Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today
Is there a connection?

The case of France

Elodie Druez and Nonna Mayer
This report derives from a five-nation study commissioned by the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (EVZ), based in Berlin, and led by the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London.

The full set of reports for this study is available to download:

- Foundation EVZ www.stiftung-evz.de
- Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk

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<td>AJMF</td>
<td>Amitiés judéo-musulmanes de France (Jewish-Muslim Friendship in France)</td>
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<td>BAAM</td>
<td>Bureau d’Accueil et d’Accompagnement des Migrants (Migrants’ Welcome and Support Office)</td>
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<td>BRDP</td>
<td>Brigade de Répression de la Délinquance contre la Personne (Special Force for the Prevention of Crime against Individuals)</td>
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<td>CFCM</td>
<td>Conseil français du culte musulman (French Council of Muslim Worship)</td>
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<td>CGET</td>
<td>Commissariat général à l’égalité des territoires (General Commission on Equality between Territories)</td>
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<td>CNCDH</td>
<td>Commission Nationale consultative des Droits de l’Homme (National Consultative Commission for Human Rights)</td>
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<td>CRCF</td>
<td>Conférence des responsables de culte en France (Conference of the Heads of Religious Confessions in France)</td>
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<td>CRIF</td>
<td>Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (Representative Council of French Jewish Organizations)</td>
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<td>DILCRA</td>
<td>Délégation interministérielle à la Lutte contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme (Interdepartmental Commission for Combatting Racism and Antisemitism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DILCRAH</td>
<td>Délégation Interministérielle à la Lutte Contre le Racisme, l’Antisémitisme et la Haine anti-LGBT (Interdepartmental Commission for Combatting Racism, Antisemitism and Anti-LGBT Hate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>Egalité et réconciliation (Equality and Reconciliation)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EVZ</td>
<td>Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft (Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front national (National Front)</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
<td>European Agency for Fundamental Rights</td>
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<td>HALDE</td>
<td>Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité (High Authority to Combat Discrimination and for Equality)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Forces</td>
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<td>IDPI</td>
<td>Idées Pratiques Innovations (Ideas Practices Innovation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFDL</td>
<td>Institut Français des Droits et Libertés (French Institute of Rights and Freedoms)</td>
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<td>IFOP</td>
<td>Institut français d’opinion publique (French Public Opinion Institute)</td>
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<td>Acronyms and Abbreviations</td>
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| **INED** | Institut national d’études démographiques  
(National Institute of Demographic Studies) |
| **INSEE** | Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques  
(National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) |
| **LDH** | Ligue des droits de l’homme (Human Rights League) |
| **LICRA** | Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme  
(International League against Racism and Antisemitism) |
| **MENA** | Middle East and North Africa(n) |
| **NMXR** | Groupe non mixte racisé (Non-mixed Racialized group) |
| **NGO** | Non-governmental organization |
| **OFPRA** | Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides  
(French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons) |
| **ONDRP** | Observatoire national de la délinquance et de la réponse pénale  
(National Crime and Punishment Monitoring Centre) |
| **PHAROS** | Plateforme d’Harmonisation, d’Analyse, de Recoupement et  
d’Orientation des Signalements (Platform for Harmonization,  
Analysis, Cross-checking and Orientation of Alerts) |
| **RAPFI** | Rapport au politique des Français issus de l’immigration  
(Political Behaviour and Attitudes of French of Immigrant Origin) |
| **SCRT** | Service central du renseignement territorial  
(Central Service of Territorial Intelligence) |
| **SIGNA** | Signalement des actes de violence (Reporting of Acts of Violence) |
| **SIVIS** | Système d’information et de vigilance sur la sécurité scolaire  
(Information and Vigilance System for School Security) |
| **SPCJ** | Service de protection de la communauté juive  
(French Jewish Community Protection Service) |
| **SSMSI** | Service statistique ministériel de la sécurité intérieure  
(Ministerial Statistical Service of Homeland Security) |
| **TeO** | Trajectoires et Origines (Trajectories and Origins) |
| **UEJF** | Union des étudiants juifs de France  
(Union of French Jewish Students) |
Preface

There is a persistent claim that new migrants to Europe, and specifically migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA migrants), carry antisemitism with them. This assertion is made to different degrees in different countries and can take different forms. Nevertheless, in Europe the association of rising antisemitism with migrants from the MENA is widespread and needs to be evaluated.

MENA migrants have been symbolically central to the migration debate since 2011. These years have been framed by the Arab spring and its aftermath and by Europe’s crisis of refugee protection. This research project has focused specifically on MENA migrants, in response to the intensity of this debate and in accordance with the brief from Foundation EVZ. The central concern of the research project has been to investigate whether the arrival of MENA migrants since 2011 has had an impact on antisemitic attitudes and behaviour in Western Europe. This report deals with the case of France. The report also considers whether government and civil society agencies have identified a problem of antisemitism among MENA migrants. The findings are based on an extensive survey of existing quantitative and qualitative evidence. Additionally, new qualitative research has been undertaken to investigate the experiences and opinions of a range of actors.

This national report contributes to a larger research project conducted in 2016/2017 across five European countries – Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A final report, Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today: is there a connection? Findings and recommendations from a five-nation study, draws out common trends, makes comparisons and provides recommendations for civil society organizations and for governments.

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1 This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. See under Definitions.
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Introduction: immediate context

France has the largest Jewish minority (around 500,000) in Europe, the largest Muslim population after Germany (around 4 million, according to the Trajectories and Origins survey data) and one of the most dynamic radical right movements in Europe. The issues of identity, immigration and Islam have become central issues in political debate in the country, and, in parallel, the electoral dynamic of the Front national (FN) and the co-optation of its issues by the Sarkozyst right have come to the fore.

There has been a spectacular increase in antisemitic actions and threats since the beginning of the Second Intifada (2000). This helps to explain why French Jews, compared with other Jewish communities in Europe, display the highest level of anxiety (FRA, 2013a), fearing the rise of a ‘new’ antisemitism in the name of Islam. This has led to an increasing number of French Jews leaving for Israel since 2012.

France has been an immigration host country since at least the 19th century. The proportion of immigrants has been gradually rising, from 3% of the total population in 1911 to 7% in 1930, around 7.5% after World War II, over 8% since the 2000s, to 8.9% in 2014. The main change is that until 2009 the share of non-European immigration steadily increased (from 21% in 1962 to 62% in 2008). Since 2010, European immigration as a whole has been rising by as much as 12% per year, and in 2012 it represented almost half the European immigrant population arrived in France. One should also note that France has the highest level in Europe of second-generation French citizens (11% of the population), people born in France from at least one immigrant parent. One-third of these are from the Maghreb.

By contrast, France has not taken in many refugees compared with other European countries. In 2015, only 26,700 of 59,335 asylum seekers were accepted, and even fewer MENA refugees were taken in (a total of 10,000 Syrian asylum seekers have been accepted since 2011).

Concerns that refugees, and more specifically MENA migrants, may be contributing to rising antisemitism are, according to the findings of this report, marginal, even in the Jewish community, which has greater concerns around home-grown antisemitism among second-generation immigrants of Muslim background.

Findings

Immigration pre-2011

According to data from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), before 2011 immigrants (defined as a resident born abroad without French citizenship at the time of entry to France) represented around 7%-8% of the population. The incoming flow was around 200,000 per year. Taking into account deaths and departures, the net growth of the immigrant population was 90,000 per year (Brutel 2015). During this period, the main trend was the rise of non-European immigration, from 50% of the total number of resident immigrants in 1990 to 62% in 2008, with most immigrants coming from north and sub-Saharan Africa (43.4% of immigrant population in 2010) (INSEE 2012a).
Antisemitism pre-2011
According to the Longitudinal Index of Tolerance, based on the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) annual survey, the level of antisemitism in France is low and has been declining since 2000. The Index of Tolerance also indicates that Jews are the best-accepted minority in the country by far.

However, traditional antisemitic stereotypes about money and power persist, and from 2000 there has been a sharp increase in antisemitic actions and threats, in parallel with developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, it is felt that a ‘new’ antisemitism has been developing beyond extreme right circles, among young people of immigrant descent taking the Palestinian side against Israel and Jews in general. It is also clear that a popular cultural antisemitism is emerging, spread via websites and entertainment shows (e.g. those by Dieudonné and Soral).

Current demographics
At the start of 2014, France had a population of 65.8 million, of whom 4.2 million were foreigners (6.4% of the total) and 5.9 million immigrants (8.9%, a 0.8% rise compared with 2006 (Brutel 2015).

It is interesting to note the profile of the immigrant population settled in France in 2012, before subsequent flows of migrants and refugees. A little more than one-third come from another European country, 43% from the African continent and more specifically 30% from North Africa. This population is a little older than the non-immigrant population (average age 45.5 vs 39.8% in 2008). Their level of education is lower (39% have at the most a Primary Education Certificate vs 15% of non-immigrants), although the proportion of those with a college degree is the same in both populations (16%). The proportion of women has been slightly rising, from 46% in 1982 to 50% in 1999 and 51% in 2013 (INED 2014). In terms of religious affiliation among the migrant population, Muslims predominate (43%), but there are also Catholics (26%) and people without any declared religion (19%) (INED/INSEE, 2008).

Immigration since 2011
Immigration within Europe has been rising by 12% a year since 2009. Some 46% of the migrants who entered France at the end of 2012 came from a European country. Another 30% came from an African country (17% from North Africa). Women represented 54% of the 2012 African migrants flow, more than in the settled migrants’ population, and were more educated than the majority population on average. They were also younger than the previous waves of migrants.

Refugee numbers have also been on the rise (from 52,762 in 2010, 57,337 in 2011 to 80,075 in 2015 and 85,244 in 2016 according to the Ministry of the Interior). But hardly a quarter are accepted. Compared with other European countries, especially Germany, one cannot speak of a ‘refugee crisis’ in France.

Antisemitism since 2011
A continuation of pre-2011 trends characterizes the post-2011 period, with a decline in antisemitic prejudice and stabilization at a high level of antisemitic actions, representing between 30 and 50% of the total number of racist actions monitored by the police.
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Perceptions
Jews are the most tolerated minority in France, with the highest level of acceptance on the ‘index of tolerance’ (a score of 82/100 in 2016). But old stereotypes persist, linking Jews to money and power, and criticizing their ‘dual allegiance’ (to Israel before France), with a peak in 2014 (after the prohibition of shows by the comedian Dieudonné and the banning of pro-Gaza demonstrations following Operation Protective Edge). Since 2014, however, belief in these stereotypes has been steadily declining. Whatever the period, prejudice was found to be stronger among uneducated, elderly, right and far right respondents. Anti-Israel sentiment is a feature more often found among young, educated and extreme left respondents, and is disconnected from traditional antisemitic prejudices.

Incidents and threats
Antisemitic incidents and threats peaked in 2014 (incidents sparked by the Day of Wrath in January and pro-Gaza demonstrations in July). They have been in sharp decline since but never returning to the pre-2000 level. There is a lack of reliable data on the profile of the perpetrators, because of the ban in France on so-called ethnic statistics. But it is unlikely that the perpetrators came only from extreme right circles; they probably also included young immigrants from disadvantaged suburbs, sometimes petty criminals, acting in the name of Islam and Palestinian rights.

However, one should distinguish between different types of antisemitic act. The majority are everyday incivilities (insults, graffiti). Less frequent are crimes motivated by antisemitic stereotypes, especially from the belief that Jews have money (e.g. the Ilan Halimi case in 2006, where a young Jew was kidnapped and tortured, the recent attack on a Jewish couple who were robbed and the woman raped in Creteil). Finally there is terrorism in the name of jihad (e.g. the Merah attack in 2012, the Hyper Casher attack in 2015 and several ‘lone wolf’ incidents such as the machete attack on a Jewish teacher in Marseille, January 2016).

As a result, several surveys show that French Jews are deeply concerned by antisemitism, reporting insults, threats and aggression against them because they are Jews; they also see Islam as a threat and no longer feel safe in France. A record number of French Jews have been leaving for Israel (with a peak of 7,800 after the 2015 terrorist attacks, falling to 5,000 in 2016).

Comparative data
Antisemitic incidents represent a disproportionate share of the total of recorded racist acts, over 80% of them in 2000, over 50% in 2014, while the estimated number of Jews is eight times smaller than the number of Muslims (for the reasons for this very high level see section 5.2).

Anti-Muslim acts have only been recorded since 2011. Most target mosques and women wearing headscarves. They tend to increase after terror attacks and generate fear and resentment among the Muslim population. After the Roma, Muslims are the most rejected minority in France, according to the Longitudinal Index of Tolerance.
New data
The main findings from our qualitative research (focus groups with refugees, a seminar with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with refugees, representatives of civil society and the state, and interviews with Jewish community representatives) indicate that:

• French public opinion is ambivalent towards refugees, showing a mixture of compassion and fear, sympathy and hostility;
• The main arguments put forward to reject refugees are economic hardship (help French citizens first) and fear of terrorists infiltrating refugee ranks;
• The risk of antisemitism being introduced by refugees is seen as a non-issue, except among part of the Jewish minority; even the latter, however, fear home-grown antisemitism more;
• The first preoccupation of migrants and refugees is survival, finding a shelter, a job, getting the required legal documents;
• All NGOs working with refugees claim there are few indications of antisemitism among them;
• The main problem noted by NGOs is intergroup hostility and conflict between refugees and migrants from different countries and of different ethnicities.

Public discourse
Social media actively propagates antisemitism, especially websites such as those of the political association Egalité et reconciliation (Equality and Reconciliation; ER), with eight million monthly visits. But on the whole antisemitic comments are far less visible than Islamophobic, xenophobic or homophobic posts. The Front national (FN) and more broadly the far-right friendly networks, the ‘fachosphère’, remain the main artery of antisemitism, but also of violent anti-refugee and anti-migrant outlooks. The media in general tend to portray refugees in an ambivalent way: compassionate (the tribulations of the boatpeople) but also scaremongering (an ‘invasion’, costing too much) and oversimplifying (poor people, victims).

Integration of second and subsequent generations of MENA migrants
There are 6.7 million direct descendants of migrants in France with French citizenship, the highest rate of second-generation migrants in Europe. Second-generation MENA migrants suffer from socio-economic inequalities and discrimination, both at school and on the labour market. However, they mix relatively well with the majority population. They hold similar values, although they are rather more conservative on moral and sexual issues. They also differ in their political attitudes and behaviour. They are less often registered on electoral lists, therefore they vote less often. But they are more interested in politics and they massively lean towards the left (Brouard and Tiberj 2005, 2011).

State and civil society monitoring and responses
There are many mechanisms for monitoring and preventing antisemitism in France:

• Police statistics on racist and antisemitic incidents and threats;
• Monitoring antisemitic and racist incidents in schools (Information and Vigilance System for School Security/SIVIS);
• The CNCDH annual survey of racism and antisemitism;
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- The Defender of Rights annual reports;
- The joint annual survey of victims made by the Census Office (INSEE) since 2007, ‘Cadre de vie et sécurité/Living environment and security’) and the National Crime and Punishment Monitoring Centre (ONRDP);
- The monitoring instruments of hate speech on the internet developed by the Platform for harmonization, analysis, cross-checking and orientation of alerts (Platform for Harmonization, Analysis, Cross-checking and Orientation of Alerts/PHAROS).

The CNCDH makes a critical assessment of all these instruments every year. It has demonstrated that several measures taken since 2015 to counter antisemitism and racism in general have ensured greater cooperation between police and justice services, have led to more severe punishment of offenders and have made combating forms of racism into a ‘major national issue’.

Former Prime Minister Manuel Valls in particular did much to protect and reassure the French Jewish community. In 2014 he revived the Interdepartmental Commission for Combatting Racism and Antisemitism (DILCRA) and placed the struggle against antisemitism at the heart of DILCRA’s new annual plan to combat all forms of racism.

