who believe they have come to terms with the National Socialist past and as a result feel morally unconstrained in expressing secondary and Israel-related antisemitism
- groups of adolescents with a migrant background who define themselves politically as Muslims, believe in a basic conflict between the West and Islam, and show strong Israel-related antisemitism (Scherr/Schäuble, 2007: 8).

The authors conclude that national identification, rather than membership in right-wing extremist or Muslim groups, was the most frequent indicator of antisemitic attitudes (ibid.: 35).

In another survey, 15.7% of young Muslims expressed the highest agreement with traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes (e.g. ‘Jews are greedy and arrogant’) in comparison with 7.4% of non-Muslim migrants and 5.4% of non-Muslim ‘domestic’ pupils (Brettfeld/Wetzels, 2007: 275). The tendency to agree with that statement correlated with the degree of religiosity and conservatism. The statement found

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17 It is highly questionable why there are no ‘Muslim domestics’ here, especially if one deals with pupils whose parents already were born in Germany. This points to a shortcoming of this survey (see also below in the section about integration): seeing all Muslims as migrant, non-German, non-domestic and thus repeating the segregation construct and tending to an essentialist if not biologic understanding of group belonging.
support among 49.6% of fundamentalist religious Muslims, 33.4% of Christians, 42.8% of traditional conservative Muslims and 37.3% of Christians, while only 13.6% of less devout Muslims and 11.5% of less devout Christians accepted it (ibid.: 279). Regarding religious intolerance in general (antisemitic attitudes being one of three forms of intolerance measured) the difference between young Muslims and non-Muslims vanished when the data was controlled for educational background and duration of stay in Germany (ibid.: 278, similarly among university students: 394).

A new phenomenon since 2002 has been the participation of young people with a Turkish family background in Israel-related antisemitism. While German Muslims with a Turkish background had largely abstained from antisemitic anti-Zionism until then, from that date male adolescents of this community increasingly expressed ‘solidarity’ with the Palestinians as fellow Muslims and victims of the Middle East conflict (Wetzel, 2014: 3).

Israel-related antisemitism in Germany differs according to the birthplace of the Muslims in question: 42% of those born in the Middle East blamed Israel alone for the Arab-Israeli conflict and hoped that Jews would disappear from the region, as did 32% of those born in African countries, 29% in Turkey, 28% in Germany, 15% of those born in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran or Pakistan and only 12% of those born in the Balkans. As a contrast, the statement found support among only 3% of German non-Muslims (Frindte et al., 2011: 230). If we distinguish between Muslim interviewees by religious affiliation, fewer Alavis blamed Israel alone for the Arab-Israeli conflict than did Sunnis and Shiites (ibid.: 240).

A 2008 survey in youth clubs and migrant organizations in Berlin-Kreuzberg that work with adolescents with a Turkish, Kurdish or Arab background found that some clubs reported continuous problems with antisemitism, others reported that problems arose largely at times of heightened tensions in the Middle East, and others reported no problems at all. Classical and religiously motivated antisemitism occurred only rarely: most cases were Israel-related. Although neither uniformly nor automatically, visitors of Arab background tended to express their antisemitic attitudes more frequently, aggressively and openly than those whose background was Kurdish or Turkish (Fréville et al., 2010).

Almost all reports stressed that what they found were cases of negative stereotypes in hate speech, not fixed antisemitic ideologies (Fréville et al., 2010; Follert/Stender, 2010: 200; Scherr/Schäuble, 2007: 12). Furthermore, in Germany as elsewhere, the Muslim part of the population has to be understood as very heterogeneous. Claudia Dantschke has identified one group of German Muslims that identifies with Islam politically and ideologically, less as a religion than as a model for society. This group attacks modernity as identity-destroying and blames secularization and laicism on the Jews. Their antisemitism is influenced by European clerical anti-modern anti-Judaism and, Dantschke argues, should be labelled Islamistic or Islamized antisemitism rather than Muslim antisemitism. While Arab and Turkish left-wing anti-Zionist groups with their stereotypically antisemitic critique of globalization and financial capitalism are also often subsumed under the label of Muslim antisemitism, in fact all these strands are only minorities within the Muslim population in Germany. The majority shows at most ‘affinities’ with antisemitic thinking that may edge toward outright antisemitism depending on discrimination experiences in Germany or a Lebanese or Palestinian family background (Dantschke, 2009: 18).
1.2.8 Antisemitism among Muslims: reasons and functions

There is no consensus about what drives antisemitism among Muslims. Very influentially, Klaus Holz stated that social, religious and racist discrimination which, in turn, promotes Islamism is one of the main preconditions of antisemitism and that there is no monocausal relation between descent and antisemitism (Holz, 2005: 9, 93; 2006: 53). There was a stronger correlation between personal experiences of discrimination and antisemitic attitudes among young Muslims with a migration background than among other migrant groups (Wetzel, 2014: 8; Brettfeld/Wetzels, 2007: 308). Over 85% of all Muslims interviewed in a representative survey felt personally affected by the situation of Muslims in the Middle East (Brettfeld/Wetzels, 2007: 195; cf. also Scherr/Schäuble, 2007: 37–40). Closely connected with this is the issue of victim competition, a special version of secondary antisemitism that complains about the privileged treatment of the Jews through Holocaust remembrance. Facing social and educational discrimination, their own histories of postcolonial discrimination and suffering often unrecognized, young Muslims envy the Jews for the public presence of the Shoah and for their social integration (Wetzel, 2014). Even in schools, antisemitism and racism are topics that carry very different weight (Fréville et al., 2010: 197).

In the above-mentioned survey among Kreuzberg youth clubs and migrant organizations, most of the latter named discrimination as a key driver of antisemitic attitudes, a means of compensating for their devaluation by the German mainstream. Yet others have questioned this argument, pointing out that antisemitism also exists among non-migrant Germans with high social status and education level (Fréville et al., 2010: 193f.).

Astrid Messerschmidt argues that discrimination and precarious situations may be a preparing ground for antisemitism, but it is not the reason for it. In addressing antisemitism, it is important to reflect on the social context behind it, but not at the price of losing sight of the problem itself (Messerschmidt, 2010: 103).

Antisemitism among Muslims is assumed to serve a number of functions: it provides a means of constructing and stabilizing identities and group belonging for Muslims in a national, ethnic or religious context (Freville et al., 2010: 194; Holz, 2005); it is a form of provocation in order to mark their own difference; it provides compensation through projecting Muslims’ own devaluation onto Jews; it allows for repression of their own experiences of racist exclusion through blaming the Jews (Messerschmidt, 2010: 95).

It is an open question whether today’s political-Islamist versions of antisemitism serve the same functions as did antisemitism in Imperial Germany – that is, functioning as a key to understanding all current political, economic and cultural problems and as a concession to those who believe their social, political and cultural position in modern society is being called into question (cf. Jochmann, 1976). Klaus Holz also extends his influential analysis of antisemitism as national

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18 On a secondary level and like Muslims elsewhere, German Muslims increasingly feel marginalized collectively and worldwide through the blanket condemnation of all Muslims as terrorists. This caused 90% of Muslim Germans in a survey to express anger (Brettfeld/Wetzels, 2007: 195).
Historical Context

semantics (Holz, 2001) to Islamist antisemitism. In his view, Islamist antisemitism plays the same role that traditional European antisemitism had done: legitimizing nationalism ideologically through the construction of a universalist enemy (Holz, 2005: 13ff.; Kiefer, 2007).

1.2.9 Antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism
On the other hand, some have argued that current anti-Muslim racism echoes the functions, semantics and structures of traditional antisemitism. As was the case with antisemitism in Imperial Germany, anti-Muslim racism serves to exclude part of the population seen as a competitor for resources, in the process constructing supposedly heterogeneous in- and out-groups. Like antisemitism, it creates a scapegoat for current political, economic and cultural problems, inventing allegedly inhumane religious rules and external characteristics that supposedly mark the outsiders. As with traditional antisemitism, it invents a conspiracy to destroy the nation, building total hostility, employing a static, homogenizing and essentializing understanding of culture that is inextricably linked to conservativism, nationalism and cultural pessimism. Finally, it offers compensation and reassurance to those who think their social, political and cultural position in modern society may be called into question, shoring up their position from racist assumptions of supremacy (cf. Benz, 2008; Messerschmidt, 2010: 97).

I would also suggest that the situation of liberal Jews in 19th-century Germany and moderate Muslims in Germany today is at least structurally similar. Like those ‘Germans of Jewish denomination’, liberal ‘Muslim Germans’ of today sometimes feel wedged between, on the one hand, their exclusion by the German majority and, on the other, the ‘assimilation’ reproach by fundamentalists of their own religion, who accuse them of losing their religious and cultural identity (cf. Frindte/Wammetsberger, 2011: 619f.).

But German antisemitism research also points to insurmountable differences that preclude us putting antisemitism on the same level as or even equating it with Muslim-hatred. At the core of antisemitism in Germany is the invention of a race or nation that is understood as a universal, total alien whose mere presence threatens human order and has to be destroyed. As an ideology it is basically anti-modern (against individualism, liberalism, materialism, gender equality), whereas European Muslim-hatred explicitly endorses modernity and enlightenment. Antisemitism is a fiction that works even without the presence of Jews, while Muslim-enmity is connected to the presence of Muslims in society (even if they might live in a different part of the country than the Muslim-hater). Antisemitism allegedly attacks the mighty from below while Muslim-hatred serves to defend the privileges and feelings of supremacy of the majority (Müller, 2009). One could add that in 19th-century Germany there had been neither Jewish-fundamentalist terror attacks on civilians nor orthodox and oppressive Jewish states elsewhere that sponsored them.

All modern variants of antisemitism consist of the same semantic elements: global conspiracy theories, the figure of the non-national, non-religious, non-racial total alien, the contrasting social models of Jewish Gesellschaft (decomposition) vs. traditional Gemeinschaft (essentialist integration) (Holz, 2005: 13ff.).

Without putting too much emphasis on this debate here, it should be mentioned that there is also evidence for the more general position not to see antisemitism as a form of racism: antisemitism and racism are relatively weakly correlated with each other within the syndrome of group-focused enmity in Europe (Zick et al., 2011: 81).
From another perspective, commentators on the debate after 2001 as to whether a new antisemitism would be introduced to Europe by Muslims observed that both the ‘alarmists’ and the ‘deniers’ were wrong (Bunzl/Senfft, 2008). ‘Islamophobia’ and antisemitism were essentially different because the latter was a historical project of national ‘purification’ to exclude the Jews from the European nations, while the former is an ongoing project of European consolidation and self-definition. In European politics antisemitism no longer played a role. There was no debate about the legitimacy of Jews in Europe, but there was such a debate about Muslims, whose existence in Europe was continuously questioned. According to Bunzl and Senfft it is an irony of history that the new antisemitism sees Jews as part of Europe – and Europe as the colonizing enemy. But their analysis that in today’s Europe antisemitism is ‘irrelevant’ (61) has been proven wrong since 2008. The concept of national ‘purity’ has not been superseded by a European pan-identity. On the contrary, the whole European Union project is being challenged by growing nationalist and racist movements in almost every country. Antisemitism is a sometimes hidden part of the agenda of most of these movements. In the cases, of Hungary and Poland, members of these movements form part of the government itself.

But nevertheless, after Heitmeyer and Benz many other researchers insisted that antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism should be analysed together instead of being framed as separate products of distinct theoretical traditions and political convictions (Foroutan, 2013: 15). According to Astrid Messerschmidt, in order to understand antisemitism and racism in an immigration society, one has to reflect upon the history and impact of both. The discourse on terror overlays the (classic-antisemitic) fear of superiority with a (racist) projection of cultural inferiority. Reflecting on the commonalities and differences between antisemitism and racism is likewise important in addressing the use of antisemitism in left-wing antiracist arguments, which tend to treat migrants only as objects rather than subjects of discrimination (Messerschmidt, 2010: 98ff.)

### 1.2.10 Other migrant groups

It should be noted that among other migrant groups, especially those from the former Soviet Union, antisemitic attitudes can be expressed with a ‘brutal openness, associated with a rigid authoritarianist conventionalism’ (Follert/Stender, 2010: 200). Even the narrative of ‘imported antisemitism’ has been used in this context. As Follert and Stender put it, ‘classic’ antisemitism ‘seep[ed] into the European Union from the successor states of the former Soviet Union’ (ibid.: 218, own translation). The public and research focus on Muslims alone appears even more problematic when one considers that the radical right-wing party AfD contains more newly elected MPs with a migration background from East Central and Eastern Europe than do the CDU/CSU and FDP.

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21 Like the equation of Zionism and racism, Israel and National Socialism, Israel and Jews, demonization of Israel, assumption of a Jewish victim monopoly etc. in post-/anticolonial scenes, esp. in Palestine solidarity and/or BDS movements.

1.3 Summary

- After the peak of the Al-Aqsa-Intifada, antisemitic attitudes in Germany have receded slowly but since 2008 stabilized at high level.

- Traditional antisemitism is vanishing. Among some non-Muslim, non-migrant Germans, however, traditional antisemitic attitudes are articulated as secondary or Israel-related antisemitism. The latter shows support rates of up to 57% for single statements and is independent of age, gender and income.

- Since 2000, political and discursive opportunity structures have lowered the threshold of what can be said about Israel and the Jews and more and more antisemites act openly, without the protection of anonymity.

- National identification and authoritarian attitudes shape the probability of antisemitic attitudes more than ethnic descent, migration background or religion.

- Muslims are among the offenders of antisemitic crimes and show antisemitic attitudes in studies, but there are only a few representative polls. Young Muslims show higher levels of antisemitic attitudes than their non-Muslim age group counterparts.

- Since 2002, rising numbers of young Germans with a Turkish family background are also expressing Israel-related antisemitism. A feeling of personal empathy for the situation of the Palestinians among a vast majority is connected with the feeling of being globally discriminated against as Muslims.

- German Muslims express a range of antisemitic attitudes. These depend on the region of origin (e.g. those born in Arab countries express more antisemitic attitudes than those Muslims born in African countries, Turkey or Germany, and much more than those born in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran or Pakistan) and degree of religiosity and conservatism.

- Almost all reports stressed that Muslims gave voice to negative antisemitic stereotypes and hate speech rather than fixed antisemitic worldviews.

- Discrimination and victim competition are discussed as reasons for antisemitism among Muslims, but mostly as a preparing ground, not as a monocausal explanation. Antisemitism serves to construct and stabilize identities and group belonging. It also serves as a provocation that helps to compensate for their perceived devaluation by the non-Muslim majority. It does so by redirecting this devaluation towards the Jews and repressing personal experiences of racist exclusion through blaming the Jews.

- The term ‘imported antisemitism’ has been used not only for Muslims but also for migrant groups from the former Soviet Union who showed high rates of antisemitic attitudes.
2 Current Demographics
2.1 Population in 2015

Figure 2: Population in Germany, 2015, in millions

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015

Note: ‘Migration background’ is defined as having immigrated or at least one parent having immigrated, ‘migrants’ having migrated themselves.

2.2 Immigrants: country of origin 2015

Figure 3: Country of origin according to citizenship


Note: Migrants (11,453 million), people with migration background (17,118 million). ‘Others or not known’, migration background = 16% other EU28, 10% other Europe, 5% other Asia, 8% none stated, the rest: other Africa and America.

23 www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/ Migrationshintergrund2010220157004.pdf. Numbers are according to the Mikrozensus. The numbers of the AZR (central register of foreigners) for non-citizens are higher (9.1 million) because the micro-census data do not include refugees in first reception centres, see http://mediendienst-integration.de/migration/bevoelkerung.html.
2.3 Religion

Religion as a demographic category is problematic to define and measure. One approach to measuring religious affiliation is to count members of churches, congregations, associations and so on, although that would include people who retain a membership but regard themselves as being non-religious. On the other hand, in some religions, such as Islam, membership in congregations is much less important than (unregistered) religious practice. In those cases simply counting members would probably miss the majority of practising Muslims. In addition, membership statistics do not recognize cultural affiliation with a religiously defined community, for example people who see themselves as Jews but do not engage in religious practice. Finally, statistics of religious belonging have to address the problem of how to represent multiple membership. This, however, is not as relevant for Germany where monotheism and identification with a single religion is dominant. The discussion that follows relies on the data of REMID (Religionswissenschaftlicher Medien- und Informationsdienst) which attempts to address all of these issues.

More than 60% of the German population identifies itself as Christian. Those not identifying with any religion constitute the second-largest group, 32% of the total population. Islam is the second largest religion in Germany and Muslims account for approximately 6% of the population. Members of Jewish congregations account for 0.12% (about 100,000 people).

**Figure 4: Religious affiliation in Germany, 2015**

![Religious affiliation chart](source: REMID)

Official estimates for the Muslim population of Germany are 4.4 to 4.7 million (Stichs, 2016). The number of Jews refers to the members of the registered congregations within the Central Council of Jews in Germany.

It is important to note that not all migrants from predominantly Muslim countries are Muslim. A 2009 survey showed a huge discrepancy among many MENA countries: while the population in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq is assumed to be

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97–99% Muslim, only 49% of migrants from Iran identified themselves as Muslim, while 38% labelled themselves non-religious. Among Iraqi migrants only 59% identified as Muslim while 24% affiliated with other religions and 17% said they were non-religious. Similarly, some 20% of Afghan migrants declared themselves non-religious, with 10% belonging to another religion and 69% to Islam. In contrast, migrant populations from Lebanon and Israel show a disproportionately high number of Muslims. Though only 59% of Lebanon’s population is Muslim, in Germany Muslims constitute 74% of Lebanese migrants. While Muslims make up 16% of Israel’s population, 22% of Germany’s Israeli migrants affiliate with Islam. (Haug et al., 2009: 87f., 323).

2.4 Immigrant population characteristics

2.4.1 Gender
Demographic statistics in Germany distinguish only between male and female. The proportions of men and women differ only slightly between migrant and non-migrant Germans. Among the non-migrant population, women outnumber men by about 1.3%. Among those with a migration background, the numbers of men and women are nearly equal. However, if only foreign-born migrants are taken into consideration, the migrant population consists of 1.7% more men than women.

Table 1: German population – gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Non-migrant</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Migrant background</th>
<th>Migrant %</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Foreigners %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>31,311,000</td>
<td>48.71%</td>
<td>8,660,000</td>
<td>50.59%</td>
<td>4,016,000</td>
<td>51.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>32,975,000</td>
<td>51.29%</td>
<td>8,458,000</td>
<td>49.41%</td>
<td>3,756,000</td>
<td>48.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015

2.4.2 Age
The migrant population in Germany generally is younger than the population without a migration background. The average age of Germans without a migration background is 44.7, that of the immigrant population 35.6.

Table 2: Age distribution in Germany 2015 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Non-migrants</th>
<th>Migrant background total</th>
<th>Migrant background – foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–5</td>
<td>2,221</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–10</td>
<td>2,237</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–15</td>
<td>2,422</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–20</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–25</td>
<td>3,249</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–35</td>
<td>7,588</td>
<td>2,624</td>
<td>1,543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 Haug et al. (2009) refer to the CIA World Factbook for the country numbers.
Current Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Non-migrants</th>
<th>Migrant background total</th>
<th>Migrant background - foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35–45</td>
<td>7,364</td>
<td>2,773</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–55</td>
<td>10,944</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>1,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–65</td>
<td>9,399</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65–75</td>
<td>7,624</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75–85</td>
<td>6,336</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85–95</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 and over</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015

Table 3: Age distribution in Germany 2015, non-migrant population, people with migration background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Non-migrant</th>
<th>Migrant background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>15.21%</td>
<td>28.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–35</td>
<td>16.86%</td>
<td>21.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–65</td>
<td>43.10%</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 65</td>
<td>24.83%</td>
<td>10.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015

28% of the population with a migrant background are under 20 (non-migrants: 15%), about half are under 35 (non-migrants: about one third), but 10% is older than 65 (non-migrants: one quarter).

Figure 5: Age distribution in Germany – absolute numbers

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015
Current Demographics

Figure 6: Age distribution in Germany: as percentage per age group

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015

2.5 Summary

- Germany is an immigration country. More than a fifth of the German population has a migration background (meaning that they or their parents migrated to the country), and about 14% have immigrated themselves.

- Among those whose parents migrated, the largest group has a Turkish background (about 17%), followed by people from the former Soviet Union (13%) and Poland (10%). Among first-generation migrants those from Turkey are the second largest group (about 12%), after migrants from the former Soviet Union (15%) and closely followed by people from Poland.

- The numbers of immigrants from MENA countries other than Turkey are lower than those mentioned above, but they are the largest group currently immigrating.

- In terms of religious affiliation, Germany is predominantly Christian (about 60%). The second largest group is non-religious people (about 32%). The third largest group are Muslims, who form about 6% of the total.

- The immigrant population of Germany is on average younger than the population as a whole.
3 Immigration
Since 2011
From January 2015 to June 2016, 1,314,158 refugees registered in Germany as immigrants. This marked a sharp rise from 2014, which saw only 238,676 registrations. The peak months were September to December 2015, with 150,000-200,000 registrations per month. From January to June 2016 the number of refugees registering as immigrants totalled 222,264 (though from March 2016 the numbers fell below 25,000). Most of the refugees came from Syria (2015: 39.2% = 428,468), followed by Afghanistan and Iraq (14.1% and 11.1%), and the rest of the countries relevant here (Iran, Eritrea, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia: 7.7%). These numbers include migrants in transit to other European states: from the more than one million registered immigrants only 441,899 applied for asylum in Germany (Bundeskriminalamt, 2015).

### 3.1 Immigration

The immigration numbers from MENA countries have been rising since 2011, with a steep climb in 2014 and an even steeper one in 2015. The main countries of origin since 2011 are Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.

For Turkey, since 1992, the net migration numbers have been falling (except peaks in 1995/96 and 2001/02). Between 2006 and 2014 a greater number of people left Germany for Turkey than the other way around (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015: 41).

**Figure 7: Net migration to Germany, relating to citizenship**

Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015; Statistisches Bundesamt: Wanderungsstatistik (=Fachserie 1, Reihe 1.2) [27](MENA incl. Afghanistan, Turkey and Eritrea, no data for West Bank/Gaza, Western Saharan Territory)

See Figure 8 for the migration numbers for specific countries.

[27](www.destatis.de/GPStatistik/receive/DE Serie_serie_00000016)
3.2 Number of MENA migrants

The number of MENA migrants in Germany who are not in possession of a German passport was stable between 2011 and 2014 and in 2015 rose by about half a million people. The five main MENA immigration countries in 2011 were Turkey, Iraq, Morocco, Afghanistan and Iran. In 2015, Turkey remained the largest group, but followed now by Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Morocco.
3.3 MENA and other migrants

By far the largest number of non-German citizens living in Germany in 2015 had Turkish citizenship, followed by people from Poland, Italy, former Yugoslavia, Romania, Syria, Greece, the Russian Federation and Bulgaria (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016: 10 and Table 3).

Despite the rise in immigration to Germany from MENA countries, the percentage of MENA migrants among non-citizens is falling slightly, mostly due to an increasing number of EU citizens having migrated to Germany.
3.4 Profile of MENA migrants 2015

3.4.1 Age

Figure 12: Average age, according to the AZR

![Average age chart](image)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016

3.4.2 Gender

Figure 13 gives the percentage of women among non-citizens in Germany in 2015. The proportion of women among Turks almost matches that of the German population in general.

Figure 13: Proportion of women among non-citizens, according to the AZR

![Women proportion chart](image)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016
3.4.3 Legal status

**Figures 14: Legal status of non-citizens, according to the AZR**

![Legal status: non-citizens from Turkey, 2015](image1)

![Legal status: non-citizens MENA, 2015 (without Turkey)](image2)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016

Note: Permanent: non-permanent permit according to old residence law, settlement permits and EU free movement; others temporary: temporary according to old residence law, education, work and others.

