Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today
Is there a connection?
The case of the Netherlands

Annemarieke Stremmelaar and Leo Lucassen
This report derives from a five-nation study commissioned by the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (EVZ), based in Berlin, and led by the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London.

The full set of reports for this study is available to download:

- Foundation EVZ www.stiftung-evz.de
- Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk

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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADL</td>
<td>Anti-Defamation League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIVD</td>
<td>Algemene Inlichtingen – en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLEW</td>
<td>Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn (Foundation for Life and Welfare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Statistics Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDI</td>
<td>Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël (Israel Information and Documentation Centre)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJO</td>
<td>Centraal Joods Overleg (Central Jewish Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Centraal Opvangorgaan Asielzoekers (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EVZ</td>
<td>Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft (Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FvD</td>
<td>Forum voor Democratie (Forum for Democracy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>Immigratie – en Naturalisatie Dienst (Immigration and Naturalization Service)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIS</td>
<td>Kennisplatform Integratie en Samenleving (Platform Integration and Society)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDI</td>
<td>Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet (Report Centre Internet Discrimination)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiND</td>
<td>Meldpunt Internetdiscriminatie (Internet Discrimination Report Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTV</td>
<td>Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OJCM</td>
<td>Overleg Joden, christenen en moslims (Council of Jews, Christians, and Muslims)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (Netherlands Institute for Social Research)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF</td>
<td>Foundation for Refugee Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNL</td>
<td>VoorNederland (For the Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Liberal Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VWN</td>
<td>VluchtelingenWerk Nederland (Dutch Council for Refugees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRR</td>
<td>Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Scientific Council for Government Policy)</td>
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There is a persistent claim that new migrants to Europe, and specifically migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA migrants), carry antisemitism with them. This assertion is made to different degrees in different countries and can take different forms. Nevertheless, in Europe, the association of rising antisemitism with migrants from the Middle East and North Africa is widespread and needs to be evaluated.

MENA migrants have been symbolically central to the migration debate since 2011. These years have been framed by the Arab spring and its aftermath and by Europe’s crisis of refugee protection. This research project has focused specifically on MENA migrants, in response to the intensity of this debate, and in accordance with the brief from Foundation EVZ. The central concern of the research project has been to investigate whether the arrival of MENA migrants since 2011 has had an impact on antisemitic attitudes and behaviour in Western Europe. This report deals with the case of the Netherlands. The report also considers whether government and civil society agencies have identified a problem of antisemitism among MENA migrants. The findings are based on an extensive survey of existing quantitative and qualitative evidence. Additionally, new qualitative research has been undertaken to investigate the experiences and opinions of a range of actors.

This national report contributes to a larger research project conducted in 2016/2017 across five European countries – Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A final report, *Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today: is there a connection? Findings and recommendations from a five-nation study*, draws out common trends, makes comparisons and provides recommendations for civil society organizations and for governments.

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1. This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. See under Definitions.
Executive Summary

Context

- At the time of writing, the largest Middle East and North Africa (MENA) groups in the Netherlands are Turkish and Moroccan Dutch. In 2016 there were 385,000 migrants with a background from Morocco and 397,000 from Turkey. Half of these were born in the Netherlands (the second and the now emerging third generation). Together they make up some 4.5% of the total population. Other relatively large groups from countries with a predominantly Muslim population are Somalis, Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans and Syrians.

- It is estimated that there are around 1 million Muslims in the Netherlands, constituting some 5–6% of the total population.

- There are fewer Jews in the Netherlands than Muslims; estimates range between 40,000 and 50,000. Emigration from and immigration to Israel is a modest phenomenon and there are no signs that Dutch Jews choose to leave the country to live in Israel.

Findings

Immigration and demography

- The category of ‘non-Western’ migrants, consisting predominantly of people from Asia and Africa, and the majority of them of Muslim faith, has increased since the mid-1990s.

- In 2014, both the composition of ‘non-Western immigrants’ and net migration changed due to the growing numbers of asylum seekers, especially from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The number of migrants from North Africa (most from Morocco) has decreased, while immigration from the Middle East and Eritrea has increased considerably since 2011. The Syrian population in the Netherlands has grown in particular, from 10,000 in 2010 to 45,000 in 2017, whereas the number of Eritreans increased from 2,000 to 9,000. The numbers of Afghans and Iraqis have also risen, from 38,000 to 45,000 and 53,000 to 57,000 respectively.

- As of 2017, the Middle Eastern population in the Netherlands numbers 200,000 (including 56,000 from Iraq, 44,000 from Syria, 44,000 from Afghanistan and 38,000 from Iran). Excluding Moroccans, the number of North Africans is lower (42,000), with Egyptians (23,000) by far the largest group.

Antisemitism since 2011

- Perceptions of Jews in the Netherlands are relatively positive when compared with other European countries, and when compared with attitudes towards Muslims and Roma.

- Dutch respondents agree more easily with survey statements blaming Jews for policies of the Israeli state as compared with ‘classic’ antisemitic stereotypes of Jews being responsible for the outbreak of wars or having control over the media.
• Since 2000, the number, scale and intensity of recorded antisemitic incidents has fluctuated in line with Israeli military operations, with peaks in 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2010. There was a small peak in 2012 and a higher peak in 2014.

• Most of the reported antisemitic incidents concern verbal or written antisemitic statements. Less common are incidents involving violence in the form of verbal abuse, threat, harassment and rarer still, are those which feature graffiti, vandalism and arson.

• As elsewhere in Western Europe, the Second Intifada of 1999/2000 changed patterns of antisemitism in the Netherlands: there has been a marked increase in its scale and vehemence, coinciding with Israeli military operations against Palestinians, and the emergence of Moroccan-Dutch youngsters (and to a lesser extent other Dutch Muslim citizens) as perpetrators of antisemitic verbal or physical abuse, resulting in the worst cases of Jews being assaulted on the street.

• Since 2000, a series of antisemitic incidents have contributed to a recurrent public debate about antisemitism and made it a serious issue for many Jews in the Netherlands. Concerns among Jews about antisemitism have been on the rise since the antisemitic terrorist attacks in Europe of 2012, 2014 and 2015.

• Existing government and civil society reports on antisemitism do not contain records of refugees or recent immigrants as perpetrators of antisemitic incidents or as people with anti-Jewish attitudes.

• Extreme right-wing activism against immigration and immigrants has led to a number of antisemitic incidents.

• There is anecdotal evidence that Jewish asylum seekers in reception centres have become the target of harassment.

Public discourse
• The issues of immigration and Islam are fiercely debated. Public debate about these topics is characterized by polarization between a multicultural anti-racist pole and an anti-immigration and anti-Islam pole. The problematization of immigration, Islam and Muslims by populist parties has partly been taken over by mainstream parties.

• The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the rise in the number of immigrants arriving in the Netherlands in 2014/2015 have contributed to the focus on Islam and immigration in public debate.

• Antisemitism is primarily discussed in connection with immigration and Islam; these debates are often vehement and emotional.

• The development of communication on social media has greatly increased the opportunities to disseminate discriminatory content and hate speech, including antisemitism.
Executive Summary

Integration

- The integration of refugees from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan) who reached the Netherlands in the 1990s has progressed relatively smoothly. Despite a long period of isolation from Dutch society and the labour market, by 2015 most of them had found a job and their children were performing well at school, especially those from Iran. Moreover, their political and cultural values do not differ fundamentally from those of the average Dutch.

- The integration process of the descendants of former labour migrants from Morocco and Turkey has taken more time but is also progressing. From about 2005, there has been a significant improvement in the educational achievement of the second generation. In respect of religion, some children of former guest workers have become more interested in Islam, but this does not influence their labour market position, nor does it lead to oppositional behaviour pertaining to core values of Dutch society.

- Only 8% of the 1 million Muslims in the Netherlands are attracted by the orthodox and conservative influence of Islamist Salafist sects.

- Since around 2007, the state no longer considers itself to be fully responsible for the integration of immigrants and their descendants and stresses that migrants themselves are responsible for their societal position.

State and civil society monitoring and responses

- Since 2010, the government has been making an effort to improve and streamline reporting on discrimination and to develop anti-discrimination policies to counter antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-black racism.

- In addition to general policies, specific measures for combating different forms of discrimination have also been introduced. These include interreligious and intercultural dialogue and projects that aim to introduce young people and adults with a Muslim background to Jews and Jewish life in the Netherlands.

Conclusions

- There is no attestable impact of recent MENA refugees on recorded antisemitic attitudes and hate crime in the Netherlands since 2011.

- There have been no significant changes in the scale or character of antisemitism since 2011. Fluctuations in the number and vehemence of antisemitic incidents can, however, be related to Israeli military operations.

- There is evidence which suggests that extreme right-wing activism against immigration and immigrants may lead to expressions of antisemitism.

- Some Jews in the Netherlands are concerned about the large-scale immigration of people who may harbour antisemitic or jihadist opinions and intentions. Fears about antisemitism among refugees stem from several factors: the fact that Dutch citizens with a Muslim background (so-called second-generation migrants from Morocco or Turkey) are involved in antisemitic incidents; the concern that radicalized Muslims in Europe or terrorists going to or returning from the Middle East may conduct antisemitic terrorist attacks; and a perceived lack of awareness and action on the issues of antisemitism and the integration of immigrants in society. With the fall in numbers of refugee arrivals the issue seems to have lost some of its urgency.
Jews are involved in a considerable number of initiatives and activities to bring refugees into contact with Jews, including having refugees temporarily staying in their homes. So far these interactions have revealed that refugees from Syria may have negative views of Israel and Jews, but such views have not manifested themselves in openly hostile behaviour or prevented friendly contact between Jews and Syrian (or other) refugees.

Recommendations

Policy
• Since 2000, Western Europe has witnessed numerous projects and initiatives aimed at countering antisemitism. Some of these have also been studied or evaluated. Knowledge of effective methods and best practices is not always used in new or existing activities. The financial arrangements for such activities, which are often paid for on a project-basis through subsidies, do not encourage the ongoing development of initiatives. Structural financing, evaluation and development of existing programmes could improve their effectiveness.

• Given the diversity of types, motivations and perpetrators of antisemitism, the narrow focus on Muslims is unwarranted.

Practice
• In debates on migration, Islam and antisemitism it is important to distinguish between refugees, immigrants, citizens with a migration background, Muslims and non-Western immigrants.

• The fear, insecurity and anguish felt by both Jews and Muslims (as well as other disadvantaged groups) should be taken seriously and dealt with in a way that stimulates solidarity, not victimhood or competition.

• In order to counter images and discourses of Muslim-Jewish animosity, activities such as meetings, dialogue and educational projects should be initiated, continued and highlighted not as exceptions but as the norm. Studies of how such projects work in practice, rather than in theory, would help improve such approaches.

• Experts argue that education around antisemitism should not focus on the Shoah, but instead on the history and present-day lives of Jews.

Research
• Given that we cannot assume that refugees espouse the ideology of the sending country it would be interesting to examine how Syrian refugees reflect on their attitudes to citizenship and diversity, the way these have been influenced by Syrian official ideology, and how these attitudes change in their respective new home countries.
Introduction

Here we summarize some of the most salient features of the Dutch context.

- In 2014, the number of ‘non-Western immigrants’, and the net immigration, changed as numbers of refugees from the Middle East and Eritrea started to rise, due to civil war, persecution and repression in these regions. The numbers have decreased since 2016.