The Ministry of the Interior, which is in charge of religious affairs, regularly meets Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Orthodox, Muslim and Buddhist representatives. Since Napoleonic times, the Jewish community has been represented on religious matters by the Jewish Consistory of France and on communal matters by the Representative Council of French Jewish Organizations (CRIF). Since 2003 Muslims have been represented by the French Council of Muslim Worship (CFCM), but its authority and legitimacy are questioned inside the large and very divided French Muslim community. CRIF and CFCM meet regularly and in 2015 took a common position against terrorist attacks and against all forms of racism and more recently in favour of taking in refugees.

Conclusions

Antisemitism did not develop in the wake of the 2011 refugee crisis. Antisemitic incidents increased after the Second Intifada (2000) in reaction to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the other hand, antisemitic opinions/attitudes, according to the Longitudinal Index of Tolerance towards minorities based on the CNCDH survey, have been declining since 1990 and Jews are today the most accepted minority in France (Muslims are the least accepted, after the Roma). These factors notwithstanding, old stereotypes about money and power, and also the feeling that Jews are privileged, persist.

French Jews display the highest feeling of insecurity of all Jewish communities in the European Union (EU) (FRA 2012). But their fears are focused on the rise of a ‘new’ antisemitism among Muslim immigrant born youth, more than on refugees.

In French public opinion, antisemitism is not linked to MENA migrants/refugees; rather, it is a ‘non-issue’. The French are more concerned by Islamic terrorism, which does not specifically target Jews but more generally French and Western societies and their way of life.


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Recommendations

Monitoring
The instruments used to monitor antisemitism, racism and Islamophobia should be developed and improved. Victims should be encouraged to report incidents (i.e. sensitization campaigns, toll free lines) and to file complaints, and the police should be trained to receive their complaints.

Research
An inclusive perspective on antisemitism should be adopted, enabling comparison with other forms of racism – against Blacks, Muslims, Roma. This will help understanding of similarities and differences and avoid considering a priori that there is a hierarchy of racisms and that antisemitism is by nature different or more important. The mechanisms and manifestations of intergroup hostility in general should be explored (e.g. Muslims vs Blacks, Roma, Jews vs Muslims). To date there have been few such studies in France because of the taboo on including ethnicity in official surveys; but such studies should be encouraged, as long as the anonymity of respondents is ensured.

Integrative public policies
The government should become involved in dealing with refugee issues. All the associations working with refugees feel they are being left alone without the means to cope with this new population and that there should be better means to integrate them: to teach them the French language and French social habits, and to integrate them with the French population. In order to develop efficient policies, government and other agencies should de-essentialize the notion of ‘refugees’. They should take into account: the heterogeneity of refugees; whether they have/do not have a sound educational background; whether they aim/do not aim to stay and integrate into the country; whether or not they have been granted asylum, etc. The way French history is taught in schools should also be reconsidered, in order to integrate the history of all French minorities and avoid useless competition between the victims and their memories.

Civil society action
Civil society action should be developed in two directions. First, French Jewish organizations could be mobilized to give help to refugees, as was publicly called for by the main Jewish representative organizations (see the 10 September 2015 call of the Chief Rabbi of France). This is the best way to develop interpersonal relations based on respect and solidarity and overcome antisemitism. Second, intercultural dialogue, should develop what the sociologist Robert Putnam calls ‘bridging’ social capital, encouraging people with different religions, cultures and backgrounds to work together and trust each other on shared anti-racist projects.
Introduction

Attitudes and debates on immigration and diversity

Immigration, identity and diversity are central issues in French political debate. This is largely because, on the one hand, of the electoral dynamic of the Front national (FN) and the strategy of former president Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) to co-opt these issues in order to win back FN voters, and on the other hand, a series of Islamist terrorist attacks (2015–2016).

The flow of refugees has intensified the situation and helps to explain why, compared with other Jewish communities in Europe, the French community is especially anxious, fearing the rise of a ‘new’ antisemitism in the name of Islam; since 2012 this has led an increasing number of French Jews to leave for Israel (FRA 2012). But the annual survey of the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) shows that, paradoxically, since 2013 the global level of tolerance towards immigrants and all minorities has been rising steadily.

Increasing incidence of antisemitism since 2000

According to police statistics, based essentially on complaints, there has been a spectacular rise in antisemitic actions (physical aggression, material damage) and threats (insults, issue of leaflets, intimidation, graffiti) since autumn 2000, triggered by the Middle East conflict, including the 2014 demonstrations (Day of Wrath in January 2014 and the pro-Gaza marches in July after the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] operation Protective Edge). Reports show peaks of up to 1,000 incidents a year following each large-scale IDF operation in the occupied territories. The other main trigger has been public policies seen as favouring Jews (reparation in 2000 for the depradation of Jews in World War II; the banning of shows by the comedian Dieudonné for alleged antisemitic statements in January 2014; the ban on pro-Palestinian demonstrations in the summer of the same year). Since 2000, the number of antisemitic actions and threats has never fallen below 500 a year, except in 2016 when they fell to 335, a decrease of more than 58% compared with 2015.

To this form of harassment, one must add antisemitic criminality motivated by financial gain, as in the dramatic Ilan Halimi affair. A young Jew was kidnapped and tortured to death in 2006 by Youssouf Fofana and his ‘Gang of Barbarians’, on the grounds that ‘Jews have money’, ‘they are rich’, ‘they can pay’. More recently (December 2014), a young Jewish couple was attacked at home in the town of Créteil and the young woman raped by a gang thinking Jews kept money at home.

The last form is jihadist terrorism, amplified with the emergence of Isis and the Syrian conflict. Its targets, beyond Jews, are the Western world, its way of life and ‘bad’ Muslims. In March 2012 Mohamed Merah shot three soldiers, Imad Ibn Zieten, in Toulouse, Mohamed Legouad and Abel Chennouf in Montauban. Then he attacked a Jewish Ozar Hatorah school in Toulouse, killing three children and a teacher. In January 2015, just after the killing of the journalists working for the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, Amedy Koulibaly took hostages among
the customers of a Jewish shop, the Hyper Casher at Porte de Vincennes in Paris, killing four of them. In January 2016 a 16-year-old Turkish boy of Kurdish origin attacked a Jewish teacher wearing a yarmulke with a machete, in the name of Isis.

Perceived insecurity of Jews

Compared with other Jewish communities in Europe the French community has the highest level of fear by far, as shown by an online comparative survey done for the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in December 2012 (FRA 2013a):² 85% of French Jews (vs two-thirds in the total sample) consider antisemitism in France as a major problem, 88% that it has been ‘getting worse in the last five years’ (vs three-quarters in the total sample), 58% that they are pointed at for being responsible for the Israeli government actions (vs 44%). Recent national surveys confirm their fear of a rising ‘new’ antisemitism in the name of Islam, and a deep feeling of insecurity, since 2012 leading to a growing number of French Jews to leave for Israel. The number of Jews making their ‘Aliyah’ was on average 1,900 per year before 2012, then it rose to 3,263 in 2013, 7,231 in 2014 and 7,800 in 2015. In 2016 it fell to 5,000.

Rising immigration in France before 2011, according to official statistics

France is traditionally a country of immigration. At the beginning of the 20th century most migration flows were from other European countries. Migration from previous colonies started in the 1950s, at first mainly from the Maghreb, followed by sub-Saharan flows at the end of 1960s. From then onwards migrants from the Maghreb were numerically more numerous, representing more than 40% of all migrants in France in spite of the resurgence of European flows in 2009.

² See the methodological appendix explaining how a sample of 6,000 was constructed via Jewish organizations and networks.
Methodology

Existing data used

To report on refugees and immigrants, the following data has been used in this report:

- Surveys such as the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) annual survey on the image of migrants and refugees and public policies on the issue;
- Official statistics, national (INSEE, OFPRA) and EU (Eurobarometer);
- A survey on the first and second generation of migrants: Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey (INSEE and INED 2008);
- The RAPFI Survey (2004): focusing on French of North African, sub-Saharan and Turkish descent;[^3]
- Academic literature.

To report on antisemitism, the following data has been used in this report:

- Police statistics on racist and antisemitic incidents and threats;
- Monitoring of antisemitic and racist incidents in schools (SIVIS);
- Annual survey on racism and antisemitism of the CNCDH;
- Reports of the Defender of Rights;
- Annual INSEE (Census Office) survey of victims;
- Monitoring instruments of hate speech (PHAROS);
- Reports of anti-racist NGOs (such as LICRA).

Generation of new empirical data: the approach and rationale

To prepare the field work with refugees we organized two seminars, one with NGOs of all sizes working with refugees (on schooling, housing, healthcare, etc.), and one with civil society representatives (NGOs specializing in defending human rights, interreligious organizations, university teachers, lawyers, magistrates, a police commissar, members of CNCDH and the DILCRA) (see Appendix 1).

This was supplemented by analysis of the content of courses devised to teach refugees the French language and French mores, set up by NGOs such as Wintergreat, Sorbonne solidaire and Sciences Po Refugee Help (SPRH). Such courses indirectly reveal perceptions of refugees and fears of a clash of values (what is most important to teach refugees about France: the role of women? Secularization? Freedom of the press? The memory of the Holocaust?).

[^3]: 'Political behavior and attitudes of French of migrant background', in Brouard and Tiberi (2011).
We also conducted a number of interviews. We had a long interview with a young member of BAAM (Migrant welcome and support office), an NGO teaching French to refugees. Four individual interviews were conducted with representatives of the Jewish community (CRIF, Chief Rabbinate, B’nai Brit, UEJF). Four individual interviews were conducted with refugees (from Sudan, Afghanistan) via the help of NGOs (Wintergreat, MigrENS). We also organized a collective interview with three Syrian students.
Definitions

Migrant (immigré)
Foreign person born in a foreign country and currently living in France; this is a more restrictive definition than Eurostat’s, which counts French citizens born abroad as immigrants.

Refugee
According to the Geneva Convention of 1951: ‘A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ A person acknowledged as a refugee is granted a resident permit of ten years and then has a right to ask immediately for French citizenship.

Asylum seekers
Persons whose application for asylum is under consideration.

MENA migrants
This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA but in addition includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. These three countries are included because of their profile either in the migration/refugee statistics or in current public debates in some European countries. We have taken the widest possible definition of MENA migrants in order not to miss any causal relationships that could be overlooked using more restrictive delineations. The full list of countries included in this study is as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Western Sahara Territory, Yemen.

In France MENA migrants come predominantly from North Africa (the Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and from Turkey. Nevertheless, part of the Muslim population comes from West African countries such as Mali and Senegal. In recent refugee flows, the highest migrant numbers are from Sudan and Syria.

5 www.ofpra.gouv.fr/glossaire.
6 A person whose demand for asylum is under review: www.ofpra.gouv.fr/glossaire.
1 Historical Context

Immigration and Antisemitism
Pre-2011
This section provides a historical context for immigration in France, focusing on migration from MENA countries since the mid-1970s. Since the 19th century France has been one of the major European countries to receive migrants (Blanc-Chaléard 2001), initially from its direct neighbours – Spain, Belgium and Italy – followed by Poles in the 1920s and Portuguese in the 1950s (ibid.). Immigration from MENA countries started after World War II, first from Algeria (in 1954, France took in 200,000 Algerian migrants) then from Morocco and Tunisia, followed in the 1960s by flows from sub-Saharan countries. At the beginning of the 1960s, almost 80% of migrants to France came from other European countries (Italy, Spain, Poland, Portugal), and some 15% from Africa (ibid.).

The proportion of migrants in the resident population, around 7% from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, has been slowly increasing ever since (Mayer 2016). Figure 1 provides an indication of migration trends between 1975 and 2008, the proportion of migrants from European countries decreasing progressively and the proportion of MENA migrants rising during the period. It also shows the more rapid growth of the migrant population between 1999 and 2008, compared with the period 1975 to 1999.

By 1990 the proportion of European-born migrants among the total migrant population in France had dropped to 50%, while the proportion of migrants from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa increased to almost 40% (Mayer 2016). The main development between the end of the 1990s and 2008 was the clear increase in flows from North and sub-Saharan Africa, thereby also increasing the number of MENA migrants living in France. From 1990 to 2010 migrants from Africa gradually became the largest group, representing 43.4% of France’s total resident migrant population, even surpassing European migrants, who had been the majority migrant population in 1999. While, as Figure 1 highlights, the North African migrant population in France increased between 1999 and 2008, the share of North Africans has been quite stable subsequently. On the other hand,
the number of sub-Saharans surged upwards by 3 percentage points between 1990 and 1999. In 2010, sub-Saharan migrants made up 9.1% of the resident migrant population in France (see Table 1). This breaks down to 13.5% Algerians, 12.4% Moroccans, 4.5% Tunisians and Turks.

### Table 1: Proportion of migrants living in France by country/continent of birth between 1962 and 2010 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td>76.4</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>21</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European countries</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE 2012

From 2004 to 2011, on average 200,000 migrants entered France each year, but the migrant population grew only by 90,000 people each year (Brutel 2014). Figure 2 shows the sudden rise of overall immigration and more specifically of European immigration since 2009, mainly caused by the enlargement of the European Union and the economic crisis of 2008.

### Figure 2: Immigration flows by continent since 2004

![Immigration flows by continent since 2004](image-url)

Source: INSEE 2012
Historical Context

1.1.2 Migration policies
After World War II, France’s need to boost its workforce led the government to adopt liberal migration policies and to open borders to migrant workers whose presence in the country was expected to be temporary. The year 1974, marked by the election of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as President of the Republic and the start of an economic crisis, after the 1973 oil shock, saw the first attempt to stop immigration flows. While the flows slowed down and borders were closed, the influx of migrants continued through family reunification, as migrant workers brought their families to come to set up permanently in the country (Fischer and Hamidi 2016). Between 1980 and 2012, 12 immigration laws were passed to restrict immigration, maintaining a consistent policy in favour of immigration control.

1.2 Antisemitism before 2011
To evaluate the level of antisemitism in France before 2011 two types of data can be called on (see section 1.1.8 above, State and civil society monitoring and responses). The first is collected by the Ministry of the Interior from complaints filed by the police and the gendarmerie in their daybooks, registering the main antisemitic incidents, either actions (physical aggression, damage to property, desecration of cemeteries, arson, etc.) and threats (leaflets, tags, insults) (Figures 3–4). The second is the survey on racism, antisemitism and xenophobia conducted every year since 1990 for the National Consultative Commission of Human Rights (CNCDH) on a national sample of 1,000 people representative of the population living in metropolitan France aged 18 and over (Figure 5). This survey is usually conducted face to face at the end of October/beginning of November. After the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Casher attacks in January 2015 an additional survey was conducted in March 2015. After the Bataclan and the Saint-Denis attacks of November 2015, the survey was postponed to January 2016.8

Anti-Jewish violence remained at a relatively low level in the 1990s, in contrast with the 1980s when three terrorist attacks shook Paris: the bombing of a synagogue in the rue Copernic in October 1980 (4 people dead, 46 injured), the killing of an Israeli diplomat, Yacov Barsimentov, in April 1982, and the shooting at the restaurant Goldenberg, rue des Rosiers, in August 1982 (6 people dead, 22 wounded). Except in the aftermath of the desecration of the Jewish cemetery of Carpentras, which was particularly shocking (with the staged impalement of a corpse) in May 1990, with a peak of 20 incidents in the days that followed, and after the first Gulf War (40 incidents), antisemitic incidents became infrequent (one in 1996 and 1998).