3.4.4 Religion

The publications of the Federal Statistics Office that cover populations from MENA countries do not provide data on religion, education or migration routes. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, however, has published some selected data on religion. Figure 15 shows the religions of all asylum seekers in Germany 2015 (total: 441,899).

**Figure 15: Religion of asylum seekers in Germany, 2015**

![Religion of asylum seekers in Germany, 2015](image3)

Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016: 25

Among the ten countries with the most asylum seekers in 2015 were four MENA countries: Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea. Figure 16 illustrates their religious affiliations.
3.5 Migration routes

The 2016 refugee survey by the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) and other institutions (Gostomski et al., 2016) provides some facts about migration routes. Among MENA refugees 38% had stayed at least three months in a transit country before arriving in Germany. Among Syrians, 42% had stayed in Turkey, 10% in Lebanon, 8% each in Austria and Egypt. Afghan refugees had stayed in Iran (34%), Turkey (21%), Syria (10%) and Yemen (6%). Eritreans stayed in Sudan (32%), Libya (20%) and Italy (18%) (ibid.: 24f.).

3.6 Summary

- The immigration numbers from MENA countries have been rising since 2011, with a steep climb in 2014 (21% of all immigration) and an even steeper one in 2015 (44% of all immigration). The main countries of origin since 2011 are Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The net migration with Turkey was still negative in 2015.

- The number of MENA migrants rose by about half a million people in 2015, mostly from Syria. In 2011 migrants came mainly from Turkey, Iraq, Morocco, Afghanistan and Iran. In 2015, Turkey remained the largest group, followed by Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Morocco.

- Despite the high numbers of new migrants, the percentage of MENA migrants among all non-citizens has been stable and even slightly falling since 2011, mostly due to an increasing number of EU citizens having migrated to Germany. Turkey remains the source of the largest group of immigrants in Germany holding a foreign passport.

- MENA migrants in Germany differ dramatically in age and gender proportions. Migrants from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan are generally younger than those from North Africa, Iran or Lebanon and much younger than Turks who are the closest to the non-migrant population average. About two-thirds or more

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28 In this survey: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Palestine (Gostomski et al., 2016: 25).
of Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi, Tunisian and Algerian citizens in Germany are men. Moroccan and Turkish citizens come closer to an equal proportion between men and women. While gender proportions remained similar between 2011 and 2015 for most of the MENA countries, during recent immigration many more men than women came from Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan to Germany.

- More than three-quarters of Turkish citizens in Germany have permanent resident status and only a few are under the threat of deportation. The rest of the MENA migrants have a much more precarious legal status. About one-third hold temporary permits, for example as acknowledged asylum seekers, and one-quarter have either no legal status or the revocable Duldung (exceptional leave to remain).

- In 2015 asylum seekers were predominantly Muslims, but almost half of the Iraqis were Yazidis, and 72% of the Eritreans were Christians, as is a small minority of Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis. Fewer than 1% of refugees from these countries declared they had no religious affiliation.

- The majority of current MENA refugees in Germany reached the country without a long stay in a transit country.
4 Antisemitism
Since 2011
4.1 Attitudes to Jews

In a recent study on the acceptance of religious pluralism, 11% of German-speaking people expressed a negative attitude towards Jews (compared with 6% expressing hostility towards Christians, 9% towards atheists and 33% towards Muslims). Some 12% would not tolerate the marriage of a close relative with a Jew (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2016: 6ff.). Thus, more than one in ten German speakers have no hesitation in openly expressing anti-Jewish attitudes. But there are forms of antisemitic ideology that are less easily recorded. Some of these negative attitudes are held by a greater number of people than 11–12%.

4.1.1 Traditional antisemitism

Traditional antisemitic stereotypes, however, have receded in Germany. According to the representative Mitte survey, the proportion of the population holding such stereotypes dropped from 14.6% in 2003 to 8–10% between 2006 and 2014 and further to 5.8% in 2016 (Zick et al., 2016: 50; see also Decker, Kiess and Brähler, 2014: 35). Such stereotypes are currently slightly stronger in East than in West Germany (7 to 5%) and correlate with age (16–30 years: 4.1%; 30–60: 5.1%; >60: 8%) (Zick et al., 2016: 59). In 2016 Zick et al. found 8.8% agreement with the statement ‘Jews have too much influence in Germany’ (ibid.: 45) and 7.3% agreement that ‘Still today, the influence of the Jews is too high’ (ibid.: 125).

A recent ALLBUS survey reports 21.3% of German interviewees agreeing that ‘the Jews have too much influence in the world’ (24.6% in the East, 20.6% in the West). This represented a decline from ALLBUS’s findings ten years earlier, when the statement was endorsed by 32.8% of all Germans (24.2% in East Germany, 34.8% in the West). Particularly interesting is the difference between East and West Germany where the (moderate) decline in traditional antisemitism mostly results from a drastic drop in support in West Germany, falling below the stable level of support in East Germany.

With a different survey design, the ADL did not observe any significant change in traditional antisemitic attitudes in Germany between 2009 and 2012. In 2009, 22% agreed that ‘The Jews have too much power in international financial markets’, while 21% agreed that they had ‘too much power in the business world’. In 2012, the figures were 24% and 22% respectively. The conviction that Jews were loyal to Israel rather than to Germany was held by 53% in 2009 and 52% in 2012 (ADL, 2012: 21). In subsequent years those percentages rose in 2013 and fell slightly again in 2015. In 2013, 33% agreed that Jews had too much power in the

29 N=1500, anonymous telephone interviews among German-speaking people in Germany, November 2015.
30 N=1896, anonymous telephone interviews among German-speaking German citizens above 16, 2016.
32 See the ALLBUS data above, in the chapter about antisemitism before 2011.
33 For the overall antisemitism index, Decker et al. described a partly different but in its general trend still similar trend: East Germany started with a level of 4.8% in 2002 that climbed to a level of around 8% in 2008, with a peak of 10.4% in 2012, and fell to 4.5% again in 2014, while West Germany showed a continuous drop from 13.8 in 2002 to around 9% between 2008 and 2012 and also ending up at 5.2% in 2014 (Decker et al., 2014: 45).
34 N=500, January 2012.
business world and in international financial markets, while the ‘deficient loyalty’ statement garnered 55% support; in 2015 the figures dropped to 28%, 29% and 49% respectively.\textsuperscript{35}

Traditional antisemitism as measured in the Mitte surveys inversely correlated with education level, positively with age (both variables could be interacting), and varies with religious affiliation:\textsuperscript{36} in 2010, 11.3% of Catholics, 7.7% of Protestants and 6.4% of non-religious interviewees expressed antisemitic attitudes (Decker et al., 2014: 38; 2010: 88).

It is striking that most of the surveys do not try to explain the decline in traditional antisemitism, for example as a result of past education and prevention work.

### 4.1.2 Secondary antisemitism

In 2016, according to Zick et al., 25.6% of their interviewees agreed with secondary antisemitic statements. This version of antisemitism is particular to Germany and Austria and typically refers to the claim that Jews tried to profit from the events of the Third Reich. The numbers here dropped from 39% in 2011 (Zick et al., 2016: 43–5). In the 2016 ALLBUS survey the same statement was agreed upon by 39.7% of interviewees (West 38.8%, East 44%) (GESIS, 2016, own calculations), although dropping as well, from 49.9% in 2006 (West 52.2%, East 39.9% - calculation: Scherr/Schäuble, 2007: 7). With a different statement (‘Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust’) and differing time frames, the ADL survey measured a percentage of 45% of support for secondary antisemitism in 2009 and 43% in 2012 (ADL, 2012: 21). This poll measured no decrease in support for this statement in comparison to before 2011. By contrast, in 2015 some 51% supported this statement.\textsuperscript{37}

In a survey of adolescents, secondary antisemitism was distinguished from other forms of antisemitism only by non-migrant Germans, with 20.2% of them ‘fully’ agreeing with the statements. For other groups, secondary antisemitism was inseparable from other forms of antisemitism but also received high levels of support (26.7% of adolescent migrants from Poland, 22% of adolescents from Arab countries, 18.8% of adolescents from other Muslim countries, 12% of adolescents from Turkey, and 14.9% from the former Soviet Union) (Mansel/Spaiser, 2013: 225). Non-migrant German adolescents showed comparably high levels of agreement with statements equating National Socialism with Israel (between 5.8 and 9.2% fully agreed). If one includes both agreement levels (agree and agree fully), then one-quarter to one-third of young non-migrant German interviewees support this type of secondary antisemitism. The strong support for this equation by the groups with a Muslim migration background has been attributed to their Israel-related antisemitism rather than to references to German history (ibid.: 226).

### 4.1.3 Israel-related antisemitism

The numbers holding Israel-related antisemitic attitudes do not show a clear trend over time. Some 40.4% of the interviewees in the 2016 Mitte survey could ‘well understand’ that people were anti-Jewish in the face of Israeli politics


\textsuperscript{36} In the ADL survey, too.

\textsuperscript{37} http://global100.adl.org/#country/germany/2015.
Antisemitism Since 2011

(17.2% ‘fully’ agreed on that statement, 23.2% ‘rather’ agreed, while only
38.6% rejected that notion fully). Such numbers mark a distinct increase since
2014 when 28% fully or rather agreed. 24.6% equated Israel with National
Socialist Germany (9.3% fully, 15.3% rather agreed, 53.4% rejected it fully),
nearly identical to survey results in 2014 when 27% fully or rather agreed.
According to the authors of the survey, it is thus not the explicit and traditional
but the subtler, Israel-related antisemitism that is on the rise. Israel-related
antisemitism now also finds stronger support in Eastern Germany than in
Western (29 vs. 22%) (Zick et al., 2016: 43ff.). In the ALLBUS 2016 survey
25.6% of Germans (East 35.5%, West 23.6%) agreed with the statement about
understanding antisemitism because of Israeli politics (GESIS, 2016, own
calculations). Yet narrower questions about individuals’ own attitudes rather
than those of others elicited different results. In a 2014 Mitte survey 20.1%
agreed with the statement that they increasingly disliked the Jews because
of Israeli politics (6.1% stated they ‘fully’ agreed and 14% that they ‘rather’ did).
Ten years earlier, 31.7% had supported that statement (Zick/Klein, 2014: 70).

These numbers provide a complex picture and leave ample room for
interpretation. The assertion that one can ‘understand’ that others dislike Jews
because of Israeli politics is ambiguous and could be affirmed by someone who
simply assesses a viewpoint without agreeing with it. Conversely, someone only
partly agreeing (or disagreeing) with that statement could hold any number of
views upon it, including full support. As a cautious interpretation of all the given
numbers one can hypothesize that Israel-related antisemitism in 2016 stood
at somewhere between an optimistic 10% and a dramatic 40% of the population.

While young Germans without a migration background tended to secondary
antisemitism and relativizing history, young Muslim Germans with a migration
background showed much stronger support for Israel-related Jew-hatred
(Mansel/Spaiser, 2013).

Generally, Israel-related antisemitism was the only type of antisemitism that could
be found in all groups of adolescents in that study, but with significant differences
in its strength. Among those with an Arab migration background, 41.5% fully
agreed (level 4 on a scale of 4) that Jews would become ever more dislikeable
because of Israeli politics. Among those with a Turkish migration background,
25.6% fully agreed, as did 25% of those with a migration background from other
Muslim countries. However that statement found full support among only 4.9%
of migrants from the former Soviet Union, 4.4% of those from Poland and 2.9%
of interviewees without a migration background (ibid.: 222f.). According to
statistical correlations, criticism of Israel expressed by juvenile Muslim Germans
and by young migrants from the ex-Soviet Union (Spätaussiedler) cannot
be separated from their antisemitic attitudes (ibid.: 217ff.).

38 Secondary and Israel-related antisemitism have not been reported constantly in the Mitte-survey.
39 That item was not a part of the 2006 survey.
40 All items for antisemitism have not reached the level of 2004 in 2014 in this survey, but the drop
was particularly drastic for secondary and Israel-related antisemitism.
41 42 qualitative interviews, 24 focus group discussions with adolescents of Turkish and Arab descent,
a quantitative standardized survey at 72 schools in Köln, Frankfurt, Berlin (mostly Neukölln) und
Bielefeld, N=2404.
4.1.4 Influencing variables

While Israel-related antisemitism was not linked to income levels, all antisemitic statements correlated inversely with formal education. Statements of traditional antisemitism found support among 8.7% of those with lower education levels, 6.1% of those with middle education levels and 1.8% of those with higher education. Israel-related antisemitism was supported by 33% of those with lower education levels, 22% of those with middle education levels, and 14% of those with higher education. However, the study’s authors warned against jumping to conclusions, owing to the influence of co-variables, e.g. higher awareness of social desirability in their answers among higher-educated people or the links between higher education and democratic, participative education (Zick et al., 2016: 59ff.).

Political attitudes still have a crucial influence on all forms of antisemitism, which display a linear rise from left to right: from 0% to 16% support for traditional antisemitism, and from 14% to 46% for Israel-related antisemitism (ibid.: 63f.). Moreover, antisemitic attitudes are also influenced by gender (held more frequently by men than women). Pervasive feelings such as anomia (the loss of a sense of understanding the world), authoritarianism and the will to control and dominate all positively correlate with antisemitic attitudes (Zick et al., 2012: 73, 76).

The recent Mitte survey found a small correlation between migration background and antisemitism, with antisemitic statements endorsed by 8% of those with a migration background and 5% of those without. However, the heterogeneity of migrant groups (from Russia, the Balkans, Turkey etc., 13% of them Muslim) and the small number of cases makes conclusions about single groups impossible to draw (Zick et al., 2016: 69).

The ADL attributes the drastic decrease in overall support for antisemitic attitudes in Germany (from 27% to 16% between 2014 and 2015) to the reaction to the antisemitic violence against Jews in Western Europe, especially the murderous attacks in France. Over the same period, the concern over violence against Jews rose by 33% (ADL, 2015). But one certainly also has to take into account the Gaza conflict of 2014. In 2012, the general antisemitism index of the ADL for Germany stood at 21% (ADL, 2012: 9). From 21% to 16% still counts as a drop, but not as such a dramatic one.

4.2 Antisemitic criminal offences

According to the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the federal police agency, and its report on ‘criminality in the context of migration’, migrants are being investigated by the police mostly for fraud and property offences such as shoplifting and fare-dodging (65.7%) and aggressive assaults and offences against personal freedom (17.3%). In comparison to their percentage among immigrants, migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq were clearly underrepresented as suspects, while the proportion of suspects from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, like those from the Balkans, was much higher than their share in population numbers. In 2015, the BKA reported a double digit number of cases of suspects to be members or sympathizers of foreign Islamist terror groups or suspected of war crimes. Antisemitic acts were not recorded separately (Bundeskriminalamt, 2015: 7–9, 22–6, 34).

42 Traditional antisemitism: left 0%, rather left 1%, centre 7%, rather right 14%, right 16%; Israel-related antisemitism: left 14%, rather left 16%, centre 23%, rather right 43%, right 46.
German law enforcement follows a particular system of registering politically motivated crime (PMK). Authorities distinguish between three general categories of the phenomenon: right-wing (especially in relation to völkisch nationalism, racism, social Darwinism and National Socialism), left-wing (especially in relation to anarchism and communism), and ‘foreigner’s’ criminality, the latter indicating cases shaped by the ‘non-German descent’ of the perpetrator, especially when the act is directed at foreign affairs or at influencing German affairs with a foreign purpose. These acts, paradoxically, can be committed by Germans, too. This classification system has several limitations: it only counts those cases that are made known to the police; it counts every action as a single crime even if several victims are injured; it relies on police assumptions about motivation, which means that many cases related to the Arab-Israeli conflict were not registered as antisemitic. Above all, the system is hampered by the vagueness of its guiding categories of left-wing, right-wing, and ‘foreigner’s’ crimes (Kohlstruck/Ullrich, 2015: 30–4). Within this system, antisemitic or anti-Israel motives are recorded separately. As a consequence, antisemitic crimes committed by foreign or migrant perpetrators are often recorded as simply anti-Israel – a tendency that has sometimes carried over to the judiciary, e.g. when a court refused to register an act of arson against a synagogue by Palestinian perpetrators as antisemitic. On the other hand, when there is no information about the perpetrators, offences with a ‘xenophobic’, antisemitic or National Socialist-related character usually are recorded as right-wing – which could lead to a distortion of the numbers for antisemitic offences committed by right-wing perpetrators. Thus, the numbers have to be interpreted with extreme caution. In public discourse, nevertheless, these statistics carry a good deal of weight, making them the most substantial and systematic source on antisemitism (UEA, 2017: 35).

Regarding antisemitic incidents recorded by the police (Table 4), there is no sign of a rise in antisemitic criminal offences after the increased immigration in the second half of 2015. After a peak of 1,596 cases in 2014 (among them 45 violent offences), in 2015 there were 1,366 cases, 36 of them violent, a return to levels of 2012. Anti-Israel offences developed along the same trend. In 2013 there were 41 cases, none of them violent; in 2014, 575 cases, 91 of them violent; in 2015 62 cases, with only one of them violent. The long-term trend since 2001 shows that the peaks coincide with rising tensions in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

44 The registration definition and its criteria are subject to discussion and revision (UEA, 2017: 32).
Table 4: Antisemitic criminal offences in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Right-wing</th>
<th>Left-wing</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>No. of injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,771</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,682</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,662</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: In 2001 the registration schematics had been changed so there are no numbers for the period before.

Perpetrators of antisemitic acts continue to be predominantly right-wing non-migrant Germans (AAS, 2015). According to MPs from the LINKE, antisemitism remains at a high level in Germany. But more and more conservative people and organizations, not only the extreme right and anti-Zionist actors, openly involve themselves in denial of the Shoah and antisemitic agitation. Accordingly, also in the third quarter of 2016 only 7 of 144 antisemitic criminal offences (and among them none of the 6 recorded acts of violence) were committed with a political “foreigners” motivation (zero with left-wing political motivation, all the others with a right-wing motivation).\(^{47}\)

As an example, in Berlin politically motivated violence and other criminal offences committed by ‘foreigners’ remained at the same level in the first half of 2016 as in the first half of 2015, before the ‘Welcome’-summer (115 to 117). (As a comparison, the full year of 2010 showed 100 such incidents, followed by 268 in 2011, 183 in 2012, 203 in 2013, 336 in 2014, and 282 in 2015.) Antisemitic cases were only committed mostly by right-wing Germans, with offences attributed to ‘foreigners’ and Islamist/fundamentalist sources declining in this period.

\(^{47}\) Answer of the Federal government to the request by the MPs Petra Pau, Frank Tempel, Dr. André Hahn and further members of the LINKE fraction in the Bundestag, 15.11.2016 (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/103/1810331.pdf).
offences for this period even declining. Although there are politically motivated ‘foreigners’ crimes that are registered as antisemitic, Berlin’s police additionally registered violence and other offences in relation to the conflict between Israel and Palestine. These numbers rise and fall largely in relation to events in the Middle East. The year 2009, when the crisis in Gaza reached a peak, saw 42 such incidents in Berlin, with 12 of them violent. That number would fall in 2010 to only three incidents, two of them violent, but would peak again in 2014, with 100 such incidents recorded, 23 of them violent. Antisemitic incidents among politically motivated crimes attributed to ‘foreigners’ have been reported separately by the police in Berlin since 2013: 13 cases (violence: 1), 2014: 23 (violence: 3), 2015: 24 (violence: 3).

Figure 17: PMK ‘foreigners’ in Berlin, reported by the police

The monitoring project Reach Out reports violent right-wing, antisemitic and racist attacks in Berlin. In respect of antisemitic attacks, there is no clear trend for the last decade, but there was a significant peak in 2014/15, in response to protests about the Gaza war. The peak in 2015 correlates with the peak for all attacks which mostly results from the Germany-wide explosion of right-wing racist politically motivated violence in the context of the anti-refugee protests. Apart from an improved and intensified motivation to report incidents, there is no other explanation given for the increase in antisemitic attacks in 2015. It probably can be also interpreted as a continuation of the 2014 high (see also the findings from the interviews). Another explanation is that the political climate of hate against refugees that prompted a surge of racist attacks also propelled more perpetrators to act out their antisemitism.


49 www.berlin.de/polizei/verschiedenes/polizeiliche-kriminalstatistik/

In 2015, the Antisemitism Research and Information Centre (RIAS) was established in Berlin. This centre collects and evaluates reports on antisemitic incidents of all sorts, including through a new online report interface. On the basis of the working definition provided by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) it registers not only criminal offences but also cases that have not been reported to the police or are not prohibited by law. For 2015, RIAS reports 210 insults and threats, 72 cases of damage to property, 68 propaganda cases, 26 demonstrations, 20 attacks and 6 massive threats. A total of 151 individuals were affected by attacks, threats and insults, 57 because they were visibly recognizable as Jews, 14 because they were identified as such, and 21 as representatives of Jewish or Israeli institutions. That the overall number of cases rose in 2016 by 16% to 470 results from a higher number of reports due to improved exchange with Jewish and non-Jewish organizations and the growing prominence of the project one year after its inauguration. The number of affected individuals rose to 303, with 132 identified as Jews by the perpetrators. Physical attacks slightly went down to 17, threats rose to 18. While fewer cases of damage were counted (53), reports showed 42 cases of damage to Shoah memorial installations, an increase of more than threefold.

### 4.3 Jewish perspectives in Germany

These numbers give a first impression, but important for an evaluation of the situation is also the perspective of Jewish Germans. There is of course not a single ‘Jewish perspective’. In the FRA report 2013, 29% of people identifying as Jews in Germany reported experiencing some form of harassment in the past 12 months, with 4% reporting antisemitic attacks (FRA, 2013: 45–6), 34% feared becoming
a victim of violent attacks, 47% feared insults or threats (ibid.: 35), 63% avoided showing their Jewishness in public through religious symbols and 26% thought about leaving Germany because of the antisemitic threat (ibid.: 35, 39–40).

According to a qualitative survey in Berlin’s Jewish communities in 2014 (Steinitz, 2015), Jews in Berlin refrain from showing their Jewishness in public more than they did in the beginning of the 1990s. Because of hostilities and attacks on public transport, at home or at school, many send their children to Jewish schools and avoid neighbourhoods with high proportions of Muslims. Although the study stressed the need to take note of the German majority’s antisemitism (e.g. with the circumcision debate in 2012), the radicalization among young Muslims has been perceived as the main threat. In particular, the ‘summer of hate’ (ibid.: 25) during the Gaza campaign of 2014 saw a peak of public Jew-hatred at anti-Israel demonstrations, in the press and in mass and social media, in correspondence with persons and institutions and also in the street with a rise of everyday antisemitism, hostility and attacks. All this has led, according to Steinitz, to a ‘grave deterioration’ of Jewish freedom and quality of life in Berlin. One interviewee added that the Jewish communities in Germany feel left alone with the fight against Israel-related antisemitism, aided only by rare expressions of solidarity by the German majority and by largely symbolic statements by politicians (ibid.: 26). Israelis living in Berlin, however, are much more relaxed and show less fear of contact with Muslims or Arabs (ibid.: 18).

According to a recent quantitative survey in Germany 78% of German Jews perceive a rising threat out of personal experiences – online, in the media, at demonstrations and as everyday harassment or violence. They attribute this increase to Muslim-Arab refugees, a lowered threshold for criticism of Israel and a generally rising hostility against minorities as a result of the large numbers of refugees. Muslims are identified as the primary perpetrators (81% of violent attacks, 62% of insults). But 84% still think that antisemitism is a problem in Germany even without the refugees: Jews still are ‘othered’ as being different from Germans (UEA, 2017: 107-19).

4.4 ‘New’ antisemitism – antisemitism among Muslims?