- In the Netherlands, the issues of immigration, diversity and Islam are fiercely debated, often in a way that reinforces polarization between those who support and those who oppose immigration, diversity, pluralism, and anti-discrimination (Huijnk et al. 2015; Pew Research Centre 2016, 13). In this context, people both with and without a migration background feel increasingly at a disadvantage, resulting in, for example, the emergence of a pro-immigrant party Denk (Think) and the rise of populist, anti-immigration parties such as the PVV (Freedom Party), VNL (For the Netherlands) and FvD (Forum for Democracy). The problematization of immigration, Islam and Muslims by populist parties has partly been taken over by mainstream parties.

- Antisemitic incidents and debates about antisemitism have been in evidence more or less constantly since 2000. Reports on antisemitic incidents since 2010 show fluctuations in the numbers and the nature of incidents, with peaks in 2012 and 2014 coinciding with Israeli military operations in Gaza.


- The fear that new immigrants may carry antisemitism to the Netherlands has been voiced by representatives of Jewish organizations, by politicians from the orthodox Christian party SGP (Reformed Political Party) and by politicians of the extreme right-wing PVV and VNL. Among those Jewish individuals and representatives who have voiced such concerns are Rabbi Binyomin Jacobs, journalist Max van Weezel, Esther Voet, editor in chief of the Jewish weekly Nieuw Israëliitisch Weekblad, and the chairman of the Central Jewish Council, Ron van der Wieken. Dutch politicians, such as the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Lodewijk Asscher and the European Union (EU) commissioner Frans Timmermans, have expressed concern over antisemitism but have been reluctant to confirm the assumption that refugees bring antisemitism to the Netherlands (Knoop 2015; Voet 2015).

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3 See the statements of rabbi Jacobs and Van Weezel in the television programme De kanarie in de kolennij (The canary in the coal mine) made by the Evangelical Broadcasting Organization (EO), 4 December 2016; ‘Een steen voor hen zonder graf’, Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant, 22 February 2016; Press statement issued by the Central Jewish Council “Centraal Joods Overleg roept regering op tot ruimhartig beleid vluchtelingen”. Amsterdam, 8 September 2015.
Methodology

This study is based on a survey of existing quantitative and qualitative evidence, and on new qualitative research examining the experiences and opinions of a range of actors. The data collection took place between October 2016 and April 2017. Existing quantitative data on migration and integration in the Netherlands was examined, focusing on that which related to migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In addition, official publications and policy documents from public agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were reviewed for data on antisemitism. An examination of this quantitative data produced an overview of recent developments and policies in the field of immigration, the position of refugees and immigrants and their children and antisemitism and other forms of discrimination and hate speech. The majority of these reports were produced by government institutions or were commissioned by the government. While they contain a wealth of data, they hold no statistics on antisemitism in relation to refugees.

Qualitative data on antisemitism which relates to MENA refugees and migrants was compiled through searches across national print media, government document collections and the Internet, covering the period 2010–2016. The data collected shows which actors have identified antisemitism among refugees from the MENA region as an issue. The media study was used to identify incidents, debates and actors for further investigation. In particular, it pointed to Jews who had made public statements about refugees as carriers of antisemitism and contacts between Jews and refugees.

New empirical data was gathered in interviews and through correspondence with a number of people. The interviewees belonged to the following categories: public authorities, civil society agencies, Jewish organizations and individuals, refugee organizations and academics. Individuals to be interviewed were identified on the basis of the media scan, expert advice or advice from other contacts, or as representatives of specific organizations. People who provided useful information via telephone or e-mail, but were not interviewed, were included in the study as respondents. Further details on the methodology, the list of interviewees, respondents and topics discussed are included in the Appendix.

Two aspects of the research methodology and data collection warrant attention. First, the predominance of Jews among the interviewees and respondents compared with representatives of other civil society organizations, especially refugee organizations. Jewish interviewees able and willing to speak on the issue were more readily found and contacted. They were aware of antisemitism in its different shades and forms, and those who had been in contact with refugees could report first-hand about such contacts. Moreover, they represented a variety of identities within Dutch Jewry and presented diverse opinions on antisemitism.

Another important methodological issue concerns the question of what can be concluded from the absence of data, in this case reports on antisemitic incidents involving refugees. The fact that in the course of this study only single cases were found, and that none of the institutions, Jewish or otherwise, knew of any incidents confirms that there is no emerging trend or pattern placing refugees as perpetrators or carriers of antisemitism.
Definitions

MENA
This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. These three countries are included because of their profile either in the migration/refugee statistics or in current public debates in some European countries. We have taken the widest possible definition of MENA migrants in order not to miss any causal relationships that could be overlooked using more restrictive delineations. The full list of countries included in this study is as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank & Gaza, Western Sahara Territory, Yemen.

Migrants and migration
In this report we use the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘migration’ in a broad sense, meaning people born abroad who settled for short or longer periods in the Netherlands. This is a diverse category, ranging from German students to Mongolian refugees, and from Malaysian software specialists to Romanian labour migrants. Within this broad category, one can distinguish between people who move primarily to work elsewhere and those whose primary reason for migrating is (a reasonable fear of) persecution, subsumed under the heading of asylum seeker or refugee. Thirdly we can distinguish groups of (post) colonial migrants, from (former) Dutch colonial possessions in the West (Suriname and the Dutch Antilles) and the East (Indonesia). Within the first group of labour migrants, we can distinguish between those with an official permission to take up employment (because they come from a European Union (EU) member state, or because they have an official clearance), and those from outside the EU who were not granted a visa and who entered the Netherlands unofficially, hoping to find a job in the informal economy. The latter are often categorized as ‘illegals’, but many scholars prefer the less stigmatizing and more concrete term ‘irregular migrants’ or ‘undocumented’ (because many of them have disposed of their identity papers in order to prevent deportation to their country of origin).

In public and political debate on migration and migrants, these terms tend to be defined in a very narrow way: migrants are conceived as newcomers who for various reasons are seen as a problem for the receiving society, either for economic and financial reasons, because they cost society more than they contribute, or for cultural reasons, because they are assumed not to subscribe to, or to be strongly opposed to, the ‘core values’ of Dutch society. Often these two arguments overlap. As a result, the discussion on migration is very skewed and myopic and thereby easily leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy, which explains why the terms immigration and migrants are viewed so negatively in the public domain.
The terms ‘Autochtonen’ and ‘Allochtonen’

The widely shared negative opinion on immigration is mirrored in the discussion on immigrant integration, which has, until very recently, been dominated by the juxtaposition of *autochtonen* (native origin) and *allochtonen* (foreign origin). The latter category denotes people with at least one foreign-born parent. Again, the discussion (and policy) is only concentrated on those people who are thought to constitute a problem, further boiled down to the category of ‘non-Western allochthones’. In practice this refers to former guest workers from Morocco and Turkey and their descendants, colonial migrants from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, and thirdly a varied group of refugees and low-skilled labour migrants from the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. In order to measure the integration process, policy makers, research institutes (such as the Netherlands Institute for Social Research, SCP) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS) distinguish between the first, second and sometimes the third generation, particularly among those groups who are thought to lag behind socio-economically and culturally. Special attention is given to people from (predominantly) Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Turkey, Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia. Interesting enough, Japanese migrants and those from the former Dutch East Indies/Indonesians are not categorized as non-Western, because they are assumed to have modernized and thus ‘reached’ Western standards.
1 Historical Context

Immigration and Antisemitism
Pre-2011
1.1 Immigration pre-2011

In the postwar period the Netherlands has always been a country of immigration. This started with a large influx of (some 300,000) postcolonial migrants from the former East Indies (Indonesia) in the period 1946–1964, followed by similar numbers from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles (especially around Suriname’s independence in 1975). Secondly, there has always been immigration from European countries and North America, which at first constituted the bulk of the total immigration, and since 2005 still accounts for around 50%. Only with the recruitment of ‘guest workers’ from Morocco and Turkey in the 1960s did the number of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region slowly increase. With the family reunification process at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s these two groups quickly increased to some 385,000 (Morocco) and 397,000 (Turkey) in 2016, half of them foreign born, the rest their descendants (born in the Netherlands). Together they make up some 4.5% of the total Dutch population today.

If we concentrate on those migrants, defined as ‘non-Western’ by Statistics Netherlands (CBS, Statline) from 1996 onwards, we can conclude that this category, consisting predominantly of people from Asia and Africa, and the majority of them of Muslim faith, has increased since 1996 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Immigration and emigration of ‘non-Western’ migrants in the Netherlands, 1996–2015

However, in the years 2003–2007, when many politicians continuously warned against the threat of ‘mass migration’, more people left the Netherlands (among whom many former immigrants) than entered the country, as Figure 2 shows:
The increase in the number of migrants from the MENA region was predominantly caused by a surge of refugees in the 1990s from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan) and again from 2011 onwards (Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan). Migrants from North Africa (most of them from Morocco) are numerically much less important and their migration balance has been around 5,000 between 1996 and 2003, decreasing to around 2,000 per year. Since 2013 there has been a slight increase, but net immigration remains at a very low level of around 4,000 per year (figures derived from CBS).

### 1.2 Antisemitism pre-2011

Antisemitism has never had broad popular support in the Netherlands, but it has been present both before and after World War II. The moral taboo on antisemitism has been widely supported; few people would openly claim they hate Jews and reactions to known violations have often been fierce. Antisemitic incidents through the years show a wave-like pattern, with peaks straight after the war, around 1960, in the 1980s and around 2000.

Since 1945, antisemitism in the Netherlands has been expressed in relation to two issues, the Holocaust and the State of Israel; both are used against Jews, and it is often the case that the themes of Jews, Holocaust and Israel are intertwined (Ensel and Gans 2016). Ever since World War II, and increasingly since the emergence of a Holocaust memory, resentment at Jewish victimhood has expressed itself in the form of secondary antisemitism. In addition, broad support for the State of Israel in the 1960s and 1970s has shifted to a much more critical attitude in the 21st century. Since 1948, in a number of cases, criticism of Israel has slipped into antisemitic stereotypes and themes, for example in reactions to the Israeli invasion in Lebanon in 1982 and the Second Intifada in 1987/1988 (Ensel and Gans 2016).

A change in the scale, intensity and sources of antisemitism occurred in autumn 1999 with the outbreak of the Second Intifada (Figure 3). As elsewhere in Western Europe, protests against Israel resulted in a peak in antisemitic incidents. In this so-called ‘new antisemitism’ anti-Jewish hostility was expressed as protest against
Historical Context

Israeli military operations. Not only was there a marked increase in the number of antisemitic incidents, but these were also more open and vehement. Moreover, antisemitism extended to a new social group: young Dutch people with a Muslim (Moroccan, Turkish or other migrant) background. Moroccan-Dutch youths in particular – mostly male – were found harassing, threatening and attacking Jews on the street (Ensel 2014; Ensel and Gans 2016).

This trend continued in the years after 2000: military operations by the Israeli State set off waves of antisemitic incidents in 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2010 (Figure 3). These incidents included verbal abuse but also incidents of violence, especially threats, graffiti and vandalism.

Figure 3: Recorded antisemitic incidents in the Netherlands, 1995–2016

In the years after 2000 two additional areas – education and commemoration – became the focus of contention, at least in Amsterdam. Youths from migrant families showed their discontent during Holocaust education programmes and during memorial ceremonies for the victims of World War II on 4 May. These manifestations of antisemitism were closely related to the identification processes of Dutch youngsters with a migration background. In the context of a fierce debate on Islam and immigration, Dutch citizens, especially Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish youths of the so-called second and third generations were identified and identified themselves as Muslim (Ensel 2014: chapters 6–8, pp. 177–270; Ensel and Gans 2016: pp. 377–413).