The turning point was the start of the Second Intifada (Figures 3–4). In autumn 2000 there were 119 violent incidents and 624 threats, bringing the total to an unprecedented 723. The total from then on never fell below the bar of 200, with peaks near 1,000 following major events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (the IDF’s entry into Jenin in 2002), the targeted killing of Sheik Yassine (2004), Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009), Operation Pillar of Defence (2012), Operation Protective Edge (2014). These figures are all the more remarkable as people of declared Jewish faith are a small minority in France, estimated at less than half a million (i.e. around 0.7%) (Della Pergola 2013), while antisemitic incidents and

8 See the reports available on the CNCDH website one year after publication: www.cncdh.fr/fr/actualite/rapport-2016-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-racisme-lantisemitisme-et-la-xenophobie. The last report was published in March 2017: see the analysis of the survey by Mayer et al. (2017), pp. 63–140.
threats in certain years, such as 2002–2003, comprised over 70% of the total number of racist incidents and threats registered (Figure 3). The figures are striking, even though they partly reflect an improvement in police monitoring, first thanks to its close cooperation with the French Jewish Community Protection Service (SPCJ), started in 1980 after the rue Copernic attack, but reinforced after 2000, and, secondly, because of a sensitization of the French Jewish population, encouraged by its representative organizations to mobilize and to report cases to the police. Conversely, it can be more difficult for immigrants and their children to go to the police when they are victims of attacks than for an old-established and well-integrated community as is the Jewish population. And this is even more difficult for Muslims, given the context of terrorism that feeds rejection and opposes integration.

**Figure 3: Antisemitic actions and threats, 1991–2014**

Source: CNCDH annual surveys of racism, 1991–2014

**Figure 4: Racist, antisemitic and anti-Muslim actions, 1992–2016**

Source: CNCDH 2017, p. 190
Meanwhile the profile of the perpetrators has been changing. Before 2000 most antisemitic incidents were inspired by extreme right, sometimes neo-Nazi, ideology developed among small fringe groups. After 2000, a ‘new’ antisemitism appeared to develop among second-generation immigrants, often from North Africa, born in France, in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Along the same lines, some school teachers in the Paris suburbs (banlieues) spoke of the difficulty of even talking about the Holocaust in some classes, as detailed in a controversial collective book, *The Lost Territories of the Republic*.9

Another deeply traumatic event was the Ilan Halimi affair in 2006 when a 23-year-old Jew was kidnapped and tortured to death during a whole month by the ‘Gang of Barbarians’, led by Youssouf Fofana, just because he was a Jew, and because Jews were believed to ‘have dough’.10 There was resentment in the Jewish community because the police took a long time to recognize the antisemitic nature of the affair, reducing it at first to criminality motivated by financial gain.

Yet public opinion data shows a very different image. The CNCDH annual survey on racism, antisemitism and xenophobia allows for the construction of a global Longitudinal Index of Tolerance summing up answers to 69 questions regularly asked. It shows that of all ethnic minorities in France Jews are the best accepted, way ahead of Muslims especially, on a series of questions exploring whether they are perceived as ‘as French as any other’, as not forming a ‘group apart’ in society, if the image of their religion is positive, or if one should severely condemn people who publicly insult the group (Figure 5). And in sharp contrast with the pattern of antisemitic incidents, it is clear that there was significant improvement in the image of Jews after 2000 (Figure 5). At that time their tolerance index score caught up and then surpassed the score of the Black and African minorities, which have just caught up again in autumn 2016 (at the same level of 81/100).

![Figure 5: Longitudinal index of tolerance (ILT) by minority](chart.png)

Source: CNCDH annual surveys of racism, 1990–2016

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9 Edited by Emmanuel Brenner (a pseudonym for the historian George Bensoussan) in 2002 (*Les territoires perdus de la république*).

In the same way, the incidence of Holocaust denial, questioning the existence of the gas chambers, has been dwindling and a large majority of French people considers that one cannot speak too much of the Holocaust today (Figure 6).

**Figure 6: Views on talking about the Shoah (%)**

![Graph showing views on talking about the Shoah (in %) from 1998 to 2016.](image)

*Source: CNCDH annual surveys of racism, 1998–2016*

Yet the old stereotypes associating Jews with money and power persist (Figure 7). They periodically flare up, in reaction to the political context. The idea that ‘Jews have too much power’, for instance, is usually around 20%. It rose dramatically in 1999–2000 at the time of the debate on compensation for the depredation of Jews during World War II, followed by the re-imprisonment of the prefect Maurice Papon, condemned for complicity in crimes against humanity.

It was also in these pre-2011 years that the humourist Dieudonné M’Bala gained a large audience among young people with anti-establishment and antisemitic sketches. For instance, on television in 2003 he appeared dressed in battle fatigues with a hood, sidelocks and a religious orthodox hat, and at the end of the programme he raised his arm saying: ‘IsraHeil!’. Initially he was left wing and anti-Front national: in this period he made sketches with the Jewish comedian Elie Semoun. They parted company in 1997. Then began his association with Alain Soral, a former communist who supported Le Pen’s party for a while (2007–2009), founder of the association and website Egalité et réconciliation. This association drove him to the other end of the ideological spectrum, and to a virulent antisemitism. Dieudonné is the inventor of a popular gesture, the ‘quenelle’, which soon gained an antisemitic connotation, looking like a Nazi salute in reverse. In 2009 Dieudonné led an ‘anti-Zionist’ group for the 2009 European elections, of which Alain Soral was also part. It gained less than 1% of the votes. His shows and public performances were more popular (on television and in his theatre, La Main d’Or), mixing antisemitism with mockery of the political class and the system.

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11 See D’Angelo and Molard (2015); the authors are journalists for the information website Street Press.

12 [www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/Presentation-de-Egalite-et-Reconciliation-1663.html](http://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/Presentation-de-Egalite-et-Reconciliation-1663.html).
1.3 Conclusion

Antisemitic incidents and opinions follow diverging trends in France. Before 2011, the level of antisemitism was low, and declining, and Jews were the best-accepted minority, although old stereotypes about money and power persisted, despite being in decline. But the level of antisemitic incidents and threats has risen sharply since 2000, in parallel with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And the perpetrators have changed: a ‘new’ antisemitism seems to have developed beyond extreme right circles among young people in ill-favoured areas, of immigrant descent, taking the Palestinian side against the Jews in general. Moreover, at the end of this period a culturally diffuse form of antisemitism emerged, disseminated via websites and entertainment shows.
Current Demographics
This section provides information about migrants living in France (stock) and about those who entered the country recently, since 2012 (flows). Both parts describe the population and highlight the specific place of MENA migrants.

### 2.1 Migrants living in France

What are the main characteristics of the migrant population living in France compared with the majority population and what is the place of MENA migrants? The most recent results are based on data produced in 2012 by INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, or Census Office). Moreover, the survey *Trajectories and Origins* (TeO) conducted in 2008 (a new survey is in preparation), based on a large sample (N=21,761 individuals including migrants and the second generation), tells us much about the trajectories and social conditions of migrants in French society.

#### Table 2: Migrants living in France by country of birth, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>606,447</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>288,418</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>245,104</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries of the EU</td>
<td>707,394</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other countries of Europe</td>
<td>274,261</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>759,757</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>709,001</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>258,597</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>796,591</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>248,616</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>825,576</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,719,761</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE 2013

According to the most recent data, the number of migrants in France defined by their place of birth and their citizenship at birth (born a foreigner in a foreign country) amounted to 5.9 million on 1 January 2014 (Brutel 2015). The proportion of resident migrants in the population amounted to 8.9%. Between 2006 and 2014, the migrant population (including French born in a foreign country) increased by 0.8% (+700,000 individuals). In 2013, 37% of migrants living in France came from a European country, mainly from Portugal (11%), Italy (5%) and Spain (5%), 4% came from an African country, mainly from North Africa with 13% of Algerians, 12% of Moroccans and 5% of Tunisians, the rest from other African countries.
2.1.1 Foreign population by age and sex

In 2013, women represented 51.3% of the migrant population (INSEE 2017a). If we consider only the foreign population, the share of foreigners by age is similar for men and women, even though women are slightly younger than men, which can be explained by the fact that immigration of the 1950s and 1960s was more masculine. Since then, the proportion of women has been slightly rising, from 46% in 1982 to 50% in 1999 and 51% in 2013. The foreign population is a little older than the French citizens (average age 45.5 vs 39.8 in 2008). Indeed, only 25.8% of foreigners are under 25 years old, compared with 42.2% in the French population. Foreign people are more represented within the two other age categories, even if the gap between them and the average population is less important. The 25-54-year-olds represent 48.7% of the foreign population and 42.2% of the French population, a difference of 6.5 points. Among foreigners 25.4% are above the age of 55, versus 17.4% in the general population.

Table 3: Foreign population by age and sex, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan France</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of foreigners</td>
<td>3,965,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 25 and 54</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 or more</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 25 and 54</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 or more</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE 2013

---

13 This data concerns only migrants who don’t have the French citizenship.
2.1.2 Ethnicity and religion

Recent national statistics do not provide information about ethnicity and religion. Nevertheless, the Trajectories and Origins survey contains information about religion and about skin colour and origin, chosen by the interviewees to identify themselves (INED and INSEE 2008). This survey shows that between 46% and 49% of MENA migrants defined themselves by their origins. Skin colour is not often used by North Africans as a criterion of identification (between 7% and 8%) but often quoted by sub-Saharan Africans (43%) (Tiberj, Vincent and Simon 2017a).

Table 4: Religion declared by migrants and majority population, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Majority population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (INED and INSEE, 2008)

In terms of religious affiliations, Muslims predominate among migrants (at 43%), with Roman Catholics (at 26%) and people without any declared religion (at 19%). These figures contrast with those found in the majority population (where 47% are Catholic and 49% agnostics-atheists). Among MENA migrants, around 80% of migrants from West Africa and from Turkey declare themselves as Muslims. A little more than 80% of Algerian migrants and around 90% of Tunisians and Moroccans describe themselves as such (Beauchemin, Hamel and Simon, 2010: 165).

Figure 9: Religion of migrants by country of origin, 2008

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (INED and INSEE, 2008)
2.1.3 Education

The data reveals much heterogeneity in the level of education, depending on origins. Table 5 provides the level of qualification of MENA migrants, showing a significant education gap between them and the majority population. There is a 10% difference between the proportion of North African migrants and the majority population who went to university. Between 27% and 33% of North Africans, 44% of West Africans and 34% of Turks did not attend primary school, compared with 9% of the French majority population.

Table 5: Level of qualification of migrants in 2008 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No qualification</th>
<th>Primary school</th>
<th>Youth training</th>
<th>College level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco &amp; Tunisia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All migrants</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority population</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (INED and INSEE, 2008)

2.2 Summary of findings

• The proportion of migrants in the French population has slightly increased in the last 20 years but it remains modest, lower than in the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain.

• Women are slightly more represented than men in the migrant population living in France (51.3%), a gap that is slightly higher than in the total French population (50.8% of women).

• 37% of migrants living in France in 2013 are from a European country and 48% are from a MENA country (including Turkey).16

• Foreigners are on average older than the French population and are largely underrepresented among the under 25-year-old category.

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16 MENA countries do not include all African countries, only West African countries but the French data does not allow such a distinction.
Current Demographics

- Half of MENA migrants defined themselves by origin but only sub-Saharan migrants frequently use skin colour as a self-identification category.
- 43% of migrants are Muslims and between 80% and 90% of MENA migrants present themselves as practising Muslims.
- MENA migrants are overall less educated than the majority population.
3 Immigration
Since 2011
3.1 Flows: migrant and refugee entry into France

Are recent migrants who have entered France since 2011 different from the migrant population already living in the country? What is the profile of these newcomers and what is the place of MENA migrants within these current flows? This section tackles these questions and describes the characteristics of this population. Nearly half the migrants who entered the country in 2012 are Europeans, mostly from Portugal, the UK, Spain, Italy and Germany. These countries represent 25% of entrances in 2012. Moreover, 30% of new migrants come from an African country and half of those from the Maghreb. Between 2009 and 2012, the number of African migrants increased only slightly (+1% per year) (Brutel 2014).

Table 6: Country of birth of migrants who entered France, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Entries in 2012 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE 2012

3.1.1 Age and gender of MENA migrants arriving in 2012

MENA migrants entering France in 2012 were younger than the other migrants arriving at the same time (45 years old on average), with half of Moroccans and Tunisians being under the age of 26. The median age of Algerian migrants was slightly higher, around 28. Their age distribution was a lot more homogeneous than among the European migrants and was more tightly dispersed. Turkish migrants were slightly younger, with a median age of 25 when they entered France.
In terms of gender distribution of migrants entering in 2012, women and men were approximately the same age. Overall, 54% of the migrants of African origins were women. Among Moroccans and Algerians 56% were women; but only 44% of Tunisians were women, a significantly lower percentage than for the two other North African countries.

### 3.1.2 Education

A significant share of MENA migrants who entered the country in 2012 was educated, even though more than a third lacked a degree. Those from Africa were on average even slightly more educated than the French population: 29% had a university degree (compared with 27% among the French population) (Ichou, Goujon et al. 2017). Among Algerians and Tunisians: respectively 33% and 36% went to university. Moroccans had a lower level of education (23%) and among Turks there were even fewer university graduates.
Table 7: Level of education of migrants entering France, 2012 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>No. diploma</th>
<th>Secondary school</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE 2012

It is interesting to note that these statistics clearly contradict the commonly held view that migrants are socially underprivileged and undereducated (e.g. statements such as France does not welcome ‘all the misery in the world’, a comment by former socialist prime minister Michel Rocard in 1990); on the contrary, recent migration appears to be more like a ‘brain drain’ than used to be thought.

### 3.2 Refugees and asylum seekers

Until 2011 France was the first country in terms of asylum applications, before Germany took over in 2012. People entering France to seek asylum used to represent a small proportion of migrants. Since 2011 there has been a clear increase of this share, even if the refugee crisis did not impact on France as much as other European countries. Moreover, refugee flows differ significantly from migrant flows; they do not come from the same countries, even though a large number of asylum seekers also come from MENA countries and are Muslims.

Figure 11 shows that the number of applications for asylum in France has been in flux since the mid-1970s. The arrival of refugees in France increased considerably from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, rising from an extremely low number of applications (1,625) to a peak of 61,422 applications in 1989, nearly 40 times more than in 1973. After this apex, applications abruptly decreased and dropped under the level of 20,000 in 1996, then rose again until 2003, when a second peak, significantly lower than the first (52,200 applications),
was reached. After a clear decline in 2006–2007, applications started rising again in 2008, surging from around 45,000 to 59,300 between 2014 and 2015.

**Figure 11: Numbers of first applications for asylum since 1973**

![Graph showing numbers of first applications for asylum since 1973.](image)

Source: OFPRA 2016

At the beginning of the 1970s most of these refugees were of European origin. In the second half of this decade, the number of refugees from Asian countries began to increase. They continued to be prevalent during two decades up to the end of the 1990s. Meanwhile the number of African (partly MENA) asylum seekers rose slowly during this period, before passing the threshold of 20,000 and skyrocketing in the 2000s up to 50,000 in 2014 and 59,300 in 2015.

**Figure 12: Numbers of refugees in France by continent or origin since 1973**

![Bar chart showing numbers of refugees in France by continent or origin since 1973.](image)

Source: OFPRA 2016

The recent refugee crisis has not had the same repercussions in France as in other European countries, such as Germany, which welcomed more than 1 million asylum seekers. Throughout the year 2014, OFPRA, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, received 59,335 requests, a figure that increased by only 25.6% by the end of 2015 with a total of 74,468 first requests: 26.20% have received refugee status, an increase of positive answers of 33.7% compared with the previous year, bringing the total of refugees in France...
 Immigration Since 2011

Figure 13: Main countries of origins of asylum applicants, 2015

3.3 Summary of findings

Migrants since 2011
• Recent statistics reveal a surge of European migrant flows, even though Africans continue to represent one-third of incoming migrants.
• Recently arriving migrants (and more specifically MENA migrants) are well-educated, young and show a balanced share of men and women.

Refugees
• There is not a real refugee crisis in France: refugee flows skyrocketed recently but are not unprecedented in the French context and are small compared with neighbouring countries. Nevertheless from 2011 to 2016 the number of applications doubled.
• In 2016, OFPRA received 85,244 asylum applications and granted asylum status to 26,351 persons.
• The nationalities most represented among refugees are Syrians (around 3,400) and Sudanese (around 5,000).