4.4.1 Characterization

Antisemitic attitudes exist among Muslims living in Germany and according to most surveys they are stronger than among other parts of the population (Glaser/Hohnstein, 2012: 12; Arnold/König, 2016: 19; UEA, 2017: 219). The most important difference between antisemitism among Muslims and antisemitism among Germans with a longer German or European family background is that Muslims holding antisemitic views tend to express them more openly and explicitly. European antisemites, in contrast, aware of the role of antisemitism in German history, tend to display such views less openly, disguising their resentment with statements of annoyance about Shoah commemoration (Mansel/Spaiser, 2013: 226). They present themselves as non-antisemitic and their views are often regarded as acceptable (AAS, 2015: 3ff.). While most European antisemites, in other words, respect established discursive restrictions, some antisemitic German Muslims shout at Gaza-solidarity rallies in Germany that they want the Jews to be gassed. This particularity of expressing antisemitism in an open and uncoded manner is also supported by Jikeli’s survey (Jikeli, 2013: 278).

54 Eleven interviews, 08-10/2014.
Yet research on German antisemitism provides no support for the thesis of a ‘new’ Muslim antisemitism, nor for any monocausal nexus between antisemitism and ethnic/religious origin. The ‘groups’ of Muslims or refugees are far too heterogeneous (Goldenbogen, 2013: 19; UEA, 2017: 215). According to Glaser and Hohnstein, the research focus on antisemitism among Muslims results from political interest, while other migrant groups, too, show high rates of open antisemitism, e.g. from the former Soviet Union (Glaser/Hohnstein, 2012: 13; Follert/Stender, 2010: 200, 218).

Regardless of whether it is ‘new’, the label of Muslim antisemitism is according to Günther Jikeli an ‘apt and meaningful’ one (Jikeli, 2013: 296). In his qualitative survey among around 100 young Muslim men in Berlin, Paris and London he found that the majority of his interviewees expressed antisemitic resentment and legitimized it directly with their religious and ethnic identity as well as with Islam. He found all forms of antisemitism, with ‘surprisingly small’ differences between the three cities (ibid.: 285): traditional stereotypes, Israel-related Jew-hatred, references to religious and ethnic identity (seeing Muslims and Jews as natural enemies) and negative views of Jews without any rationalization (Jew as general negative term). Some of his German interviewees also expressed secondary antisemitism (complaining about the supposedly high level of German compensation to Israel), which is intriguing in itself because obviously they adopted an antisemitic trope from mainstream German society without sharing the usual underlying discourse of guilt rejection (ibid.: 285f.). Those interviewees who rejected antisemitism, Jikeli argued, demonstrated the possibility of individual choice as opposed to environmental determination (ibid.: 286). Nevertheless, he did note a correlation between the tendency to oppose antisemitism and an oppositional or minority stance in the land of their (family’s) origin (e.g. Kurds, Berbers or Alavis) (ibid.: 292). Similarly, he found that ‘Arab identity is an important additional factor that can enhance hostility against European Jews’ (ibid.: 281).

Michael Kiefer dissented from Jikeli’s assertion of a specific Muslim antisemitism by pointing to the roots of modern Islamic antisemitism in European antisemitism, arguing the antisemitic narratives expressed by juvenile Muslims in Europe had European-Christian as well as Muslim roots. Ideologically, he contends, Islamist antisemitism is therefore a reimport rather than an import. The connection to the Koran was made by modern Islamists in the 20th century (Mendel, 2013; Kiefer, 2007, 2012).

The observation of a higher level of antisemitism among Muslims is backed by quantitative research. The Mansel/Spaiser survey found substantially higher support for classical and religiously motivated antisemitism among Muslims in Germany than among others, with clear distinctions between high levels among migrants with an Arab and lesser among migrants with a Turkish

Beyond ethnic identity he found further influence factors on the negativity of Muslim views on Jews: friends, peers, relatives; school; media (particularly Arab TV channels incited hatred against Jews, also the internet was named as source); religious identity (level of religiosity and belief patterns); contact with Islamist organizations and mosques; level of formal education (higher leads to expressing antisemitism in more socially accepted ways).
or other Muslim background (Mansel/Spaiser, 2013: 224f.). Also the ADL 2015 Muslim oversample\(^{57}\) found much more support for antisemitic statements among Muslims than among non-Muslims in Germany:

**Table 5: ADL 2015 Muslim oversample, % responding ‘probably true’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Muslims in Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Germany</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews think they are better than other people</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in the business world</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in international financial markets</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much control over global affairs</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADL, 2015

Again, non-Muslims are less likely to display agreement with traditional antisemitic statements than Muslims (whose numbers are disturbingly high in this survey, but with a sample size of 100 these results have to be taken with care), but the difference fades away when it comes to secondary antisemitism like that displayed in the final question above.

A survey among the biggest group of Muslims in Germany, with a Turkish background, supports the finding of a widespread enmity towards Jews: while 49% of the interviewees\(^{58}\) expressed a positive stance to Jews, 21% adopted a negative one and a suspicious\(^{59}\) 30% refused to give an answer.

To compare: atheists were seen by the interviewees in a similarly negative way (27% negative, 24% ‘no answer’), and Christians found overwhelming sympathy (80% positive, 5% negative, 15% ‘no answer’), as did people of German descent in general (85% – 4% – 10%) (Pollack et al., 2016: 5).

Many recent studies of antisemitism among adolescents concur that it often manifests itself in a fragmentary way rather than as a closed ideology.

These studies stress, however, that such views are in no way less relevant to antisemitic action and thus no less a threat to Jews (Glaser/Hohnstein, 2012: 13; Mansel/Spaiser, 2013: 230; Jikeli, 2013: 278). In the case of recent MENA refugees the fragmentation is accompanied by a widespread lack of knowledge about the Shoah (Arnold/König, 2016: 19–27, resp. UEA, 2017: 215–19).

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56 ‘Full’ agreement with the statement that the Jews have too much influence in the world:
\[
\text{German family background: 3\%, Polish 9.9, Turkish 24.9, Kurdish 26.9, other Muslim countries 25.5, Arab countries 40.4. On the statement ‘in my religion it is the Jews that bring harm to the world’: German 2.5\%, Polish 8.7, Turkish 15.9, Kurdish 16.7, other Muslim countries 20.1, Arab countries 25.7 – See the statistical data online under www.beltz.de/fileadmin/beltz/kostenlose-downloads/9783779915010.pdf.}
\]

57 \(N=100\), March–April 2015.


59 It has to be noted that the questionnaire involved no neutral answer possibility.
Although young interviewees with a Moroccan, Egyptian or Turkish migration background (either migrants or children of migrants) were not affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict, they still identified with Palestine – as Muslims (Nordbruch, 2014).

Finally, it is important to differentiate between Muslim groups. Fewer Alavis, for example, expressed antisemitic attitudes than did Sunnis or Shiites. The findings thus do not support sweeping generalizations about Muslims in Germany since many show no antisemitic attitudes at all (Mansel/Spaiser, 2013).

4.4.2 Antisemitism and discrimination against Muslims

According to Günther Jikeli, one of the reasons why scholars are ‘reluctant’ to point to the fact that there is a ‘significant Muslim involvement in European antisemitism’ is the discrimination against Muslims in European societies (Jikeli, 2013: 270). And indeed, discrimination is a topic that features in many studies about German Muslims and antisemitism – but not by refusing to name antisemitism. A report by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation (AAS), for instance, explicitly rejects any attempt to legitimize antisemitism by experiences of discrimination (AAS, 2015). It is a specific trait of migrant groups to combine influences from their milieu and/or countries of origin (traditional stereotypes and remote conflicts) with those of the migration situation itself and experiences in the country of living, such as discrimination.

Some quantitative studies disagree with the claim of a correlation between discrimination and antisemitism (Glaser/Hohnstein, 2012: 15). For socialization theorists, the concrete relations between a group’s experiences of exclusion and its own readiness to exclude are considered to be insufficiently researched. The influences of the different areas of socialization, from family, school, neighbourhood, peer group to media and hobbies, remain unclear, especially for migration specifics (Möller, 2012: 251). Jikeli himself found no statistical correlation between discrimination or perception of otherness or residential status and antisemitism. While the perception of otherness in the different countries was very different, the antisemitic attitudes were similar. Furthermore: ‘Some perceptions of discrimination even include antisemitic views [the Jews being behind it] […] Similarly, the rhetoric of victimhood competition can contain antisemitic arguments’ (Jikeli, 2013: 295). A recent qualitative study among MENA refugees found no direct relation between migrants’ own discrimination experiences and antisemitic attitudes, (see Section 5.2 above and Arnold/König, 2016: 34f.).

Other publications, in contrast, try to explain the spread of antisemitism among Muslims with their experience of being discriminated against and excluded from the majority’s society. So antisemitic anti-Israel remarks by Muslim teens are described by Götz Nordbruch as strongly bound to their own present experiences: ‘the conflict between Israel and Palestine serves […] as a metaphor for injustices that Muslim teenagers also in Germany are feeling to be affected by.’ General feelings of helplessness and anger at the West that are connected with Palestine as a symbol should be taken seriously in order to prevent Islamist radicalization and further social separation (Nordbruch, 2014). Even if the conflict between Israel and Palestine is used to legitimize antisemitism, argues the head of the Anne Frank Educational Center, Meron Mendel, the rise of Islamist antisemitism in Germany is ‘an expression of social inequality, discrimination experience and a lack of appreciation of Muslims’ in Germany (Mendel, 2013: 57). Antisemitism, thus, was not caused by discrimination, but served as compensation for it through
upgrading the own group and devaluating the Jews (Bildungsstätte Anne Frank, 2013). According to Anne Goldenbogen, Muslims often see themselves as the only or most affected victims of discrimination and exclusion in Germany. But they could never challenge the Shoah in the competition for victimhood, and this gives rise to much ill feeling and can help promote antisemitism. (Goldenbogen, 2013: 21).

Jikeli may be right that ‘attempts to rationalize expressions of antisemitism often lead to denial of their antisemitic ideology’ (Jikeli, 2013: 275). It would be questionable indeed to attribute antisemitism only to the circumstances instead of taking people seriously as acting and responsible individuals who make decisions. Otherwise one could not explain why many Muslims with discrimination experiences do not entertain antisemitic thoughts. But in a weaker sense, the studies do prove that social and political circumstances like discrimination and marginalization help to prepare the ground for antisemitic thought – even if there is no monocausal nexus (a claim, however, that has not been made anywhere in the literature cited).

The connections between discrimination and negative attitudes are complex. According to Mansel/Spaiser, education at best only weakly explains the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in their sample. The connections they found were indirect: the experience of religious discrimination leads Muslims to media from the countries of their (family’s) origin which in turn can intensify antisemitic views. Political socialization in certain (radical) religious communities or mosques also has an increasing influence – and could also be interpreted as a reaction to exclusion by the majority. Experiences of discrimination influence the desire to validate one’s own group, propelling individuals towards religious fundamentalism and towards the ‘antagonism narrative’ further exacerbating secondary antisemitism and the downgrading of exterior groups. That ‘antagonism narrative’ combines anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism and conspiracy theories into a story in which the Jews set out to bash Muslims all over the world and particularly in the Middle East (Mansel/Spaiser, 2013: 242–51). But the discrimination and devaluation of their own group did not automatically lead to devaluing other groups (ibid.: 235). These findings, however, question the assertion of other studies that antisemitism among Muslims is mostly fragmentary and not based on closed ideologies.

4.4.3 Muslim institutions

A survey of imams in Germany reveals that most of them criticized the disproportionate level of public attention paid to antiemitism and demanded that more attention be paid to anti-Muslim racism. All rejected antisemitism, with even those imams from more conservative associations interpreting anti-Judaic passages in the Koran historically and critically as mere statements about political situations of the past, not applicable to the present. According to the imams, enmity against Jews is not a trait of Islam; religion does not divide where politics does (UEA, 2017: 201-8).

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60 Accordingly, 63.6% of the interviewees with an Arab migration background agreed on the conspiracy theory that Al Quaida had had no responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, in comparison to 54.8% of a background in other Muslim countries, 53.2% Turkish, 33.3% former Soviet Union, 27.9% German, 23.1% German – Mansel/Spaiser, 2013: 251.
The same survey among imams emphasized the fact that none had heard about the Shoah before they had come to Germany (ibid.: 205). This points to a central problem for Muslims in Germany and for Germans generally: until recently, German political discourse has deemed the millions of Muslims living in Germany as somehow illegitimate, neither they nor their religion belonging to Germany. Ausländerpolitik always has dreamt of their ‘return’. Because of that failure of integration, the establishment of university departments for the training of imams is a very recent phenomenon and still lags far behind demand. Instead, German authorities allow the Turkish government to run most of the mosques in Germany. How problematic this influence is can be demonstrated by the observation made in another place that more people with a Turkish background attend antisemitic rallies against Israel in Germany since the Turkish government under Erdoğan has turned against Israel (AAS, 2015: 4).

4.4.4 Externalization
Another recurring topic in literature on antisemitism in migration societies is the problem of externalization: the non-Muslim Germans’ projection of antisemitism onto other groups, mostly Muslims. The argument, however, does not suggest there is no antisemitism among Muslims, but that many non-Muslim Germans (and often teachers) focus on antisemitism among Muslims in order to avoid discussing non-Muslim, and in many cases their own, anti-Jewish stereotypes and resentment. Antisemitism is a problem of German society as a whole, leading many education and prevention projects and initiatives to target both antisemitism and racism. Education against antisemitism would not work if the teachers did not reflect their own entanglements with antisemitism, if they didn’t reflect on the heterogeneity of motives and sources of antisemitism, and if they tried to tackle antisemitism by ascribing it (in an essentializing, racist way) only to Muslim teenagers. The critique of antisemitism among Muslims in this case has sometimes become a re-ethnicization of them as Muslims when it traced antisemitism only to their religious origin (Messerschmidt, 2010; Bildungsstätte Anne Frank, 2013; Beyer, 2015; Lantzsch, 2016; Coors, 2016).

The Amadeu Antonio Foundation (AAS), a key player in civil society activities against racism, antisemitism and other forms of group-focused enmity, clearly stated that there is no such thing as an imported antisemitism. The import hypothesis had been popular in Germany before the events of summer 2015, with the importation attributed to Arab or Islamist satellite TV channels instead of refugees. The import thesis is popular among the non-Muslim majority because it enables them to blame widespread German antisemitism on Muslims and to legitimize their anti-Muslim racism (AAS, 2015). When antisemitism scholar Klaus Holz said in an interview, that the fight against antisemitism among Muslims would not be a specific challenge but ‘part of the continuous task that embraces all parts of the population. We do not have antisemitism in Germany because of migrants’, he said something many people active against antisemitism in Germany would agree with.62

61 90% of German imams in 2009 were not born in Germany, their majority are employees and under direct order of the Turkish authority for religious affairs – www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/DE/DIK/4ReligioesesPersonal/ImameTheologie/ZahlenDatenFakten/zahlen-daten-fakten-node.html.

A recent related development in German public discourse is the narrative of the ‘Judeo-Christian tradition of the occident’ which can be found in speeches of Chancellor Merkel and other politicians but is also part of declared ideology of the anti-Muslim radical right like the Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) or the AfD. In many cases, however, it is less an embracing of the Jewish part in European history than an attempt to integrate Jews into the European front against Muslims. Accordingly, while (some) party leaders of the AfD propagate support for Israel, many members and the electorate foster stable antisemitic attitudes (which is inevitable for a völkisch party).  

4.4.5 Refugees
It is important to differentiate between new immigrants and Muslim Germans who have lived in the country for decades or who were born in the country in the second or third generation, but also between different groups of refugees, for example people fleeing poverty, Roma fleeing persecution in Hungary or Romania or the heterogeneous groups fleeing the recent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, not all of them Muslims as the demography has shown. These differentiations, however, are not very popular in German public discourse. Recent refugees are assumed to be Muslims, if not Islamist terrorists. An incident in the Saxon town of Meißen might be quite telling: there, a white right-wing German man distributed antisemitic leaflets to refugees. The text explained to them that the Zionists had destroyed their countries and brought them to Germany in order to finish the extinction of the German people.

Other than for (in part German) Muslims in Germany with a migration background there is no quantitative data on antisemitic attitudes among recent MENA refugees in the country. Only for one state, Bavaria, a recent survey among MENA refugees also polled antisemitic attitudes and found that a majority of about 55% of (predominantly Muslim) refugees from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan agreed with the statement that the Jews had too much influence in the world. (Haug et al., 2017: 68).

And there are single reports about incidents, e.g. from the ‘Welcome classes’. The Berlin education centre against antisemitism KIgA has recently undertaken a research project on young refugees. At a workshop about political education for refugees, in 2016, a KIgA team member reported several incidents but due to the method and the sample could give no evidence for any general trends. Teachers in those classes were unsure how to deal with these statements, shied away from topics like the Arab-Israeli conflict and some differentiated between ‘good’ Syrian and ‘bad’ Palestinian students. The difficulty of assessing attitudes like antisemitism


64 www.sz-online.de/nachrichten/antisemitisches-hetzblatt-in-meissen-verteilt-3563576.html.

65 Agreement: Syria 52.3%, Iraq 53.6%, Afghanistan 57.1%, Eritrea 5.4%, N = 547, no answer = 232. Those from Eritrea (mostly orthodox Christians) expressed the same level of disagreement like the others (between one quarter and one fifth of the interviewees) but much more answered ‘partly’: 67.6%. The authors attributed this effect to the fact that many Eritreans knew Jews only from the bible and thus did not understand the question (ibid.: 69).

66 Kreuzberger Initiative gegen Antisemitismus.
is exacerbated by more general problems that refugees face: their precarious legal status; their traumatization by oppression, war and flight; and the stereotypes facing them in German society, the assumptions that they are Islamist, sexist and antisemitic before they even speak for themselves (cf. KIGA, 2017: 32–51).

A large representative survey among recent refugees (conducted by three government institutions: Gostomski et al., 2016) found that they support democracy to the same high extent as people with a German passport. Of the total, 96% said they wanted to have a democratic system (Germans: 95%) while 21% (Germans 22%) were in favour of a strong leader who would not care about parliaments and elections. Asked about what defines a democracy, 93% answered that civil rights should protect people against state oppression. The same number argued that men and women should have equal rights, and only 13% felt that a religious leader should have the last word in legislation (Germans 83, 92 and 8%). Unfortunately, the survey goes no further in exploring political attitudes and sentiments – there was no question probing discriminatory attitudes or even antisemitism. But as a tendency, these results support the camp of the anti-alarmists. As a caveat, however, the answers may reflect the influence of social desirability. After all, how else would a refugee reply on leaving her integration class (where she learned how highly democracy, civil rights and equality are officially esteemed in the country that hosts her) when an academic researcher with a laptop questions her about precisely these values?

4.5 Antisemitism and other group-focused enmities

For comparing different types of group-focused enmities only data with a common reference frame can be used. Surveys that measure these attitudes with different questions (like the ‘Mitte’ surveys) are not suitable.

One feasible approach can be through the study by the Federal Anti-Discrimination Unit on the acceptance of religious diversity. It compared the attitudes towards different religions in Germany. Of the German-speaking interviewees, 6% expressed a ‘rather’ or ‘very negative’ attitude towards Christians, while towards atheists 9%, Buddhists 10%, Jews 11%, Hindus 12% and Muslims 33%. 1% would not tolerate a marriage of close relatives with Christians, while 5% expressed that intolerance towards atheists, 12% towards Jews, 12% towards Buddhists, 14% towards Hindus and 30% towards Muslims (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2016: 6ff.).

Another approach analyses the official data on politically motivated crime (PMK) and hate crime. The Federal Ministry of the Interior publishes reports on the numbers registered by the police. Relevant for our study is not the whole complex of PMK but the cases related to hate crime. In the year 2015, 10,373 cases were registered, among them 1,151 violent incidents, a 77% rise in comparison with 2014. Figure 20 reveals how these incidents were directed at different groups.

Antisemitism Since 2011

68 Xenophobic hate crime also shows the steepest climb in 2015, by 116%, although racist and religious motivations also rose sharply.

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68 The problematic term ‘xenophobic’ has been used here because the official statistics are using the equally problematic category ‘fremdenfeindlich’ (hostile towards foreigners). While the latter cannot define what ‘foreign’ means and how it is distinguished from racism, the ‘phobia’ concept constructs an exculpatory pathology which dismisses the intentional dimension.
The most drastic increase in 2015 has been registered for attacks on refugee homes, to 1,031 attacks, a rise of 418%, among them 177 cases of violence, which represented an increase of 532%. These attacks included 385 cases of damage to property (2014: 64), 60 bodily injuries (2014: 13), 94 arsons (2014: 6), 8 bomb attacks (2014: 4) and 4 attempted killings (2014: 1).69 Although the numbers of new refugees decreased in 2016, the level of violent aggression against them and people who were helping them has remained as high as in 2015, with 988 attacks on refugee homes, 2,545 attacks on refugees outside their homes, 217 attacks on refugee supporters, with 560 people injured, among them 43 children.70

Antisemitic cases decreased by 14% in 2015, but rose again in 2017;71 generally, antisemitic crime shows constant values since the Arab spring, the only peak being the events around the Gaza war in 2014.72

Antisemitism thus remains a continuing problem in Germany, with a dependence on the development in the Middle East. In comparison, Jews are facing less negative attitudes than Buddhists and Hindus, far less than Muslims, although more than Christians or atheists in Germany. Xenophobic and racist motivations caused about seven times the number of hate crimes than antisemitism.

4.6 Summary

• About 10% of the German-speaking population in Germany openly express negative attitudes to Jews.

• Traditional antisemitism is being expressed less, but other forms are even on the rise, with a weight shift from secondary to Israel-related antisemitism.

• Between 7% and 29% of interviewed Germans, depending on poll, agree with the traditional antisemitic statement the Jews had too much power, with a decreasing tendency.

• Between 26% and 51% of Germans interviewed support secondary antisemitic statements, but the majority of surveys observed that support was declining. Among adolescents, secondary antisemitism could be singled out among non-migrant Germans, while it was inseparable from other forms of antisemitism for the groups with different migration backgrounds.

• 10% to 40% of interviewees express Israel-related antisemitic attitudes. Among juvenile interviewees, Israel-related antisemitism was the only type of antisemitism present in all groups, but with clear distinctions, the strongest support (up to 42%) among those with an Arab background, around 25% with a Turkish or other Muslim migration background, around 5% of migrants from the former Soviet Union and Poland and 3% of interviewees without a migration background.


70 According to an inquiry of the Left faction in the Bundestag, see www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/gewalt-gegen-asylbewerber-3500-angriffe-auf-fluechtlinge-im-vergangenen-jahr/19443722.html.


72 Even larger numbers have been recorded for the years 2001 (1,691), 2002 (1,771), 2005 (1,748), 2006 (1,809), 2007 (1,657) and 2009 (1,690) – Bundesministerium des Innern: Übersicht „Hasskriminalität“ – Entwicklung der Fallzahlen 2001–2015, see www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/05/pks-und-pmk-2015.html.
While income had no effect on antisemitic attitudes, such attitudes clearly increase when we move from left to right along the political spectrum. But while there was no support for traditional antisemitic statements among left-wing interviewees, Israel-related antisemitism is supported by 14% of them (and 46% of the right). Migration background had a small increasing effect on antisemitic attitudes but due to lacking sample sizes no statements about single migrant groups could be made.

Regarding politically motivated criminal offences, antisemitic incidents have not increased in relation to immigration, but to events in the Middle East and to the explosion of right-wing racist violence since the beginning of Willkommenskultur. Perpetrators still are predominantly non-migrant Germans with a right-wing background.

Within hate crime and negative attitudes against minorities in Germany antisemitism is a constant threat, although racism, especially against refugees and Muslims, is far more widespread today.

Among Jews, it was mostly the rise of antisemitic attacks by young Muslims in relation to the Gaza mobilization in 2014 that led to an increased feeling of insecurity. For some, a perceived lack of solidarity for the Jews by the non-Jewish German civil society had been worrying. But also recent MENA refugees are perceived as a threat, directly and indirectly through the generally increased hostility against minorities. In contrast to the police statistics, male Muslims are seen as the main perpetrators of antisemitic harassments and attacks.