The development of the Internet and social media since the 1990s has greatly increased the opportunities to broadcast discriminatory content and hate speech, including antisemitism. In the past antisemitic content could be found on various websites, including far-right forums and websites for youths with Moroccan, Turkish or Muslim backgrounds. Since the early 2000s webmasters have introduced moderation systems to remove insulting contributions, resulting in a decrease in antisemitic content on websites. Most antisemitic and racist content is now found on social media, in online discussions, especially on Facebook, and in readers’ comment sections on news sites, for example, reactions to news reports about events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; many of these can be considered ‘mainstream’ websites. Some online antisemitism can also be found on websites specifically set up to publish antisemitic content (Tierolf, van Kapel and Hermens 2016, 41).
Since 2000 consecutive antisemitic incidents have contributed to a recurrent public debate about antisemitism, making antisemitism a serious concern for many Jews in the Netherlands. Antisemitism, especially when related to Muslims and/or immigrants, has been a topic of high priority for several political parties. At the same time, antisemitism in the Netherlands has shown a variety of forms, social settings, perpetrators and motivations. Antisemitic attitudes have been held by Catholic and Protestant circles, leftist sympathizers with the Palestinian cause, the extreme right and soccer fans. Both in schools and in confrontation with authorities such as the police, ‘Jew’ is used as a swear word (Ensel and Gans 2016). Although Catholic and Protestant antisemitism is often seen as something of the past, orthodox Protestant children’s books about Jewish conversion have been republished and include antisemitic stereotypes. It is telling that this did not elicit a significant outcry (Sanders 2017).

1.3 Historical context pre-2011: summary

1.3.1 MENA migration

- The number of migrants from the MENA region has been growing since the 1970s. This migrant population consists mainly of labour migrants from Morocco and Turkey and their descendants (in total some 800,000 people), and smaller refugee groups from the Middle East and Somalia (accounting for some 250,000 people).

1.3.2 Antisemitism

The Second Intifada in 1999/2000 was a turning point for patterns of antisemitism in the Netherlands: it marked an increase in the scale and vehemence of antisemitic activity in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and led to the involvement of Moroccan-Dutch youth and other Dutch citizens with Muslim backgrounds.

- Between 2000 and 2011 there were fluctuations in the scale and intensity of antisemitism related to military operations by the Israeli State, with peaks in 1999/2000, 2002, 2006 and 2009.

- Consecutive peaks in antisemitic incidents contributed to recurrent concern and public debate about antisemitism.
2 Current Demographics
The Dutch population in 2016 totalled almost 17 million people, of whom almost 2 million were born abroad (Table 1).

### 2.1 Migrants

**Table 1: The Dutch population in 2016, according to origin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Second and subsequent generations of migrants</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native population*</td>
<td>13,300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born abroad</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>814,000</td>
<td>788,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas (including Suriname)</td>
<td>353,000</td>
<td>307,000</td>
<td>660,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (including former Dutch East Indies)</td>
<td>425,000</td>
<td>401,000</td>
<td>826,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>641,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total immigrants and their children</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

* Those with grandparents born in the Netherlands.

If we present the data in a pie chart, we get the following overview (Figure 4):

**Figure 4: Overview of the Dutch population in 2016 according to origin**

Figure 4, which again makes a distinction between migrants (foreign born) and their children (descendants), shows that notwithstanding considerable immigration since World War II, the large majority of the population is still of indigenous origin, be it that if we go back further in time many of them have German and Scandinavian roots (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011). The number of migrants from the Americas is relatively large, due to the immigration of some 200,000 postcolonial migrants from Suriname and another 150,000 from the Dutch Antilles in the 1970s and 1980s. As for African migrants, the bulk originate from Morocco, due to the recruitment of guest workers from 1960 onwards.
For Asia we see a combination of these two developments: some 300,000 migrants from the former Dutch East Indies and almost 400,000 former guest workers from Turkey.

2.2 The MENA region

The largest numbers of predominantly Muslim immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are those from Morocco (385,000) and Turkey (397,000), half of them foreign born, the rest their descendants. Together they make up some 4.5% of the total population. Other relatively large groups from countries with a predominantly Muslim population are Somalis, Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans and Syrians (see Table 2 below). In total, the number of Muslims in the Netherlands is estimated to be around 1 million, constituting 5–6% of the total population, although there are big differences in the type of Islam espoused and the degree of observance.

Table 2: Number of settled immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands from countries with a predominant Muslim population in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>First generation</th>
<th>Second generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>385,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>207,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>397,000</td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td>217,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>39,500</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS

2.3 Religion

- The Netherlands went through a fast and rather radical process of deconfessionalization in the 1960s and 1970s, and today only half the population feels attached to a religious group (Schmeets 2014). Some 26% of the population declares itself Catholic, 16% Protestant, 5% Muslim and 6% belongs to other types of denomination, including Jewish (0.1%), Hindu (0.6%) and Buddhist (0.4%). Immigrants with colonial links are almost all Protestant or Catholic and only a very small percentage are of Jewish, Hindu or Muslim faiths. It is a different situation among the guest workers and refugees from the MENA region, who are predominantly Muslim, and among whom there are large variations in observance and practice. Only 8% of the 1 million Muslims in the Netherlands are attracted by the orthodox and conservative influence of Islamist Salafist sects (Roex, Van Stiphout and Tillie 2010).
2.4 Summary of findings

• Since the 1960s the Netherlands has become a multicultural society with considerable numbers of migrants from both colonies (East and West), Turkey and Morocco (former guest workers) and various refugee groups (Middle East and the Horn of Africa).

• These migrants brought their religion (Islam and Hinduism) to the Netherlands, and in this period the country went through a fundamental deconsecionalization and secularization process.
3 Immigration
Since 2011
From 2008 onwards the migration balance has been positive, adding moderately to the stock of non-Western migrants. The number and balance of non-Western immigrants changed significantly in 2014 when the numbers of refugees from the Middle East and Eritrea started to rise. Among migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since 2011, the predominance of Syrians immediately strikes the eye (Figure 5).

**Figure 5: Yearly immigration from the MENA region, 2011–2016**

![Bar chart showing yearly immigration from the MENA region, 2011–2016](image)

Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

These immigration flows led to the stocks (those present at a given moment) illustrated in Figure 6 for the four main Middle East groups (2011–2016). North Africa has been omitted because the very large stock of Moroccan-born distorts the overview. Moreover, the stock of North Africans (with the exception of Morocco) - some 4,000 Algerians and 12,000 Egyptians - remained stable over the last five years, with around 200,000 native born.

**Figure 6: The size of the population born in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria in the Netherlands, 2011–2016**

![Bar chart showing the size of the population born in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria in the Netherlands, 2011–2016](image)

Source: CBS
As for sex and age, in 2011 most migrants were young males between the ages of 20 and 30. Since then the gender ratio has become more balanced, due to reunification with family members for those who were granted asylum (see Table 3).

Table 3: Sex ratio of migrants from the Middle East in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Sex ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>17,620</td>
<td>15,410</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>22,985</td>
<td>17,846</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>15,857</td>
<td>13,582</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>22,533</td>
<td>15,965</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS

As Table 3 shows, the sex ratio in all four cases show a predominance of men over women and in this sense the migrants differ from most other immigrant groups who tend to have more balanced sex ratios. However, there is a significant difference between Syria and the rest. This is because this group arrived recently and has not yet reached its final composition: many men who were granted asylum are still waiting for their wives and children to join them. As for age, we are dealing primarily with a young population (Table 4).

Table 4: Age distribution of Syrians and Dutch (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Dutch population</th>
<th>Syrians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–10 years</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31–40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41–50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51–60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61–70</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71–80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS

The religious background of the MENA migrants is overwhelmingly Muslim, with a small minority of Christians. We know little about their religiosity but research on refugees from the Middle East who settled in the 1990s shows that some of them are not observant and do not visit mosques regularly. Their ideas on gender equality and democracy are quite similar to that of the average Dutch person (Dourleijn and Dagevos 2011; Van Houtum and Lucassen 2016; Lucassen 2018). Their educational background varies, but on average (with an exception for Somalians and Eritreans) it is higher than that of former guest workers from Turkey and Morocco who were selected for low or no skills. Most recent MENA migrants are asylum seekers from urban regions in the Middle East and tend to be much better educated than the Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s.
3.1 Summary of findings

- Since 2011 immigration from the Middle East (especially Syria) and Eritrea has increased considerably. The Syrian population, which numbered some 10,000 in 2010 grew to some 45,000 in 2017, whereas the Eritreans increased from 2,000 to 9,000. The numbers of Afghans and Iraqis have also risen, from 38,000 to 45,000 and 53,000 to 57,000 respectively.
Antisemitism
Since 2011
To investigate the empirical basis for the claim that recent refugees and immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East had an impact on antisemitic attitudes and behaviour requires, first, a review of existing quantitative and qualitative data and, second, the strategic generation of new empirical data.

### 4.1 Attitudes to Jews in society

There is no regular survey in the Netherlands of people’s perceptions of Jews, which makes observers dependent on incidental studies. The existing polls show that perceptions of Jews are relatively positive when compared with other European countries and with attitudes towards Muslims and Roma. The surveys indicate that Dutch respondents agree more easily with statements blaming Jews for policies of the Israeli state compared with ‘classic’ antisemitic stereotypes of Jews being responsible for the outbreak of wars or having control over the media.

A global investigation conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in August–September 2013 (n=500) and March 2015 (n=500) showed that, in the Netherlands, 5% of the population harboured antisemitic attitudes, against 11% in 2015 (when the average score in Western Europe was 24%). Indications of antisemitism were highest in response to the statements ‘Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the Netherlands’ (33% and 46% in 2013 and 2015 respectively) and ‘Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust’ (20% and 34%) (ADL 2014, 2015).

Similarly, in a survey of ten European countries conducted by the ADL in 2012, 85% of respondents in the Netherlands agreed with the statement that they would view Jews more negatively as a result of actions taken by the State of Israel; the highest score in the sample. They also scored relatively highly (56%) when asked whether ‘the violence directed against Jews in the Netherlands [was] a result of anti-Israel sentiment and not of anti-Jewish feelings’. 25% of Dutch respondents said that their opinion of Jews was influenced by the actions taken by the State of Israel against a European average of 28% (ADL 2012, 14–15).

The Europe-wide survey by the Bielefeld group indicates that so-called group-focused enmity is weak in the Netherlands when compared with France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal. Scores for three statements to measure antisemitism were relatively low: statements that Jews have too much influence in the country, that Jews try to take advantage of past persecution and that Jews only care for their own people. This changed with the statement ‘Considering Israel’s policy I can understand why people do not like Jews’, which elicited an approval rate of 41%, around the average, and the rate of agreement with the statement ‘Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians’ was close to that recorded in other countries (Zick 2011, 57).

The data gathered by the Eurobarometer survey indicates that the Dutch population, just like other European populations, would be most uncomfortable with a Roma colleague, followed by a Muslim colleague and would be least uncomfortable with a Jewish colleague at work (European Committee 2015, 33–5). Whereas the population in the Netherlands, as in the UK, would be relatively comfortable with a Jewish, Muslim or Roma colleague, it is less favourably disposed towards more people from those groups coming to live in the country (European Social Survey 2014). A similar picture arises from a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2016. While 35% and 37%
of the Dutch respondents said they had an unfavourable view of Roma and Muslims respectively, only 4% claimed to have an unfavourable view of Jews. In the Netherlands 61% of those surveyed said they believed that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country (Pew Research Centre 2016, 3, 9).