4 Antisemitism
Since 2011
We shall use here the same statistical data as used for the previous period, the annual survey of the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) and police surveys, in addition to some recent surveys among French Jews.

### 4.1 Attitudes towards Jews in society

According to the Longitudinal Index of Tolerance (ILT) constructed by Vincent Tiberj, summing up 69 questions asked at least three times since 1990 in the CNCDH annual survey of all forms of racism, the Jewish minority – after as well as before 2011 – continues to be the best integrated of all minorities, with an index of 82/100 in January 2016: this is higher than the index for Blacks (79) and way ahead of North Africans (Maghrébins) and Muslims (69 and 62) (Figure 5), and 81/100 in autumn 2016. This finding remains true even if one adds the questions about stereotypes associating Jews with power and money, which are not systematically included in the survey. If one looks at the questions that compose the ILT, the difference between Jews and Muslims is striking. Some 89% of the sample, which is representative of the adult population living in France, consider that French Jews are ‘as French as any other’ (13 points above the average for the French Muslims); the idea they form ‘a group apart’ is held by only 24% (vs 40% for the Muslims); perceptions of the Jewish religion as ‘something negative’ are held by only 21% of the sample (vs 32%); etc.

Negative stereotypes about Jews reached a new peak in 2013–2014, in direct parallel with two events framed as showing the influence of Jews. The first was the procedure leading to the ban on the antisemitic show of comedian Dieudonné (January 2014), and the ban on pro-Palestinian demonstrations in the summer, after violent incidents in Paris in the wake of a demonstration supporting Palestinians following Operation Protective Edge, carried out in Gaza by the IDF (July 2014). The proportion of respondents in the CNCDH survey believing Jews ‘have too much power in France’ rose to a record 37% in autumn 2014 (Figure 7). But since then the approval of such antisemitic stereotypes has been gradually declining, falling to 21% in autumn 2016, while the proportion of those who think Jews have ‘a special relationship with money’ follows the same decreasing trend (from 61% to 35%).

There has been a growing debate about a ‘new’ Judeo-phobia masked behind the criticism of Zionism and Israeli policies, in the name of the defence of the rights of Palestinians (Taguieff 2004). What the CNCDH survey shows, on the base of a factor analysis (Mayer et al. 2017: 117), is that today in France three distinct dimensions of antisemitism coexist, one major and two minor. The first (explaining 26% of the variance) is based on traditional stereotypes about Jews associated with money, power, communitarianism and ‘dual allegiance’. Respondents favouring this view have the classical profile of prejudiced people (older, low education, right-wing orientation, ethnocentric). The second one (13% of the variance) is anti-Israel sentiment, based on a negative image of Israel and the feeling Israelis are more responsible for the continuation of the Middle East conflict than Palestinians; this goes along with the rejection of all the old antisemitic stereotypes of the first dimension. The profile of these respondents is very different: younger, with incomes and education above average, on the far left and with low scores on all our scales of racism. The third one (11% of the variance) is anti-Judaism, with a profile closer to the ‘old’ antisemitism.
Recent surveys among the Muslim population (unfortunately not always representative in small samples) show that they hold antisemitic stereotypes more often than the general population. For instance, in a survey conducted in 2015 by the polling Institute IPSOS, and supervised by Dominique Schnapper and Chantal Bordes, two experts in antisemitism, half of the declared Muslims (vs 36% in the general sample) approved at least five stereotypes of the eight proposed, especially those about power and money.19

### 4.2 Jews’ perceptions of antisemitism

Several surveys since 2011 explore the perceptions of people of declared Jewish faith. Compared with other Jewish communities in Europe the French community has the highest level of fear by far: as shown by the online comparative survey for the FRA in December 2012,20 85% of French Jews (vs two-thirds in the general sample) consider antisemitism in France as a ‘major problem’ and 88% consider that it has been getting worse in the last five years (vs three-quarters in the general sample), 58% (vs 44% in the general sample) feel they are made responsible for the actions of the Israeli government. Their fear is linked to terrorism (the Merah attacks in March 2012) and a more general feeling that everyday antisemitism (insults, intimidation, even physical aggression) is on the rise, especially for the more religious Jews wearing visible signs (yarmulke) of their religion. A more detailed analysis of the 2012 FRA data by country shows that French Jews are a little more inclined to say they were physically attacked as a Jew (2.8%, vs 1.9% in Belgium, 1.6% in Germany, 0.9% in the UK), and 21% verbally attacked (here less than the Belgium, more than the British or German Jews with respectively 28%, 19% and 16%) (Dencik, and Marosi 2017: 24–8). And there is a clear fear of Muslims among French Jews, as shown by their answers to questions about who they perceive to be the perpetrators, of both comments and aggressive acts. They see them first as ‘someone with a Muslim extremist view’, more often than with ‘a left-wing political view’, ‘a right-wing political view’ or a ‘Christian extremist view’ (respectively 73%, 67%, 27% and 22% for antisemitic comments, and 53%, 18%, 4% and 3% for aggressions), and in a higher proportion than Jews in any other country.21

Another symptom of fear since 2012 is the growing number of French Jews leaving for Israel. According to the Jewish Agency,22 the number of those making their ‘Aliyah’ was on average 1,900 per year before 2012, rising to 3,263 in 2013, 7,231 in 2014 and 7,800 in 2015. In 2016, however, the figures fell to 5,000. One of the representatives of the Jewish community (CRIF/Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France) correlates this decrease with the supportive policy of Prime

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19 IPSOS/Fondation du judaïsme de France. 500 respondents considering themselves as Muslims (on line survey, between 24 February and 8 June 2015): Bordes et al. (2016).

20 See FRA (2013b). Online survey in eight countries (N=6 000) publicized via Jewish organizations and newspapers, it is not representative of Jews as a whole but of the most integrated in their community.

21 The questions about comments are separate questions, the one about physical aggressions and threats is a single question (Thinking about the incident in which somebody attacked or threatened you in a way that frightened you because you are Jewish – who did this to you?). One should however keep in mind these are perceptions, and that there is a bias in the FRA study because of the way the sample was constructed, over representing religious and practising respondents, more easily targeted as Jews. Non-religious Jews appear far less afraid.

22 www.jewishagency.org/fr/inside-jewish-agency/leadership.
Minister Manuel Valls, who did a lot to protect and reassure the French Jewish community policy, reviving an old agency, the DILCRA (Interdepartmental Commission for Combatting Racism and Antisemitism) in 2014, putting the campaign against antisemitism at the heart of DILCRA’s new annual plan to combat all forms of racism and offering support to the Jewish community.

Recent surveys confirm this trend. According to a study conducted by the French Public Opinion Institute (IFOP; French Public Opinion Institute) in 2016, 40% of declared French Jews see Islam as a threat (vs 32% in the general sample), 63% feel there is ‘a lot’ of anti-Jews racism in France. They see racism coming as much from the extreme right as from Muslims (57% in each each case, 35% seeing it as coming from from the extreme left and 20% from Christians). Some 63% say they have been insulted because they were Jews, 51% threatened and 43% said they had suffered aggression. In almost the same proportions they fear the same for their children (51%, 41% and 37%), while 47% (vs 31% in the general sample) feel a ‘very high’ threat of individual jihadist attacks. Moreover, 59% say that some family members or relatives have left the country recently to go to live abroad, a majority in Israel. And for 47% the main cause is that they no longer felt safe in France. Another survey, but of a smaller sample of declared Jews, by IPSOS for the Fondation du judaïsme français, supervised by the sociologists Dominique Schnapper and Chantal Bordes, shows the same trends.

4.3 Antisemitic incidents

The pre-2011 trend continues, with ups and downs, for antisemitic actions (aggression, damage to property) and threats (insults, graffiti, tracts), as registered by the police services (see above). Never have the figures gone back to their pre-2000 level (Figure 14), but they are not as high as in 2002 (after the destruction of Jenin) or 2004 (at the time of Sheikh Yassin’s targeted killing, and operations in Gaza).

Figure 14: Racist and antisemitic actions and threats, 1990–2016

Source: CNCDH 2017, p. 190

23 Online survey conducted between 10 June and 25 August for the Fondation Jean Jaurès among 724 people declaring they are of Jewish faith or having at least one Jewish parent (from a pooled file of 45,250 people), of which 41% are Sephardi, 26% Ashkenazi, 14% both.

24 IPSOS/Fondation du judaïsme de France. 313 people considering themselves as Jewish and 500 as Muslims (online survey, between 24 February and 8 June 2015); Bordes et al. (2016).
The year 2012 saw a slight rise in antisemitic incidents, in the wake of the Merah attacks. But the highest peak (N=851) was in 2014, with the conjunction of the Middle East conflict (Operation Protective Edge during the summer) and the Dieudonné affair. The first escalation followed a violent demonstration on 26 January, ‘Jour de colère’ (Day of Wrath), against François Hollande and his government, protesting against the ban of the show by humourist Dieudonné, but also against gay marriage, called for by the network ‘Le printemps français’ (French Spring). The Day of Wrath Manifesto states: ‘Nous avons tous au moins une raison d’être en colère contre ce gouvernement qui: n’écoute pas le peuple, matraque les contribuables, affame nos paysans, enterrer notre armée, libère les délinquants, déboussole nos enfants, pervertit notre système scolaire, réduit nos libertés, assassine notre identité, détruit nos familles’ (‘We all have at least one reason to be angry against this government that does not listen to the people, crushes taxpayers, starves our peasants, buries our army, sets delinquents free, confuses our children, distorts our school system, kills our identity, destroys our families’). The result was a heterogeneous gathering of some 17,000 angry demonstrators, where fans of Dieudonné and Soral marched next to Roman Catholic traditionalists and extreme right small groups. But they shouted together antisemitic slogans recalling the 1930s, such as ‘Faurisson [the Holocaust denier] a raison’ (Faurisson is right), ‘la Shoah, c’est bidon’ (Shoah is bogus), ‘A mort les Francs-maçons’ (death for Freemasons), ‘La France aux Français’ (France for the French), as well as Dieudonné’s puns such as ‘Shoananas’ (Birnbaum 2015).

The second peak was in July the same year, after the start of the Israeli Defence Force’s (IDF’s) Operation Protective Edge, which resulted in a very high number of civilian victims in the population of Gaza. A pro-Palestinian demonstration on 13 July was followed by incidents around two synagogues in Paris, in rue de la Roquette, opposing the League of Jewish Defense with pro-Palestinians activists. The following week, the government of Manuel Valls decided to ban a new pro-Palestinian demonstration in Paris. This however, took place in spite of the ban, in the north of Paris (Barbès), and degenerated into violent clashes with the police. There were similar violent incidents in Sarcelles where a pro-Palestinian march degenerated into riots, with very young people wearing the keffiyeh circling the synagogue, attacking the police, setting fire to wastebins, breaking bus stops and shop windows, and so on. Thus the banning of Dieudonné’s show and of the pro-Palestinian demonstrations were a pretext for denouncing the ‘double standards’ when Jews are concerned and fuelled a spectacular rise in antisemitic incidents (+140% compared with 2013 for the actions, +90% for the threats), in January and then in July.

4.4 Sources of antisemitism – breakdown by perpetrator and type of incident

As a result of the French ban on ‘ethnic’ statistics – categorizing people by their ethnic belonging, their religion, the colour of their skin – it is difficult to establish reliable statistics about perpetrators of antisemitic actions. The victims’ testimonies, the videos of the demonstrations, website data, the claims of the authors, give some indications, however. There can be a background of social resentment against Jews in disadvantaged suburbs, where they appear as being part of ‘the system’, earning money, having good relations with the police and the political elected leaders.
representatives. The Palestinian cause can add a nobler motive to acts of incivility (insults, grafitti, scuffles), especially among children of immigrants in search of an identity. Lastly, the attraction of Isis and Muslim fundamentalism can radicalize a minority, leading to terrorist attacks and murders in the name of the jihad, targeting not only Jews but ‘Christians’, infidel Muslims and the Western ungodly way of life, as shown by the attacks of 13 November 2015, targeting a football stadium, a theatre and street cafes.

But the ‘old’ forms of antisemitism espoused by the far right have not disappeared, especially among small ultra-right groups such as les Identitaires, even though their main targets are immigrants, Muslims and refugees. At the Day of Wrath demonstration on 26 January 2014, far right ‘white’ groups, Catholic fundamentalists (Civitas), youths of immigrant origin from the outskirts of Paris, Dieudonné and Soral fans all marched together.

4.4.1 Overall trends and reasons for spikes in antisemitism
The serious antisemitic incidents of 2014 have nothing to do with the refugee crisis. They stem largely from tensions between the French Jewish and Arab Muslim communities, kindled by the Middle Eastern conflicts and sometimes by the very government policies intended to protect Jews, which appear to single them out as a privileged minority. Terrorist attacks in the name of the jihad have even less to do with refugees. Most terrorist attacks, including those of 13 November 2015, were perpetrated in France by French nationals, not by refugees.

4.5 Existing data in summary

**Figure 15: Proportion of antisemitic actions and threats compared with other forms of racism, 1990–2016**

Source: CNCDH annual surveys of racism, 1990–2016

Using the same police data, we evaluate the share of antisemitic incidents and threats in the total of racist incidents and threats. There are about half a million Jews in France, a tiny group compared with the estimated number of Muslims (over 4 million). Yet there have been many years when antisemitic incidents and threats accounted for over half the totals registered by the police (Figure 15).

26 See their website www.les-identitaires.com/.
not only outnumbering specifically anti-Muslim Islamophobic acts, only recently counted apart by the police, but all other ‘racist’ incidents, which mostly targeted North Africans (Maghrébins), who happen to be Muslims too. However, after spectacular peaks at the time of the Second Intifada (over 70% in 2000) and after operations of the IDF in Jenin and Gaza (over 80% in 2002–2003), the proportion of antisemitic incidents and threats declined except for the peak of 2014, which, as we have seen, had nothing to do with the refugee crisis.

Anti-Muslim acts, which mostly target mosques (dumping pigs’ heads outside them, for instance) and women wearing the headscarf, follow a different pattern, rising every time there is a jihadist terror attack. They multiplied threefold between 2014 and 2015 (from 78 to 305 threats and 55 to 124 actions), with a peak after the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Casher attacks and then after the 13 November killings. In 2016, there was a noticeable decline (a drop of respectively 57.6% and 58.5%).

In parallel with fears experienced by the Jewish minority, there is a growing fear among Muslims in France, who are stigmatized after each attack and associated with Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.27

27 See the testimonies of French Muslims interviewed for the journal Le Monde one year after 13 November killings: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/visuel/2016/11/13/apres-les-attentats-paroles-de-francais-musulmans_5030366_4809495.html survey. And several surveys conducted among people of Muslim faith such as the one already mentioned of IPSOS for the Foundation for a French Judaism confirm their growing feeling of insecurity (e.g. 41% of the Muslim sample say they personally experienced insults or offensive remarks).
5 New Empirical Data
5.1 The two seminars

What came out of the discussions in the two seminars we organized, the first with NGOs dealing with refugees, the second with representatives of the state and of civil society, is that antisemitism is not connected with the arrival of refugees and migrants in France; it even seemed incongruous to some participants that such a question should have been asked. Refugees are above all seen as victims of prejudice and intolerance, from the part of the welcoming society. Before the discussion started, several participants, especially in the morning seminar, asked about the presence of the word ‘antisemitism’ in the title of the project, not understanding the link between refugees and antisemitism. Only participants in contact with Jewish organizations spoke about such fears, the feeling that the refugees come from countries with antisemitic and anti-Israel cultures, and also that terrorists could hide among them. But these were not central issues. In both groups we had to explicitly ask questions and probe about antisemitism (see box).

**Antisemitism is not the issue**

Among the group of NGOs working with refugees, some asked ‘what about antisemitism, have you heard antisemitic comments?’ The first reaction was to say ‘never’. But they had heard several times refugees saying they were ill treated, as France had ill treated Jews during the war. Another said: ‘If we were Jews, we would not be treated like that’. Another participant said it is not antisemitism but, rather, ignorance of history, explaining that some refugees taking part in the Wintegreat programme did not know about the Shoah and thought it was a fallacy. These students completely accepted the Shoah as a fact after their teacher devoted the course to the history of the Shoah.