Antisemitism among Muslims has been proven in many studies, many of them establishing higher degrees of antisemitic attitudes among German Muslims than among non-Muslims. The most important difference is that Germans with a Muslim migration background who expressed antisemitic attitudes did it uncoded and more openly than non-migrant non-Muslim antisemites who expressed them through filters and mostly respected the established discourse restrictions about open traditional antisemitism.

The presence and frequency of antisemitism among Muslims in Germany is not connected to recent immigration, but to events outside of Germany in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the anti-Israeli developments in Turkey that mobilize parts of the German Muslim population. A survey in Bavaria among recent refugees found that like in polls among Muslims in general, the majority of Muslim refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan agreed with the statement that the Jews had too much influence in the world.

Many studies discuss at least an indirect correlation, but not an automatic causality, between antisemitic attitudes and discrimination against Muslims in Germany. It prepares the ground and serves as legitimation, but can also lead to higher awareness for the discriminatory character of antisemitism and to its rejection.

There is consensus in antisemitism research and prevention/education that antisemitism can only be understood as a problem of German society as a whole, and that it should not be ascribed to a single group such as German Muslims. Non-Muslim Germans, however, use this ascription to externalize their own antisemitic attitudes and legitimize anti-Muslim racism.
5 New Empirical Data
5.1 Findings from the interviews: turning point 2014, not 2011

In accordance with findings from existing data, some interviewees were surprised by the time frame of the project. They saw 2014, rather than 2011, as the relevant turning point, with its increased immigration, *Willkommenskultur* and the intensified debate about refugees, their norms and values. Trends in antisemitic incidents were rather connected to events in the Arab-Israeli conflict (topical trends) than to immigration trends (SCA1). An employee of a Jewish history museum said that they have always felt the influence of the politics of the day, be it the Middle East or interior debates like that about circumcision, in increased demand for discussion or in provocative, sometimes antisemitic statements by visitors (SCR5).

The founder of the Jewish-Muslim ‘Salaam-Shalom’ initiative saw no rise in antisemitism in recent years but rather cycles tied to the developments in the Middle East. He found it disturbing and ‘disrespectful’ when the Israeli ambassador to Germany said in 2014 that the situation would be as severe as in 1933 (SCN1). Nevertheless, as a researcher who had interviewed German Jews pointed out existing Jewish fears and the real attacks on Jews in Germany had to be taken seriously. She had been told that Jews often felt there was no safe space anymore to articulate those fears because they would immediately be misappropriated by racists (SCR7). A politician pointed to the fact that the protection of Jewish institutions in Germany by the police would demonstrate a perpetual state of emergency, with children growing up behind bulletproof glass (SCP1: 8'20).

From the Jewish perspectives in our interviews, the summer of 2014, with its demonstrations and assaults around the Gaza war constituted the main turning point – these events changed what antisemites dared to express in public. But the change was largely in expression, not in attitude, explained one interviewee, and it had nothing to do with recent immigration. Nevertheless, she admitted she was not one of the most worried Jews in Berlin. Many had a more cautious interpretation of the situation (SCJ2). A representative of a Jewish NGO discerned no new quality, but rather a ‘concentration’ of antisemitism. According to her, antisemitism is expressed openly much more frequently while, at the same time, the perspective of Jews is not given due attention (SCJ1). For many Jews, an observer of antisemitism from a Western German city reported, it was not only the frequency and the level of aggression of the assaults and demonstrations in 2014 that provoked deep insecurity. What irritated them most was the non-reaction by German authorities and civil society. Reactions came too late and were not clear (SCJ4, see also: Steinitz, 2015). It was the Central Council of the Jews that initiated a demonstration against the anti-Jewish hatred at the Gaza rallies.73 The reaction of law enforcement had been very slow, and in one case the Jewish congregation had to talk at the city’s administration for a long time until they decided not to allow an anti-Israel rally to end close to the synagogue. At that point Jewish parents started to explain to their children what antisemitism was, forbade them to wear their Magen David openly and urged them to be more alert in public. In some cities Jewish religion classes were cancelled. They did not

73 According to a politician an especially shaming fact and ‘catastrophe’ (SCP1: 30'49).
know if they would meet the hatemongers from the rallies personally in the street. Since nobody knew when ‘it’ would happen again, the feeling prevailed that one should be prepared. The situation today is different insofar as the authorities, including the police, show an increased awareness of the problem, partly as a result of public interest (SCJ4). In addition, the head of Frankfurt’s Anne Frank Education Center, Meron Mendel, stated the relevance of 2014 as a turning point regarding their counselling cases but also regarding attacks on their institution itself. Only after mid-2015 did the situation go back to the level of 2013. Apart from the connection to events in the Middle East he could not spot any trends in the development of antisemitism in Germany (SCR6).

The perception of the head of a Jewish community in an East German city was different insofar as she reported rising fears of Middle Eastern antisemitism among the members of her congregation when the immigration from the MENA countries had reached its peak. Many were concerned about a first reception centre being built in front of a Jewish cemetery. But she stressed multiple times that their actual problem with antisemitic assaults came primarily from right-wing (white) Germans (a statement also endorsed by others). Her main concern was the general shift of German society to the right. The recent decision by the German Institutional Court not to ban the neo-Nazi Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) had opened up a Pandora’s box and caused a new wave of assaults and hate mail from obvious NPD and AfD supporters (SCJ3: 2‘53, 17’00). Like others mentioned before, she criticized the majority of German politicians and media for refusing to take antisemitism seriously and restricting their activities to dishonest ritualized statements on Holocaust remembrance day (SCJ3).

5.2 Findings from the interviews: antisemitism, MENA refugees and Muslim Germans

In our interviews, connections between antisemitic incidents and MENA refugees were not quantified. As an example, the police chief of a West German city with some 100,000 inhabitants reported that since 2011 there had been no antisemitic incident made known to the police that had been attributed to a MENA migrant. Below the level of reported offences, a monitoring unit active in the same area recorded 12 antisemitic incidents in the second half of 2016, one of them was attributed to an Iranian refugee (SCA2).

5.2.1 General context and methodological problems
Most interviewees in contact with refugees said that the new immigrants generally had more pressing problems than those created by negative attitudes, both those they face and their own. Most of them were in an extremely precarious situation: waiting for the authorities to decide about their status of residence and asylum application; living in mass accommodations under very trying circumstances; attempting to learn German; looking or training for a job; trying to find orientation in a foreign and, especially outside of the large cities, often hostile environment; coming to terms with violence and flight experiences; and generally

74 Moreover, the MBT Hessen observed a rise in antisemitic attitudes among neo-Nazi and right-wing populist groups (SCN2).

75 Because it would not be strong enough to endanger the political system.
coping with acculturation stress (SCR1, SCR6, SCR7, RM2, RM6, SCM3, SCA3, with reference to additional problems of unaccompanied adolescents: SCR2, SCR3, SCR4). Nevertheless, many showed thankfulness for being received and a strong will to integrate and were interested in learning about German society and about its relation to the Shoah (SCR7: 23’39, RM3, SCR2). The level of integration to a large degree depended on the type of accommodation. Refugees who were allowed to live in normal apartments and whose children immediately attended local schools integrated swiftly, apart from the ones barracked in anonymous mass accommodations, reports the police chief of a city in West Germany (SCA2).

German society, on the other hand, is extremely polarized toward refugees. On the one hand there is the liberal Willkommenskultur, composed of people from all strata of society who invest much time and effort to welcome and help refugees. On the other hand there are people hostile to diversity and fearing immigration, many of them acting out their hatred verbally in Parliament, in the street or on the internet, but also physically by attacking refugees, refugee accommodations or people helping refugees. Some interviewees reported that split in their personal environment (RM6, RM1). Some mentioned Muslim-hatred and racism as the biggest problem for the refugees (RM1), while others described a ‘dramatic change’ in society from the ‘summer tale’ of Willkommenskultur to today’s level of continuous discrimination and daily attacks on refugees (RM2: 6’01), a ‘degree of contempt for human beings that is shocking – and new’ (RM1: 2’15). In general, due to exclusionary social and administrative structures and the negative attitudes of individuals, it is harder for refugees to find jobs, housing, contacts and so on. Structural racism, racist discourses in the media and racist attitudes amplify each other and lead to German society preventing refugees from arriving (and integrating) properly (RM3).

MENA migrants in particular faced the additional problem of widespread anti-Muslim prejudice. First, it is assumed that they are all religious Muslims; second, they are believed to bring behaviours like forced marriage or honour killings with them; and finally they are thought to be Islamists and thus bringing extremism, violence and terror to Germany (SCM1, SCN2, SCR4). But there are differences in discrimination among MENA refugees as well. While a Yazidi woman rarely would face any hostilities, the experience of a young man from North Africa will likely be very different (RM2).

Discrimination emanates not only from the non-migrant part of society but also from migrants, both groups with an older migration background and more recent immigrants. Even in an accommodation designed for LGBTI refugees as a safe space, a refuge from homo-, trans- or queerphobic attacks by fellow refugees, there have been reports of Eastern European LGBTI persons mobbing queer housemates from Africa (RM6). Further hostility is generated by the different recognition quotas, which mean that prospects to stay in Germany vary for different countries of origin. A youth worker reported tensions between Afghan (with low acceptance rates for asylum applications) and Syrian kids (with currently the highest approval rates) over access to resources such as German classes (SCR2).

Because of that highly precarious situation, most of the refugees were very aware that the range of what they can say and do is very limited. There is a clear awareness about what one is allowed to say in Germany and what one is not. For instance, some were told by their translator that when at
the Ausländerbehörde (aliens authority) they should not say anything negative about Israel (SCR7). For that reason, the methodological problem of social desirability bias in surveys must be assumed to be much higher than among people with a secure status of residence. The results should therefore be interpreted with extreme care. In contrast to this, the head of the Anne Frank education centre explained that the newly arrived lack awareness of the social desirability of opposing antisemitism and so they tend to express antisemitic stereotypes more openly (SCR6).

After a survey among refugees, the researchers pointed out two other methodological problems: in many cases the refugees perceived the academic interviewers as part of the authorities, of the state. And their sample of interviewees was already distorted because many explained their readiness to participate in an interview as an attempt to counter the negative public image of refugees (SCR7).

5.2.2 Attitudes and actions

No interviewee doubted that there were antisemitic attitudes among MENA refugees, at least because no group was free of prejudice (SCR6). But at the same time, nobody could provide any evidence for differences in the degree of antisemitic attitudes of Muslims or non-Muslims, refugees, migrants or non-migrant Germans. In the setting of Holocaust education, antisemitism has been perceived as being a problem of white older people and related to trends in the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than being caused by country of origin. The vice director of the Holocaust education and memorial institution ‘Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz’ admitted that undoubtedly there would be antisemitic attitudes also among Muslim refugees. But there would not be enough data to say anything reliable about it: ‘Where is the empiricism?’ (SCR1). What has been reported, though, are anecdotal examples of antisemitism among MENA refugees.

Additionally, researchers in a recent survey among refugees concluded that antisemitic stereotypes did exist among refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. While only one out of 24 demonstrated a consistent antisemitic ideology, the others with antisemitic attitudes (the majority of interviewees) expressed occasional, partly contradictory elements. Those elements mostly were ill-thought-out pieces of everyday knowledge learned in school and from the media (in Syria) where there would be no counter-narratives. In part they contradicted their personal experiences with Jews, but most of the refugees admitted that they knew very little about Judaism (SCR7).

In order to evaluate certain statements, like comparisons with the Shoah, one had, according to the same experts, to keep in mind that most MENA refugees lacked sufficient historical knowledge to make an informed comparison. For most of them, ‘the Holocaust’ was just a ‘symbol for something very bad’ (SCR7: 26’20). If they then said something like ‘what happens in Syria today is worse than the Holocaust’ (SCR7: 26’35) that would not qualify as an indicator for antisemitism as it would in a German context.

76 See Arnold/König (2016: 27f).

77 Nor did monitoring and education projects like the Mobile Beratungsteam gegen Rassismus und Rechtsextremismus (MBT) (Mobile counselling team against racism and right-wing extremism) have any information on the participation of recent migrants in the antisemitic incidents they encountered (SCN2).

78 For details see Arnold/König (2016).
A similar statement was made by a German teacher from a Syrian family background: although numbers were not available, she argued that antisemitism is widespread among MENA refugees. After all, Syria remained at war with Israel and against this background education and socialization to stereotypes or enemy images were the norm (SCM3). It would indeed be in need of explanation if there was no antisemitism among refugees from states with such a level of antisemitic propaganda. However, she considered a more pressing question concerns whether these attitudes are fixed and stable, especially in view of the fact that that most of the refugees had fled the regimes sponsoring that propaganda (SCP1).

These accounts have been partly supported by an interviewee teaching German to MENA refugees (mostly Syrian, some Iraqi, adults aged over 30, university graduates) in an East German state (RM5). When the group was talking about recent events in Mosul, the discussion switched to Israel when somebody claimed that the Jewish state supported American activities in the Middle East because it wanted to expand its territory. As she intervened it turned out that nobody in the group accepted Israel’s right to exist, believing that all Israelis should go ‘back where they came from, that means to Europe’ (RM5: 12’06) – a statement indicating that they actually did not mean Israelis but Jews. When she then asked them about antisemitism and the Shoah as reasons for the existence of Israel as a Jewish state, they answered with the next conspiracy theory: it all had been prepared in the 1930s, Hitler had been a friend of the Zionists, and the dead Jews had been sort of collateral damage. They questioned the number of European Jews killed: ‘we believe it was only 900,000’ (RM5: 1’40). The interviewee said she was shocked not only by the statements as such but by the fact that nobody in the group contradicted them, that they were not ready to deviate from their conviction and rather pitied her for having to hear the truth now. They understood their account as knowledge, not opinion: ‘the innocence which they said all this with was unbelievable’ (RM5: 1’30). Their source mostly was Syrian school (the Iraqis had been much less radical) and they had barely any historical knowledge: only half of them knew the name Auschwitz, most thought that only German Jews had been killed and they knew almost nothing about the history of persecution of Jews in Germany.

A museum guide working in an exhibition on Jewish history reported antisemitic statements made by one pupil in a group of about 25 visiting young refugees. When discussing the Shoah one participant expressed surprise that there would still be Jews in Germany, while another contradicted the number of European Jews being killed by the Germans. That number, he continued, had only been invented to allow the Jews to occupy Palestine. He claimed to have known all this since childhood (SCR8).

A researcher at KIgA reported two cases from welcome classes. In one case some of the students had rejected the visit of a Jewish Holocaust survivor. The other was about a self-identified Palestinian pupil who during a visit to the Holocaust memorial said that he agreed with the killing of the Jews. Earlier, he already had erased Israel from a map at school (SCR4: 8’30).

The founder of the Jewish-Muslim Salaam-Shalom initiative refused to say anything about the proportion of antisemitism among MENA refugees because that would be a ‘bluff’. Among Syrians, he personally had encountered philosemitism and interest rather than antisemitism, e.g. two refugees that
started to learn Hebrew or his invitation to a mosque where he wore a kippah, recited from the Torah and met interest instead of being beaten up. Nevertheless, he would not deny the existence of antisemitism among German Muslims and Muslim refugees (SCN1). A similar account was provided by a member of a Berlin synagogue who was part of a Jewish initiative that wanted to add a Jewish voice and participation to the help for refugees. Her personal experiences with recent MENA refugees, especially from Syria, were largely ones of ‘openness’ and ‘surprise’ (SCJ2: 8’35, similarly: SCJ3, SCR4) instead of hostility when her group volunteered in the refugee centre, as Jews, some with kippah or Magen David. Some refugees told her that they had had a totally different picture of Jews before and now would be positively surprised. This, she added, would not have been the same with MENA migrants who had been living in Germany for ten years, or in the second or third generation – ‘among them you find more radical perspectives, but this is also not new’ (SCJ2: 8’49). On the other hand, from her experiences with local school classes with a Muslim migrant background that took tours through the synagogue she reported no radical reactions. Most of the students did believe that all Jews were rich, though, but apart from that the most complicated problem had been boys who refused to put on a kippah (mostly because they did not want somebody to put pictures online of them wearing it). But after frequent reservations at the beginning, the experiences of encounter mostly turned out to be good (SCJ2: 14’07).

A teacher in welcome classes said he had no experience of antisemitic statements (SCR3). A psychologist leading several psychosocial support centres for refugees said that they had expected many more prejudices like antisemitism and homophobia than they actually experienced in their work. He also reported that his colleagues from IsraAID, where volunteers and employees do not hide their Jewish religion, experienced the work with refugees as being ‘surprisingly conflict-free’ (RM2: 11’37). The head of a department overseeing all ‘initial reception centres’ of an East German state only spoke about discrimination of the refugees by xenophobic elements of society but could not account for any discriminatory attitude or behaviour by refugees, be it between different groups of immigrants or to other groups (SCA3).

The interviewee from the antisemitism monitoring unit in Kassel reported some recent antisemitic incidents attributed to MENA refugees, but the events of summer 2014 remain most important for what he perceives as the relationship between antisemitism and migrants from MENA countries (SCJ4).

5.2.3 Muslim and mainstream antisemitism

According to the member of an antisemitism prevention institution, it is beyond dispute that MENA migrants bring antisemitic or anti-Zionist content with them, mostly ill-thought through. But they also bring the capacity to change these attitudes. That, in turn, is not easy in German society, which itself has difficulties with home-grown antisemitism (SCJ1: 22’47). Home-grown and immigrant antisemitism overlap and interact. For example, volunteers in refugee centres

79 ‘I would prefer not to start a discussion’ if somebody says he is Palestinian and his home town is Haifa (SCJ2: 9’20).

80 E.g. 2016 when at a rally against the Syrian regime Jewishness had been equated with the absolute evil: ‘The Syrian army is a Jewish army’. Participants had been reported to be mostly refugees. But to demonstrate that also the migrant population was aware of antisemitism, he added: also the person reporting the case had a migration background (SCJ4: 8’11).
reported antisemitic slogans by refugees but their own, unconsidered antisemitic attitudes prevented them establishing effective boundaries against them. The only measure they were prepared to take was invoking political correctness and the taboo on antisemitism. Additionally, in many cases migrants and non-migrants alike were unaware of their antisemitic utterances (SCJ1). The difference between migrants and Germans mostly consisted in the openness of expression, as mentioned earlier, of their antisemitic sentiments. In her educational work with young and adult Germans of a Muslim migration background (not refugees) she observed: ‘it doesn’t take you long with Muslim participants to bring it [an antisemitic attitude] to light’. German-socialized participants, on the other hand, would rather use a detour technique (SCJ1: 17’47). The same has been observed in antisemitism monitoring for the anti-Israel rallies in 2014: people who self-define as Muslim demonstrated more aggressiveness, making fewer references to the Shoah and exhibiting less restraint in expressing and acting out their antisemitism while left-wing anti-Zionists at the same events would disguise their attitudes much more. But, nevertheless, the demonstrations were dominated by MENA migrants (including Turkey) (SCJ4: 12’30). The fact that non-migrant Germans had learned detour communication in order to express their attitudes without being identified as antisemitic may well explain why Muslims proportionally are caught more often expressing antisemitism in polls (SCJ4: 15’50, see also SCR6).

Most of the interviewees emphasized that antisemitism remained a problem of the majority society or of society as a whole and should not be externalized onto a distinct group like young male Muslims or refugees. That does not mean closing one’s eyes when adolescents in a welcome class express antisemitism, as the vice director of the Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz put it. The problem facing her institution is not the 300 residents of a nearby refugee home but rather the new political situation with the presence of the AfD. However, in her long career in Holocaust education with young Germans of a migrant background, she had experienced only about five problematic situations with young Muslims, but in all three of her institution’s recent public events they faced AfD politicians or other right-wing populists and their revisionist statements (SCR1).

From her experiences in Holocaust education she would firmly reject the ‘rumour’ that one could not discuss (German) history with pupils from a Muslim migrant background without them making antisemitic remarks (SCR1). In schools, if kids with a migration background and problematic opinions on Jews met white German teachers with unconsidered antisemitic attitudes it would sometimes be difficult to distinguish between what was ‘imported’ from the migrant background and what was amplified by or even adopted from the teachers (SCR1). Teachers’ unease about how to deal with antisemitic remarks has been raised as a problem, as have knowledge gaps among the teaching community (SCR4). An interviewee who helps train youth workers and other people working with young refugees argued in the same direction: not only the refugees, but the Welcome Culture as a whole had to be addressed. In particular, practitioners in small volunteer projects such as bike workshops for refugees often had no idea how to react when they encountered antisemitic statements. In many cases they would just affirm them and provide the teens with antisemitic arguments in the first

81 ‘Oh Ahmed, don’t ever say anything bad about the Jews or women or you will have a hard time in Germany.’ (SCJ1: 24’20).

82 E.g. about the decade-long state of disintegration of Palestinians in Syria and other Middle East states.
place instead of setting boundaries and explaining. To stop those two forms of antisemitism from interacting requires ‘education on both sides’, reaching both the new immigrants and those who are helping them. (SCR2).

The chairwoman of an East German Jewish congregation emphasized that claims of widespread antisemitism among Muslims were used by people with a right-wing agenda. The Pegida movement and the AfD refer to Israel and the Jews because they hoped to gain support from German Jews and because they tried to do something politically correct. But when she, as a prominent local Jew, did not react with the same anti-Muslim sentiments, the usual threats resumed. She was glad, though, that Middle East and German right-wing antisemitism have not yet merged (SCJ3).

The researchers who qualitatively studied antisemitism among MENA refugees concluded that their results were similar to those for the German majority: there are some die-hard antisemites, there are more widely spread fragmentary stereotypes, but there are also secular atheists ‘without a trace of prejudice’ (SCR7: 34’01). Because of this differentiation, to treat ‘the Muslim refugees’ as one unified group would be problematic and ‘the whole discourse on antisemitism among refugees [is] a non-convincing generalization’ (SCR7: 33’40).

The Welcome Classes alone consist of so many different religious, geographic, national, ethnic and language backgrounds, insisted a teacher, that it would be misleading to treat them as one homogeneous group. Additionally, due to this diversity, most of the students are primarily interested in getting to know each other, e.g. when pupils from the Middle East learned about the existence of Yazidis (SCR3). A volunteer working in a residence for queer refugees who reported encountering no incidents of antisemitism or other forms of discrimination emphasized that age, personal experiences and above all individual differences had more weight than country of origin or religion in determining whether one would discriminate against others (RM1).

5.2.4 Discrimination and antisemitism

One interviewee said the connection between discrimination and antisemitic attitudes was more of a problem in France than in Germany (SCN1). But in agreement with the research mentioned above, some of our interviewees believed there was a relation between experience of discrimination and one’s own discriminatory attitudes. A member of a refugee support initiative said she often heard: ‘Here everybody is always saying that we Muslims must all be bad, so why couldn’t I say that all Jews are bad?’ (RM3: 6’02). The painful experience of being labelled an Islamist terrorist thus was passed on (RM3). In a different group, a (liberal Muslim) teacher observed that most German Muslim pupils felt socially excluded and disadvantaged and looked for an even smaller minority to repeat the same devaluation mechanism. But this reaction was not peculiar to Muslims but applicable to all discriminated minorities (SCM3). A professional in Holocaust education said that some German Muslim adolescents had the feeling that it would always and only be about the Jews and never about their own histories – and that feeling could lead to the ‘detour communication’ of antisemitic remarks

83 Refugee: ‘Big Brother Hitler was cool’ - Welcome Culture representative: ‘Yeah, that really is terrible what Israel is doing to the Palestinians, isn’t it? It’s really the same as the National Socialists were doing.’ (SCR2: 18’07).