Two recent surveys on prejudices held by young people gives an insight into differences between youths of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. A study on antisemitism in secondary education commissioned by the Anne Frank House was conducted by Panteia and published in July 2013. For this study 937 teachers completed a survey about the number and nature of antisemitic events they had observed. According to their observations, pupils with an immigration background used antisemitic language more often in the context of the Middle East conflict, while those without did so in the context of soccer. While two-thirds of the pupils concerned (‘perpetrators’) were not of immigrant background, pupils of Moroccan (10%) and Turkish (8%) background were overrepresented in relation to the total pupil population (Wolf, Berger and De Ruig 2013, 31).

An online survey among young people commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment was conducted by the Anne Frank House and the Verwey-Jonker Institute in 2014–2015 (Van Wonderen and Wagenaar 2015). The survey completed by 2,350 respondents revealed that self-identifying Muslims had ‘some’ or ‘much’ understanding or sympathy for verbal (20%) and physical violence (12%) against Jews. Those who thought negatively about Jews claimed that this is mainly due to ‘Israel’ and ‘because of the great influence of Jews (such as in the media or in the financial world)’. The survey also showed that more youths with a Turkish background were negative about Dutch Jews than those with a Moroccan background (12% versus 9%), and that many more Muslim youths had negative attitudes towards Zionists (66%), than towards Jews (12%) (Table 5).

A follow-up survey explored the images Muslim youngsters had of ‘Zionists’. The respondents claimed to distinguish between Jews and Zionists; nevertheless, not only were their images of Zionists largely negative, these also showed antisemitic characteristics such as striving for power, hiding true intentions and wielding influence behind the scenes (Van Wonderen, Wagenaar and Stremmelaar 2015). A survey of Turkish-Dutch Muslims of various ages confirms the existence of negative attitudes towards Jews among them. Respondents gave Christians and Hindustanis a score around the neutral midpoint of the scale, while mean scores for Jews and non-believers were clearly negative, with around one-third of the participants choosing the most negative score, of zero degrees (Verkuyten 2007).

Table 5: Survey questions about Jews, Israel and Zionists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How do you think about... (% not so positive)</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Other religions</th>
<th>Non-believers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews in the Netherlands</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews in Israel</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State of Israel</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionists</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 2,224</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1,214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Van Wonderen and Wagenaar (2015)
4.2 Jews’ perceptions of antisemitism

There is no recent survey of Jewish perceptions of antisemitism: an attempt to gather data for a report on experiences of discrimination published in 2014 failed to bring together a representative sample of Dutch Jews (Andriessen, Fernee and Wittebrood 2014, 118). Surveys of Dutch Jews conducted in 1999 and 2009 showed that a large majority of respondents believed that antisemitism exists in the Netherlands (75% and 84% in 1999 and 2009 respectively). The percentage considering antisemitism a significant presence increased from 7% in 1999 to 19% in 2009, although there may have been a connection to widely publicized antisemitic incidents during the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip.

Whereas in 2009 the percentage of respondents reporting to have experienced antisemitism in the past ten years decreased to 22% from 28% in 1999, some 50% reported feelings of increased vulnerability over the past ten years. The discrepancy between the percentage of respondents who consider antisemitism to be present and those who have experienced it themselves is observed regularly in this type of research (Van Solinge and de Vries 2001; Van Solinge and Van Praag 2010).

Jewish concerns about antisemitism have probably increased since 2009 due to a number of factors: peaks in antisemitic incidents in 2012 and 2014; the rise of jihadist activists in Western Europe; the anti-Jewish terrorist attacks in Europe since 2012; and the arrival of large numbers of refugees from the Middle East since 2014. A survey completed by 814 readers of the Jewish weekly Nieuw Israëlitisch Weekblad in the days leading up to the March 2017 elections highlights concerns about issues of security and antisemitism: 48% said they were afraid of becoming a victim of physical violence related to antisemitism, while 30% were not afraid (de Jager and Waterman, 2017).

Concerns about the threat emanating from international terrorism have also been voiced by BLEW, the advisory body protecting the Jewish community in the Netherlands (Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn). BLEW has been in existence since 1983, but it was only in 2014 that it started issuing reports on terrorism as a threat to the Jewish community. In these reports it has called the situation ‘critical’ and demanded increased security measures for Jewish institutions (BLEW 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). The aim was not only to convince the government that the threat to Jewish targets was serious, but also to secure financial support for security measures, which are a financial burden. In 2014, after years of back-and-forth requests, parliamentary questions and motions, the central government and the municipality of Amsterdam decided to contribute financially to security measures for Jewish institutions.4

There is no clear evidence that rising concerns about antisemitism have led Dutch Jews to emigrate. Emigration from and immigration to Israel is a modest phenomenon, and as Figures 7 and 8 show there are no signs that Dutch Jews are en masse choosing to leave the country to live in Israel. The trend is rather the reverse over the last 20 years, except for the years 2011–2012.

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4 Parliamentary papers 29 754, nr. 268, 10 October 2014.
Figure 7: Immigration from and emigration to Israel, 1995–2016

Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

When we look only at those immigrants and emigrants who are born in the Netherlands, emigration tends to trump immigration, but the numbers are quite small, annually around 0.5% of all Dutch Jews, whereas the positive annual migration balance since 2002 is barely 0.1%.

Figure 8: Immigration from and emigration to Israel, 1995–2016
(only Dutch born)

Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

4.3 Antisemitic incidents

Instances of discrimination are recorded by several institutions: anti-discrimination offices, the police, and the Public Prosecutor. For antisemitism there is additional reporting by the Israel Information and Documentation Centre (CIDI), an NGO representing the interests of Jews in the Netherlands and lobbying on behalf of Israel. The records of these institutions are used in comprehensive reports on discrimination. None of these reports contain any reference to antisemitism among refugees, with one exception mentioned below.
Analysis of the number of antisemitic incidents reported over the period 2010–2016 shows a relatively small peak in 2012 and a large peak in 2014, coinciding with Israeli military operations in Gaza.

**Figure 9: Antisemitic incidents recorded in the Netherlands, 2010–2016**

To assess the types of incident, perpetrator and motivation it is helpful to look at data on antisemitism in the various reports over 2015. CIDI reported 126 antisemitic incidents, in the following categories: verbal abuse (24), destruction and graffiti (20), education (16), e-mails (12), neighbours (12), sport (10), letters (9), work (8) and threat (5) (Muller 2016, 11).

In the case of antisemitic incidents reported at anti-discrimination offices the majority of cases (77/104) concern the category ‘hostility’. This category includes harassment at the workplace, bullying at school, verbal or written statements and graffiti. Significant smaller categories are ‘contested treatment’ (11), destruction (3), violence (2) and threat (2). The latter includes both oral and written expressions of threat directed against persons or objects; destruction also includes arson and desecration. The social domains in which antisemitic incidents took place varied: public space (33), neighbourhood (18), media (14) and education (10) (Dinsbach et al. 2016, 18, 23).

The police recorded 57 antisemitic incidents in 2015, of which 37 were directed against individuals, ten against goods, and ten had no specific target. Of the 37 incidents targeting individuals 18 were insults, 12 threats, and 5 were assault. In just over half of these, antisemitic intent seems to have led to the incident. In many of the remaining cases antisemitism was expressed as part of an unrelated confrontation that escalated. A number of other cases had a ‘political background’ – the term used for those that were connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The category of incidents against goods included graffiti and destruction of (supposed) Jewish targets, such as a Jewish cemetery and war memorials. The category without specific target consisted of provocative exclamations and gestures, for example in front of a Jewish building or during a ceremony commemorating World War II (Tierolf, van Kapel and Hermens 2016, 19–23).
A report on the police records of 2014 analysed different types of antisemitic violence and perpetrators. Of 76 cases of antisemitic violence against an (alleged) Jewish person or object, 52 incidents were linked to antisemitic intentions, meaning that the Jewish background of the target was the direct reason for the incident. This is different from racist violence which is more often expressed in the course of another incident: for example a racist slur made in the course of a traffic quarrel. In 14 out of 76 cases antisemitism was part of the escalation of another incident, such as a quarrel between neighbours or between (ex) partners; in this category no clear characteristics of perpetrators emerge. Ten out of the 76 incidents were directly related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and more specifically to pro-Israel remarks (Tierolf et al. 2015a, 65–72).

The identity of many perpetrators of antisemitism remains unknown and there is no systematic reporting on the background of perpetrators. Where there is data the numbers are so low that it is hard to say anything conclusive on perpetrators’ identity and motivation. According to the report on the police records of 2014, 36 incidents with antisemitic intentions against unknown (supposed) Jews were committed primarily by a group. Tierolf does not give characteristics for these perpetrators; however, these incidents resemble the ‘stereotypical confrontations between young Moroccan-Dutch men and individual Jews’ as noted by Ensel (2014, chapter 8). Incidents against Jews known to the perpetrator seem to be primarily committed by confused perpetrators. In the incidents where antisemitism was expressed in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, perpetrators were of North African, Turkish or Arab background (Tierolf et al. 2015a, 69–70). Reports by the Public Prosecution and CIDI contain references to antisemitism perpetrated by extreme right-wing activists or citizens with a Moroccan or Turkish background. Moroccan-Dutch, seem over-represented when the reported ethnic background of perpetrators is reviewed (LECD 2016, 26; Muller 2016).

4.3.1 Extreme right-wing activism

Extreme right-wing organizations in the Netherlands have long been marginal. They are small, numbering a few hundred supporters in total, but have been growing in response to the arrival and settlement of refugees in the country. They consist partly of small local initiatives, which are not organized centrally. In recent years, extreme right-wing groups and individuals have shifted their attention away from Jews as targets to Islam and Muslims, asylum seekers and ideological opponents (Tierolf et al. 2015a, 39–45; Wagenaar 2017). Nevertheless, racist and antisemitic ideas live on among supporters, and are occasionally expressed in public (G.02).

Some extreme right-wing activists have tried to emulate the success of the alt-right movement in the United States. A xenophobic nationalist group, Erkenbrand, has emerged which is striking in the explicitness and openness of its racist and antisemitic ideas about the demographic decline of the white race (Wagenaar 2017). The website altrechts.com was a classic extreme right-wing site, including worship of Hitler, holocaust denial and antisemitism; it was taken offline by the provider in May 2017 after several NGOs noticed lists of Jews and ‘enemies of the people’ on the site.5

A few examples of possibly antisemitic symbols and slogans used by extreme nationalist organizations in 2015 and 2016 were forwarded to the researcher by a respondent working for an NGO monitoring extreme right-wing activity (NG.22). In Amsterdam, during a demonstration against refugees organized by the neo-Nazi Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volks-Unie) two demonstrators were arrested for displaying an antisemitic image (‘forbidden for noses’); a church in Wezep was despoiled with the words ‘Nee AZC’ (‘No asylum seekers’ centre’) and a star of David; during a protest of citizens in Utrecht against an asylum seekers’ centre, antisemitic slogans were shouted at Alderman Diepeveen, originally from Amsterdam; and in Hulst, extreme right-wing stickers were found with a star of David and the words ‘Go to hell fucking Zionists’.