In the civil society group, the founder of an association for interreligious dialogue, Coexister, related to the Foundation for ethnic understanding, said, spontaneously, when presenting herself, that she worked with Jewish and Muslim associations: for the former the main concern is antisemitism, and for the latter it is Islamophobia, before concern for the situation of refugees. She said antisemitism exists, of course, in the countries they had left, in Syria for instance. She underlined the fear of Muslim refugees expressed by some Jewish organizations she worked with. Then the issue was dropped and we had to probe again. ‘What about antisemitism?’ This time the answers were more developed:

‘It is difficult to tackle; there are already legal and educational regulations against antisemitism, are we not projecting this problem on the refugees?’

‘Political Islam (therefore antisemitism) has existed for a long time, and it can certainly exist among refugees, but it is difficult to know.’

Another point made was the fact that the refugees who arrive are fleeing radical Islam; antisemitism therefore is not the main issue.

One of the participants, a magistrate, and strongly involved in the defence of human rights, reacted strongly:

‘For me it [antisemitism] is a non-issue, it is too early to say if these refugees have antisemitic claims. More important for France is the issue of intergroup racism, the relations between French Muslims and French Jews, but both groups are very diverse. This presumed antisemitism needs to be explored more in depth, one still knows little, especially in the second generation, children of North African descent, born in France.’

Another participant monitoring racism and antisemitism on the Internet said she did not see the link between refugees and antisemitism. For her there were just two kinds of antisemitism on the web, one classical coming from extreme right, white, ‘Catholic’ groups, another from young second-generation French of North African (Maghrébian) descent, acting individually.
Another said there is confusion, a projection on the refugees, because they are Muslims, not acknowledging the fact they come from cultures and contexts which are different from those inhabited by French Muslims. But the confusion is understandable, especially in the Jewish community, deeply afraid already of what they see as a rising antisemitism in France. And one should think about what to do to counterbalance these fears.

A former university president talked about antisemitism at her university, with the rise of ‘non-white’ antiracist movement (Parole non blanche) for whom antisemitism is no longer a problem, because the Jews have been ‘whitened’.

The founder of Coexister said Jewish organizations she worked with feared that refugees would bring antisemitism from their home country; antisemitism which definitely exists (antisemitic cartoons in Syria). Therefore the organization is a little reluctant to work with refugees and tends to see the refugees flow as a threat, transposing onto them relations between Jews and Arabs from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

One of the (Jewish) participants wrote a long email after the seminar on the issue of Jews being afraid of antisemitism, saying one should take seriously the fear of antisemitism in the Jewish community, because Jews have been specifically targeted by Islamic terrorism in France, and because terrorists, as in Berlin, can hide among the refugees. She concluded with suggestions for ‘good practices’ that could help combat these fears: public interventions by representatives of the Jewish community, but also day-to-day activism in interreligious groups.

5.2 Voices in the French Jewish community

A last source of information is the interviews conducted among the French Jewish community leaders (an advisor to the Chief Rabbi, the vice president of the Representative Council of French Jewish Organizations [CRIF], the president of the B’nai B’rith and the president of the French Jewish Students organization). Our four interviewees agreed on the issue of refugees.

Refugees were not seen as a central issue for the organizations they belong to nor to their members. The principle that refugees should be accepted and welcomed by French Jews was put forward, in line with the call of Chief Rabbi Haim Korsia in September 2015 reminding the community of its duty of solidarity, ‘Tikkoun Olam) (see below). All the main Jewish organizations signed the platform.

As far as the risk that refugees would bring antisemitism, all admitted that no incident involving refugees had been reported, and they noted that very few points of contact exist between French Jews and the refugee population, which is mostly restricted to camps, shelters and the streets. However, our interlocutors said that many members of the community were concerned that antisemitic incidents could be possible in the future, because many refugees come from countries such as Syria where there is a strong anti-Israel sentiment and a form of cultural antisemitism. They could be a ticking bomb.

But the community is far more worried by the growth of antisemitism in French society today and more specifically its ‘new’ forms, developing among Muslim youth from North Africa or sub-Saharan Africa and legitimized by the anti-Zionist/anti-Israel stands of extreme left and Green organizations. Fear of Muslims is developing not only because of a long series of terrorist attacks.

(Merah, Hyper Casher) but also because of everyday antisemitism, based on anti-Jewish prejudice as shown in the Ilan Halimi affair, or the more recent murder of Sarah Halimi (an old Jewish lady beaten up and thrown out of a window by a Muslim neighbour). The general feeling is that ‘Jews are killed in France today because they are Jews’.

And this fear of Islam, for some of our interviewees, might explain the lack of support they see in the community for pro-refugee initiatives, contrary to what is seen in Italy, Germany or the United States, where the history of antisemitism has been different. The best way to prevent antisemitism, they proposed, would be to show solidarity with the refugees, and beyond them with French Muslims.

5.3 Summary of findings

Has recent immigration led to a rise in antisemitism?
Recent immigration has not contributed to a rise in antisemitism in France. Antisemitic incidents are triggered by the consequences of the Middle East conflict since the Second Intifada on the one side, and national events on the other hand, which give the impression that Jews are privileged compared with other minorities, as in 2014 when the antisemitic shows of the humourist Dieudonné were banned and the pro-Palestinian demonstrations forbidden. On the whole antisemitic stances are on the decline, and antisemitic incidents have also been declining after 2014. Associating refugees with antisemitism arises from an error of interpretation, the belief that coming from a MENA Muslim country will necessary be associated with antisemitism because of a polarization on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

What is the relationship between the instigators of antisemitism and the population of immigrants and refugees?
The refugee population in France is still very small. It is scattered all over the country, in camps, hotels and improvised shelters, often in the middle of nowhere. It has very little contact with the French population except with the administration and NGOs. Refugees are individualized, often cut off from friendship and family networks. They are striving to survive and completely focused on material needs: obtaining refugee status, learning the language, finding a job, getting money to settle before helping their family come to France.

How does the French population see them and interact?
If one looks at the way the French population perceives refugees, it is clear they are not seen ‘like fish in water’. The perception of refugees oscillates between compassion (as after the photograph of the little Aylan, the 3-year-old Syrian refugee found dead on the beach whose photograph went all over the world) and fear they will take advantage of already scarce resources from the French who also need help. The annual CNCDH survey of January 2016 shows this ambivalence (CNCDH (2015a: 357–89). Respondents were asked: ‘France has decided to accept 30.000 people in two years to take part in the European effort to welcome refugees. About these refugees, of which of these two opinions do you feel closer: ‘It’s a duty for France to welcome refugees from countries at war/France cannot welcome these refugees because one must before all help the people who don’t manage to have decent housing and living conditions in France.’ Some 54% chose the second answer, 41% the first.
An experiment on the wording of the question, splitting the sample in four and asking randomly about African or Syrians, refugees or migrants, shows that ‘African migrants’ are the most rejected (21% in favour of accepting them), ‘Syrian refugees’ the best accepted (30% in favour of accepting them), but whatever the wording, a clear majority agrees in principle to welcome them but considers the present situation does not make it possible (Table 8).

Table 8: Views of the acceptance of refugees according to the word used to describe them and the country of origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Today a large number of migrants (refugees) come to France from Syria and Iraq (Africa). Do you think:</th>
<th>Migrants from Syria and Iraq</th>
<th>Refugees from Syria and Iraq</th>
<th>Migrants from Africa</th>
<th>Refugees from Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France should welcome them</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France should welcome them but the present situation of the country does not allow it</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France does not have to welcome them</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNCDH 2017

One must, however, compare actual behaviour with mere opinions, as described by survey data. If in some towns there were demonstrations against the opening of shelters for refugees, as well as acts of destruction, including arson, against the facilities, as in the gentrified 16th arrondissement of Paris, for instance, there were even more acts of solidarity. Some people even went against the law to help the refugees, as in the valley of La Roya for instance near the Italian border where Cédric Herrou, a farmer, made his farm an open shelter for those crossing the border. He was later prosecuted for this solidarity with the refugees, under an old law from 1945. Hundreds of individual gestures of solidarity were documented by NGOs – providing a room in one’s apartment, being a mentor for those who want to finish their studies in France, teaching French, organising football games, balls, picnics – recreating some sociability. So the attitude of the French population is not uniform.

How do the refugees feel?
The double perception of the refugees is very clear in the way interviewed refugees describe the way they are perceived in France. All of them felt welcome in France and are very grateful towards the people who came every day to bring them food and talk to them. These interactions with people helping them greatly influence the positive impression they have of France. Hozifa, a 25-year-old Sudanese interviewee, said that France was the least racist country in Europe, a lot less racist than Germany, and that he does not understand how Marine Le Pen has such high levels of political support. He told the interviewer:


30 Article L. 622-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA), dating back to 1945, stipulates up to a five-year prison sentence and a fine of 30,000 euros for ‘toute personne qui aura, par aide directe ou indirecte, facilité ou tenté de faciliter l’entrée, la circulation ou le séjour irréguliers d’un étranger en France’.
French people they are less racist. They are very friendly. Very respectful. So I love the people. That’s the most important thing because I don’t deal with the government everyday but I deal with the people every day.

On the other hand, the refugees we interviewed felt that in some circumstances they were not welcome. For instance, Abdallah and the young Syrians interviewed in the focus group were negative about the government and mentioned their difficult relationship with French institutions (whereas others didn’t complain about civil servants but spoke about the slowness of administrative procedures). During the focus group, Khadij said:

*Governments did not decide to welcome us, they destroyed our countries, not only France, but they destroyed our countries for gas and oil.*

And regarding administrative procedures, when they were asked about racism, Hayyan added:

*They always tell you to come back, and they are not welcoming.*

The interviewees didn’t have a strong experience of racism in France but knew that they were not welcomed by all French people. Abdallah explains that there are two contrasted perceptions of refugees in French society: victims fleeing wars and looking for security on the one side, or those just wanting to take advantage of France on the other. Omeid, an Afghan refugee who took a BA in Business Studies in India, explained that he did not tell people that he was a refugee in order to avoid stigmatization. Imran, an Afghan doctor, considered that racism is really subtle and that it completely depends on individuals:

*Even in the street it really depends on the person. I met a guy once that walked with me for around 15 minutes to show me the way. And even I saw people looking at me like very badly. It really depends on the person.*

Besides, refugees form a very heterogeneous population. Being a Muslim is not a sufficient factor to unite them. There are different types of Islam (Islam in sub-Saharan Africa has not much in common with Islam in North Africa or the Middle East for instance). The refugees we met stay together with others from the same country, Sudanese with Sudanese, Afghans with Afghans, mainly because they share the same language and can communicate, or often on the basis of family networks. For instance, when he was asked about his friends in France, Hozifa explained:

*So you don’t have specifically more Sudanese friends?*

*Hum yeah but that is because of the language, because we live in the same place. But everyone who is nice to me is my friend.*

Their first preoccupation is survival – finding a place to sleep, getting papers, learning French in order to find a job – not the political situation in the Middle East or Jews. When Imran was asked to conclude the interview, he summed up very clearly the main preoccupations of refugees:

*I think there are some things that the government can do. I don’t know if it’s practical or not. One thing is if a person applies, if he is able to learn the language, it would be very good. Second thing is, based on French law; a person who applies to asylum cannot work. Rather than relying on the social system, it could be good to work.*
Other forms of enmity expressed by immigrants and refugees

What appears in the interviews is not antisemitism but intergroup enmities. NGOs say that there is racism against the Blacks, the African refugees. A French teacher was astonished to discover that the Syrians whom he taught despised North Africans, their language, their culture. In the focus group with the young Syrians, her comments were confirmed, the three interviewees revealing what they thought about North Africans:

*There are North Africans that are nice and that are French, but there are some that are scum and speak with another accent. They have another culture. When you go to Barbès, it’s Algeria. We don’t want them to represent Arabs, they are different. When you talk to French people and you ask them ‘what do you think of Arabs?’, they have a bad image whereas we have a good culture, a good language. We have a great culture, but it is not the one you would find in La Chapelle.*

In their discourse, we can see the clear distinction they make between themselves, as Arabs, and North Africans. They despise the North Africans and accuse them of giving a bad image of their culture. There is also a class dimension to this quotation, as they are talking about the ‘scum of Barbès and La Chapelle’ which are Paris neighbourhoods with high concentrations of poor migrant populations.

An Afghan said how much he resented the role of Arabs, starting with Al Qaida and Osama Bin Laden, in bringing chaos to his country. Even if they go to the mosque here, they do not feel much affinity there. The mosques tend to be too small and they don’t spend a lot of time in them. The idea of solidarity between Muslims is a myth, and it is an error to transpose the antagonism between French Muslims and Jews to MENA Muslims. Besides, there are deep socio-cultural differences among the refugees, between economic migrants from agricultural regions with little education and those who went to university and had a social position and lost it all (the Syrians, the Afghans), as there is a real gap between the happy few who have secured political asylum and those who have not. Imran comments on the difficulties he had living with other Afghans of lower-class background:

*And then it was a little bit difficult to meet people. I was in contact with Afghan people applying for asylum but again the problem was they were not educated. We did not share the same opinions but I was in a minority so I could not discuss what they say. I lived with them for some time. It was very difficult.*

Empathy towards the Jewish population and rare antisemitic attitudes

The interviewed refugees seem to know only a little about the Jewish minority in France and did not say much about it. Omeid mentioned that he consulted a Jewish doctor who was very nice to him (he knew he was a Jew for he wore a yarmulke). The three Syrians considered they could be friends with everyone and that religion was not an obstacle; enumerating different religions, they explicitly mentioned Jewish people. Moreover, in some circumstances, refugees identify indirectly with Jewish people regarding their experiences of racism. Hozifa had for instance this statement regarding Germany:

*You know what’s horrible, they are very racist. They don’t accept new people. I understand the situation why the government is like this after the World War II, what happened and everything. The first day I arrive to Germany. They were saying you have to speak German. But I don’t ... this is Germany. This was the police, not someone from the street.*
You were mentioning the German culture relating to World War II? Why?

I don’t know because during World War II they were fighting for racist reasons, the Aryans. What Hitler said about them that they are the best and everything. And for them to remove that it will take a long time. I understand that. But they are not giving the effort to do it, the immigrants they are suffering there.

Nevertheless, a few elements regarding attitudes to Jews, which emerged in the interviews with refugees, should be highlighted. Hozifa, laughing, said there are ‘too many of them’ in his neighbourhood, but that he does not interact with them simply because he does not know them. When he was asked to explain why they were ‘too many’ he just answered that a lot of them gathered near Boulogne. He described the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as ‘the mistake of Europe and the Palestinians are paying for it’: he did not criticize Israel but considered the European states to be responsible. Imran also expressed a positive stereotype quite common in French society, the fact that the Jewish people are well off:

As for Jewish, I really do not know many. I have not been in contact with them. But historically Jewish were rich people and when you are rich you can solve your problem, so I don’t think they would be affected much by anything. [...] But if Laicité says that you can’t wear the hat they wear so I believe it’s limiting their freedom.

Are there Jewish people in Afghanistan?

There were some before unfortunately in the civil war, you know when there is a conflict the first group that suffers a lot is the minority. So many Jewish people left the country and they went to other places. I think to Israel. There were also Indians and Sikhs and they went to India because of the civil war. That was a tragedy but unfortunately it should not have gone this way. Those people suffered a lot. As for Jewish, most of the time, they were in cities so I really don’t know but when there is a conflict people try to avoid it and Jewish as I said normally they are rich people, in Afghanistan they were rich. They were businessmen so they left the country when the conflict occurred.