84 ‘You should start to make up your mind who your friends are. Wait for the time when things have changed!’ (SCJ3: 6’47).
New Empirical Data

(SCR1). The representative of Berlin’s anti-discrimination authority said that a relation between discrimination, a feeling of powerlessness, disintegration, and the support for exclusionary attitudes like antisemitism could not be ignored. But he rarely had found evidence in his work for a direct (causal) correlation; instead, he would describe it as a ‘conglomerate’ that influenced antisemitism indirectly (SCA1: 27'48, similarly: SCJ1). That position also has been shared by the interviewee from the Anne Frank educational centre who added that legitimizing one’s own antisemitism with discrimination experiences was a frequent pattern among Muslim migrants. But these same discrimination experiences also formed a good starting point for education against antisemitism (SCR6).

The researchers in the qualitative survey among MENA refugees found no connection between discrimination experience and antisemitic attitudes. Discrimination experience could even lead to the opposite. The group of Afghans stood out in their sample because many of them had a long history of flight, often with a long stay in Iran where they had to endure intense everyday racism but, nevertheless, showed the lowest probability for antisemitism or anti-Zionism among the interviewees. Some even demonstrated a potential for empathy with the Jews – past and present (SCR7). That effect has also been reported for a completely different group: participants in interreligious dialogue projects. A representative of the ‘House of One’, a project of Muslims, Christians and Jews to build a common place of worship, said that according to his experiences in interreligious working groups, the experience of discrimination led to reinforced dialogue and search for common ground rather than to further exclusion (SCN3).

A crucial result of the survey among MENA migrants was that it ‘made no sense to [draw parallels between]’ the results from research on young German Muslims with a migration background and the results from recent MENA refugees (SCR7: 33'15). There was not much to learn from that because these were completely different groups with completely different experiences of racist discrimination. The former were ‘German teens who try to provoke the majority society which time and again excludes them’ (SCR7: 22'02) from positions and status and, most importantly, refuses them a German national identity. The latter could not even think about performing such provocation – their exclusion functioned through their weak status as non-citizens where they had to fear deportation on a daily basis (SCR7). How problematic it is to equate recent MENA refugees with Germans of a Muslim migration background is underlined by the fact that the latter participated in the non-migrant majority’s excluding attitudes. As a teacher reports about Berlin, there was almost no contact or exchange between the students in the Welcome Classes (mostly from Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan) and the other students, even if the latter themselves or their family had migrated to Germany and even if (as was the case with Arabic) they spoke the same language (SCR3: 19'00).

Although antisemitism among Muslim Arabs in Germany is therefore fundamentally different from antisemitism among MENA refugees – according to social scientists interviewed here – the debate on the former informed the current debate. To subsume both under one label, ‘the Muslims’ is a generalization possibly motivated by racism (SCR7).

85 See Arnold/König (2016: 30–5).
The representative of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany saw the connection between discrimination and antisemitism rather in the modern Jew – or Israel-hostile discourse assuming that Jews supported hostility against Islam worldwide. This prejudice was reinforced by the ‘fact that among the popular disseminators of Islam-hostile stereotypes there have been or still are Jews, like Henryk Broder and Ralph Giordano’. But at the same time Muslims realized that it was Jews in particular who spoke up against right-wing populism and that it was mostly the activity of Jews that allowed the practice of common rituals like circumcision or kosher/halal butchering. All this, he said, helped to ease anti-Jewish prejudice among German Muslims (SCM1).

5.2.5 Islam and antisemitism

The participant in the Jewish-Muslim initiative pointed out that all monotheistic religions tend to be exclusionary in the face of competitor religions (SCN1).

The research project on recent MENA migrants found only a weak correlation between religion and antisemitism. Arab nationalism seemed to be much more important. It also was what their interviewees mostly told them they were taught in school and the media: ‘Arabs and Jews are enemies’ (SCR7: 28’17). Generally, those with strong collective identities, be they religious, national or ethnic, tend towards generalizing stereotypes about other groups, such as Jews. Those with a more individualistic frame of mind tend towards differentiation (SCR7).

The representative of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany said there was resentment against Jews in the Islamic world, but this, other than the historic hostility against Jews among Christians and Muslims, had its source mostly in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As soon as this conflict found a political solution, the resentment among Muslims and Arab Christians would disappear. But ‘actual antisemitism’ ‘in a lexical sense’ according to him was non-existent among Muslims, because antisemitism had to be understood as racially grounded hostility against Jews like in National Socialism and Islam did not recognize racial exclusion. Arab Muslims in particular could not be antisemitic, because Arabs understood themselves as semites. He also stressed the European origin of the sources of anti-Jewish conspiracy theories circulating in the MENA countries (the Protocols and Mein Kampf) (SCM1).

This strategy of externalization and denial has been addressed by the co-founder of the Liberal-Islamischer Bund (LIB) (Liberal Islamic League), Lamya Kaddor. Until now, she said, not one Islamic umbrella association in Germany had dealt with antisemitism among Muslims. The LIB had been the first one, e.g. with its project for empowerment against antisemitism among Muslim schoolchildren.86 The reason for that hesitation, she believes, is fear of tensions in the ranks of their organizations. It is obvious for her that latent antisemitism ‘just exists in large parts of the Muslim community’ (SCM3: 7’30) – not ideologically grounded and hard-core, rather in the form of unconsidered stereotypes but still spread wider than the institutions liked it to be. That the umbrella associations (and the congregations) accepted this without criticism she deems very dangerous (SCM3).

86 That verdict may be too generalizing. Just recently, there has been a workshop of the Central Council of Muslims and the Central Council of the Jews on the topic – www.rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/josef-schuster-im-gespraech-niemand-wird-als-antisemit-geboren-aid-1.6828071.
But in regard to countries like Syria, she added, one should not forget that the education and socialization to Jew-hatred affected not only Muslims, but Syrian Christians, too. The problem was one of Arab nationalism rather than Islam. The support for antisemitism probably was higher among Christian Arabs in the Middle East than among Muslim Moroccans or Indonesians (SCM3).

In regard to the relation between Islam and antisemitism, a member of an education project against antisemitism found it interesting to note who talked about that relation, arguing that in most cases it was brought up out of anti-Islam motives (SCR3).

5.2.6 Toleration
The norm of toleration is something any minority ordinarily would support as a matter of course since it guarantees its own safety and freedom. So it does not come as a surprise that the overwhelming majority of refugees in Germany chose the country for its respect for human rights. Some 73% of current refugees (who mostly come from MENA countries), according to the IAB survey, gave that answer (Gostomski et al., 2016: 26f.).

Furthermore, most refugees’ extremely insecure status make it highly unlikely that they will transform any negative attitudes into action, as a researcher for the survey about prejudice among MENA refugees noted (SCR7). For most, their priority was to deal with their individual problems of daily life, like residence status, employment, housing, language, before they started to act politically (RM6). The norm of toleration was accepted, and aversion did not automatically turn into assaults (SCM3). The museum guide, who also works with refugees in schools, reported that even refugees expressing antisemitic attitudes supported the value toleration (SCR8, see also: SCR3). The German language teacher in the East German state said that her pupils knew very well that Holocaust denial was a criminal offence in Germany (they had learned it in the integration courses) and that they clearly distinguished between what they were allowed to say in public and what they believed in private (RM5: 16’50).

On the other hand, the police chief interviewed here was not so sure. He reported that at some of the larger refugee centres during information events about the democratic constitutional state, police statements about the equality of all humans, the law-abiding character of the police work and opposition to violence against women had been greeted with disdain. He concluded that law-abiding behaviour as part of integration was hard to enforce (SCA2).

But, as a worker at a queer refugee centre reports, since many refugees experienced their country of origin as being oppressive, corrupt or at war, they appreciated Germany precisely for its embrace of democracy, freedom of speech, gender equality and freedom to live out their sexual identity (RM6, similarly: SCR4, SCR6). Many nevertheless first had to learn to place trust in politics and executive authorities after their experiences with regimes like Assad’s (RM3).

In response to the question of toleration, a Berlin synagogue member active in refugee help said she had met many very enlightened Syrian refugees but also completely unenlightened ones. She added that also among Germans without a migration background the toleration norm was not always accepted (SCJ2: 25’50).

87 Other reasons were much less important: education system 43%, the feeling to be welcome 42% [], social welfare 26%, economic situation in Germany 24%, German asylum process 22%, family, compatriots or friends/acquaintances already living in Germany 19, 14 resp. 12%.
The representative of the Central Council of Muslims stated that many Muslims living in Germany considered phenomena like homosexuality as forms of life that in principle had to be tolerated, even if they rejected them for themselves. Generally, both for refugees and for long-settled immigrants, the readiness to accept the rights and security of other groups and minorities largely depended on how far their own religious rights were accepted by institutions and the majority society (SCM1).

5.2.7 Changes in attitudes
Some Syrian refugees reported that the war has changed their attitudes towards Jews. They now see more clearly who causes suffering, IS and Assad, and who treated Syrian wounded in Israeli hospitals (SCR7).88

According to the analysis of the representative of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, enmity against Jews in the Islamic world was fostered by the lack of real contact with Jews. As soon as immigrants were in Germany, acquired the German language and encountered the German Jewish community, they no longer had to build their image of the Jews from third sources (SCM1).

5.3 Findings from the interviews: antisemitism and other forms of group-focused enmity

According to the representative of an institution for antisemitism prevention, antisemitism was the key topic for anti-discrimination work in Germany. Under the German conditions, it opened up access to other topics, like racism (SCJ1). But to effectively counter antisemitism and other forms of discrimination, one needed competent, qualified people reflecting on both antisemitism and racism (SCJ1: 25’35).

A very interesting contribution was the insight that discriminatory attitudes and the fight against them had nothing to do with democracy: negative attitudes and hostilities ‘perfectly continued to exist in democracy’. The reference to democracy was a useful supplement but could not detract from the actual problem (SCJ1: 36’18).89

5.4 Recommendations from the interviews

The federal politician interviewed here demanded more research on antisemitism, especially quantitative surveys, among recent refugees and other minorities. How stable or changeable are the antisemitic attitudes brought from countries with anti-Jewish state propaganda? Which patterns do they follow? How is their antisemitism different from the majority’s? (SCP1). Answering those questions also demands reminding ourselves that every European society carries classic antisemitic stereotypes as part of their cultural baggage. Only with that awareness can ‘the beast [be] tameable’ (SCP1: 16’17). Accordingly, organizations should be more self-reflective and self-critical. Restraint in speaking about antisemitism among Muslims with Muslim organizations should cease and politicians should start to practically implement what has been promised in speeches (SCP1).


89 See also the discussion of ‘democratic racism’ that in a colonial tradition projects antidemocratic attitudes on Muslims and constructs a democratic non-Muslim We-group (Messerschmidt, 2010: 100).
The main question of our research was also the ‘elephant in the room’ at the conference of the Inter-parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism, ICCA, held in Berlin in 2017 (SCP2: 16’17) and continued to separate the ‘alarmists’ from their opponents. That conflict would not be solved until a large quantitative survey would prove or disprove the speculations on both sides (SCP2).

Keeping in mind the need for differentiation within the groups of ‘Muslims’ and ‘refugees’, and the antisemitic attitudes broadly shared amongst all parts of the German population, including its refugees, the researchers of the refugee survey stressed that an enquiry into the specific situation among Muslim refugees still is important. Holocaust education and antisemitism prevention have shown that prevention programmes must be tailored specifically to specific target audiences (SCR7). Antisemitism among Muslims in Germany should be scrutinized and fought, the interviewee from an anti-antisemitism education initiative emphasized, but as a problem of German society as a whole. It should be addressed together with Muslims – instead of blaming them alone for the problem. (SCR3: 31’20).

Many MENA refugees need safe spaces (without language barriers, without fear of sanctions) to discuss topics like antisemitism and to ask ‘stupid questions’. In contrast to many German Muslim adolescents, they demonstrated a deep interest to integrate and a willingness to learn about German society (SCR4, SCR7). For all refugees, of course, a stable prospect to stay and be able to integrate and an appreciation of their knowledge is crucial for education projects (SCR2).

Muslim organisations could learn from the past efforts of Jewish organizations in their struggle to counter hostility by education and explaining their religion, said the representative of the Central Council of Muslims (SCM1).

That this has been far from accomplished for Jewry is demonstrated by the statement by an employee of a museum for Jewish history. He repeated the demand that school curricula stop presenting Jews as either exotics or victims. To expose students to antisemitic stereotypes or images without preparation could even confirm those stereotypes (SCR5). At the same time, school curricula should be adapted to the reality of a migration society. Even now, students at German schools normally learn little about Muslims and Islam in German history. That omission helps confirm non-Muslims in their mistaken assumption that German and Muslim are separate categories. For Muslims, it reinforces their sense of exclusion from German society, their belief that their stories and histories do not matter (SCR4).

In terms of methodology, schools could benefit from incorporating non-white German role models, such as non-antisemitic Palestinians (SCR2). But beyond that, addressing antisemitism demands a holistic approach, not simply the inputting of information but also an approach that avoids making assumptions about specific perpetrator groups. Antisemitism should be described as a unique phenomenon, but one that connects to students’ own experiences of racism and other forms of discrimination. In so doing, education could activate empathy and a feeling for similarities within diversity (SCR3). This seems to be the position of Berlin’s anti-discrimination authority: that projects combatting antisemitism must reflect on the conglomerate of discrimination, marginalization, exclusionary attitudes and feelings of powerlessness (a combined anti-racist and anti-antisemitic approach) (SCA1).
New Empirical Data

There has been deep methodological reflection on these questions at one educational institution devoted to antisemitism prevention. In their projects they try to establish dialogical spaces for reflection without reproaches and exposures. The three-fold core concept consists of a critical reflection about the entanglements of individual and social thought structures (like antisemitism), a critical analysis of social structures, and a practical reference to the professional background of the participants. The most important prerequisite was the consciousness of being part of the problem. For that reason, the interviewee also wished that the media would put an end to its ascriptions as to who is ‘bad’ and who is ‘good’ (SCJ1).

The main political need raised is the question of resources. To change discriminatory attitudes requires qualified, self-reflective education experts, along with enough time for each project (SCJ1, similarly: SCA1, SCR2). In addition, more research is needed into these attitudes, as well as scientific evaluation of all projects and trans-disciplinary cooperation. All these require further resources for education, and, beyond that, genuine appreciation that goes beyond hollow slogans (SCJ1: 36’01, similarly: SCP1). The interviewee from Berlin’s anti-discrimination authority also described the need for more projects in education, consulting and documentation and that the state of Berlin did well in supporting successful projects on not only a temporary but an ongoing basis. In addition, he observed, it is important to look for ways to reach under-evaluated groups such as parents or people without higher education – even adults in general are underrepresented as research and education object (SCA1).

One member of an antisemitism monitoring project expressed the ideal that all groups affected by group-focused enmity and discrimination should cooperate in solidarity instead of valuing people according to their descent. If one person were attacked, then all would defend them (SCJ4: 36’47).
5.5 Summary

- Many interviewees saw the relevant turning point not in 2011 but either in 2014 with the antisemitic Gaza rallies and the tremendous increase in antisemitic incidents or in 2015 when the unprecedented number of refugees caused the rise of Welcome Culture as well as an explosion of racist violence.

- MENA refugees, according to some interviewees, faced manifold existential problems and discrimination and mostly would not dare to threaten their status through statements they knew are undesirable in Germany. Therefore all surveys had the problem of a high rate of social desirability in their responses. One interviewee contradicted this finding, stating that MENA refugees (and other MENA migrants) could not yet have acquired that awareness, and that this formed one of the reasons for their higher rates in antisemitism polls.

- None of the interviewees doubted that a certain percentage of MENA migrants held antisemitic attitudes, but no one could provide reliable numbers. Interviewees reported cases of single antisemitic events or classrooms with an antisemitic majority but also experiences of open-mindedness without any prejudice among migrants. As with the German majority, there were some diehard antisemites among the MENA refugees, some supporting certain antisemitic stereotypes, but also secular atheists ‘without a trace of prejudice’.

- Several interviewees were surprised that antisemitism among recent MENA refugees was not as strong as they expected.

- Refugees with antisemitic or anti-Zionist attitudes were able to change their attitudes. But that was not easy in a German society that had its difficulties with its own antisemitism. Unconsidered home-grown antisemitism even among teachers or people in refugee aid, as well as obvious dishonesty in politicians’ statements against antisemitism, could bolster antisemitic attitudes among refugees and make it impossible to determine the source of antisemitic content. Therefore education programmes were needed for refugees and Germans alike.

- It has also been stressed that due to the group’s diversity, any generalizations about MENA refugees were bound to be misleading.

- It would also be misleading, if not a racist assumption, to equate recent MENA refugees and Germans with a Muslim migrant background. The two groups display different characteristics, had different racism experiences, and hold different antisemitic attitudes.

- Experiences of discrimination as Muslims were in many cases seen as influencing but not causing antisemitism. Such experiences could in fact be drawn on to initiate anti-prejudice and anti-antisemitism education, since individuals’ own discrimination experience can help inculcate the values of pluralism and empathy.

- The representative of a German Muslim association attributed antisemitism among Muslims mostly to the Arab-Israeli conflict and tried to deny its existence through referring to the old exculpation narrative that Arabs were Semites themselves and therefore could never be antisemites. This strategy
of denial has been criticized by the representative of a liberal Muslim association as being the predominant reaction among Muslim associations and congregations in Germany. Generally they dared not address the topic due to fears of ill-feeling among the ranks of their organizations where latent antisemitism existed more broadly than the institutions care to believe.

- Several interviewees regarded Arab nationalism rather than Islam as the source of antisemitic attitudes, with, for instance, Arab Christians showing stronger antisemitic attitudes than Moroccan Muslims.

- Many interviewees reported that most refugees were aware of the norms of toleration, many embracing it as the reason for their flight to a country like Germany (and this is supported by polls among refugees). The representative of a German Muslim association stressed that the acceptance of another group’s rights and securities depended on the extent to which one’s own religious rights were accepted by institutions and the society more broadly.

- The close connection between democracy and tolerance in education and prevention programmes has been challenged. Negative attitudes and hostilities could well exist under democracy.

- Recommendations and demands by the interviewees included the following: more resources for documentation (especially representative) research, consulting, education, empowerment and prevention; more activities in line with politicians’ speeches; more critical self-reflection on the part of institutions and non-migrant Germans; more attention in addressing antisemitism as a problem of German society as a whole; less restraint in talking about antisemitism among Muslims with Muslim organizations; fewer generalizing assumptions about Muslims; prevention of the construction of a Muslim-German dichotomy; better prospects for refugees to remain in the country; more appreciation of immigrants’ history and contribution (for both refugees and Germans with a Muslim migration background); school curricula that reflect Jewish history not only as a history of victimhood, while also including Muslims and their histories in Germany, and not least, a combined anti-racist and anti-antisemitic approach in education and prevention projects.
6 Public Discourse
6.1 Social media

To date, quantitative surveys on antisemitism in social media are rare. Generally, due to the nature of antisemitism, it is hard to isolate the phenomenon nationally. But its role in group-focused enmity is widely recognized. Social media serve as networking tools for people with similar interests, also if this interest is hate. Circular references and legitimations make it easy to stabilize even the most dubious conspiracy theory. Antisemitic activities from the far right and Islamist backgrounds shifted their weight from websites to social networks (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2011). According to the Amadeu Antonio Stiftung (AAS), it no longer makes sense to differentiate between online and real-world antisemitism. Content and form that appear online are present on the streets as well (AAS, 2015). In general, if it comes to antisemitism, groups and individuals from the far right, Islamism, the anti-globalization left and the so-called Mitte all are present online. Islamist activism in the field recently gained attention while that from right-wing extremists is still evident (see also Wetzel, 2003, 2004). Recent migrants have not been a topic of scrutiny.

It was the perceived dramatic increase in online racist content (and its violent real-life consequences) in social media formats that led German state attorneys to investigate Facebook. An international survey on deletions made on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube found that reported antisemitic contributions (N=2024) consisted of 5% calls for violence against Jews, 12% Shoah denial, 49% traditional antisemitism, 34% Israel-related antisemitism. YouTube and Twitter, however, seem to attract more antisemitic content than Facebook (Oboler, 2016: 7).

The Federal Ministries of Justice and Consumer Protection (BMJV) and for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ) together fund the monitoring of online hate speech and promote easy access to reporting hate crime. According to this monitoring, Islamist propagandists use Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to recruit new members, particularly through antisemitic incitement in the context of the conflict between Israel and Palestine: demonization of Israel as sole aggressor, victimization of the Palestinians and conspiracy theories. Young users of social media often share these contents uncritically. The same monitoring efforts list antisemitism as an important part of the conspiracy theories that found an ideal ground in the social web. 980,000 people liked the Facebook page of the German ‘Anonymous’ collective which mostly hosted historical revisionism, antisemitism and conspiracy theories. Google’s YouTube easily led users to Shoah denial material, even as auto-completing ‘Holocaust’ to ‘-Lüge’ (Holocaust lie). While the platform reacted swiftly to removal requests, Facebook did so only in 50% of the cases, and Google+ did not react at all. The structure of the social web with its quotation loops was opaque particularly for young users.

The BMJV promised in March 2016 to improve the statistical registration of politically motivated crime. The first numbers, circa 2014 and 2015, were released in November 2016. The data show a steep increase in hate crime, especially online. The number of online cases of ‘incitement’ and xenophobic displays of violence rose from 500 to 2,300. Generally, the chances to get caught and convicted for hate crimes on social media are very low. Most cases have to be closed because of a lack of evidence, while politicians and NGOs charge that the authorities remain far from prepared to handle internet hate crime, as they lack training, personnel, hardware and the will to prosecute.\(^{94}\)

In his 2012 Ph.D. project, Christian Hardinghaus counted 120 Facebook groups that bear the word antizionism(us) in their title and discussed Israel and its boycott, and the search for the sentence ‘I hate Jews’ brought up 653 groups (Hardinghaus, 2012: 104–8). He found it extremely easy to uncover antisemitic and Nazi content through Facebook. A survey he undertook in 2009 in the German social networks StudiVZ and SchülerVZ (at the time still bigger than Facebook) led him to conclude that antisemitic prejudices prevailed in the social media generation.\(^{95}\) Of his interviewees, 31.9% said the Jewish influence in the world was too big; 27% claimed there was a specific Jewish character, with about the half of them describing it mostly negative; 21.4% assumed biological differences between Jews and non-Jews; 18.6% believed that Jews bore the blame for their persecution by the National Socialists; 48.8% said that Jews made too much of a fuss about the National Socialist past; and 52.6% stated that Jews profited from it. In sum, 75.5% of his interviewees agreed with at least one of the statements. On average, ‘migrants’ agreed with 3.1, ‘Germans’ with 2.2 of the statements. The small number of ‘migrant’ interviewees (7.4%), however, makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions (ibid.: 173ff.).\(^{96}\) StudiVZ has frequently been criticized for hosting antisemitic groups and expressions. When a ‘Simon Wiesenthal-Center im StudiVZ’ group reported antisemitic posts in a group named ‘Israel öffentlich kritisieren dürfen’ (being allowed to criticize Israel in public) StudiVZ’ reaction was to close the Simon-Wiesenthal group (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2011: 92).

An ongoing research project by Monika Schwarz-Friesel investigates verbal antisemitism linguistically and includes online media, particularly social media. Commentaries and social network activities are the main place for everyday antisemitism. The semantics of antisemitism on the social web are homogeneous regardless whether the sources are far right, Christian-fundamentalist, Islamist or individual. The internet turns out to be an identity-stabilizing space for antisemitic communication, one that is beyond control. Online there is no communication latency regarding antisemitism – and the virtual reality affects real life in making Jew hatred an integral part of public communication again. The new online media thus support the normalization of Jew-hating speech: antisemitic remarks are not proscribed and the danger of contemporary antisemitism is denied. With their specific characteristics as a medium new online media work as catalyst for an increasing radicalization of antisemitic use of language, especially in the context of Israel and of economic crises. Antisemitism in the commentaries

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94 \[\text{www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/rechtsextremismus-hetze-im-netz-nimmt-zu-oft-kommen-die-taeter-straftlos-davon/14903238.html.}\]

95 N=1176, age: 15–40, average: 21.3, living in Germany.

96 He defines as ‘migrants’ the first immigrating generation, with and without German passport (in his sample 2.8 and 4.6%).
of webpages of big online media like newspapers is not being expressed anonymously; nor is it being contradicted, censored or otherwise proscribed. In this context, such expressions appear as a legitimate opinion, not an act of hate crime (Becker/Gisel, 2016: 118–25; Schwarz-Friesel, 2013).