4.3.2 Discrimination against Muslims and refugees
The greatest single category of complaints and notifications received by antidiscrimination bureaus (over 40%) are about discrimination based on race, a category including colour, nationality, origin and ethnic background. Over the past few years discrimination against Muslims has been rising, and accounts for almost the entire category of discrimination on the basis of religion. From 2014 to 2015 the numbers of reported Islamophobic incidents increased. The number of Muslims who reported discrimination on account of their faith to the antidiscrimination offices increased from 165 in 2014 to 240 in 2015; and the number of reports of discrimination against Muslims on the internet almost doubled in 2015, up to 472. This development is associated with the terrorist attacks in Paris, and the increase in asylum seekers in the Netherlands (Dinsbach et al. 2016, 12-14). It is difficult to compare this data with previous years because the category of Islamophobia has only recently been created. In 2015, 439 Islamophobic incidents were registered with the police, more than doubling the numbers of 2014 (Van Bon and Mink 2016, 29, 68). If we look at incidents on the Internet, online racism and particularly online Muslim discrimination, increased in 2015 compared with 2014 (Tierolf, van Kapel and Hermens 2016, 37).

Of the discrimination incidents dealt with by the Public Prosecutor in 2015, 50% concerned race. Looking at the breakdown by specific group, antisemitism is the largest category at 28%, followed by anti-black discrimination at 17% and discrimination against Muslims 13%. Discrimination due to homosexual orientation accounted for 6% of incidents. The large proportion of antisemitic cases among those that were prosecuted also says something about the cases that the Public Prosecutor expects to stand up in court: the majority of these charges are against soccer fans for shouting anti-Jewish slogans (LECD2015, 22; LECD 2016, 16; LECD 2017, 8).

6  ‘Meerdere arrestaties tijdens demonstratie NVU’, ATS, 12 March 2016. Available at: www.at5.nl/ artikelen/153706/liveblog_nvu-demonstratie_agenten_massaal_op_de Been.
Research in 2014 on Muslim discrimination in secondary education revealed that nearly two out of three teachers said they had witnessed incidents in class that they regarded as discriminatory against Muslims. More than half of the teachers (61%) stated that students made hostile comments towards or harassed Muslims. In secondary education discrimination against Muslims is more common than antisemitism (36%) or discrimination against Christians (30%), but less common than discrimination against homosexuals (77%) (Bouma and De Ruig 2015, 13). A study on antisemitism in secondary education also showed that young non-Muslims were much more Islamophobic than young Muslims were antisemitic (Van Wonderen and Wagenaar 2015, 29).

It is difficult to assess the discriminatory experiences of asylum seekers and refugees. In 2015, when the numbers of incoming refugees were rising fast, the question as to whether the Netherlands should take in refugees and how many set off a fierce public debate. There were numerous initiatives throughout the country to welcome and assist people, but also local protests against the arrival of asylum seekers, partly from (numerically small) extremist groups. In online discussions on social media, discriminatory or racist statements have been made, for example on Facebook pages created by residents of municipalities in opposition to the (possible) establishment of an asylum seeker centre.

Dutch antidiscrimination offices received notice of a few serious incidents; it is likely that underreporting among asylum seekers and refugees is high. A 2014 survey showed that the extent to which people feel welcome and at home varies considerably. In general, refugees find it difficult to acquire a place in society and experience unfriendly and hostile behaviour from their environment. There have also been incidents of verbal or physical violence directed at asylum seekers and refugees (Klaver et al. 2014, 36–7; Van Bon and Mink 2016, 31–2).

In a study on social media specifically used by refugees, respondents agreed that social media had not reduced discrimination and racism; on the contrary, it may have reinforced stereotypical images of refugees fleeing the war in Syria and other African countries, as well as giving negative impressions of Islam (Alencar 2017). A minority mentioned that social media might help Dutch people change their perceptions and conceptions about refugees. The majority of participants reported being connected to Facebook groups aimed at improving intercultural contact between Dutch natives and refugees, as well as other social media sites for the acquisition of language and cultural competences. Furthermore, social media was used before, during and after the migrants’ journey for obtaining information and for contacting family and friends (Dekker et al. 2016; Alencar 2017).
4.4 Summary of findings

• The number of recorded antisemitic incidents since 2010 shows fluctuations in relation to Israeli military operations, with a small peak in 2012 and a high peak in 2014.

• Most of the reported antisemitic incidents have concerned verbal or written antisemitic statements; graffiti, vandalism, arson and assault have been rare. The development of the Internet since the 1990s led to a new medium to communicate and spread antisemitic stereotypes and language, especially on web forums and social media sites.

• Existing government and civil society reports on antisemitism do not contain records of refugees or recent immigrants as perpetrators of antisemitic incidents nor as people with anti-Jewish attitudes.

• The majority of perpetrators of antisemitism do not belong to any single ethnic or religious minority; Moroccan-Dutch and to a lesser extent Turkish-Dutch are a notable presence among perpetrators.

• Extreme right-wing activism opposing immigration and immigrants generally has led to a few instances of antisemitism.
5 New Empirical Data
5.1 Perceptions of Jewish organizations and individuals

The interviews conducted for this study revealed a diversity of perceptions among Jews as to the scale and character of antisemitism in the Netherlands. Interviewees also held different views about the impact of refugees on patterns of antisemitism. A few Jewish organizations expressed concern; others do not see any significant change since 2011. In fact, interviewees did not so much disagree on the facts, as in their assessment of the situation. With one exception, none of the people contacted had heard or seen any report about antisemitic incidents in which asylum seekers or refugees were involved.

Some representatives expressed serious concern about antisemitism among refugees (NG.01, NG.03, NG.04). None of the interviewees wanted to use the word ‘fear’ for their own feelings, but many of them had noticed that other Jews were fearful, especially older and orthodox Jews (NG.02, NG.07). According to one interviewee the situation had clearly changed since 2010 or so, with increasing numbers of Jews being afraid (NG.01). Others stated that there had been no substantial change with respect to antisemitism (NG.02, NG.06).

For representatives of some Jewish communities, for example liberal Jewish communities in The Hague and Rotterdam, antisemitism among refugees was not an issue at all (NG.05, NG.17). Others assumed that refugees may have antisemitic ideas but found the fears for antisemitism unwarranted (NG.02, NG.06, NG.10). One respondent said he experienced more antisemitism from ‘native’ Dutch than from others, and that antisemitism was being used by politicians for an anti-Islamic agenda. (NG.10). Another stated that there would always be antisemitism, even without Muslims (‘one does not need Muslims for that’), and that it was blown out of proportion (NG.06). A rabbi stated that the biggest problem was the loud anti-Islam and anti-immigration voice in the Netherlands. The synagogue was visited regularly by groups of children of Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds, some of whom displayed a negative attitude, for example refusing to wear a kippah. Of course there were concerns, but there would always be ‘bad apples’ (NG.05).

A good illustration of diverse Jewish attitudes is the debate in October 2015 on the plans to open a centre for asylum seekers on the outskirts of Amsterdam in Buitenveldert, where the orthodox Jewish community is concentrated: ‘the only Jewish neighbourhood in the Netherlands’ (NG.04). Emotions ran high while vehement supporters and opponents of the plan debated in newspapers, on the Internet and on national television. Among the opponents was the Central Jewish Council (CJO). The plan created genuine fear in parts of the orthodox Jewish community (NG.07). In the end the refugee centre was established on the site. There are no known antisemitic incidents related to the centre; it was closed down in 2016 due to declining numbers of asylum requests. For one interviewee the episode illustrated that there was a lot of commotion beforehand, which died out when nothing out of the ordinary happened (NG.06).

Interviewees gave a number of grounds for concern about refugees arriving from the Middle East. First among these concerns was the high numbers of asylum seekers (NG.01, NG.03). It also seems that since the drop in arrivals in 2016, the issue has lost some of its urgency. One representative even declared that ‘things had turned out okay’ (NG.04).
A second concern among interviewees was that many immigrants came from the Middle East, especially Syria, but also Iraq, a region which they regard as thoroughly antisemitic. The conviction that the Middle East, especially Syria, is deeply antisemitic, especially its media and school curricula, was voiced by several interviewees. This view was based on international sources, such as Israeli media, MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) or NGOs, or on conversations with individual Syrian refugees (NG.01, NG.03, NG.04). While a rabbi denied that Islam was antisemitic per se (NG.01), two respondents saw the problem in Islamic beliefs, and the worldview of people from the Middle East, which engenders a lack of respect for women, non-believers and homosexuals (NG.03, NG.04). The fact that some atheist, Christian and homosexual asylum seekers had moved to separate shelters because of the intimidating practices of other refugees was mentioned as a case in point (NG.03).

Furthermore, respondents referred to the contribution made by earlier generations of immigrants to the rise of antisemitism since 2000. In particular they pointed to the involvement of Dutch citizens with a Muslim background in the antisemitic incidents in the summer of 2014 during Israeli military operations in Gaza. Here they referred to the labour migrants from Morocco and Turkey rather than the refugees of the 1990s. They stated that the refugees in the 1990s came in much smaller numbers (NG.01), but nevertheless, antisemitism could be found among them, or at least among Bosnians (NG.03). Interviewees foresaw that the refugees now settling in the Netherlands would become perpetrators of antisemitism in the years to come, as had happened with the so-called second-generation migrants from Morocco or Turkey.

The antisemitic protest repertoire of Moroccan – and Turkish-Dutch – protesters was worrying enough, but the radicalization of a number of Dutch Muslims was seen as particularly alarming to respondents. In the summer of 2014, Dutch Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) supporters with black flags held an anti-Israel demonstration and shouted ‘Death to the Jews’ in Arabic. The spectre of the protesters and their slogan understandably scared people, the more so because there was no immediate police interference (NG.01, NG.03). Fears of terrorist attacks on Jewish targets have increased since the series of attacks in Western Europe; respondents mentioned the concern that terrorists planning an attack may be present among incoming asylum seekers or that asylum seekers may radicalize after their arrival (NG.01).

The rise of ISIS in the Middle East has attracted radicalizing Muslims in the Netherlands, resulting in about 280 people joining ISIS or Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and Iraq. Security services have warned that attacks may be perpetrated by ISIS supporters who are either still in the Netherlands or have returned from the Middle East (AIVD 2014, 2017). Moreover, a study has shown that the state cannot possibly monitor all asylum seekers entering the Netherlands for radicalism and should manage unrealistic expectations in this matter (Van Wijk and Bolhuis 2017). Institutions and professionals dealing with either asylum seekers or young Muslims are confronted with the same difficulty: a lack of clear guidelines on how to identify radicalization and potential terrorists (Van Wijk and Bolhuis 2016; Van de Weert and Eijkman 2017). The denunciation of Jews is an example of intolerant and undemocratic attitudes present among Salafis and may be a sign of radicalization (AIVD and NCTV 2015; Kouwenhoven 2017). However, this topic receives little attention in reports about Salafism and jihadism in the Netherlands.
A final source of concern for respondents was the alleged lack of awareness among the government, government institutions and politicians (NG.01, NG.03). The lack of response to the protesters shouting ‘Death to the Jews’ in the summer of 2014 was mentioned as a prime example of a lax attitude. Other examples mentioned as proof of little political and social backing for Jews were decreasing support for religious freedom and the non-discrimination principle in favour of an emphasis on ‘free speech’ (NG.01, NG.03, NG.10).