If Imran mentioned this stereotype, he did not express any prejudice regarding Jews and even deplored their departure from Afghanistan because of the war, showing clear empathy towards this group. He is conscious of their situation as a minority in his country as well as the difficulties they have to face. In a nutshell, aversion to Jews did not appear in the testimonies of the NGOs working with refugees, who say they hardly ever raise the issue. The refugees interviewed for this project seemed not concerned with Jews; antisemitism was the least of their preoccupations. Prejudice was not an issue either. They had a distant vision of French culture and French values. They just seemed to follow French politics a little (they were able to quote some of the candidates for the coming presidential election).

If one probed their vision and approval/disapproval of French society, acceptance prevailed. France is seen as a multicultural society where people coexist (Abdalah) and as a developed country which functions well and which reflects the diversity of the world (Imran). This support for diversity applies in the way refugees connect with people in their everyday life: Hozifa declared he can be friends with everyone who is nice to him and Ahmad, in the same way, explained during the focus group:
We meet everyone, a Jewish person, a Muslim, a Christian. We don't have any problem. I don't think that religion is an obstacle to relationships.

Omeid, asked about possible differences in values between the society he came from and the French one, said there are differences for Muslim women: they can move more freely, not all wear a veil etc. But he did not mind these differences, he likes diversity, he is planning to bring his family to France as soon as he has a job. Imran said explicitly that it is very important to accept the differences and to understand the different norms of the country you live in. A young French student who teaches them French classes said that refugees don't mind the fact she is a woman and wears no veil. Only two things are important in their eyes: being able to practise their religion and being married or in a stable relationship.

Nevertheless, two of them directly criticized the way ‘laïcité’ (secularization) is dealt with in France. Hozifa said that in France he won't be totally able to practise his religion as he wants and that it will be difficult for him to raise his family as a Muslim. According to him a secular state should not forbid practices that are not harmful to others (such as wearing the veil); he added later in the interview:

Most of the minorities they are fine but the Muslims will never be fine.

Imran said he prefers British multiculturalism because it permits greater freedom to practise a religion and quotes Benoît Hamon, a socialist politician running for the presidential election, saying that ‘laïcité’ has become a religion of the state in France. Imran mentions an anecdote: he could not find a place to pray at the university in France, whereas in the UK there are rooms for this purpose.
6 Public Discourse
6.1 The role of the media as vectors of antisemitism

Long before 2011, social media (Twitter, Facebook), and the Internet in general were active promoters of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic comments. The monthly survey of hate demonstrations constructed by Fredéric Callens, at the time he was at the Ministry of Urban Affairs (Commissariat général à l’égalité des territoire), based on the collection of some 400,000 tweets per month, showed that there were relatively few antisemitic comments compared with anti-Islam and racist comments, contrasting with the data on actual violent antisemitic incidents. For instance in June 2016, of a total of 390,408 tweets, 69,601 could be classified as hate speech, of which antisemitic expressions represented 12%, Islamophobia 34%, xenophobia 35% and homophobia 20% of the total. But the main vehicles of antisemitism are websites such as that of Alain Soral, Egalité et réconciliation (ER).

According to the Alexa database (Table 9), on 9 October 2016, of the 30 most visited political sites (in the group of the 10,000 most visited French sites in general), ER was in the lead with over 8 million monthly visits, followed by Fdesouche (French by origin), 4.5 million. In the top ten, seven are extreme right sites, and in the 30, these are the majority (16).

Lastly, one must take into consideration the followers and sympathisers of the far-right party, the Front national (FN), often prosecuted for antisemitic comments on the net, especially in electoral periods (see box). Survey data confirms that FN sympathizers are far more antisemitic than all the other parties’ supporters. Far right supporters remain a channel for antisemitism in France, independently from the arrival of refugees.

Antisemitism among Front national candidates

‘The main problem is with Jews and Masons, Jews are not a unique race but a parasite for in their religion it is written black on white that all other races are more or less their slaves. They deserved to be killed as they killed Jesus. They are big fat racists who only deserve a cruel death’

(Alexandre Larionov, FN candidate in the canton of Causse-Comtal, Aveyron), excluded from the party since.

‘Banks rule the world, Jews rule the banks, Jews have the permit to kill! What does the Arab world do?’

(Jérémy Aycart, FN candidate in the canton of Limoges-6, Haute-Vienne).

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31 On the intense activity of the FN on the net, see Boyadjian (2015). On the antisemitic comments of FN candidates in the last departmental elections see the interactive maps: www.slate.fr/story/99195/fn-derapages-electorat.

32 Based on pooled CNCDH survey data, before and after the arrival of Marine Le Pen at the head of the party: Mayer (2015).
Table 9: The 30 most visited political websites in France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The sites</th>
<th>Traffic rank</th>
<th>Monthly visitor numbers</th>
<th>Number of computer visits</th>
<th>Number of smartphone visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Égalité et réconciliation</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>8,100,000</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
<td>4,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fdesouche</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les moutons enragés</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sénat</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>640,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblée nationale</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>380,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wikistrike</td>
<td>2,189</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riposte laïque</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>640,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voltairenet</td>
<td>2,433</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>770,000</td>
<td>930,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primaire2016.org</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>94,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Résistance républicaine</td>
<td>2,995</td>
<td>940,000</td>
<td>440,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>3,072</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreuz.info</td>
<td>3,264</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>610,000</td>
<td>690,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gouvernement.fr</td>
<td>3,393</td>
<td>710,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty.fr</td>
<td>3,657</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jlm.2017.fr</td>
<td>3,954</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Salon Beige</td>
<td>4,355</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFDT</td>
<td>5,004</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>en-marche.fr</td>
<td>5,263</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mélanchon.fr</td>
<td>5,268</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acrimed</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jovanovic.com</td>
<td>6,111</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elysee</td>
<td>6,166</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>7,099</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alainjuppe2017.fr</td>
<td>7,237</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dieudosphère</td>
<td>7,343</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polemia</td>
<td>8,445</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>91,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJIM</td>
<td>8,970</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Colibris</td>
<td>9,712</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initiative communiste</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alexa database (n.d.)

6.2 Refugees in the media

Public discussion in France on the subject of refugees is double-edged. On the one hand the media portrays a compassionate image of refugees fleeing war, as in the Syrian conflict, drowning in the sea while trying to reach European coasts via the Mediterranean, being blocked, attacked, harassed by the police and even
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by local people on the borders of Eastern Europe (in Hungary, Greece), struggling to find shelter when they are on French soil, gathering under tents in camps such as those in Stalingrad (Paris subway station) or in the Calais Jungle where living conditions are abominable. Everyone remembers the image of the little Syrian boy lying on the beach, dead, and of the weekly news announcing the numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. Expressions of solidarity among the population were often reported in the media and Angela’s Merkel decision to open Germany’s borders was widely broadcast.

On the other hand, the media also gives an impression of invasion, showing images of people arriving by the thousands, questioning the feasibility of welcoming and housing so many people in a situation where housing is already an issue. Behind this image of invasion lies the question of the cost of such immigration to be borne by the French people and the idea that migrants are favoured over poor French: we find here the usual arguments against immigration. With regard to the religion and origins of the refugees, it seems that the media has focused essentially on Syrians, and the fact they are Muslims is not presented as problematic, except in contexts where terrorists from Syria are mentioned. Moreover, refugees are essentially a target, on social networks and on far-right websites such those quoted above: Fdesouche, Salon Beige, Riposte laïque, which are virulently anti-immigration, anti-Islam and anti-Muslim, and anti-refugees when events make them conspicuous (the evacuation of Calais, the announcement of a camp for refugees in the North of Paris, etc.).

The public stance of the government and especially of the then Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, also appears double-edged and paradoxical. If Valls recalled the humanitarian duties of the French state and the French tradition of asylum and human rights, he did not embrace Angela Merkel’s position. In September 2015, France agreed to host 24,000 refugees in the two coming years, expressing its solidarity with Europe. But in February 2016, Valls decided to reassure public opinion, explaining that the government was able to keep the situation under control and that he would not hesitate to close the borders in an emergency situation. He said that it was important to have heart, but to remain lucid and firm. This firm position on the part of the government appeared alongside the debate on the penalization of solidarity: several people helping refugees at the border and welcoming people into their homes were sued, which triggered public indignation.

The representatives of different NGOs and associations interviewed in our first focus group strongly criticized the way journalists portrayed refugees. They accused the media of focusing on numbers and of giving a wrong image of refugees. According to them, asylum seekers are presented as poor people, as victims or as dangerous people. Their individuality and the specificity of their trajectory are neglected and no mention is made of the fact that a lot of refugees have good qualifications and something positive to bring to the country. An activist working in Calais said that journalists only came to look for sensational information and focused on issues that would get the attention of the public such as fighting, rape and theft. There have been many debates about the ethics of journalism, what should be shown or not. One thing is sure: we need a more balanced presentation of refugees and refugee diversity should be taken into account.  

7 Integration of Second and Subsequent Generations of MENA Migrants
This section reviews the literature on the integration of second-generation MENA migrants to France, covering socio-economic integration, political participation, identity and belonging, social and religious attitudes. Quantitative data available on the second generations in France is in short supply because of the lack of ‘ethnic’ statistics. The main resource to evaluate the integration of MENA migrants is the Trajectories and Origins survey already referred to, collected by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, or Census Office (INSEE) and the Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) in 2008 and 2009, and to a lesser extent the RAPFI survey (Political Behaviour and Attitudes of French Immigrants, English translation 2011) (Brouard and Tiberj 2005).

7.1 Demographics

France has one of the highest proportions of second-generation immigrants in Europe, with an estimated 6.7 million people being directly descended from migrants in France (Bouvier 2012). In 2015, 7.3 million people born in France, or around 11% of the population, had at least one migrant parent. Half of second-generation immigrants have only one migrant parent and half are of European origin (two-thirds of them are from Portugal, Spain and Italy). Some 30% are of North African origin and 9% of sub-Saharan origin (Santelli 2016). North African second-generation immigrants thus represent the largest ethnic minority in France.

**Figure 16: Second-generation migrant origins by country and continent, 2012**

Second-generation immigrants in France are a lot younger than the average population: 4.5 million are above 18 years old, 47% are less than 25 years old (compared with only 30% for the rest of the population). For instance, 66% of the interviewees of Algerian descent were between 18 and 35 years old, a percentage that rises up to 92% in the case of the second generation of sub-Saharan interviewed in this survey. The oldest second-generation immigrants were more European and less often located in Ile de France than first-generation migrants. Some 30% of the second generation lives in the Paris region (35% of migrants, 

34 www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2575541 être né en France d’un parent immigré (born in France from an immigrant parent).

12% of non-migrant population), 28% in cities of more than 200,000 inhabitants (13% of non-migrant population) and only 11% live in rural communes (vs 27% of the non-migrant population) (Brutel 2017).

### 7.2 Socio-economic integration

Compared with the general population, the living conditions of immigrant children are less good. People living in households headed by a migrant have a living standard that is 30% lower than that of the average population. Generally speaking, the education level of migrants is significantly lower than that of the French population too. Some 75% of fathers from North and sub-Saharan Africa have no diploma and are manual workers. Turkish fathers more frequently follow self-employed occupations (20%). Moreover, a great proportion of mothers are described as inactive by the second-generation interviewees (65% for North African mothers). MENA second-generation immigrants are more numerous in poor neighbourhoods (zones urbaines sensibles; ZUS). One-quarter live in such zones compared with 3.5% for the majority population, the second generation of sub-Saharan origin being the most highly represented (42%) (Santelli 2016). Nevertheless, these findings relate mostly to children of two migrant parents. When only one parent is a migrant, the findings are significantly different: fathers are less often workers, parents more often have a university degree and their families live in more privileged neighbourhoods.

Second-generation immigrants are confronted with specific educational difficulties: compared with the majority population, a smaller percentage graduates from university, and they more frequently leave without any certification. Nevertheless, Louis-André Vallet and Jean-Paul Caille showed that compared with children of similar social background, second-generation children have better results at school (Vallet and Caille 1996). There is also a marked positive gender gap, with girls succeeding better at school than boys and more often gaining a university degree. Table 10 shows that the education level of children of MENA migrants is slightly lower than that of the majority population. Indeed, 36% of men and 41% of women in the majority population are university graduates compared with 20% of men and 25% of women of Algerian descent. This gap is slightly lower for Moroccan and Tunisian second generations but is worse among migrants from West Africa and Turkey: only 17% of West African men and 14% of Turkish men have a university degree.

MENA second-generation migrants (North African, sub-Saharan and Turkish) have an unemployment rate twice as high as the majority population. These rates are even higher among young people (under 25) and among those who have not graduated and those living in poor neighbourhoods. Women tend to have lower rates of unemployment than their male counterparts (between 12% and 20%) but always higher than women of the majority population. Generally speaking, and all things being equal, MENA second-generation migrants are more likely to be unemployed than the majority population.

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36 According to the children’s answers.
The socio-economic position of second-generation migrants greatly depends on their parents’ social status: 45% of male North African second generations are blue collar workers: migrants’ sons are less often blue-collar workers than their fathers, and they are more often skilled workers or employees. Only 8% of North African second-generation migrants work in executive positions compared with 20% of the majority population. Daughters of migrants are mainly employees (55% when the father is North African). But social origins being equal, North African women’s professional occupations are more in line with the female majority population than are their male counterparts. They occupy executive positions more frequently than their male counterparts: a differential that is not noticeable in the majority population.

### 7.3 Civic participation

Most MENA second-generation migrants have French citizenship and have been socialized in France. Data show that they are politically integrated: they are interested in politics even though they are slightly less likely to vote than the population on average and they position themselves more often on the left side of the political orientation scale (Tiberj and Simon 2012b).
MENA second-generation immigrants are less often registered on the electoral lists than the majority population (between 78% and 83% compared with 89% among the majority). There are no major differences between nationalities in this respect, with the exception of Algerian women who have nearly the same enrolment rate as the average population and Turkish women who are registered less frequently than other groups (75%). In municipal and presidential elections, MENA second-generation immigrants are slightly less likely to vote than the majority population. The gap is significant in respect of Turks, where turn-out rates are respectively 76% (men) and 70% (women) compared with 88% of men and 91% of women within the majority population. If Moroccans/Tunisians and sub-Saharan Africans are quite close to the national average, the gap is wider for Algerian men (only 81% of them voted in the general election of 2007) and sub-Saharan women (76%). The authors also show that, all things being equal, North African ancestry and the feeling of not being considered French reduces the likelihood of being registered to vote. Thus those who were stigmatized or reminded of their origins were significantly less likely to have voted at the last local elections (Tiberj and Simon 2012b).

Table 11: Enrolment rate and participation in elections of MENA second-generation immigrants by origins, 2008 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National origins</th>
<th>Enrolment rate</th>
<th>Participation in local elections</th>
<th>Participation in presidential election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco &amp; Tunisia</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority population</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (INED and INSEE, 2008)

But this weaker participation cannot be explained by a lack of political integration or a lack of political interest. The hypothesis of an absence of politicization among the second generation does not hold. One of the first surveys conducted in 1988 on the second generations shows that they are, on the contrary, more interested and more engaged in politics than young people of the majority population, when age and level of education are taken into account (Muxel 1988). The Trajectories and Origins survey confirms that the second generation of migrants is more interested in politics. As shown by Figure 17, children of migrants are slightly more interested in politics than the majority population, registering around 5% more interest in French and international politics than the majority population.