Judith Rahner qualitatively investigated 100 Facebook profiles of young Berliners who understood themselves as Muslims or were assumed to be such, during the Gaza war in 2014. Many of the profiles that had previously been non-political abruptly became politicized, in many cases antisemitically. The posted content referred to the traditional antisemitic ritual murder legend (claiming that Israel systematically targeted Palestinian children) and conspiracy theories as well as Israel-related topics (equation of National Socialism and Israel, denial of the right to exist, victim blaming) and was mostly obtained from conservative-Islamic or Islamist websites, although it showed no evidence of a specific Islamic antisemitism. Personal statements often referred to an individual’s own discrimination experiences and complained that Muslims are described as the only antisemites in the media (Rahner, 2014: 40–4).

The report of the body of experts on antisemitism sees the internet as a tool for the distribution of content that until recently had been restricted to hate letters, but acknowledges a trend among social media providers to restrict hate speech, including antisemitism (UEA, 2017: 130–40).

### 6.1.1 Findings from the interviews

More than half of the interviewees who said anything about social media described it as a very important instrument for the dissemination of racist or antisemitic stereotypes, but not for their formation. Many stressed its function as amplifier, catalyst and affect mobilization tool and as a radicalizing virtual ‘safe’ room of like-minded people isolated from any critical discussion. The lack of filters and (social) control has been mentioned several times, as well as its readiness to publish hatred in (pseudo-) anonymity. In sum the internet functions as a ‘central organ for hate messages, fake news and stereotypes’, ‘a-social media’ (SCM3: 30’11).

The real-life effect has also been noted: the way the internet functions as a network and mobilization tool and as the ground for thought that can transfer into real life when the same people start to attack others in the street. In the context of the antisemitic events linked to the Gaza rally mobilization in 2014, the representative of an antisemitism monitoring unit said that in contrast to the authorities they had not been surprised by the strength of the mobilization because they had observed it on Facebook (SCJ4).

At the same time, the majority emphasized that social media also could be used as a means for counteracting and networking against prejudice and inhumane attitudes.

### 6.2 Mass media and politics

The years 2010–2015 have been described by the authors of the Mitte survey as ‘Die enthemmte Mitte’ – the centre losing its inhibitions (Decker et al., 2016). While the so-called compromise on asylum in 1992 (a drastic restriction of the right to asylum in Germany through a change in the constitution, carried out by the conservative and social democrat parties) legitimized the racist rage of the 1990s, the first decade of the 21st century was a time of shifting norms
connected to the ‘Aufstand der Anständigen’ (revolt of the decent people) called out for by chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the start of the federal programmes for democracy. Because of a lack of skilled workers, ‘useful’ migrants were welcomed. As a result, these years saw a significant decrease in Ausländerfeindlichkeit (enmity against foreigners). But since 2014, racist, völkisch thought is on the rise again, the ground prepared by bestselling authors such as Thilo Sarrazin and leading to increasing hatred against Muslims, Sinti and Roma and refugees. The neo-Nazi Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) was elected into state parliaments, but meanwhile and after its völkisch radicalization the new Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party has attracted people with radical right-wing attitudes, with much greater success (Decker/Brähler, 2016).

After 2015 and the increased numbers of immigrants from Syria and other Muslim countries, German media and political culture was dominated by the topic of migration and deeply divided into two camps: on the one hand liberals who welcomed migrants and a diverse society with equal rights for everybody and, on the other hand, people with racist, white supremacist, anti-feminist, anti-homosexual, anti-liberal nationalist attitudes. Politicians from the AfD and the CSU (the Christian Social Party from Bavaria), such as Bavaria’s prime minister Seehofer, aggressively attacked Chancellor Merkel’s short-term (and mostly verbal) welcome politics and fostered racist resentments on a regular basis. In the debate, refugees were increasingly linked to criminality, sexual attacks were ethnicized, a crisis of the state that could not protect its borders was declared, and Welcome Culture was blamed as naive. Islamist terror in Paris and Berlin, and also the New Year’s Eve incidents in Cologne, provoked an even more ‘hysterical’ public debate which developed a striking resemblance to that of 1992 (Häusler, 2016: 172ff.).

The AfD profited significantly from the public debate about refugees and at the same time drove it towards further radicalization. Its growth resulted from a legitimation crisis in the German political system and a trend towards social fragmentation following neo-liberal deregulation (Häusler, 2016: 168; see also: Hofmann, 2012). After the Sarrazin debate, surveys had predicted 18% support for a Sarrazin party and in some elections this was the outcome for the AfD. The party consists of former members of CDU, CSU, SPD and FDP for whom their parties have become too liberal, but also members of smaller and older radical right parties. With the leader Frauke Petry and several other prominent figures it has now developed into a völkisch-nationalist party (Häusler, 2016: 170).

The events of New Year’s Eve in Cologne 2014/15 (500 reports to the police about sexual harassment, 16 about rape, in the public’s view all of them were attributed to Muslim men from North Africa) were one of the most important turning points in the debate about migration. In reaction to the extremely heated debate and in a very short time, the majority of CDU and SPD in the parliament approved of the government’s new law on asylum. The package further restricted the right of asylum, its sole purpose being to decrease the numbers of refugees in Germany. A contemporary media study showed that the public TV stations ARD and ZDF homogenized the perpetrators as North African refugees, as being the non-German ‘others’, thus culturalized sexism

97 Thilo Sarrazin, member of the SPD, former board member of the Federal Bank and Berlin’s former senator for finance, published a successful book denouncing German Muslims and migrants alike in a racist way. The book sparked an intense public debate.
and sexualized violence as belonging to ‘other’ (Muslim) cultures. The stations discussed mostly actions against the group of the assumedly homogeneous perpetrators (deportation, restriction of the right of asylum) and less the victims and the context of sexism that comprises society as whole (Drüeke, 2016). The affirming reactions by politicians to the racist discourse are highly problematic if one follows Decker and Brähler in their assessment that politically manifested racism and structural racism would lead to (more) mass racism, thus coming full circle (Decker et al., 2006: 167f.).

Regarding antisemitism, the report of the independent experts to the Federal Ministry of the Interior in 2011 stated that in the so-called quality papers and on television antisemitic stereotypes could hardly be found in Germany – as opposed to other European countries and radical right-wing and Islamist publications. But in connection with the conflict in the Middle East and the financial crisis, traditional antisemitic stereotypes had entered ‘quality media’, mostly subconsciously. The coverage was conflict-oriented and ignored diversity in Israeli society, often showing bias in favour of the Palestinians and in opposition to Israel (if not in text, then in picture and context), a bias reflected in much of German society (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2011: 98ff.). The coverage of the financial crisis recurrently mentioned the Jewishness of negative figures like Bernard Madoff and the American investor Haim Saban who had bought the Kirch Media group (ibid.: 102ff.). Other authors come to a much more critical conclusion: antisemitism was widespread among journalists, who expressed it in their Israel-hating Middle East coverage. German media subliminally conveyed the narrative that without Israel there would be peace in the Middle East. reproaches against Israel were exaggerated, fake and fabricated news stories often were published without anyone checking them and in general human rights violations in Israel received much more attention than those anywhere else in the world (Shapira/Hafner, 2010).

An earlier discourse analysis of German print media coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 2000/2001 concluded that journalists tended to portray all players negatively, drawing existing German antisemitic as well as anti-Muslim discourses. The authors also found a lack of self-reflection by the journalists and a paternalistic tendency that used the coverage to bolster a positive German self-image (Jäger/Jäger, 2003). A more recent study on German left-wing newspapers and journals similarly found connections to antisemitic as well as racist and anti-Muslim attitudes, but stated that these positions were not fixed or monolithic, being mostly divided between a pro-Palestine and a pro-Israel position (Ullrich, 2013). And as for social media so with traditional media: there is a tendency for poor communication and a focus on Israel as a placeholder for ‘the Jews’ (Betzler/Glittenberg, 2015).

Arab satellite TV channels have been blamed for importing antisemitism to European Muslim communities. Turkish TV stations have also been charged with such an influence,* although Germans with a Turkish migration background watch both Turkish and German TV, with Turkish media predominating among

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*98 Constantly increasing following the worsening of the relations between Israel and Turkey and the ongoing Islamization of Turkey.
older people (Demirel, 2011). An example is the Turkish Israel-hate movie *Valley of the Wolves: Palestine* (2011) that has been shown in German cinemas, partly in Turkish and with some success.\(^9^9\) It provoked much critique about its antisemitism and Turkish-nationalist propaganda style but also has been declared harmless due to sheer ridiculousness.\(^1^0^0\) The latter, highbrow interpretation seems problematic in light of reports that juvenile viewers indeed did take the movie as a documentary and discussed its content as factual (Kohistruck/Ullrich, 2015: 41). Another example is the Turkish antisemitic TV documentary *Mastermind* that re-tells the story of the global Jewish conspiracy and presents Erdoğan as the only resistance fighter against it (UEA, 2017: 140–4).

A survey on radicalization tendencies among young Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany found a causal connection between a preference for Turkish TV stations and the opinion that Israel alone was responsible for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Additionally, that preference in combination with a preference for German private TV channels RTL and Sat.1 (over public ARD and ZDF) led to higher rates of religious fundamentalism, negative emotions towards the West and alienation from ideas of democracy. A reason could be found in the outcome of a content analysis, which showed that every fifth feature on public stations and every fourth one on private stations portrayed Muslims as real or potential terrorists (Frindte et al., 2011: 618, 627f.).

### 6.2.1 Findings from the interviews

Most interviewees did not want to make any generalizing statement about the role of mass media and politics in the discourse about migration and antisemitism. According to one interviewee the connection between antisemitism and migration as a topic has been dropped entirely by the ‘liberal’ media but is employed by the ‘extreme’ ones (SCA2). Another commentator argued that the public discourse on migration had been narrowed to a question of security (SCM1). Many complained about the media’s polarization and their tendency to always invite the most radical voices and ignore positive developments, too quickly adopting topics from right-wing populists (SCN2, RM3). The terms ‘refugee wave’, ‘refugee crisis’ or ‘imported antisemitism’ alone would block discussion and blame specific groups (SCJ1, SCM3).

Regarding politics, the empty promises and the lip service of ritualized speeches about the fight against antisemitism and racism have been criticized (SCRI, SCJ3). A contextualization of news and information was almost always missing, even among liberal media (SCP1).

As a positive account, the representative of Berlin’s anti-discrimination authority concluded that the capital’s media in general had promoted a balanced and informed debate. The multi-dimensional approach, framing antisemitism and racism as a problem of society as a whole, not only of migrants, had been shared by Berlin’s media and political factions. Whether this prevails after the rise of the AfD can only be awaited (SCA1). Particularly after the terror attack in Berlin in December 2016, it became evident that the media had more and more trouble maintaining anti-racist coverage (RMI).

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\(^{9^9}\) Its prequel, *Valley of the Wolves: Iraq*, had already been identified as antisemitic.

\(^{1^0^0}\) Wetzel (2014: 14); www.welt.de/kultur/article12395937/Tal-der-Woelfe-ist-antisemitisches-Popcorn-Kino.html; www.taz.de/5127754/.
6.3 Summary

• Social media plays an important role in the unfiltered dissemination and amplification of antisemitic thought – but not in its formation. It serves as a low-threshold networking tool and provides uncensored and uncontrolled virtual spaces where like-minded people can cement their convictions through circular references and legitimations. All groups with antisemitic agendas are present. Much of what before was restricted to hate letters now has found its place on the internet.

• The effects of online hate crime are not restricted to the web. The verbal radicalization in many cases is followed by action in the street. The platforms are also used by antisemites, racists and other hate groups for recruitment and mobilization, e.g. for demonstrations. The surprising support for the Gaza rallies in 2014 has been attributed to social media mobilization.

• The amount of online hate crime is constantly rising. The new online media support the normalization of Jew-hating discourse: antisemitic remarks are not prohibited, and the specific characteristics of online media allow them to catalyse the increasing use of antisemitic language in discourse, especially in the context of Israel and of economic crises. Online, there is no communication latency regarding antisemitism.

• German authorities have started to demand more efforts in detecting and deleting hate content but the number of deletions remains far from acceptable for the state and for NGOs. Further steps to force the providers to act are being considered. In addition, state and civil society institutions have set up monitoring units.

• Social media also can be used as a means for counteracting and networking against prejudice and inhumane attitudes.

• Since 2015 and the increased numbers of immigrants from Syria and other Muslim countries, German media and political culture have been dominated by the topic of migration. The public discourse reflects the deep divide between the liberal Welcome Culture and the rising anti-Muslim, racist, anti-immigration, white supremacist, anti-liberal nationalist movement reaching from established conservative parties to the far right of AfD, Pegida and NPD.

• The topic of antisemitism among Muslim refugees was either dropped entirely by the liberal media or used widely by the ‘extreme’ ones, one interviewee stated.

• Many interviewees complained about the media’s polarizing and decontextualizing effects; some said they adopted the topics and ideologies of right-wing populists too quickly, for example in terms such as ‘refugee wave’, ‘refugee crisis’ or ‘imported antisemitism’. These terms blocked discussion and blamed specific groups.

• Islamist terror attacks and crime by perpetrators of Muslim migration backgrounds further fostered the racist discourse through homogenizing and essentializing ascriptions to Muslims and Muslim refugees and polarizing the categories of ‘German’ and ‘Muslim’ in the media and politics. While the media has increasing difficulty in perpetuating anti-racist coverage, politicians have been eager to implement further immigration restrictions. At the same time, the discourse has often been narrowed down to security questions.
• Antisemitic stereotypes are rarely found in German mass media, but a weakened communication latency and a focus on Israel as a placeholder for ‘the Jews’ has been observed, especially when covering events in the Middle East or financial crises.

• The use of media with antisemitic content (Arab and Turkish TV stations and movies) has had an influence on the antisemitic attitudes of Muslims in Germany. When, additionally, German private channels were watched (which have a higher rate of portraying Muslims as real or potential terrorists), a sense of alienation from the West and democracy increases.

• The empty promises and the lip service of ritualized political speeches about the fight against antisemitism and racism have been heavily criticized.
Integration of Second and Subsequent Generations of MENA Migrants
Integration of Second and Subsequent Generations of MENA Migrants

Until very recently and against historical, demographic and social facts that make Germany Europe’s primary immigration country, the German majority, including politics and media, has been denying that Germany is an immigration country. Now that the official position has changed and immigration is a declared fact, the problem remains that immigration continues to be perceived predominantly in terms of deficit-thinking and as a ‘challenge’. The normality of migration for modern society is not accepted by the German majority and is largely not reflected in the country’s social and administrative structures.

7.1 New disintegration and slow structural improvements

In Germany, the 1990s were marked by a wave of nationalism after the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany with the German Democratic Republic. At the same time, the first half of the decade saw dramatic growth in immigration numbers due to the government-planned immigration of ethnically defined ‘Germans’ called Spätaussiedler from the former Soviet Union, Jewish contingent refugees from the same area, and also an unprecedented number of asylum seekers. But it was less the presence of refugees and migrants than the newly awakened nationalist and racist zeal after the reunion that triggered the often deadly surge of right-wing violence against refugees, migrants (even in the third generation), Sinti and Roma, alternative and left-wing people, the homeless and disabled people.

Although public discourse turned its focus in the early 1990s from Ausländer (foreigners) to Asylanten (a pejorative term for asylum seekers), the victims of the arson attacks in Mölln and Solingen were Germans with a Turkish background. For people with a migration background, especially a Turkish one, this deadly threat in the context of their continued discrimination and marginalization came as a shock. The preferential treatment and quick naturalization of Spätaussiedler that culminated in the official slogan ‘Aussiedler sind keine Ausländer’ (Aussiedler are no foreigners) made the continuous exclusion more than clear to them. They had been born in the country, but much of that integration had always been refused to them. As a result, many chose to leave Germany or to retreat into their ethnic group, and the already-slow process of gaining parity in social status and education came to a halt (Bade/Oltmer, 2004: 103ff.). The second and third generations became more estranged from non-migrant Germans. Between 1990 and 1994, the percentage of adult German Turks who had no ‘German’ contact person in their social environment rose from 31% to 56% (Heitmeyer et al., 1997: 165). The year 2000 was marked by job losses for second-generation migrants (and also young Spätaussiedler), a decline in social contacts, a tendency toward spatial segregation and also decreasing identification as Germans (Leggewie, 2000). The aforementioned survey by Heitmeyer concluded that young migrants with a Turkish background due to the discrimination, segregation and the new violence would not only

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101 In 1999, under the Social Democrats / Green Party coalition, the law on citizenship from 1913 had been abolished and the new one for the first time partly substituted ius sanguinis by ius soli. In that process, Germany for the first time had been officially declared a ‘Einwanderungsland’ (immigration country), which had been opposed by the political right for decades.

102 Because of their belonging to the working class and their lower education level former guest workers and their families fell victim proportionally more often to neoliberal deindustrialization, crisis and knowledge-based economic reconstruction than non-migrant Germans (Leggewie, 2000: 90ff.).
retreat into ethnically homogeneous groups, but more and more of them would develop attitudes of Islamic superiority and support religiously motivated violence. The last part of Heitmeyer’s analysis has been contested and refuted by follow-up studies that stress how deeply integrated into German society and its positive values the vast majority of migrants from Turkey have become, especially within the second and third generations (Weidacher, 2000). In addition, one has to consider differences within an assumed ‘community’ of e.g. Turkish migrants, where a minority did very well – in education, job situation, and housing (Leggewie, 2000).

The end of Christian-Democratic rule in the second half of the 1990s in part brought a change to the paradoxical ‘migration situation without migration country’ (Bade, 1994: 41). In 1999, *ius sanguini* was abolished with the new law of citizenship, and in 2004 a law on immigration was finally passed. But in both cases the Social Democrat/Green government failed to implement these changes – mostly because of massive opposition from the Conservatives and also in their own parties. So only half of the people with a migration background born in Germany had the chance to gain citizenship. Moreover, the immigration law turned out to be a law of immigration control and restriction that incorporated many security-driven measures in the spirit of general terror suspicion against (Muslim) migrants.

After the attacks of 11 September 2001 the negative public discourse shifted from asylum seekers to Muslims/Islamists – thus ‘Islamizing’ the Turkish migrant population in the first place, as an ascription (Ramm, 2010). At the same time, the debate about the Green Card immigration and its implementation proved that the old, restrictive *Gastarbeiter* policy still prevailed. Migrants are only welcome as long as they are economically usable, and preferably they should only stay for fixed terms (Saleh, 2008: 127, 252).

### 7.2 Thwarted integration

The authors of a government-funded study on the situation of Muslim migrants in Germany drew attention to a diversity that makes nonsense of speaking of ‘the’ Muslim population. The outcome of existing surveys let them draw a picture of thwarted integration still in place in 2007. Muslims of Turkish background, who represent the majority of Muslims in Germany, continue to be less integrated in terms of socio-economic, identity and social factors: statistically, they are less educated, more frequently unemployed (due to socio-structural discrimination and the highly selective German education system), in a worse economic situation (60% ‘cope badly’ or not at all), show more conservative family values, have poorer language skills than other migrant groups, have fewer social contacts outside Muslim groups and articulate stronger experiences of discrimination and are less likely to identify as Germans in comparison to non-Muslims (Brettfeld/Wetzels, 2007: 27ff., 192ff.). While in this survey only 12.2% of the Muslim interviewees identified themselves as Germans, in another survey Muslims showed the same identification with Germany as non-Muslims (strong or very strong: 35% and 36%). In contradiction to this self-description only 35–45% of non-Muslims in the same survey believed that Muslims would remain loyal to Germany (Gallup, cited in Brettfeld/Wetzels, 2007: 26ff.).
The deep roots of this rejection are also demonstrated by the fact that in both surveys the authors themselves distinguished between ‘Muslims’ and the ‘einheimisch’ (‘domestic’ = non-Muslim) population and generally spoke of ‘ihre Heimatland’ (their land of belonging) when referring to the land of (their family’s) origin (ibid.: 26f., 192f., 235). The literal discrimination between ‘German’ and ‘Muslim’ or ‘Migrant’ prevails in public and even in parts of academic discourse today.

Another survey among Muslims in Germany repeated the findings: Muslim migrants, regardless of their country of origin, were less educated than the members of other religions (Haug et al., 2009: 332f.). Those from Turkey had the lowest education level. Some 70% felt strongly or very strongly connected to Germany, 60% to their country of origin. But while only 36% of all Muslim interviewees expressed a stronger tie to Germany than to their country of origin, 51% of those already holding a German passport did so (ibid.: 337f.). These numbers alone demonstrate how dependant successful integration is on the integration possibilities on offer – the passport as the starting point, not the goal of integration. German policy prefers the latter.

An even stronger example of thwarted integration is the question of partnership. The same study found that most Muslims had contacts and friendships with non-Muslims and non-migrant Germans (if less often than people of other religions), but only 4% of Muslim migrants had a non-migrant partner (24% of other religions, 18% of non-religious migrants). At the same time, 65% of single Muslims and 58% of married Muslims could imagine marrying out of their religion. It is revealing that in explaining this discrepancy the researchers point to a lack of true tolerance among Muslims alone (ibid.: 266ff., 339), rather than at least pondering the possibility that some of those 65% of single Muslims had not found a non-migrant German partner tolerant enough to marry them.

Although the integration of second- and third-generation Turkish migrants has been more successful than that of their parents and grandparents, with no sign of the ‘parallel societies’ alleged by prominent anti-Muslim racists such as Thilo Sarrazin, there are still enormous – and at the time of the aforementioned survey by Brettfeld/Wetzels (2007) rising – obstacles. Almost half of German Muslims believed that the relation between them and non-Muslims had become worse. More than three-quarters reported discrimination experiences (and 80% of pupils – Brettfeld/Wetzels, 2007: 27, 234). Muslims in Berlin were much less keen to live in a segregated, non-mixed environment than non-Muslim Germans: 15% to 34% (ibid.: 31, according to a Gallup poll). The finding is supported both by Brettfeld and Wetzels’ own survey among school students where non-Muslims expressed a much stronger tendency towards segregation than Muslims (ibid.: 235) and also by a poll conducted between 2003 and 2005 in which about a quarter of non-migrant Germans wanted Muslim immigration.

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103 N=6004, from a set of 50 countries of origin with predominantly (or relevant enough in migration to Germany) Muslim population.

104 See the rejection of this possibility among non-Muslims in polls as mentioned above, chapter 8.5. This does not disregard the possibility of phenomena like more traditional family rules among Germans with a Turkish background prohibiting intermarriage. The results just cannot be blamed on them alone.

105 Non-Muslim pupils much more frequently expressed blanket negative attitudes toward Muslims (23.1% non-Muslim migrants, 17.2% non-Muslim ‘domestics’) than Muslims toward Christians (6.3%) – ibid.: 275.
to Germany to be banned. A third felt ‘fremd im eigenen Land’ (being a stranger in their own land) because of the presence of Muslims, and cultural rejection of Islam had risen from 65.9% to 74.2% (Leibold et al., 2006: 4). By 2016, fully 50% of the interviewees felt themselves a stranger in their own land and 41.4% wanted Muslim immigration to be banned (Decker et al., 2016b: 50). Bertelsmann’s *Religionsmonitor* and its special issue on Islam in 2015 noted that on the one hand German Muslims are strongly connected to German society and the German state but they face increasing rejection by the non-Muslim majority (Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2015).

A major stumbling block for the integration of younger generations is the German education system, which is not adapted to diversity - German schooling is still shaped by the historic norm of a (white) German middle-class family and the majority of the teachers and other pedagogues lack intercultural qualifications (El-Mafalaani/Toprak, 2017: 10ff.). At the same time, the enormous social selectivity of the German school system continuously excludes students with a (particularly Muslim) migration background from higher degrees.