5.2 Jewish asylum seekers

The number of Jewish asylum seekers is probably extremely small. Like other minorities they are in a vulnerable position and risk being harassed if their identity is revealed. There have been reports of maltreatment of Christians, atheists and gays in asylum seeker centres. The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) publishes a report on recorded incidents but it is impossible to determine from this whether discrimination or hate speech was involved. One Jewish interviewee knew of three Jewish asylum seekers, two from Syria and one from Iran. They were afraid of their identity being disclosed to other refugees and concealed it; one had been beaten up after being visited by a rabbi (NG.02). One other incident has been recorded by CIDI: in March 2015 the anti-discrimination office in Drenthe recorded an incident of an asylum seeker who felt discriminated against because of his Jewish faith. An Israeli flag he had put up on his door had provoked another asylum seeker, resulting in an exchange of blows (Muller 2016). None of the other respondents had heard of the presence of Jews in refugee centres; most of them assumed there would not be any.

5.3 Initiatives by Jewish individuals and organizations

Jewish respondents emphasized that they were (and as Jews should be for religious and historical reasons) of the opinion that refugees should be assisted and supported (NG.01, NG.04, NG.05). A rabbi had repeatedly called in the synagogue for society to accept foreigners and was aware of individual members who had been active in this way, but there had been no institutional initiatives in that community (NG.05). One respondent stated that there was a broad consensus on this issue among Jews, and none of the respondents said anything to the contrary. At the same time, the government should not be naive and should screen refugees before accepting them (NG.04).

Jews have been vocal in calling for and showing solidarity and support for refugees. However, the suggestion that Jews are overrepresented in such activities was greeted with scepticism by an interviewee, who pointed out support for anti-immigration policies among Jews (NG.06). Jewish interviewees have taken in refugees into their homes and knew of other Jews who had done so; their experiences were only positive (NG.06, NG.10). Other Jews have been volunteering in locations where refugees live and organized meetings with refugees (NG.02, NG.07, NG.12, see also Van Weezel 2017). Members of the Liberal Jewish community in Amsterdam have organized a few events for

10 See also a number of contributions on the Crescas and Jonet websites, for example ‘Wesly vangt vluchtelingen op in zijn hotels’ Jonet 13 September 2015. Available at: https://jonet.nl/wesly-vangt-vluchtelingen-op-in-zijn-hotels/; Baruch, Robbert, ‘Doe wat’. Jonet 8 July 2016. Available at: https://jonet.nl/doe-wat-column-robbert-baruch/.
and with refugees in a neighbouring refugee centre, and also visited the centre. Their experiences were largely positive, even though a few Syrian asylum seekers had preferred to stay in their rooms to avoid seeing the Jewish delegation. However, this refugee centre has now closed (NG.04, Van Hilst 2015). None of the respondents had experienced or heard from others of refugees showing animosity towards Jewish participants. A respondent who wears a kippah said he had met about 15 Syrian refugees, some of Palestinian background, who had all been polite in their communications with him (NG.18).

The people involved in these activities are often also involved in initiatives to bring together Jews, Muslims and others. In 2016, the Jewish–Muslim dialogue group Mo & Moos organized an event for Jewish residents of Buitenveldert and the inhabitants of the local refugee centre, together with a local group for Jewish-Muslim cooperation (NG.07). The aim was to counter fears and prejudices on both sides. The meeting was pleasant and uneventful. One organizer did not notice any antisemitic prejudices among the asylum seekers, but added that people who join such events do so because they want to. On the other hand, they observed that some of the (especially older) Jewish inhabitants of the quarter refused to go to the meeting, because they lacked the courage, will or strength to do so. For some of them the lack of security guards was an issue (NG.07).

Some Jewish respondents had been involved in different types of initiatives to acquaint refugees with Jews and to counter antisemitism. Several Jewish organizations contacted the COA separately to propose activities to acquaint asylum seekers and refugees with Jewish life and religious plurality in the Netherlands (NG.01, NG.03, NG.04). One initiative came from the the Council of Jews, Christians, and Muslims (OJCM). A Muslim representative of the OJCM explained that they had wanted to show how believers of different faiths live together in the Netherlands (NG.19). Respondents reported considerable hesitation on the part of the COA over cooperation with Jewish or generally religious organizations, out of a concern for security but also from a lack of understanding of the importance of religion to staff working in the refugee centres. Many of them come from an environment in which religion is seen as unimportant or even obsolete and have little affinity with religion and religious beliefs; hence these issues tend to be disregarded (NG.03, NG.19, Gelderblom 2016). The COA has organized its own courses for integration but respondents doubted whether there would be any attention to the issue of antisemitism (NG.04). At the beginning of 2016 the COA convened a working group on fundamental rights and in February 2017 the first pilot project started, which involved the cooperation of interreligious organizations including Jews.12

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5.4 Refugees’ perceptions of Jews, Israel and the Holocaust

Respondents who had been in contact with Syrian refugees report that these refugees have negative ideas about Jews and Israel. Stereotypical images cited are that of Israel striving for regional and global supremacy, and of Jews as powerful, conspiring and intrinsically bad people (NG.02, NG.07, NG.10). In some cases refugees explained that the idea of Jews being bad people was what they had learnt or heard. An individual Syrian refugee told a rabbi he had learnt that the Jews should be destroyed and routed (NG.01). One interviewee said that refugees were mostly surprised when he told them he was Jewish, because they did not understand how a Jew – of whom they had heard only bad things – could help them; their reactions were of surprise and incomprehension but not of aversion (NG.02).

An educator working in the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam had guided groups of Syrian refugees in the museum, some of whom visited following an initiative from a Syrian refugee association. He noticed no adverse reactions and very few signs of hostility, no more than average. If any stereotype stood out it was that of Jews having power and influence, but this was seen as something positive, as a sign that Jews were able to defend themselves (NG.08).

Two respondents were struck by the emotional attachment to Palestine expressed by Syrian refugees of Palestinian origin. Both were certain that they had heard no anti-Jewish statements or expressions of anti-Jewish hostility but statements criticizing Israeli policy, as a country occupying and bombarding Palestinian land and discriminating against Palestinians (NG.16, NG.20, NG.09). One refugee centre housed a number of stateless asylum seekers from Syria with a Palestinian background. As the respondent explained: ‘You find that the nationalism of them is still very much alive, while they were always born in Syria. Sometimes their parents were already born in Syria. Still they see Palestine as their homeland even though they had never been there.’ In conversations about religious minorities in Syria asylum seekers pointed out that Christians lived harmoniously with them before the war (NG.16).

5.5 Recommendations of interviewees

Interviewees’ recommendations centred on the integration of refugees into Dutch society, and education for refugees and other immigrants. They called for a policy that would facilitate the fast integration of refugees. Some interviewees were critical of the practice of moving asylum seekers several times from one refugee centre to another, making their introduction to local people and activities very difficult; moreover such centres are often located in the countryside (NG.02, NG.07, NG.09). In the past, policies on asylum seekers forbade them from engaging in activities such as studying, working or volunteering – benefits which were expected to attract more asylum seekers to the Netherlands and to make the removal of those who did not get approved status more difficult. Since the appearance of a report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) entitled ‘No time to lose’ such attitudes have changed (Engbersen et al. 2015).

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13 A similar experience has been retold by journalist Max van Weezel in ‘De kanarie in de kolenmijn’ (The canary in the coal mine) made by the Evangelical Broadcasting Organization (EO), 4 December 2016.

14 In the north of the Netherlands refugees have visited the Nazi transit camp Westerbork as part of the integration programme for immigrants (NG.13).
Respondents saw education as essential to facilitating socio-economic as well as cultural integration into society. They believe refugees should be instructed in the social norms and values of Dutch society, especially how democracy works, since the latter have a totally different view of politics and democracy (NG.01, NG.02, NG.03, NG.04, NG.09). One Syrian refugee found the focus on cultural norms concerning gender and homosexuality exaggerated and a sign of stereotypical thinking about Syria and Muslims. He emphasized the crucial importance of work and education (NG.09).

Some interviewees pointed out that earlier generations of immigrants (especially Moroccan and Turkish labour migrants) had not received any such education, and considered this a cause of problems and especially antisemitism among such groups (NG.01, NG.04). Some interviewees regretted the lack of awareness and a sense of urgency among authorities and institutions in this respect (NG.01, NG.03, NG.04).

5.6 Summary of findings

• Existing government and civil society reports on antisemitism do not contain evidence of refugees or recent immigrants as perpetrators of antisemitic incidents or as people with anti-Jewish attitudes.

• Jews in the Netherlands are divided over whether recent years have seen a change in antisemitic incidents.

• A number of representatives of Jewish communities in the Netherlands have expressed concern about the immigration of large numbers of people who may harbour antisemitic or jihadist opinions and intentions.

• Those who voice concern about antisemitism among refugees give a number of reasons for their apprehension:
  • The antisemitic terrorist attacks in Europe since 2012
  • The peak in antisemitic incidents in the summer of 2014 during Israeli military operations in Gaza
  • The activities of radical jihadis in the Netherlands and the rise of ISIS in the Middle East
  • The arrival of immigrants from the Middle East, especially Syria, among whom may be terrorists or antisemites, and the large numbers, although as argued above these numbers were not unprecedented
  • The fact that Dutch citizens with a Muslim background (so-called second-generation migrants from Morocco or Turkey) have been involved in antisemitic incidents
  • A perceived lack of awareness and action by authorities and politicians around the issues of antisemitism and the integration of immigrants into society.
  • The slowing down of the influx of refugees combined with the absence of any antisemitic incidents perpetrated by refugees has taken away some of the urgency surrounding this issue.
  • Jews are involved in a considerable number of initiatives and activities bringing refugees into contact with Jews.
New Empirical Data

• Interviews with a number of these individuals suggest that refugees from Syria do hold negative views about Israel and Jews, but that these views have not manifested themselves in openly hostile behaviour or prevented friendly contact between Syrian (or other) refugees and Jews.

• In centres for asylum seekers Jews (rare as they are) have become the target of harassment.

• Interviewees recommended that didactic efforts to counter antisemitism will be undertaken but as part of the larger framework of education on citizenship, democracy and human rights.

• Interviewees further recommended that in order to facilitate the integration of refugees into society they should not be moved around from centre to centre but stay in one place and start education and other activities as soon as possible.
6 Public Discourse
6.1 Public debate on immigration and Islam

Negative reactions to the influx of asylum seekers in the Netherlands can only be understood within the prevailing mood of ‘integration pessimism’ (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011, 2015). Since the beginning of this century immigration and integration policy have become more restrictive. As part of a growing nationalist discourse, integration policies became increasingly characterized by the expectation that migrants would assimilate one-sidedly into a static Dutch society. In January 2004, an extensive parliamentary report concluded that the integration of minorities had been at least partly successful. This is confirmed by yearly ‘integration monitors’ which have been issued by authoritative state institutions such as the SCP (Netherlands Institute for Social Research) since the 1990s. However, the idea that integration and the multicultural society had failed has been dominant and informs public debate and policies until this very day. As a consequence, the state no longer considers the integration of immigrants and their descendants its sole responsibility, and for the last decade it has stressed that migrants themselves are responsible for their societal position. Or, in the words of Prime Minister Rutte in spring 2015, migrants should start ‘making their own way instead of complaining about discrimination’. Dutch integration policy has moved from extensive government involvement in promoting integration to a strong emphasis on individual responsibility. Under the current system, refugees and newcomers are themselves responsible for finding integration courses and language tests (Klaver et al. 2014). The radicalization of a number of Dutch and European Muslims, terrorist attacks in Europe and the arrival of numerous refugees in Europe have further consolidated the central place of immigration and Islam in public debate. Antisemitism is primarily discussed in relation to these themes.