Moreover, MENA second-generation migrants are clearly located on the left side of the political spectrum, even more than their parents, and significantly more than second generations of European origin. Some 48% of second-generation migrants from West Africa register on the left of the spectrum, 45% among those of Algerian origins and 41% for those of Moroccan-Tunisian origin. A little more than 30% do not position themselves on the left-right spectrum at all, and a small minority consider themselves as right wing. The exception is the Turkish second generation, which is a lot less left-orientated: less than 30% are left wing and they are more inclined to define themselves as neither left nor right.
7.4 Social and cultural integration

MENA second-generation migrants are often accused of not being well integrated. However, the Trajectories and Origins survey reveals that while they are discriminated against and do not feel they are perceived as French by others, they are culturally integrated into the French population regarding the choice of their partner and of their group of friends. Some nevertheless suffer from a form of social exclusion because of discrimination at school and urban segregation. According to Table 12, MENA second-generation migrants have friends beyond their country of origin. Around 54% of North Africans declare that less than half of their friends share their origins, a rate that is 5% higher than among those of West African origin.
Table 12: Proportion of friends of the same origins declared by the MENA second generation, 2008 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins by country</th>
<th>More than half</th>
<th>Less than half</th>
<th>Half/half</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco &amp; Tunisia</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (INED and INSEE, 2008)

Regarding relationships, two-thirds of the second-generation population over 25 years old have a partner who is not connected with immigration. But this trend is less true for MENA second-generation migrants than for people of European descent. For the former, there is a clear gender gap, women engaging significantly less in a relationship with a man of the majority population. For men, between 41% (for the Turks) and 52% (for the Moroccans) have a partner from the majority population. This rate is extremely low for Turkish girls (7%) and is 21% lower for women from West Africa compared with men of same origin. Whereas the gender gap between Moroccans and Tunisians is still 12%, it is only 2% between Algerian men and women (Hamel and Pailhé 2012).

The cultural values of MENA second-generation immigrants do not greatly differ from those of the majority population. In respect of socio-economic values they are approximately the same: both groups believe that the rich should be taxed more highly and that unemployed people could find a job if they want to do so. Nevertheless, there is a clear difference regarding the expected role of the state. Some 66% of MENA second-generation migrants (compared with 52%) think the state should regulate companies more, and 31% (compared with 46%) that the number of civil servants should be reduced. But 82% consider that you have to work hard to succeed, compared with 55% for the majority population, and 47% consider that material success is important (compared with 30% for the majority population).

The MENA second generation seems rather less authoritarian in respect of societal values than the majority population. But they are more conservative and less tolerant in respect of sexual freedom. Some 39% have a negative opinion of homosexuality (compared with 21%) and 32% of them think that women should not have sex before marriage (compared with 8%). The data shows that Islam plays an important role in this conservatism: 69% of those without a religion are liberal (permissive), the figure stands at 57% for Roman Catholics and 29% for Muslims. This result has been confirmed by a recent study produced by the Montaigne Institute. Nevertheless, regarding women’s social equality and gendered social roles, MENA second-generation migrants do not differ from the rest of the population.

In terms of religious affiliation, the percentage of MENA second-generation migrants declaring themselves as Muslims is 81% for those of Turkish origin, 67% for those of North African origin and 72% for those of West African origin. They are slightly more prone than the non-immigrant population to consider that religion is important: this is true for 73% of Algerians, 77% of Moroccans-Tunisians, 88% of West African and 73% of Turks.

Table 13: Religion of MENA second generation in 2008 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins by country</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (INED and INSEE, 2008)

7.5 Identity and belonging

This sub-section provides information about the relationship second-generation migrants have with French society but also about the way they are considered by French society. Migrants and their children are expected to integrate into French culture, a pressure that is often reinforced in public discourse. Some 95% of the second generation under 36 years old has French nationality. But only 64% of migrants who arrived before the age of ten became French. As to feeling French, 63% of the second generation (with two migrant parents) agree strongly, 26% rather agree and 10% disagree. MENA second-generation migrants do not differ significantly in this respect, with the exception of Turks who less often think of themselves as French: only 76% compared with around 90% for the others. French national identity is not the only identification that second-generation migrants put forward.

Table 14: ‘Feeling French’ in MENA second-generation migrants by origin, 2008 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I feel French</th>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Total (1+2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco &amp; Tunisia</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trajectories and Origins survey (INED and INSEE, 2008)

7.6 Summary of findings

- The number of second-generation migrants in France is one of the highest in Europe with an estimated 6.7 million direct descendants of migrants.

- Second-generation MENA migrants suffer from socio-economic inequalities, because of their socio-economic background but also because of discrimination and racial barriers. They are generally less successful at school but do better than the average population when the parent’s social status is taken into account. Some of them inherit the lower social position of their parents but a significant minority experiences social mobility.
• Second-generation MENA migrants are quite well integrated socially and culturally into French society: they mix with the majority population and their values are quite similar, but they suffer from social exclusion partly because of segregation and discrimination. They vote less and are less often registered on electoral lists but they are more interested in politics. They tend to be more left wing and to support greater state intervention in the economy but have slightly more conservative societal values; this is especially true for devout Muslims.
8 State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses
8.1 Existing mechanisms for monitoring and combating antisemitism

In combatting antisemitism and racism, the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) plays a central role. Created in 1947 on the initiative of René Cassin to protect and promote human rights, it saw its jurisdiction extended by the 1990 anti-racist Gayssot law, when it was charged with creating an annual report on all forms of racism, antisemitism and xenophobia, to be presented to the Prime Minister on 1 March. The report is based on contributions from all the public agencies, unions and associations, and religious authorities involved in the defence of human rights (see the box below). It gives a summary of antisemitic and racist acts based on police reports, an assessment of the level of prejudice in France, including antisemitic prejudice, on the base of an annual opinion survey on a national sample representative of the adult population living in France (N=1,000), and an evaluation of the application of laws, public policies, law suits, meant to combat racism in all its forms and at all levels.

Composition of the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights
(68 members)

Government representatives for the prime minister and for each of the 17 concerned Ministers:
- One deputy named by the President of the National Assembly;
- One senator named by the President of the Senate;
- Members of the Conseil d’Etat (Higher administrative Court) and magistrates;
- The Mediator of the Republic;
- Representatives of 33 human rights NGOs;
- Representatives of trade unions and confederations;
- Civil society personalities, representing churches, university teachers, sociologists, etc.;
- Qualified ‘experts’ concerned with human rights issues.

8.1.1 Main monitoring instruments

Police data: two services collect data at the Ministry of the Interior, the SCRT (Central Service of Territorial Intelligence) and the SSMSI (Ministerial Statistical Service of Homeland Security). The first, the better known, centralizes the main racist acts registered by the police and the gendarmerie (a selection of complaints and simple declarations on the ‘main courante’ or Register of offences) relative to racist, xenophobic, antisemitic and, since 2010, Islamophobic acts (physical aggression, material damage) and threats (insults, tags, intimidation, tracts). Since the attack against the synagogue in the rue Copernic in 1980, there has been collaboration between the police and the SPCJ (French Jewish Community Protection Service), and since 2010 a symmetric collaboration has been set up with the Observatory against Islamophobia of the CFCM (French Council of Muslim Worship). However, the data is not exhaustive: they do not take into account acts of discrimination, they depend on the

38 See the summary of the 2015 report in English www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/english-version-les-essentiels-report-prevention-racism-2015. All the reports are available online.

39 There is a representative of the Jewish Consistory, presently the Rabbi Didier Kassabi, and one of the French Council of Muslim Cult (CFCM), presently its former president Anouar Kbibech.
goodwill of the local police officer to register the complaint, sometimes the acts are just mentioned on the ‘main courante’ (register of offences), and victims are not always willing to file a law suit. A methodological assessment on the quality of the data is in progress.

The other service, the SSMSI, registers online all the legal procedures registered by the security forces following a complaint, for all offences falling in the category of insults, discriminations, murders, violence or threats, perpetrated in relation to the race, origin, ethnic group or religion of a person. The detailed data has only been available since 2014. It complements the SCRT data because of its much larger scope, including all forms of discrimination, not only violent acts or threats. For instance, in 2015, 11,610 offences were registered, and 9,460 in 2016, four to five times the total number of racist acts and threats reported by the SCRT in the same period (respectively 2032 and 1125). But they only give information on the nature of the infraction, the category of crime, not on the type of victim, thus preventing any attempt to classify the offence as antisemitism, Islamophobia or other form of racism.

INSEE/ONDRP: another source of information is the survey of victims, ‘Cadre de vie et sécurité’, conducted in the general population by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, or Census Office (INSEE) among 25,500 households in association with the ONDRP (National Crime and Punishment Monitoring Centre). Over time it has included questions about the nature – racist, antisemitic or xenophobic – of the insults (since 2007), acts and threats (since 2012) and violence (since 2016).\textsuperscript{40} It reaches the mass of people who do not file a complaint. Only 6% of the victims of insults go to police, and only one in two files a complaint; as for the threats one in three go to the police and two in three file a complaint. From 2011 to 2015 on average every year 5 million people aged 14 and over declare they were victim of insults, threats or violence, 14% of whom (698,000) say they were victims of racist, antisemitic or xenophobic insults and 7% of threats of the same nature. A comparison of the figures suggests that the police data reveals only a fraction of actual incidents, the most serious acts and threats, and that there is a large grey zone.

Ministry of Justice: the Ministry is also acutely aware of the gap between the numbers of offences based on the victim’s race, religion or origin as declared in studies of victims and the number of actual law suits and judgments that follow, often long after. The number of court cases in 2015 was 7,251, a rise of 19% from the figure of 5,553 in 2012, which could reflect the greater propensity of victims to declare offences. The number of convictions meanwhile rose from 414 in 2011 to 515 in 2015. But here again it is not possible to single out offences of an antisemitic nature, and there is no information about the ethnicity of the victims or perpetrators.

Internet tracking: PHAROS (Platform for Harmonization, Analysis, Cross-checking and Orientation of Alerts) tracks illicit behaviour and statements on the Internet.\textsuperscript{41} In 2015, PHAROS received 188,055 notifications, an increase of 36.8% compared with the previous year (137,456 alerts). But hate speech, promotion of racism and antisemitism are but a small part of the total number of notifications (10% in 2016), while notifications which concern the promotion of terrorism

\textsuperscript{40} For an up-to-date presentation see INHESJ/ONDRP (2017).

\textsuperscript{41} www.police-nationale.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-police/Plateforme-Signalement-sur-Internet.
are rocketing (31,302 notifications in 2015 vs 1,675 in 2014). To this tool one must add the Expression of Hate online monthly survey, created by IDPI in 2014 in partnership with the General Commission on Equality between Territories (CGET) to follow hate speech on Twitter.\(^\text{42}\)

Several monitoring instruments have been developed to register racist and antisemitic violence in schools. SIVIS (Information and Vigilance System for School Security), taking the place of SIGNA in 2007, is based on an annual survey of violence on an anonymized sample of schools. Head teachers are asked to fill in a form about racist and antisemitic incidents. The study is coupled every two years since 2011 with a study of victims. The SIVIS platform shows that racist, xenophobic and antisemitic acts represent a small and stable number of the declared incidents. In 2014–2015 for instance the survey was conducted in 1,727 educational establishments, where 328 racist, antisemitic or xenophobic incidents were declared (0.5 for 1,000 pupils), among which acts of discrimination of an antisemitic nature counted for 17% (CNCDH 2015a: 46). But this is an imperfect instrument, because of the low rate of response (half the sample) to the survey, which was not compulsory, the lack of clear guidelines about the type of incidents to declare and therefore the obvious underestimation of actual violence.

The High Authority to Combat Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE) was replaced in 2011 by a Défenseur des droits/Defender of Rights, currently Jacques Toubon, to whom anyone who feels they are the victim of discrimination can address their complaints.\(^\text{43}\) In 2015 there were some 120,000 demands of which 4,535 were concerned with discrimination.

### 8.2 Policies and programmes to counter antisemitism/racism

Over time, France has developed a wealth of legislation and institutions to combat antisemitism and other forms of racism, from the 1881 law on the freedom of press to specifically anti-racist laws such as the Pleven law of 1972, the Gayssot law of 1990 which stipulates new regulations contesting Holocaust denial (‘negationism’), the Lellouche law of 2003 with severe penalties for offences of a racist, antisemitic or xenophobic nature, and the law of 9 March 2004 extending the time limit for public prosecution of such offences.

The government of Manuel Valls (2014–2016) prioritized work against racism and antisemitism at all levels of society. Valls brought two key organizations under his direct authority: the Interdepartmental Commission for Combatting Racism and Antisemitism (DILCRA), which became DILCRAH (Interdepartmental Delegation for Combatting Racism, Antisemitism and anti-LGBT Hate in 2016).\(^\text{44}\) Created in 2012 with the objective to coordinate the action of the different Ministries and administrations concerned, it took a new turn after 2014 under the leadership of the prefect Gilles Clavreul, seeing its mission extended and its visibility increased. In 2015 racism in all its form was proclaimed a ‘major national cause’ by the President of the Republic in December 2014 and a two-year national plan for combatting racism and antisemitism (PNACRA) was launched. Operational committees for

\(^{42}\) [www.idpi.fr/category/actualites/](http://www.idpi.fr/category/actualites/).

\(^{43}\) [www.defenseursdesdroits.fr/](http://www.defenseursdesdroits.fr/).

\(^{44}\) [www.gouvernement.fr/dilcra](http://www.gouvernement.fr/dilcra).
combating racism and antisemitism (CORAS) were installed in each department and correspondents were appointed in schools. In 2016 a national campaign against racism and antisemitism was launched with the support of a series of striking (and controversial) video clips showing violent aggressions against members of religious or ethnic minorities, around the hashtag #TousUnisContrelaHaine/AllUnitedAgainstHate. Civil society associations were mobilized by a national fund for projects to pursue anti-racist initiatives, and researchers were called into DILCRA’s scientific council. Special care was given to work against racism and antisemitism in the classroom, with online material designed to help teachers prepare their courses on these sensitive issues (Canopée). Last, the repression of racism, antisemitism and homophobia was reinforced with the Egalité et Citoyenneté/Equality and Citizenship law, adopted in December 2016, making racist or discriminatory motives ‘aggravating circumstances’ to be punished more severely for all offences.

8.3 Interactions between state agencies, established civil society organisations

The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of religious affairs in France. It periodically meets the representatives of the six largest religious groupings: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Orthodox, Muslim and Buddhist. Official representation of the Jewish community goes back to the time of Napoleon. It is represented by the Jewish Consistory of France for religious matters and by the CRIF (Representative Council of French Jewish Organizations). Several attempts were made to organize the Muslim community on the same model but this proved difficult because of its heterogeneity and fragmentation. Since 2003 it is represented by the French Council of Muslim Worship (CFCM). In reaction against the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016, there has been a common front of all religions, condemning the attacks and calling for unity. The CFCM is invited to the annual dinner of the CRIF, in the presence of the President of the Republic. In 2015, however, Dalil Boubakeur, at the time President of the CFCM, boycotted the dinner after the President of Crif, Roger Cukierman, had said that ‘young Muslims’ were responsible for ‘all antisemitic violence’ in France. Relations improved with his successor at the head of the CFCM in 2015, Anouar Kbibech, who attended the 2016 dinner. And the CRIF has set up a commission with them to discuss together issues of mutual interest, such as ritual slaughter.

Both Jewish and Muslim authorities called for solidarity on the refugee issue. But the problem is mostly left to specialized NGOs, not only the oldest established (Secours catholique, Secours populaire, France terre d’asile, etc.) but also a myriad of small new networks (see the list of NGOs we invited to the seminar). And there is not much contact as yet with the Jewish and Muslim national representative organizations other than at local levels.

45 A pig’s head above the entrance to a mosque, a young Black beaten up, graffiti ‘death to the Jews’ on the door of a synagogue. Inspired from real facts, these 30-second clips are all built the same way: an aggressive act filmed with a smartphone, in the background a conversation, referring to common racist stereotypes about the group concerned, until a voice speaks up saying: ‘You are really serious there? You really believe what you are saying?’