### 7.3 Reactions: rising Muslim self-consciousness

The massive rejection by non-Muslims, experienced daily, may very well explain the low identification rate as Germans. Accordingly, recent studies describe the strong influence of social and cultural exclusion on self-ethnicization and self-segregation (El-Mafalaani/Toprak 2017: 10ff.). While Brettfeld and Wetzels found that two-thirds of their interviewees longed for integration, one-fifth opted for segregation and 16% insisted on their cultural difference and demanded its acknowledgement (Brettfeld/Wetzels, 2007: 194). It is a clear tendency - and very likely a reaction to rising discrimination - that the last group (demanding acknowledgement of cultural diversity) is growing among young Muslims: about half of the interviewees (ibid.: 235).

A later survey found that 78% of German Muslims and 55% of non-German Muslims (in Germany) supported integration (Frindte et al., 2011: 219). But regarding their identity, many interviewees in the qualitative part of the survey with a Turkish family background but born in Germany and holding a German passport understood themselves as Turks rather than as Germans – because ‘the Germans’ would never accept them as Germans regardless of how long they had lived in Germany and how well they spoke the language. More importantly, Muslims frequently saw themselves sweepingly condemned as terrorists. They mostly see racism, not religion, as the reason for this rejection, since it also affects non-religious Muslims (ibid.: 620). Similarly, they perceived the public discussions about the construction of mosques, particularly the debate about minarets, as primarily motivated by racism. Thus, it is increasingly difficult for Muslims to maintain hyphenated identities like German Muslim or *Deutschtürke* (German Turk). Some of the moderate Muslims longed for a pluralist society where different religions and ethnic groups could live together but stressed that German society was not yet prepared for this. Quite a few even opted for moving...
to Turkey although they felt at home in Germany (that was before the recent dictatorial developments under Erdoğan) (ibid.: 619f.). These findings were supported by the quantitative part of the study where Muslims in Germany tended to turn away from German society the more they perceived a discrepancy between their integration intentions and the majority’s attitude towards that integration (ibid.: 612).

As a result of the exclusion, children with a migration background tend to look for alternative identities, like those German kids who define themselves as Turks or Arabs or Muslims. Even if they never have been in the respective countries or have hardly any religious knowledge, they find that identity in a narrative (El-Mafalaani/Toprak, 2017: 11).

### 7.4 Turkish and other migrants

A survey undertaken in Baden-Württemberg compared the integration of three generations of migrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Italy, the former Soviet Union and Poland with that of Germans without a migration background. Among the migrants with a Turkish background the study observed a greater distance from the values of non-migrants: a higher tendency to identify with the country of origin and with the migrant group; a higher tendency to speak their original language; lower self-estimated German language skills in the second and third generations; a more pessimistic view of the development of anti-Muslim attitudes; less social integration than among the other migrant groups; and a specific pattern of integration in which ethnicity plays a role. (Fick et al., 2014: 2f., 5). Later generations of migrants with a Turkish background in particular are less likely to obtain higher professional degrees than non-migrant Germans, while other migrant groups only marginally differ in the second and third generations (ibid.: 5). Some 50% of the second generation in other migrant groups lived with a partner without a migration background, compared with only 25% of those with a Turkish background (ibid.: 7). There were no major differences between groups regarding civic and political participation, except that the group with a Turkish background was more interested in taking part in elections (ibid.: 8). But the feeling of belonging differed considerably and in correlation with perceived discrimination. Only 50% believed they had the same chance to get a job in the public sector as a non-migrant German. While personal discrimination experience receded from generation to generation, this is not the case for migrants with a Turkish background. They and those with an Italian background identified less with Germany than others but a majority did so, nevertheless. (ibid.: 9).

According to a 2009 study, migrant groups from former Yugoslavia, ‘Africa’ (the survey employed this category) and Turkey were furthest from successful integration, defined as equal participation in society. The values for those with a Turkish background were the lowest in all categories regardless of their long stay in Germany, especially regarding education, but also in social integration (93% of the generations born in Germany married partners of a Turkish background) (Woellert et al., 2009: 4f.). This study can unintentionally serve as an example of the different obstacles for integration in Germany:

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110 40% of all interviewees and 50% of those with a Turkish background saw a deterioration of the attitudes towards Muslims in the last decade (ibid.: 7).
when it discusses the reasons for lack of integration it focuses largely on deficits and attitudes of the migrants and completely omits informal discrimination. Even the terms discrimination (1 hit) and racism (0 hits) are virtually absent. Assumption-laden terms such as Parallelgesellschaft on the other hand are used massively and uncritically. Furthermore, it discusses migration and migrants almost only from the perspective of their economic potential.

### 7.5 Improvements?

But social integration is increasing among the younger generation. Only 8% of the interviewees under the age of 25 in a recent survey had no contact with Muslims – which was the case for 22% of those above that age (Foroutan et al., 2015: 6). By contrast, from 1985 to 2003 a constant level of contact between Muslims and non-Muslims had been observed, with 70–80% of Muslims visiting non-Muslim friends and vice versa (Leibold, 2006: 7f.).

While in a recent survey 40.4% of young adults still distinguish between Muslim and German, the definition of Germanness seems to shift from ethnic-biological constructs to more open forms of belonging. Only 30% of interviewees under 25 maintain that being German means having a certain descent and accent, while 95.5% attribute Germanness to speaking German and 76.4% to holding a German passport (Foroutan et al., 2015: 60, 7). Younger Germans also are more likely to reject anti-Muslim stereotypes than those aged over 25. Of those surveyed, 76% of those under 25 rejected the statement that Muslims were inherently more aggressive, in contrast to 63% of those over 25. Similarly, younger Germans are more likely to accept the presence of Muslims in society. 85% of those under 25 agreed that Muslims had the right to make demands in Germany, in contrast to 65% of older interviewees; and 68.6% of those under 25 rejected any restriction on the construction of publicly visible mosques, as opposed to only 52.2% of those over 25 (ibid.: 8, 72). These findings are backed by Bertelsmann’s Religionsmonitor, where more than 60% of all non-Muslims over the age of 25 responded that Islam would not fit into the Western world while ‘only’ about 35% of those under 25 agreed to that claim (Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2015: 10).

A very recent poll among people with a Turkish background confirms the trends developed in the last decades. 90% of the interviewees feel comfortable in Germany, 87% feel connected to Germany and 85% to Turkey, and 70% want to integrate no matter what (Pollack et al., 2016: 2). While 40% of them think they get less than they deserved, 43% of all West Germans do think so as well, along with 61% of East Germans (ibid.: 4)! Half of all the interviewees feel discriminated against as second-class citizens, but the second and third generations much less so than the first. The second and third generations are much better educated, with almost all their members speaking ‘good’ or ‘very good’ German (compared with only 47% in the first generation), and they have more numerous contacts
with non-migrant Germans and hold less traditional attitudes toward gender - if still more traditional ones than average Germans (ibid.: 9). In regard to the question of whether women should stay at home while men work for pay, there is no difference in the responses of women of a Turkish background in the second or third generation and women in Germany in general. But the generations born in Germany developed a stronger cultural and religious self-consciousness than the immigrated (grand-)parents. Only 52% believe they had to assimilate to ‘German culture’, in contrast to 72% of older migrants. And while they pray less and go to the mosque less often, they consider themselves as more religious than the first generation did (ibid.: 12). While this may be an expression of religiosity as a display of identity, pride or defiance, it also contains dangers: religious dogmatism and fundamentalism is decreasing in later generations but still remains at a high level. Of the generations born in Germany more than a quarter still consider it a good idea to return to Mohammed’s social order, with close to 50% believing that there is only one real religion. 73% of all interviewees think that media that attack religions should be banned (ibid.: 14, 17).

7.6 Summary

- Germany has the largest rates of immigration of all European countries but still demonstrates structural, political, mental and cultural deficits in acknowledging itself as an immigration country. All migrants, but especially those non-white or Muslim migrants from non-European and non-Western countries, are subject to discrimination and exclusion by structures of society as well as by individual non-migrant Germans. Immigration is generally seen as a ‘challenge’, its only positive aspect relating to migrants’ potential economic contributions. Discussions about migration and migrants are predominantly deficit-oriented.

- For many people with a migration background, the surge in nationalist and racist violence following German reunification exacerbated the segregation of the decades before. It intensified alienation among non-migrant Germans, hastened retreat into ethnic sub-groups, and increased rates of emigration. The changes to citizenship (partial abolition of ius sanguinis) and immigration regulations after the change of power from the Conservatives to the Social Democrats and Greens in the second half of the 1990s were inconsistently implemented.

- After 1990, the negative term in public discourse shifted from foreigners to asylum seekers, and after the attacks of 11 September 2001 shifted to Muslims/Islamists – thus ‘Islamizing’ the Turkish migrant population. At the same time, the old, restrictive Gastarbeiter policy still prevailed, welcoming migrants only insofar as they were economically useful.

- Notwithstanding the structural and legislative improvements there remains a thwarted integration of most people with a Muslim migration background in Germany.

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115 72% vs. 62% regard themselves ‘deeply’, ‘very’ or ‘rather’ religious.

116 Return to Mohammed’s rule: first gen. 36%, G2+ 27%; only one real religion: first gen. 54%, G2+ 46%; fundamentalists (≥agreement with all 4 items): first gen. 18%, G2+ 9%.
• Muslim migrants, including those of Turkish descent who form the largest group and have been living in Germany for decades, are less integrated in terms of socio-economic, identity, cultural and social factors than other migrants, even in the second and third generations. These differences correlate with perceived discrimination. While discrimination experience receded from generation to generation, this is not the case for migrants with a Turkish background. In terms of political and civic participation the migrant groups showed no differences, although those with a Turkish background were more interested in voting.

• The tendency to segregation is stronger among non-Muslims than among Muslims.

• Migrants with a Muslim background, even in the third generation, are not considered to be Germans by many non-migrant Germans, although this attitude is receding with younger generations. Even academic studies continue to fall for the essentializing construction of ‘Muslims’ versus ‘Germans’, ‘Muslim’ versus ‘domestic population’.

• Nevertheless, the diversity of Germany’s Muslim population means it cannot be described as a homogeneous group.

• Rejection of Islam and Muslims is rising. In 2016, more than 41% of the interviewees in one poll wanted Muslim immigration to be banned, and half felt like a ‘stranger in their own land’ due to the presence of Muslims.

• The vast majority of German Muslims longs for integration, although a rising number, especially among younger generations reacting to exclusion, insists on being accepted as culturally different. This segregation makes it increasingly difficult for Muslims to maintain joint identities such as ‘German Muslim’. They turn away from German society the more they perceive a discrepancy between their integration intentions and the majority’s attitude towards that integration. A rising and demonstrative religiosity is attributed to the exclusion.

• As a result of exclusion, children with a migration background tend to look for alternative identities – as Turks, Arabs or Muslims – even if they have never set foot in these countries or have hardly any religious knowledge.

• Very recent polls, however, show positive changes among younger Germans. Non-Muslims under 25 harbour less anti-Muslim prejudice than older ones, and there is a positive trend among younger Muslims towards social integration. Moreover, among young Muslims there is rise in religious identification that does not extend to religious practices.
8 State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses
8.1 Monitoring of and education against antisemitism

8.1.1 State monitoring and response

The police statistics regarding hate crime were reformed in 2001, after massive criticism claiming that the old system downplayed the significance of right-wing violence, especially the death toll by the far right since 1990. Since 2001, different motivations for ‘politically motivated crime’ including antisemitism are registered, but still employing the problematic categories of left-right-foreigners and ‘extremism’.

To eliminate shortcomings in the judiciary’s registration statistics, in March 2016, the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection started an initiative to provide a more detailed and uniform accounting of politically motivated crime – including differentiations between investigations, charges and convictions. This has led to statistics about the development of antisemitic criminal offences since 2014. In 2013, the federal justice administration had started to collect and publish unified data about politically motivated crime including a differentiation for antisemitism (SCA4).

Another problem in the state’s reaction to antisemitism is the judiciary’s recurring refusal to take antisemitism into account. A case that triggered a lot of international attention is the arson attack on the Wuppertal synagogue in 2014 by three men with a Palestinian background who had lived in Germany as refugees for 15 years. Their attack with six Molotov cocktails was considered by three consecutive courts as not being antisemitic but rather a ‘criticism of Israeli politics’ – the judges accepting the men’s excuse that they only wanted to draw attention to the conflict about Gaza. Another prominent case is that of German politician and journalist Jutta Ditfurth who was forbidden by a Munich court from calling the notorious antisemitic agitator and New Right activist Jürgen Elsässer a ‘die-hard antisemite’. Particularly disturbing was the judge’s contention that the description ‘die-hard antisemite’ could only apply to those who refused to distance themselves from National Socialism. The same judge forbade the president of Munich’s Jewish community, the Shoah-survivor Charlotte Knobloch, from repeating her judgement that the Jewish publicist Abraham Melzer would be infamous for his antisemitism. Melzer in many cases had equated Israel with National Socialism and notoriously addressed Knobloch, a German Jewess, as an Israeli agent.

So far as politicians in our sample are concerned, Germany will soon be a country without antisemites but with a lot of antisemitism. There is simply no awareness about what is antisemitic in Israel-hostility and why it ‘happens to them time and again’ (SCP1).

117 The numbers since 2001 are not comparable to those from before, although there has been monitoring of antisemitism since the early 1990s.
118 www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/Themen/Buergerdienste/Justizstatistik/Straftaten/Strafrechtspflege_node.html. Available 2013–2015. Due to technical problems (partly no data for Berlin) the overall numbers are not reliably comparable, yet.
120 www.publikative.org/2014/10/10/keine-antisemiten-links-von-hitler/.
121 www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/antisemitismus-streit-knobloch-verliert-vor-gericht-1.3273975.
The Bundestag’s body of experts recommends further education of the police officers regarding antisemitism, a cooperation between state and NGO actors, and an independent evaluation of the police’s ‘PMK’-registration system (UEA, 2017: 290).

Concerning online hate crime, the Federal Ministries of Justice and Consumer Protection (BMJV) and for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ) together fund the monitoring of online hate speech and promote easy access to reporting hate crime. The two most relevant watchdog institutions are jugendschutz.net with its project hass-im-netz.info, sponsored by the federal and state governments, and netz-gegen-nazis.de, a project of the Amadeu Antonio Foundation (AAS), a non-government organization. Both are actively monitoring the web, reporting hate content to the providers and demanding deletion, with significant success, as can be concluded from the deletion success rate of 80% reported about the former.

Two monitoring projects have been initiated explicitly for antisemitic incidents, in Berlin in 2015,\(^\text{122}\) and in 2016 in Kassel.\(^\text{123}\) Beyond that, many monitoring projects cover several forms of group-focused enmity, such as the ‘Berliner Register’ for radical right-wing and discriminatory incidents.\(^\text{124}\) The interviewee from the authority in Berlin that funds the Antisemitism Research and Information Centre (RIAS) called the project a resounding success of which they could be proud. It had succeeded in making the threat of antisemitism visible and its data was able to supplement the limited perspective of the police with information gathered from civil society. (SCA1: 13’20).

The German federal minister of justice drew a clear line from online hate crime to politically motivated violence, declaring that companies with significant earnings from social networks were socially obliged to prevent their platforms from misuse for hate crime, racism, antisemitism or Islamist terror phantasies (SCA4). It was the perceived drastic increase in racist online content (and its violent real-life consequences) in social media formats that led German state attorneys to investigate Facebook. That subsequently led to an agreement between the German government and Facebook, Google (YouTube) and Twitter that content illegal according to German law will be deleted within 24 hours.\(^\text{125}\)

An international survey on the deletion success on the three platforms found that ten months after the reporting of offensive content, much of it remained online: 25% of Facebook posts inciting antisemitic violence and 96% of Israel-related antisemitism on YouTube (Oboler, 2016: 7). Should the deletion quota not increase, the federal minister of justice announced he would consider holding providers liable, perhaps through fines, and requiring them to publish the numbers of reported and deleted criminal content (SCA4). This move now has materialized as a proposed law.


\(^{123}\) Informationsstelle Antisemitismus of the Sara Nussbaum Zentrum für jüdisches Leben – http://sara-nussbaum-zentrum.de/informationsstelle/.

\(^{124}\) www.berliner-register.de.

\(^{125}\) www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Artikel/DE/2015/12152015_ErgebnisrundeTaskForce.html.
State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses

The German government’s reaction to and even understanding of the problem of antisemitism is limited not just on a practical but on a conceptual level.  

A member of Berlin’s state-level unit for equality and against discrimination, for example, described the three categories German law enforcement uses to classify politically motivated crime – right-wing, left-wing and ‘foreigner’s’ – as ‘anachronistic’ (SCA1, see above). A politician interviewed here argued that in the context of the Gaza war rallies a swastika was not necessarily a symbol of right-wing ‘extremism’ as police often believed (SCP1). Generally, the police have been criticized for a strategy of avoidance: even in the face of overt antisemitic motivations, they often point to alternative, non-political backgrounds (UEA, 2017: 281). As a consequence, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance complains in its 2014 report that Germany fails to recognize, register and punish crimes motivated by racism and other ideologies of intolerance for what they are. The government failure in handling the Nazi terror by the ‘National Socialist Underground’ was only one example.  

The latest report (2017) welcomes some changes like the integration of the sub-category ‘hate crime’ into police statistics and the amended Criminal Code that makes racist and xenophobic motives an aggravating circumstance. But it nevertheless regrets the remaining shortcomings, especially that the motivation of the perpetrator is relevant, but not assessments by the victim or third parties, and that the misleading meta-category of ‘politically motivated crime’ (PMK) has been maintained for all hate crime.  

Additionally, a spokesperson for the federal interior intelligence service repeated the fact that antisemitism would not be the object of surveillance by the agency – unless there was a link to ‘extremism’. One of the German state’s problems in understanding antisemitism and other ideologies of inequality rests precisely with the concept of ‘extremism’. This is an academically contested concept popularized by the aforementioned German interior intelligence agency (Verfassungsschutz) and some scholars close to it in the 1970s. It constructs a flawlessly democratic social centre (‘Mitte’) and projects all non-democratic and destabilizing attitudes onto society’s political margins at the far left and the far right – groups who in many respects are equated. That model necessarily ignores non-democratic, authoritarian and discriminatory tendencies within the so-called ‘Mitte’, the social mainstream (Butterwegge, 2010; Forum für kritische Rechtsextremismusforschung, 2011; Feustel et al., 2012; Stöß, 2015; but also: Pfahl-Traughber, 2013).

8.1.2 State activities in education

The German minister of justice officially demanded zero tolerance for antisemitism and a clear acceptance of Israel’s right to exist. These basic guidelines would have to be made clear to refugees, too, through speaking about the Shoah in the integration courses, he declared at the Jewish community assembly in 2016.  

Numerous federal programmes in recent decades have funded monitoring and educational initiatives that targeted antisemitism. The federal Demokratie  

126 See also UEA (2017: 31–37).
leben programme (Live democracy) initiated by the BMFSFJ currently funds a large number of model projects against radicalization, racism and antisemitism, but also long-term institutions such as centres for education in democracy at state and communal level.

In one case, however, a partner institution in a model project, the German-Islamic Union of Associations Rhine-Main (DIV-RM), has been evaluated by the Hessian intelligence service as being ‘extremist’ through its associations with a Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood background. The ministry discontinued the collaboration thereafter, although the project ‘Action contra radicalization of Muslim teenagers’ was still accessible at the website of the Demokratie leben programme at the time of this report.

In 2016, the Federal Ministry of the Interior started to fund model projects for antisemitism prevention. Under the title ‘Flight and Islam’, projects could apply for a maximum of 50,000 euros. The main goals were organizational support and training for persons and programmes that helped refugees (particularly Muslims), support for Islamic and migrant organizations assisting refugees with integration, and political education that aims to prevent polarization by exploring topics such as antisemitism, gender equality and the German constitutional order. The funding was restricted to 2016.

8.1.3 Shortcomings
A problem with education against antisemitism that has been pointed out by the vice director of the Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz, a Holocaust educational and memorial institution, is that the research results and best practice recommendations of past projects have never been fully implemented. Educational structures and methods have barely changed, and a new generation of teachers has developed that, despite commitment and goodwill, has no understanding of Israel-related antisemitism. Experts’ discussion of antisemitism is highly specialized and often does not reach the places where its findings are most needed.

Even if looking at all the projects that constituted best practice, the federal politician interviewed here concluded, there would not be much to praise in Germany. Examples like KigA are needed everywhere, not only in Berlin. In regard to the fight against antisemitism, he added, politics in Germany performed ‘far too many rituals’ and implemented ‘far too few lasting things’ (SCP1: 28’00). When, for instance, the federal government was asked how the recommendations of the last expert commission on antisemitism had been put into practice, they were hard put to find an answer (SCP1). The UEA experts, too, complained that German politics in general had implemented almost none of the recommendations of their predecessors’ report.

133 At the event presenting the report of the body of experts, Berlin-Kreuzberg, 24.4.2017.
Surveying the landscape of projects against racism and antisemitism, one notices another problem: a certain youth bias. Only a few address adults. The representative of Berlin’s anti-discrimination authority asked if this focus on children and adolescents did not produce a form of stigmatization. In his opinion, the imbalance has practical-structural sources: one big player in the field, the BMFSFJ, by definition targets its funding at children and youth. Additionally, surveys tend to focus on those most readily reachable such as children in school (SCAI).\textsuperscript{134}

At the same time, the major organizations in Germany, including political parties, should acknowledge that they all house antisemites. Instead most of them ignore the problem and project it onto others: the Muslims, the left, the right and so on (SCP1). There also was too much hesitation in addressing antisemitism among Muslims when speaking with Muslim organizations. In all these cases the topic should at least be mentioned, because ‘if you don’t tackle it won’t just go away’ (SCP1: 32’18).

But there are improvements in comparison with earlier periods. Our interviewee from an education project in the AAS said it was a ‘good signal’ that in its funding scheme ‘Live democracy’ the BMFSFJ now also supports projects with longer terms: five years instead of three years as before. In addition, the topic of antisemitism now draws much more attention than before (SCR2: 21’35). Moreover, the Bundestag’s independent body of experts on antisemitism stated that the BMFSFJ’s improved funding policy had laid the foundation for the wide range and high quality of projects against antisemitism in Germany today (UEA, 2017: 239).

Regarding prevention of Islamist antisemitism, the head of the Anne Frank education centre brought up another recent problem: German federal and state authorities spend a lot of money on rapidly building up prevention projects against Islamist radicalization from scratch. Too often, due to a lack of reflection, these end up working with obsolete concepts: assumptions that put a specific part of the population (the Muslims) under general suspicion. While long-established programmes targeting right-wing radicalism have been working for years as bottom-up civil society projects independent from state institutions, these new top-down structures were much too close to state institutions such as the Verfassungsschutz or the Staatsschutz (the department of the police responsible for politically motivated crime). Not being independent from the state was generally problematic for projects such as these, but proximity to the intelligence service and police made the projects particularly vulnerable to instrumentalization for security ends. All this was counter-productive for a long-term solution to the problem of Islamism. The education/prevention sector should be made independent from the state (SCR6).