In this context, people both with and without a migration background feel increasingly at a disadvantage, resulting, for example, in the emergence of the pro-immigrant party Denk (Think) and the rise of Geert Wilders’ PVV (Freedom Party), as well as other anti-immigration parties. Among young people with a migration background (from the Antilles, Morocco, Suriname, and Turkey) there is a growing feeling of ‘not belonging’. This development has been strongest in the second generation, especially among those with Moroccan and Surinamese backgrounds. The percentage of people experiencing discrimination rose between 2006 and 2015, and the divide between people with and without a migration background seems to be widening as they have different perceptions of each other and of interethnic tension (Huijnk et al. 2015; Huijnk and Andriessen 2016).

The debate on immigration to the Netherlands began in the 1970s and was led by extreme right-wing movements, one of which, the Centrumpartij, attracted enough votes (0.8%) in 1982 to be represented with one seat in Parliament. Its main issue was mass migration, which it regarded as dangerous for demographic (overpopulation) and cultural (national identity) reasons. The immediate cause was the large-scale immigration from Suriname and the family reunification of former Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest workers’. These worries were shared on the extreme left by the Maoist Socialist Party (SP), which was very active locally and represented in Parliament since 1994.

During the 1980s, mainstream parties, confronted with the settlement of considerable numbers of migrants, more or less agreed not to make
immigration into an electoral issue. Moreover, the politically correct idea, that it was dangerous to be critical of immigration and minorities because this would lead to stigmatization and discrimination, was dominant. The memory of the Holocaust and persecutions during World War II played an especially significant role, supported by the Anne Frank House. At the same time a ‘minorities policy’ was established at the national level, predominantly aimed at creating equal opportunities and fighting social deprivation in the housing and labour market, and in education.

The first cracks in the broadly shared agreement not to make immigration and integration into an electoral theme appeared after the Rushdie Affair, when in spring 1989, even in the Netherlands, Muslims took to the streets demanding a ban on the Dutch translation of Satanic Verses. The leader of the Liberal Party (VVD), later Euro commissioner Frits Bolkestein, called for a critical discussion about the illiberal characteristics of Islam. At the same time, members of the reigning Labour Party (PvdA) asked for measures to limit immigration, especially from Turkey and Morocco, but also of asylum seekers, whose numbers soared in the 1990s. The evaporation of the (according to some ‘suffocating’) political correctness was further enhanced by the rising popularity of Pim Fortuyn, a former member of the PvdA, who started a widely read column in the right-wing weekly Elsevier. His critique of Islam (‘a backward religion’) and immigration was both heavily criticized and applauded. After 9/11, the discussion on integration once and for all became almost exclusively focused on Islam and Muslims, much more than in the United States, where terrorist attacks had recently taken place.

Apart from terrorism, the shift in discourse was also caused by social problems among the children of Turkish, Moroccan (and Antillian) migrants. Most of them had been chosen for low or no skills and were settled at a rather unfortunate moment, at the beginning of a protracted economic recession. That this would lead to all kinds of social and cultural frictions was unavoidable. Moroccan male youths in particular became the target of attention, and their unequivocal misbehaviour, in terms of criminality, dropping out of school and harassing Jews, gays and women, became a topic of constant media coverage and was increasingly linked to Islam. Although research shows that structural integration is making progress and that anti-social behaviour (including the harassment of Jews, gays and women) is highly correlated to educational attainment and much less to ethnicity, the focus on cultural determinants, especially religion, remains.

By the time Fortuyn was running for Parliament in early 2002 with his own List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) he had become the centre of media attention and of a highly polarized debate on the alleged ‘failed integration’ of immigrants, especially from Muslim countries. His assassination on 6 May by an environmental extremist came as a great shock and posthumously caused a landslide victory for the LPF. But the party soon fell victim to internal rows and infighting, and the political landscape and debate on integration fundamentally changed. Soon Geert Wilders, who left the VVD in September 2004, started his own PVV in 2006 and would become an important and influential factor in Dutch politics. His success was boosted by the assassination of Theo van Gogh, two months after Wilders’ decision in November 2004 to start his own anti-immigration and anti-Islam movement. The influence of Wilders and his PVV has been mostly indirect, by leading mainstream parties to adopt the way he defines and frames the problem of immigration and integration.
The populist right, as exemplified by the PVV, has adopted the issues of antisemitism, gender equality and homosexuality despite evidence that their followers have different attitudes to these issues. The charge of antisemitism has been politicized and abused by populist, anti-immigrant political parties such as the PVV. This is clear from the fact that the PVV protests against antisemitism generally, only when it comes from Muslims (Gans 2013/2014; Romeyn 2014).

Antisemitism is primarily discussed in connection to the themes of immigration, Islam, integration, the Holocaust and national values and norms; as such the debate is often emotional and polarized. Since 2000, the public and political debate about antisemitism has been dominated by the question, to what extent can antisemitism in the Netherlands be attributed to the presence of Muslims? Geert Wilders’ PVV in particular has repeatedly called attention to the presence of antisemitism among Muslims in order to demand a total ban on immigration from Muslim countries. It is no wonder that the arrival of large numbers of refugees from Syria and other Middle Eastern countries has also been discussed from this perspective. Asylum seekers have been seen primarily as dangerous Muslims who were unable or unwilling to integrate. They are distrusted because of the association with Islamist terrorist organization, the radicalization of a tiny minority of (second-generation) youngsters and the influence of Islamist Salafist sects.

Since the late 1990s the limits of what can be said and written, especially about immigrants and Islam, have been broadened. The first illustration of this trend was the filmmaker and writer Theo van Gogh, until his murder in 2004. It is interesting that his provocative utterances sometimes featured antisemitic slurs (including against specific Jews) (Gans 1994, 70–85). This development has primarily impacted on Muslims, but also on religious and ethnic minorities such as Jews.

Jewish organizations and individuals have expressed concern about what is perceived as dwindling support for religious, and especially Jewish, practices, beliefs and sensitivities. This has led to proposals to ban kosher and halal slaughter and male circumcision, and to change the first article of the Dutch Constitution containing the non-discrimination principle, in order to expand the freedom of speech. A legislative proposal to ban non-anaesthetized slaughter passed in Parliament on 28 June 2011, but was rejected in the Senate on 19 June 2012 (Wallet 2013; Vellenga 2015; Ensel and Gans 2016, 510–20; Van der Raaf 2016).

6.2 Summary of findings

- The issues of immigration and Islam are fiercely debated, and antisemitism is primarily discussed in connection to these themes.
- Public debate is characterized by polarization between a multicultural anti-racist pole and an anti-immigration and anti-Islam pole.
- The rise in the number of immigrants arriving in the Netherlands in 2014 has contributed to this focus, as have the rise of ISIS and terrorist attacks in Europe.
- The development of communication on social media has greatly increased the opportunities to disseminate discriminatory content and hate speech, including antisemitism, whereas these can rarely be found in the mainstream media.
7 Integration of Second and Subsequent Generations of MENA Migrants
In discussions of second- and third-generation migrants in Dutch society, the focus is generally on the children of Moroccan and Turkish descent, and furthermore those with roots in Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. To understand their integration process into Dutch society, we should realize that these postcolonial newcomers and the family reunification of the labour migrants coincided with the start of a long economic recession, following the oil price shock of the mid-1970s. The result was that many migrants, as well as native Dutch, lost their jobs in the late 1980s and unemployment rates reached dramatic heights, with more than half of the former guest workers unemployed, compared with some 10% of the total population. The reason for the high proportion of unemployed labour migrants was because they were selected for their low human capital and were employed in sectors (textile, shipbuilding, metallurgic industry) that closed their doors around 1980 and were moved to (East) Asia. The postcolonial migrants also suffered from the recession, but less than the Turks and Moroccans, because their human capital was on average higher, and because Dutch was their mother language.

That the integration process of both groups would take time and cause social and cultural problems should not surprise us, given the unfortunate timing of the settlement migration in combination with the negative economic selection of the guest workers. Given this unpropitious start, the outcome – measured by the position of their children, the ‘second generation’ – is much better than is often thought. About one-third of them (girls even more than boys) are doing much better than expected, given the very low socio-economic position of their parents, and have completed higher education. Another third performed as expected, meaning that they remained stuck at the lower ends of the labour market and are overrepresented in criminality and school dropouts. The final third finds itself somewhere in between.

The postcolonial group, especially the Surinamese (both the ‘Creoles’ who descended from African slaves and ‘Hindustanis’, who originate from Indian contract workers who arrived in the 1860s) are doing much better and have by now more or less caught up. Apart from ‘structural’ integration, pertaining to housing, work and education, what we call ‘identificational’ integration also shows some notable differences between labour migrants and postcolonial migrants. Whereas the (Christian) Creole Surinamese, despite their dark skin colour, mingle quite easily with the native white Dutch population, showing high intermarriage rates, this is much less so for groups with a non-native religion, such as Islam and Hinduism (for the Surinamese Hindustanis). Although the offspring of Moroccans and Hindustanis tend to have many native Dutch friends (more than Turks), their intermarriage rates are low, although slowly on the rise. This can be explained by a mix of ethno-religious preferences by these groups and social distance from the rest of Dutch society, which has widened in the last decades due to the anti-immigration climate and the successful problematization of Islam and Muslims by populist parties List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and the Freedom Party (PVV), whose discourse was partly taken over by mainstream parties (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011, 2015).

We are well informed about the integration of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region who settled in the Netherlands in the 1990s, Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans and Somalis. This is thanks to longitudinal research published
by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) in 2011 (Dourleijn and Dagevos 2011) and the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in 2015 (Engbersen et al. 2015). The conclusion is that it took a long time for people to find work, housing and a good education. This is explained by the deliberately long asylum procedures, and linked to this, the prohibition to work legally, as well as the lack of informal networks. Since 2012, however, labour force participation has increased considerably to an average of 55% (against 70% for the population at large). The only exception are refugees from Somalia who depend much more on social security. This is partly due to their low human capital, coming from a country where the educational system has been virtually non-existent for half a century.

In respect of education, is it interesting to see that most (Dutch born) children of refugees of Middle Eastern groups are doing quite well and some of them above the national average, which can be explained by the often high educational background of their parents. Regarding their identificational integration we see (again with an exception for the Somalis) that most of the former refugees from the 1990s, and largely Muslims, embrace the core values of Dutch society in its respect for the rule of law, democracy, freedom of speech and gender equality. This is the more remarkable given that the settlement period has been relatively short.

We can conclude that this fairly recent group of MENA migrants is on average doing (much) better than some groups of descendants of labour migrants from the MENA region (Moroccans and Turks) who came in the 1970s and 1980s. This is largely explained by the – on average – much higher human capital of the refugees arriving in the 1990s.

7.1 Summary of findings

• The integration of MENA migrants differs considerably.

• Former guest workers from Turkey and Morocco were selected on a low/no skills basis, arriving at the beginning of a long recession and thus have had a hard time integrating. Their children face a number of obstacles in Dutch society and compared with Dutch age cohorts are lagging behind in education and labour participation. Moreover they (especially boys) are overrepresented in crime statistics. Over time, however, they are catching up, especially in education, and given the low human capital of their parents and the unfortunate timing of the immigration, the situation overall is positive.

• For migrants from Turkey and Morocco Islam as a religion remains important, although there are also signs of secularization. Only 8% of the 1 million Muslims in the Netherlands are attracted by the orthodox and conservative influence of Islamist Salafist sects.