47 For the Muslim call of fraternity and sharing the feast of the Aid El Khebir in 2015 see www.saphirnews.com/Crise-des-refugies-le-CFCM-appelle-a-la-mobilisation-des-musulmans_a21232.html.
8.4 Good practice

• Promoting interreligious dialogue: The special councillor of the Chief Rabbi Haiïm Korsia, Moshé Haim, also part of the Conference of European Rabbis, has been doing much in this direction, in Le Raincy where he is rabbi and also in partnership with the Embassy of Tunisia, multiplying joint celebrations of Muslim and Jewish feasts (the end of Ramadan, and lighting the third Candle for Hanouka). He also is part of a special educational programme, ‘Emouna, l’amphi des religions’, to train together rabbis, imams, Catholic, Protestant and Buddhist priests, to enhance among them knowledge of all their religions. It started at Sciences Po, Paris, in the autumn of 2016 and the first cohort of 35 graduated in July 2017. Lastly, Moshé Haim was one of the founders in 2011 of the CRCF (Conférence des responsables de culte en France/Conference of the Heads of Religious Confessions in France), with two representatives by religion (the same five), meeting every three months.

• Promoting intercultural dialogue: Intercultural dialogue is just as important as interreligious dialogue. A selection of current projects is shown in the box below.

Promoting intercultural dialogue

• The Aladdin Project, chaired by Anne-Marie Revcolevschi, was launched under the patronage of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in March 2009, with the aim of countering Holocaust denial and trivialization in the Muslim world. Then it extended its scope to promote knowledge of ‘the other’ and serve as bridge between Western audiences and the cultures and societies of the Islamic world. (http://projetaladin.org/en/the-aladdin-project.html).

• AJMF (Jewish-Muslim Friendship in France) was created in 2005 by a Franco-Moroccan rabbi, Michel Serfaty, driving through France with his buses for friendship, initiating a dialogue between Jews and Muslims (http://ajmf.org/).

• ‘Coexister’ is a neutral and non-denominational French youth movement that has been advocating Active Coexistence through a method of peer education aimed at 15–35 year olds since 2009 to promote dialogue solidarity and awareness (http://english.coexister.fr/).

• CoExist is a joint initiative of the Union of Jewish Students of France (UEJF), SOS racism and La Fabrique (ex Confédération étudiante). The principle is that a duo team of young mediators visit schools (college and high school), giving a two-hour class dedicated to the deconstruction of racist, antisemitic, sexist, homophobic stereotypes on an interactive and playful basis: involving, for example, word associations (for terms such as ‘Jew’, ‘Arab’, ‘Woman’, ‘Black’, etc.), drawings, and discussions in small groups. (http://uejf.org/blog/2013/05/le-programme-coexist-de-luejf-sos-racisme-et-la-confederation-etudiante-dans-liberation-du-30042013/).

• ‘Parler en Paix’, where participants learns Hebrew and Arabic together.
Increasing involvement of French Jewish organizations in helping refugees, as was publicly called for by the main Jewish representative organizations (10 September 2015) and was done, for instance, in Milan where refugees from Eritrea were sheltered in the Holocaust Memorial.49

After the terrorist attacks of 2015, the main organizations representing the Jewish community called for solidarity with refugees in the name of ‘Tikkoun Olam’ (‘repairing the world), recalling the biblical verse ‘Tu aimeras l’étranger comme toi-même, car tu as été étranger en terre d’Egypte [‘Love the stranger as yourself, for you were a stranger in the land of Egypt’] (Leviticus XIX, 34) (10 September 2015).

9 Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions

In this specific French context, the main finding is that antisemitism did not develop in the wake of the refugee crisis of 2011; rather, when it exists, it is home grown. Its evolution follows a specific chronology, linked to the national and international context. And far from increasing after 2011, antisemitic prejudices are rather on the decline, as are traditional antisemitic stereotypes, and the number of antisemitic incidents has been decreasing since 2014.

Anti-Jewish actions and threats started rising after the start of the Second Intifada in 2000, with peaks corresponding to the episodes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the representatives of the Jewish community, a ‘new’ antisemitism seems to have emerged, not only driven by the old extreme right groups but by children of immigrants in search of their identity, identifying with the Palestinians and associating Jews with Zionism and the unconditional defence of Israel.

Antisemitic attitudes follow the opposite trend. After 2000, Jews became even better accepted than formerly, scoring the highest level on the Longitudinal Index of Tolerance towards minorities (based on the CNCDH annual survey), far above the scores of Muslims and North Africans (Maghrébins).

The reverse of this positive image is a certain ambivalence. NGOs defending the children of immigrants such as the Groupe des Indigènes de la République or the NMXR network (Groupe non mixte racisé/Non-mixed racialized group),50 organizer of a series of workshops ‘Parole non blanches’/Non White Word’ at the University of Paris 8, Saint-Denis, consider antisemitism is no longer a problem in France, as Jews have been ‘whitened’: they no longer see Jews as among the ranks of those who suffer discrimination or as the victims of racism. These statements mirror the feeling that there are ‘deux poids, deux mesures’, meaning that Jewish people are more protected than other ethnic and religious minorities, while among the mass public old stereotypes associating Jews with money and power persist. But far from increasing after 2011, acceptance of these stereotypes has also been on the decline since 2015.

Most people invited to our seminars or interviewed did not see a link between MENA migrants and rising antisemitism: for them this is a ‘non-issue’. For relevant NGOs, the main problem for refugees and migrants is survival, getting papers, going through the formalities. Migrants have little contact with French society except with NGOs and administrators; they are often dispatched to rural areas or to the Paris suburbs, becoming invisible except in the camps of Calais or Paris, which are now dismantled. They form a socially and culturally heterogeneous population, showing strong connection with their compatriots, but little solidarity with other refugees, even Muslims. If there is intolerance it is less against Jews than between groups: for instance, several interviewees report that Syrians feel superior to North Africans. Refugees interviewed did not know much about the Jewish community in France and did not express antisemitic remarks. Only one interviewee gave a stereotyped statement, saying that French Jews are quite well off. As for representatives of the civil society and the state (university, police, judges, antiracist public agencies and independent authorities) they connect

antisemitism either to extreme right networks or to second-generation immigrant youth of disadvantaged background, but not to MENA migrants. And they think of refugees as the first victims of intolerance.

Only interviewees of Jewish faith or representatives of the Jewish community expressed concern about a potential antisemitism imported by refugees, as they come from Muslim countries with antisemitic cultures and anti-Israeli feelings. They also feared Islamic terrorists could hide among them. But their main concern is, first, their difficult relationship with French Muslims and their children, especially from North Africa, owing to the French history of colonization and decolonization. Their second concern is their tense relationship with French public opinion. After the Merah killing in the Jewish school of Toulouse in 2012, there was the feeling in the Jewish community that Jews did not get the support of the population. It was the same after antisemitic slogans were shouted in several demonstrations in 2014 (first in January at the anti-Hollande ‘Day of Wrath’ demonstration, then in July in the pro-Palestinian demonstrations) and even more so after the Hyper Cacher terrorist attack in 2015, giving many Jews the feeling that the Charlie Hebdo killing mattered and mobilized more. It was believed that Manuel Valls, when he was Prime Minister (March 2014–December 2016), did much to allay these concerns. It is too early to comment on the relations between French Jews and the new president, Emmanuel Macron and his government in the wake of the 2017 presidential elections.
Recommendations

• Improve tools for monitoring antisemitism at all levels of society: acts and threats, as well as hate speech on the Internet.

• Analyse antisemitism from a global perspective, comparing it to the other forms of racism - against Blacks, Muslims, and Roma - seeing what makes these forms of racism similar and what makes them different, without considering *a priori* that there is a hierarchy of racisms and that antisemitism is by its nature the most virulent.

• Explore intergroup prejudice in general, not only Muslims and Jews (also Black, Roma, etc.). There are few studies in France because of the taboo on including ethnicity in official surveys.

• De-essentialize ‘refugees’: take into account the heterogeneity of this population. This is a precondition for creating efficient public policies (with/without educational background, with/without the intention of staying and integrating in the country, etc.).

• ‘Bring the state back in’: the government should take a larger role in the reception, housing and support of migrants and refugees. All the associations working with refugees have the feeling they are left alone without the means to cope with that population, that there should be public policies to host refugees, integrate them, teach them the French language and French social customs, and promote their interaction with the French population.

• Revise the way in which history is taught at school in France, integrating the memories and histories of all its minorities.

• Develop interreligious and intercultural dialogue (see section 8.4, Good practice).
Bibliography


Methodology of the seminars

After informal discussions with activists belonging to human right or solidarity NGOs, our strategy was not to directly probe on antisemitism at first, but to insist on the refugee dimension.

The invitation to both groups presented the seminar as a preliminary to focus groups with the refugees themselves, in the context of European comparative research. Only the title of the Foundation EVZ project mentioned antisemitism.

The final programme outlined the main topics of discussion, and antisemitism as such appeared at the end: ‘What are the main fears (conflicts of values, of culture, of religion, risks of radicalization)? In Germany for instance, where the memory of the Shoah is omnipresent, Angela Merkel said ‘migrants seeking asylum in Germany must reject antisemitism’. What are the terms of the debate in France?’

Opening the seminar, we presented antisemitism as one topic among others, which was important for Foundation EVZ in relation to the specificity of the German context, and waited to see if it came spontaneously in the discussions. Only if it did not appear did we probe the issue at the end of the discussion.

Invitation to the morning seminar (NGOs working with migrants and refugees)

We come back to you with details of the goals and programme of the seminar you agreed to take part in, an informal closed research seminar, designed to allow for an open discussion about refugees/migrants arriving in France and their integration. It is part of a comparative European survey (Germany, Belgium, France, Netherlands, UK) funded by the German Foundation EVZ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft) of which the Centre d’études européennes de Sciences Po is partner (...).

Before talking with refugees, we would like to know more about this population, its relationship with French society, the real or imagined obstacles to its integration. You are in the frontline welcoming them, your eyewitness account is essential.’ (...).

Here are the main issues about which we would like to hear your views, drawing from your own experiences of helping refugees and migrants (tell us if there are others that seem to you important to address):

From the perspective of refugees/migrants:

- What are their most urgent expectations and needs (material, medical, psychological, legal help…)?
- What are for you the main assets, the main obstacles to their integration/insertion in French society (origin, religion, social background)?
- What image of France do they have, do they feel welcome or rejected? Is it a country where they could/would live or not? Why?
From the perspective of the host society:

- **How is your action perceived, helped, opposed?** (support, donations, volunteering, opposition, violence)? Who are your main allies/opponents (government, administration, elected representatives, churches, civil society, foreign NGOs, parties, unions)?

- **How are refugees/migrants perceived in the population** (acceptation, rejection, indifference)?

- **What are the main fears** (conflicts of values, of culture, of religion, risk of radicalization)? In Germany for instance, where the memory of the Shoah is omnipresent, Angela Merkel said ‘migrants seeking asylum in Germany must reject antisemitism’. What are the terms of the debate in France?

**Invitation to the afternoon seminar with representatives of state and civil society**

We come back to you with clarifications about the goals and programme of the seminar you accepted to take part in, an informal closed research seminar, designed to allow for an open discussion about refugees/migrants arriving in France and their integration. It is part of a comparative European survey (Germany, Belgium, France, Netherlands, UK) funded by the German Foundation EVZ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft) of which the Centre d’études européennes de Sciences Po is partner (…).

Before talking with them directly, we would like to understand how French society perceives and receives them, how it mobilizes for or against them. In the morning a first seminar will gather NGOs specializing in the reception of refugees, in daily contact with them. The afternoon seminar will bring you together as representatives of the state or the civil society. Whether you are members of voluntary associations, magistrates, lawyers, civil servants, your testimony is essential as witnesses and actors in the process (…).

Here are the main issues about which we would like to hear your views, (tell us if there are others that you consider it is important to speak about):

- **How do you see this flow of refugees and migrants, what can be its consequences for the society, what problems does it raise?**

- **How are they perceived in the population** (acceptation, rejection, indifference)?

- **What are the main fears** (conflicts of values, of culture, of religion, risks of radicalization)? In Germany for instance, where the memory of the Shoah is omnipresent, Angela Merkel said ‘migrants seeking asylum in Germany must reject antisemitism’. What are the terms of the debate in France?

- **How can one integrate, receive these refugees, what should be done?**
List of participants in the study

Seminar – 16 December 2016

Morning (NGOs working with refugees)
- Jocelyne Clément, Quid’Autre (network of psychologists helping migrants)
- Bahia Dalens, Collectif Parisien de Soutien aux Exilé.e.s (local citizens association helping refugees)
- Houssam el Assimi, Collectif La Chapelle Debout (local citizens association helping refugees)
- Fatma Fall, Association Service Social Familial Migrants (association helping migrants)
- Paul Garrigues, Ligue des droits de l’Homme (LDH) (Human Rights League)
- Florian Huygues, Fondation Abbé Pierre (association helping the poor and the homeless)
- Marie Jacob, Quid’Autre
- Aleksi Leskinen, Wintegreat (association helping refugees to complete their studies in top-ranking higher education establishments)
- Rachel Lindon, Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme (LICRA-International league against racism and antisemitism)
- Mirta Matthieu, Emmaüs (association helping the poor and the homeless)
- Nathanaël Molle, president of SINGA (association giving the opportunity to receive refugees in one’s home)
- Margaux Riquet, Quid’Autre
- Christian Salomé, L’Auberge des migrants (association helping migrants in Calais)

Afternoon (Civil society and state)
- Claire Allègre, Brigade de Répression de la Délinquance contre la Personne (BRDP)
- Aline Angoustures, Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA/Archives department)
- Martine Cohen, Ligue des droits de l’Homme/Human Rights League (LDH) (founded in 1898 at the time of the Dreyfus affair), and in several neighbourhood solidarity associations.
- Louis Dassonneville, University Paris 8 Vincennes – Saint-Denis (chief of staff of the former president of the University, Danielle Tartakowsky)
- Geneviève Decoster, ATD Quart monde, member of the CNCDH
- Nadia Doghramadjian, Ligue des droits de l’Homme/Human Rights League (LDH)/CNCDH
- Samia Hathroubi, Coexister & Foundation for Ethnic Understanding
Appendices

- Magali Lafourcade, Secretary general of the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH)
- Donatien Le Vaillant, Délégation Interministérielle à la Lutte Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme (DILCRA)
- Antoine Meyer, Institut Français des Droits et Libertés (IFDL)
- Marine Quenin, chair of ‘Enquête’, an antiracist educational NGO www.enquete.asso.fr/enquete/enquete-cest-qui/
- Danielle Tartakowsky, former president of the University Paris 8 Vincennes – Saint-Denis

Profile of the refugees interviewed for the project
- Abdallah, 22 years old, Sudanese, university degree
- Omeid, around 30 years old, Afghan, BA in Business
- Imran, around 40 years old, Afghan, doctor
- Hozifa, 25 years old, Sudanese, BA in Arabic and English

Focus group
- Hayyan, 20 years old, Syrian, student
- Khadij, 19 years old, Syrian, student
- Ahmad, 25 years old, Syrian, student

Profile of the four representatives of the Jewish community
- Yonathan Arfi, Vice President of the CRIF
- Moshe Levin, special counsellor of the Chief Rabbi, executive director of the Conference of European Rabbis
- Serge Dahan, President of B’nai B’rith France
- Sacha Ghozlan, President of UEJF (Union of French Jewish Students)

Profile of interviewee in NGO teaching to refugees
- Irène Charbonnier (Bureau d’accueil et d’accompagnement des migrants, BAAM)
The Trajectories and Origins Survey

The TeO survey was conducted jointly by INED and INSEE (2008). It was closely supervised by the official bodies which oversee the collection and use of public statistics (CNIS; CNIL). It guarantees scrupulous respect for respondents’ rights: all participants were surveyed on a voluntary and anonymous basis.


TeO covers all populations living in metropolitan France (mainland and Corsica), their current living conditions and their trajectories. The survey focuses on populations whose life course may be adversely affected by factors linked to their physical appearance (immigrants, descendants of immigrants, persons from the French overseas territories and their descendants).

The TeO survey aims to:

- study living conditions at the time of the survey, but also the social trajectories of respondents in a variety of social domains (education, employment, housing, civic participation, etc.);
- identify the impact of origins on the living conditions and social trajectories of individuals, while taking account of other sociodemographic characteristics, namely social environment, neighbourhood, age, cohort, sex, educational level.