\textbf{8.1.4 Recommendations}

In 2002, an Education on Antisemitism Taskforce under the coordination of the American Jewish Committee started to build a network of practitioners inside and outside of schools. Out of the meetings of this task force emerged educational guidelines for the work with teenagers from Muslim families. A 2008

\textsuperscript{134} The problem has already been identified in the evaluation of former programmes at the BMFSFJ as well as in the first report of the UEA, as a solution a legislative change of the working foundation of the programmes at the BMFSFJ has been suggested, cf. UEA (2017: 240).
revision of these guidelines stressed that their focus on Muslims did not mean to minimize the antisemitism of other groups, especially the majority who strongly tended to see antisemitism as a problem only of minorities, particularly migrants. Second, it stressed that the group of young Muslims should not be viewed monolithically, since it consisted of many different subgroups with different characteristics, be their background Turkish or Arabic. Since these teens in many cases were subject to racist discrimination by the non-Muslim majority, which viewed them as members of a foreign culture, they were forced to take on an identity as Muslims and lost a more pluralist sense of ethnic identity, although most of them knew little about religion or Muslim cultures. At the same time, many developed anti-democratic and discriminatory attitudes themselves, including antisemitism. Pedagogues and the classical Holocaust education often were incapable of reaching these teenagers. For that reason, the guidelines demand professionalization in education, with engaged and self-reflective teachers working in diverse, inclusive teams, focusing on the students’ real-world problems while widening their horizon by linking their experience to the history of the Shoah, Jewry and so on, in the process strengthening their sense of responsibility and reflecting on their self-concepts (see SCA1, SCJ1, SCR2, SCR3).135

In education against antisemitism in a migration society, some prerogatives have been identified as central elements of best practice. In discussing history – for example, National Socialism and the Shoah – the origins of the migrant families should be taken into consideration, and a German-national guilt-centred narrative should be avoided. Shoah history should be equated with neither the Jewish past nor its present; rather both should be discussed in their full diversity. The reproduction of anti-Jewish stereotypes and any homogenizing description of Jewry have to be avoided. Jewish-non-Jewish encounter projects have to be undertaken with care because they often simply reinforce differentiation and prejudice. The work rather should show the limits of group differences and the importance of commonalities. It should demonstrate the variety in Jewish self-understandings as well as in self-definitions. In so doing, it should reflect upon the complex structures and processes in society, especially the mechanisms of constructing groups and prejudices (Bildungsstätte Anne Frank, 2013; Coors, 2016).

For refugees, their special situation should be taken into account, political discussion should be stimulated and fear – and taboo-free spaces for asking questions should be established. The particular originating contexts have to be considered – not as an excuse for antisemitism but as explanation and lever for changing attitudes (Arnold/König, 2016: 42–6). The AJC reacted to the increased immigration from Muslim countries in 2015 with the organization of an expert’s committee on the integration of refugees into the ‘demokratische Wertegesellschaft’ (democratic value community). The main demands from this meeting, apart from a general increase in resources for refugee integration, were for an intensified education about democratic values in the Welcome Classes, more integration courses, and, in light of the diversity of refugee origins and backgrounds, using the experiences of Jewish, Kurdish and Syrian communities and integrating pedagogues with a similar migration background.136

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For education against antisemitism the authenticity of teachers is a crucial problem. Not only do teachers need to be well informed about the topic, but they need to demonstrate genuine honesty in discussing the issues if they are to succeed in reaching their students. This means reflecting on their own entanglements with both antisemitism and other relevant forms of discrimination. It means positioning themselves in relation to histories of migration, recognizing discrimination because of origins, and acknowledging the significance of national historical narratives and collective memories (Goldenbogen, 2013).

An important element of the fight against antisemitism among Muslims is taking their social and educational integration seriously. This means neither projecting the problem of antisemitism onto Muslims as the sole perpetrators, nor shying away from addressing antisemitism among Muslims out of misguided consideration (Wetzel, 2014: 21). In a 2008 survey of migrant organizations, most argued that any truly effective fight against antisemitism had to acknowledge the stigmatization of migrant communities and eradicate the tendency to see migrants only as troublemakers. Because of this stigmatization, migrants tend to perceive all mainstream institutions, including school, as part of the long arm of the state. Many of those organizations expressed a strong motivation to fight antisemitism but lacked resources since they are busy with social work and with helping migrants in daily survival tasks such as their residence status (Fréville et al., 2010: 196f.).

Discussions about the Arab-Israeli conflict also have a potential for tackling antisemitism: anti-Jewish statements could be taken as a starting point for exploring different perspectives on the conflict and assessing one’s own interests and entanglements in order to break up diffuse enmities against Jews (Nordbruch, 2007, see also SCR6). In our interviews, a professional in Holocaust education stressed that in most cases when young people with a migration background were treated respectfully, even in the case of antisemitic statements, there was almost always a chance for a change of opinions and attitudes (SCR1, see also: Gryglewski, 2013).

The 2017 report by the Bundestag’s experts on antisemitism demands the establishment of a federal commission on antisemitism to coordinate all education and monitoring activities. This would result in a permanent body of experts overseeing initiatives at the federal and state level: monitoring, publicizing, and prosecuting antisemitic crimes; releasing long-term funding for prevention programmes and research; and conducting a permanent monitoring of events and attitudes (like the continuous survey in France) (UEA, 2017: 19f., 94).

Regarding antisemitism among refugees, the body of experts recommends more research that acknowledges their heterogeneity, and more education programmes that acknowledge their political and social awareness. It also recommends incorporating the ‘Welcome’-volunteers into the research (UEA, 2017: 221).

Regarding antisemitism prevention programmes, the experts recommend a stronger connection between the different actors: between education and counselling, and between post-colonial, anti-racist and anti-antisemitic approaches. Muslim organizations should be integrated and pedagogues better educated. The recommendations of the German-Israel school book commission should be implemented, and antisemitism should no longer be depicted as a problem confined to the Middle Ages and National Socialism (UEA, 2017: 248–56).
8.2 Summary

- In 2001 the state reformed the monitoring system for politically motivated crime reported to the police, which includes antisemitism in criminal offences. The new categories of registration have been criticized for not being able to fully recognize antisemitism. In the judiciary, a monitoring of antisemitic offences was implemented in 2013. Meanwhile, some courts repeatedly have refused to identify antisemitism as such and excused it as Israel-‘criticism’.

- Federal ministries and civil society actors have initiated online hate crime monitoring which also reports cases to the authorities and/or providers, with a certain success in getting hate content removed.

- In addition to a wide range of monitoring projects for group-focused enmity in general, two regional monitoring units for antisemitic incidents have been established in Berlin and Kassel.

- The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth has traditionally funded a large number of model projects against radicalization, racism and antisemitism. Recently funding has been extended to long-term institutions such as centres for democracy education. The Federal Ministry of the Interior has funded research and training projects on integration and against radicalization in areas where antisemitism was an issue.

- Monitoring and prevention programmes against Islamist radicalization (which also includes antisemitism) are currently being established with massive resources from the state, observed one interviewee. But their top-down construction and proximity to police and secret service structures has already led to ill-considered ascriptions and suspicion of all Muslims and risks being instrumentalized for security ends.

- A general problem of antisemitism education is that many research results and best practice recommendations of past model projects are not being implemented. The structures and methods of the education system have barely changed.

- Successful projects should be rolled out nationwide, but to date this has not happened. The fight against antisemitism often remains a topic for politicians’ speeches and manifestos.

- Monitoring/research and prevention/education need to be funded on a permanent basis by the state.

- Many research and education projects have a youth bias; adults are less of a focus or target group.

- Most German organizations, including Muslim bodies, lack critical self-reflection – the antisemitism that clearly exists within all of them is often denied or projected onto others.

- Best practice policies in antisemitism education for the migration society are: to acknowledge that antisemitism is not a problem of minorities alone but also to address majority antisemitism; to avoid stereotyping, homogenizing and essentializing groups like young Muslims or Jews in history and instead to keep their diversity in mind; to reflect on the relationship between discrimination...
State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses

and antisemitism; to acknowledge that discrimination exists; to integrate migrant histories; to show the irrelevance of group differences in comparison to their commonalities; to reflect about the complex structures and processes in society, especially the mechanisms of constructing groups and prejudices.

• To meet these guidelines, resources are needed for the training of teachers, with a focus on self-reflection and respect for all students. Teaching teams should demonstrate the value of pluralism by integrating minorities, by relating to the real life of the students, and by strengthening everyone’s sense of responsibility and capacity for self-reflection.

• The main prerequisite for teachers is to reflect on their own position and their relation to antisemitism and racism.

• Research on antisemitism and refugees should be stepped up in order to get a clearer picture of the complex situation. It should also include volunteers in refugee aid.

• More education and information are needed for refugees, who should be acknowledged as politically thinking and acting persons.

• Prevention programmes should integrate post-colonial, anti-racist and anti-antisemitic approaches as well as Muslim organizations. Pedagogues should be better educated and school books should be revised in order to stop depicting antisemitism as a problem of the Middle Ages and of National Socialism.
9 Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions

• Neither the analysis of existing data nor that of the interviews has established proof for a rise in antisemitism caused by recent immigration. Representative surveys are still lacking and the qualitative accounts report many single cases of antisemitic incidents but at the same time also of open-mindedness among recent MENA refugees. The strength of negative assumptions about these refugees is documented by the surprise interviewees expressed that antisemitic attitudes among refugees were far below their expectations. The only quantitative survey among MENA refugees, in the state of Bavaria, found that about 55% of the Muslim refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan supported the traditional antisemitic statement of Jews having too much power in the world.

• Existing literature as well as the findings from this survey, stress the diversity of Germans from a Muslim migration background. The group of recent MENA migrants alone shows so many differences regarding religiosity, education, national background, discrimination experience and attitudes that it is hard to address them as group. Even more, recent MENA migrants and Germans with a Muslim migration background (which in itself is also a very diverse group) have so little in common that addressing them as a single group rather raises questions about who is doing that and why.

• Antisemitism remains a continuing problem in Germany, as an attitude and as a concrete threat. The apparent decrease in its traditional forms can in part be attributed to their articulation (by non-Muslim, non-migrant Germans) as Israel-related or as secondary antisemitism. According to responses to some survey statements, Israel-related antisemitism is espoused by up to half of the population, making it the main problem in respect of antisemitic attitudes in Germany. Referring to an existing conflict, it is particularly dangerous because it is widely spread throughout all segments of the society and because it is easy for its supporters to disguise their antisemitism as Israel-criticism (‘what has to be said’). At times, indeed, they may not realize that they are saying or doing something antisemitic. Israel-related antisemitism also prepares the ground for antisemitic violence based on traditional stereotypes because the perpetrators may feel legitimized by the majority.

• Nevertheless, the impact of education and prevention programmes in contributing to the decrease in articulation of traditional antisemitism, especially among younger people, should not be rejected completely.

• Among Jews, an increased feeling of insecurity was mostly attributed to being threatened or attacked by young Muslims in relation to the Gaza mobilization in 2014. Particularly worrying had been the perceived lack of solidarity for the Jews by non-Jewish German civil society. MENA refugees are sometimes seen as a particular threat. This perspective in surveys and among congregations, however, should be contrasted with the view of a representative of a Jewish congregation interviewed here who stressed that the non-migrant, non-Muslim political right continues to be the main problem for them.
Conclusions

• The development of antisemitism in Germany, and especially antisemitism among Muslims, is highly dependent on developments in the Middle East, at least as far as outbreaks of violence and other attacks against Jews in the last 15 years are concerned.

• Germans with a Muslim migration background statistically have been demonstrating higher approval rates for antisemitic attitudes, although these are partly dependent on variables reflecting their lower average education level and integration status. The most important difference is that Germans with a Muslim migration background express antisemitic attitudes in a more overt and uncoded manner than do non-migrant non-Muslim antisemites, who express them through filters and more readily adapt to established speech norms.

• But since non-migrant Germans tend to externalize their own antisemitism through ascribing it to Muslims, and since antisemitic immigrants also react to the host society’s discourses for and against antisemitism, antisemitism among migrants and Muslims in Germany cannot be addressed without acknowledging and exploring home-grown antisemitism (including right-wing antisemitism) and the relations between antisemitism and racism.

• The study has not found proof of specific norms of toleration among recent MENA migrants that distinguishes them from the German population in general. Keeping in mind the small number of relevant statements and the problem of social desirability, the one existing quantitative survey measured support for gender equality and democracy among them that almost matched the attitudes of the overall German population. Most interviewees in our study reported widespread support for the norm of toleration among recent MENA refugees, and some hinted that many had fled from intolerant environments. Researchers conducting similar studies have emphasized that among MENA refugees, as with the German majority, there were die-hard antisemites, people with certain antisemitic stereotypes, but also secular atheists ‘without a trace of prejudice’.

• As far as Germans with a Muslim migration background (and not refugees) are concerned, our findings, derived from literature and interviews, give no indication that their acceptance of the toleration norm differed from that of other migrant groups or from that of non-migrant Germans. Indeed, it is logical that they should support the toleration norm since it guarantees their own safety and freedom. The statement of the representative of a German Muslim association points in that direction while it contains two other layers of meaning. First, toleration in the sense of equal rights has not yet been fully implemented towards Muslims in Germany. Second, it is not inevitable that a minority that is not entitled to equal rights will accept equal rights for other minorities. While refugees in Germany have not been granted equal rights, they have been expected to respect this concept regarding others. Clearly, such a situation will not be endured forever by those who have been living, learning, working and paying taxes in Germany for a long time and who may have been born in the country, or whose parent may have been born in the country.

137 With the exception of two Ahmadiyya congregations, Muslim communities still have not been granted the status of being a ‘Körperschaften des Öffentlichen Rechts’ (statutory bodies) and many other rights that the Christian churches and many other religious communities have (see also Lemmen, 2001: 181).
Conclusions

• Many refugees from MENA countries visit mosques in Germany, for religious as well as social reasons. Given the fact that Turkey under Erdoğan is increasingly veering towards authoritarianism, Islamism, antipluralism and even outright antisemitism, it is of grave concern that most mosques in Germany are still under the direct influence of the Turkish government.

• Thus, regarding the fight against antisemitism there is an authenticity problem for most actors in German society. As long as teachers, social workers, civil servants, police and judges refuse to tackle their own antisemitic (and racist) stereotypes or feelings of resentment, as long as political statements on Holocaust remembrance day are not followed by committed action and especially as long as refugees or Germans with a Muslim migration background or German Muslims in general are not being granted full equal rights, it is hard for them to take seriously any demands on the part of the German majority that they follow toleration norms.
Recommendations

General

• Israel-related antisemitism has to be understood and treated as the most important current variant of antisemitic attitudes.

• In general, a necessary condition for all effective work against antisemitism among minorities is to establish authentic actors from state and civil society institutions and organizations, in politics and education. This means that:

  • Declarations by politicians should be followed by committed action.
  
  • The antisemitism of the majority has to be addressed, not only traditional but also secondary and Israel-related versions and also in one’s own organization and institutions - instead of always blaming it on others. Antisemitism is not a problem of minorities alone. This in turn means more self-reflection on the part of institutions, organizations and most non-migrant Germans, in order to perceive antisemitism as a problem of and for German society as a whole.

  • Minority antisemitism must not be evaded or overlooked. There should be less restraint in talking about antisemitism among Muslims with Muslim organizations. The fight against antisemitism among Muslims has to be fought together with Muslims.

  • The diverse forms of structural, collective and individual discrimination against minorities, including Muslims, immigrants and refugees, must be tackled sincerely. The norm of toleration is not convincing if applied selectively. In practice this means there should be fewer generalizing ascriptions applied to Muslims and that the concept of a Muslim–German dichotomy should be discouraged.

  • Muslim organizations also need more critical self-reflection on antisemitism among Muslims.

  • Germany should end its policy of regarding its Muslim population as somehow foreign and thus leaving their religious structures such as mosques and religious education mostly in the hands of the Turkish government.

  • In practice, the commitment to combat antisemitism needs more resources for documentation, research, consultation, education, empowerment and prevention.

  • A broader perspective is required in research and education, which currently focuses on children and adolescents, in part because of the ease of reaching them in schools.

  • A representative survey among MENA refugees is needed that analyses discriminatory attitudes and corrects for the problem of social desirability. Only then will the scholarly debate between ‘alarmists’ and ‘deniers’ evolve on an empirical basis.
Recommendations

Education and prevention

• Refugees need more respect, better opportunities to stay in the host country and more appreciation of their history and contribution as a prerequisite for any education attempt.

• Work against antisemitism in education and prevention in a German context can only be successful if it follows a combined anti-racist and anti-antisemitic approach.

• Best practice for antisemitism education in the migration society includes: avoiding prejudicial assumptions and addressing antisemitic attitudes instead of assumed antisemites – without rationalizing and legitimizing whatever antisemitic attitudes do exist; taking individuals seriously and holding them responsible for their actions; refraining from stereotyping, homogenizing and essentializing groups like Muslims or Jews, and instead keeping their diversity in mind; reflecting on the relations between discrimination and antisemitism; acknowledging that discrimination exists; showing the irrelevance of group differences in contrast to commonalities; reflecting on the complex structures and processes in society, especially the construction of groups and prejudices; relate to students’ real-life experiences; strengthening their capacity for responsibility and self-reflection.

• Teacher training should focus on self-reflection and respect for all students and should strive for pluralism in teaching teams, integrating minorities.

• Unconsidered antisemitism among teachers and people in refugee aid, as well as obvious dishonesty in politicians’ statements against antisemitism, support antisemitic attitudes among refugees and make it impossible to tell if the refugees’ antisemitism comes from their country of origin or from Germany. Therefore, long-term education programmes for refugees and Germans alike are needed.

• School curricula should reflect Jewish history and present it in its diversity and not only as a victim history, while incorporating the presence and history of Turks and other migrant groups.

• A general problem of antisemitism education/prevention is that many research results and best practice recommendations of past model projects have not been implemented. The structures and methods of the education system have barely changed. These now need serious rethinking according to the findings in research and practice. Successful projects should be rolled out nationwide.
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Appendices

1. List of interviewees

Interviews were held with workers from state and civil society organizations and with migrants and migrant groups as shown in Appendix Table 1. Anonymity was offered to all those taking part, although not all interviewees required this. Quotations used in the report are coded.

Appendix Table 1: Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State and civil society groups/actors</th>
<th>Interviewee/organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCA1 Authorities Beck</td>
<td>Lorenz Korgel Berlin State Office for Equal Treatment and Against Discrimination (Landesstelle für Gleichbehandlung – gegen Diskriminierung Berlin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCA2 ANON</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SCA3 ANON</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SCA4 Press dept.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCN1 NGOs</td>
<td>Armin Langer Salaam-Schalom Berlin-Neukölln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCN2 ANON</td>
<td>Mobile Advice Team Hesse (MBT Hessen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCN3 Frithjof Timm</td>
<td>House of One Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR1 Research &amp; education</td>
<td>Elke Gryglewski House of the Wannsee Conference, Berlin (Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz Berlin)</td>
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<td>SCR2 ANON</td>
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<td>SCR5 ANON</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR6 Meron Mendel</td>
<td>Anne Frank Education Centre, Frankfurt am Main (Bildungsstätte Anne Frank Frankfurt/M.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR7 Sina Arnold/ Jana König</td>
<td>Humboldt University, Berlin/Berlin Institute for Integration (HU Berlin/Berliner Inst. f. empirische Interaktions- und Migrationsforschung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR8 ANON</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SCJ1 Jewish org.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCJ2 Nina Peretz</td>
<td>Friends of Fraenkelufer Synagogue (Freunde der Synagoge Fraenkelufer Berlin)</td>
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<td>SCJ3 ANON</td>
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<td>SCJ4 Martin Sehmisch</td>
<td>Kassel Antisemitism Information Centre (Informationsstelle Antisemitismus Kassel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCM1 Muslim org.</td>
<td>Mohammed Khalilou Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM2 Cancelled</td>
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2. Topic guide for interviews

Public bodies, NGOs, education and research
The title of the project is ‘Immigration, antisemitism and toleration in Western Europe today’. This international comparative study (involving the UK, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands) is examining the idea currently being put forward in the European media that there is a link between increased immigration from MENA countries (Middle East and North Africa, along with Eritrea, Turkey and Afghanistan) since the Arab spring and an increase in antisemitism (attitudes, propaganda, political mobilization, crime). To this end, we are conducting interviews with public bodies and civil society organizations, including support and solidarity networks aimed at and run by refugees, in order to integrate their viewpoints into our work. We also aim to discover why the link between migration and antisemitism in Europe has become such a significant topic in the media.

First: we are fully aware that interviews and rapidly established research projects such as our own cannot come to any hasty conclusions; rather, they should map existing observations. Above all, we are aware that this is a highly complex, emotional and extremely sensitive topic, particularly in the current climate. The issue represents the intersection of multiple experiences of discrimination and discriminatory structures, and public attitudes towards certain societal groups have become increasingly tense in recent years – in particular towards refugees from Muslim countries. This is why it is important to gather the perspectives of a variety of stakeholders. Their expertise should add important insights to our overview of the situation.
Part 1: background, involvement, experiences

Part 2: migration, antisemitism, toleration

[Extra question following on from Part 1, depending on interviewee]

• What problems do refugees and migrants from the aforementioned states face in Germany in particular?

• Do you believe that antisemitic views are displayed among new migrants arriving from MENA countries since 2011?

• If yes: how widespread do you think these attitudes are within this group? How do they relate to similar attitudes held by the local population? I.e. do you believe that MENA immigrants play an important role in the rise in anti-Semitic attitudes and behaviour in Germany? What other sources have played a significant role?

• In the context of current immigration: do you believe that antisemitism and hostility towards Muslims interact and reinforce one another?

• Has the experience of Islamophobic discrimination ever been used to legitimize antisemitic attitudes?

• Would you agree that there is a link between Islam and antisemitism? Why/why not?

• In your opinion, to what extent do these new immigrants support Germany’s standards of toleration, i.e. the nominal entitlement to equal rights and safety and security for everyone, including people you disagree with, or have an aversion towards or contempt for?

Part 3: social media, traditional media, politics

• In your opinion, what role do social media play in the emergence of antisemitism and racism?

• Generally, do mass media and politicians foster an open, balanced discussion of a) migrants and refugees, b) antisemitism and c) a link between the two?

Migrants, migrant organizations, refugee cooperatives

The title of the project is ‘Immigration, antisemitism and toleration in Western Europe today’. This international comparative study (involving the UK, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands) is collecting opinions on current migration in the EU and the position of refugees in society in order to examine the idea currently being put forward in the European media that there is a link between increased immigration from MENA countries (Middle East and North Africa, along with Eritrea, Turkey and Afghanistan) since the Arab spring and an increase in antisemitism (attitudes, propaganda, political mobilization, crime). To this end, we are conducting interviews with public bodies and civil society organizations, including support and solidarity networks aimed at and run by refugees, in order to integrate their viewpoints into our work. We also aim to discover why the link between migration and antisemitism in Europe has become such a significant topic in the media.

We are fully aware that interviews and rapidly established research projects such as our own cannot come to any hasty conclusions; rather, they should
map existing observations. Above all, we are aware that this is a highly complex, emotional and extremely sensitive topic, particularly in the current climate. The issue represents the intersection of multiple experiences of discrimination and discriminatory structures, and public attitudes towards certain societal groups have become increasingly tense in recent years – in particular towards refugees from Muslim countries. This is why it is important to gather the perspectives of a variety of stakeholders. Their expertise should add important insights to our overview of the situation. Some of these questions are phrased in very general terms because they have to be asked in the same way in all study countries in order for the data to be comparable.

**Part 1: background, involvement, experiences**

**Part 2: experiences of racism**

- What problems do refugees and migrants from the aforementioned states face in Germany in particular?

- Have refugees experienced discrimination and prejudice in Germany?
  - If yes: how seriously do you believe the problem of discrimination against your community is taken in Germany, and how seriously is it addressed? Are there differences in how different groups are treated in this respect?
  - How much empathy and support can refugees expect to receive in Germany?

- Are there any conflicts or negative views within your community/your clients’ community/your cooperative partners’ community – with regards to different religious or national groups?

- Are there negative attitudes in this community towards other societal groups? If yes, towards which groups?

- Is there a link between personal experience of discrimination and negative attitudes towards other groups?

**Part 3: politics**

- Is it important for refugees to have access to a network of people from their home country?

- How do they stand in relation to political views in their home country, e.g. with regard to democracy, equal rights, gender equality, religion, political views?

- What do the people in their community believe are the differences between the political conditions in their own country and those in Germany?

- Have they changed how they think and act politically since arriving in Germany? If yes, how?