• The integration of MENA refugees from the 1990s had an unfortunate start, due to state policies that prevented them from entering the labour market. Nevertheless today, most of them (except Somalians) have found work and most of their children (especially Iranians) are performing well at school. Islam is important for only some of these refugees and orthodox leanings are an exception. Most of them subscribe to the core values of democracy, gender equality and free speech.
8 State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses
8.1 Government policies and programmes

Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution forbids discrimination ‘on the basis of religion, belief, political orientation, race, sex or whatever reason’. Article 1 is elaborated in various laws and regulations, most important of which are the General Equal Treatment Act and various articles in the Criminal Code. The General Equal Treatment Act rules that everyone must have equal job opportunities, good working conditions, a good education or a particular service or product. Articles 137c and d of the Criminal Code forbids making statements that are discriminatory or that encourage hate or discrimination. Antisemitic incidents do not constitute a separate ground for discrimination, but form part of discriminatory regulations based on origin or religion.

Policies to counter discrimination are the responsibility of several ministries, those of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations, Security and Justice, Social Affairs and Employment, Education, Culture and Science and Public Health, Welfare and Sport.

The Ministry of Security and Justice is responsible for the security of Jewish institutions and contributes financially; on this issue it cooperates with the municipalities and with Jewish organizations such as the Foundation for Life and Welfare (BLEW), Israel Information and Documentation Centre (CIDI) and the Central Jewish Council (CJO). It is also responsible for reporting to the police and for the prosecution of discrimination. The Ministry of Interior Affairs is the ministry primarily responsible for the prevention and registration of discrimination.

Since 2010 the government has launched several action plans to counter discrimination, most recently, in 2016, the ‘National Action Programme against Discrimination’. The government’s general anti-discrimination programme consists of measures aimed at prevention and awareness raising, strengthening institutions and stimulating local anti-discrimination policy. It also includes measures aimed at improving registration practices, for example by encouraging cooperation and setting up a joint knowledge programme. In addition to general anti-discrimination policies it proposes specific measures to counter, for example, antisemitism, Islamophobia, anti-black racism and online hate speech.15

Since 2010, the government has been making an effort to improve and streamline reporting on discrimination. Discrimination can be reported at local independent anti-discrimination agencies, at the police, at the Human Rights Council and (for Internet) at the Internet Discrimination Report Centre (MiND). Antisemitic incidents can also be reported to CIDI. In its efforts to improve and streamline registration practices the government has since 2010 commissioned studies into registrations of discrimination, in particular antisemitism and Islamophobia (Tierolf et al. 2013a, Tierolf et al. 2014, Tierolf et al. 2015b, Tierolf, van Kapel and Hermens 2016; Lachhab and Vorthoren 2016; Van Wonderen and Van Kapel 2017). In 2015 and 2016 antisemitism and Islamophobia were created as separate categories of discrimination in the registration systems of the police and the local anti-discrimination offices. In 2016, a comprehensive report was published bringing together data from different sources for the first time. This included data from the national police and anti-discrimination facilities, and from other

15 See the letter to parliament by Minister of Interior Affairs Ronald Plasterk dated 23 March 2017 on the programme against discrimination and the two appendices with general and specific measures to counter discrimination.
organizations recording discrimination, such as the Internet Discrimination Registration Centres, CIDP and the national Report Islamophobia centre (Dinsbach et al. 2016).

8.2 Countering antisemitism

As a cornerstone of anti-discrimination policies the government engages in conversations with various civil society organizations and individuals faced with or working on exclusion and discrimination. The aim is to seek out concrete ideas and solutions, stimulate cohesion and increase the visibility of existing initiatives. An example is given by the Ministry of Social Affairs which holds annual round tables about antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-black racism.

In addition to the general measures, including combatting online discrimination and promoting of citizenship education, the government has taken a number of steps to counter antisemitism specifically. Since 2016 these have focused on strengthening local organizations and leaders, promoting social cohesion, developing citizenship education and anti-hate speech campaigns in soccer. This is related to two recent studies which identified the Middle East conflict and soccer as important triggers for antisemitic expressions (Wolf, Berger and De Ruig 2013; Van Wonderen and Wagenaar 2015).

While facilitating civil society organizations and leading figures is part of the government’s general anti-discrimination policy, Jewish-Muslim dialogue has been a preferred instrument to counter antisemitism (G.01). Policy is aimed at supporting leading figures from Jewish and Muslim communities who engage in cooperation as role models. The government has ordered an inventory of projects and good practices in six municipalities to better understand the contribution of role models and leading figures from Jewish and Muslim communities in preventing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict impacting on community relations in the Netherlands, and to promote the exchange of local projects between cities (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit 2017). The government has initiated several meetings including a wide-ranging joint meeting in which various social institutions, municipalities, funds, initiatives, citizens and others actively engaged in dialogue have been discussing how their impact can be further strengthened. It has also awarded funds to several projects in the field of Muslim-Jewish dialogue, for example a project initiated by the Council of Jews, Christians, and Muslims (OJCM) aimed to strengthen interreligious dialogue. A signature project is a series of 27 activities bringing together Turkish and Jewish associations in the Netherlands to discuss antisemitism, Islamophobia and discrimination (G.01).

The government views education as an important means to counter racism and discrimination and to transmit fundamental democratic values. To counter antisemitism specifically, it highlights Holocaust education and citizenship education. World War II and the Holocaust are expected to form part of the citizenship education curriculum, as well as the curriculum for history education for both primary and secondary schools. However, it is not clear what their place in citizenship education will be, and how attention to the Holocaust will contribute to citizenship competencies (Bruijn 2015).

The government has instigated a study of difficulties encountered by teachers when discussing ‘controversial topics’ such as the Holocaust and antisemitism, but also Islamophobia and homosexuality (Sijbers et al. 2015). Support for teachers is available in the form of a helpdesk and training through channels, such as the School & Safety Foundation (Stichting School en Veiligheid) and Diversion.

An online portal about citizenship education presents lesson plans about diversity, the rule of law and human rights. Educational material and training programmes on antisemitism as well as Holocaust education and human rights education can be found on an online portal of the Anne Frank House. The portal for education on World War II and the Holocaust contains primarily material on historical antisemitism.17

While education is an obvious instrument to counter antisemitism, what the content and methods of antisemitism-prevention programmes should be are not at all clear-cut. Underlying many political responses and public debate on this issue is the assumption that Holocaust education will counter antisemitism. However, Holocaust education cannot, and is arguably not designed to ensure the prevention of antisemitism. The Holocaust and antisemitism are topics that can and should be connected, but teaching about one cannot replace teaching about the other. One reason is that Holocaust education includes a discussion of Jewish victimhood, while education about antisemitism calls for avoiding a one-dimensional perception of Jews as victims (OSCE 2007; Can, Georg and Hatlapa 2013; Wetzel 2013).

8.3 Best practice

There is little insight into the effectiveness of general anti-discrimination policies and specific measures and projects. It is extremely difficult to measure the extent of discrimination and the scope or effectiveness of policy. As the government itself has argued, policy has, in addition to its aim of preventing discrimination, the purpose of increasing awareness of discrimination and thus it affects the readiness to report experiences of discrimination.18

The government aims to invest in the development and dissemination of knowledge about successful approaches to exclusion and discrimination, together with local authorities and social partners. The Platform Integration and Society (KIS) supports civil society organizations, for example by offering factsheets, brochures and workshops about effective anti-discrimination methods and about project management and project funding acquisition.19

There are a number of websites bringing together information on the various organizations, programmes and activities countering discrimination, antisemitism, etc.:

17 www.annefrank.org features a portal for teachers with lesson plans, materials and tips and tricks on a number of topics including antisemitism, the Holocaust, discrimination, and citizenship. With partner organizations in other European countries, it is currently developing an online toolbox against discrimination, ‘Stories that Move’. www.tweedewereldoorlog.nl focuses on World War II, not on discrimination and antisemitism.


hate speech and radicalization. However, a systematic evaluation and development of programmes is usually lacking. Recently KIS issued several reports on the effectiveness of different types of interventions, and produced a dos and don’ts for combatting discrimination. These reports were based on an assessment of the presuppositions underlying interventions; the interventions themselves had not been tested in practice (Felten and Keuzekamp 2016; Felten, Taouanza and Keuzenkamp 2016; Taouanza, Felten and Keuzenkamp 2016). Moreover, none of these specifically addressed antisemitism. Similarly, the Ministry of Social Affairs produced an inventory of 28 activities involving Jewish-Muslim meetings, which could be used as models by others, but stated that these had not been tested for effectiveness. Only in three of the 28 initiatives had an independent evaluation or study had been conducted (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit 2017).  

8.4 Summary of findings

• Since 2010, the government has been making an effort to improve and streamline reporting on discrimination and to develop anti-discrimination policies.

• Antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-black racism have received serious attention.

• In addition to general anti-discrimination policies, the government has taken specific measures for countering antisemitism. These include projects which aim to introduce youths or adults with a Muslim background to Jews and Jewish life in the Netherlands.

20 The first author of this report, Annemarike Stremmelaar, has written an (as yet unpublished) report evaluating a project of Turkish-Jewish meeting and is currently evaluating a second one; see also Ensel and Stremmelaar, 2013. For a study of a number of cooperation projects see Roggeveen, Vellenga and Wiegers, 2017.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions

There is no demonstrable evidence that recent Middle East and North Africa (MENA) refugees have had an impact on antisemitic attitudes and behaviour in the Netherlands since 2011. Moreover, although the numerous activities bringing refugees and Jews together have revealed that some refugees do hold negative ideas about Jews, they have mostly led to friendly and polite exchanges, not to expressions of hostility.

In public discourse, all Muslims, immigrants from MENA countries and refugees are grouped together; antisemitic views are ascribed to all of them and all are seen as possible future perpetrators of antisemitic acts. However, the assumptions underlying these assertions are problematic.

Those inhabitants of the Netherlands with ties to the MENA region vary in many respects. Different migrants have a different relationship to the values of the sending country. The refugees who have arrived in the Netherlands after 2011 differ to a large extent from the Dutch citizens of Moroccan and Turkish background who are involved in antisemitic incidents or have become foreign fighters in the Middle East. Moreover, there is no one-to-one link between antisemitic views, attitudes and antisemitic behaviour. The expression of antisemitic attitudes in public requires mobilization, opportunity and knowledge of an antisemitic repertoire (discourse, slogans and images).

There is a tendency to externalize the issue of antisemitism in assuming it comes from outside. However, antisemitic images and discourses are not simply imported from the Middle East, but part of a highly globalized culture, in which Al Jazeera and Turkish television series are mixed with international neo-Nazi, pro-Palestinian and conspiracy networks (Ensel and Stremmelaar 2013; Ensel 2014; Ensel and Gans 2016).

Research on antisemitic incidents involving Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch citizens shows that the incidents are related to the processes of integration and identification. The actors involved do not directly translate ideas imported from the Middle East or North Africa into anti-Jewish action; their expression of anti-Jewish sentiments is often related to their experiences and developing attitudes as they navigate their position in Dutch society (Ensel 2014; Ensel and Gans 2016).

Likewise, the relationship between antisemitism and religion is not straightforward. It seems that ISIS supporters in The Hague in 2014, waving black flags and calling for the death of Jews, are an exception. Many Muslim youths involved in antisemitic incidents are not particularly, if at all, religious. If Islam plays a role it is in their identity as Muslims, both forced upon them by the outside world and by self-identification. But even here it may be as much their position in society as outsiders, strangers, un-white and underprivileged that is at play (Ensel 2014, 247–70).
Recommendations

In debates on migration, Islam and antisemitism it is important to distinguish between refugees, immigrants, citizens with a migration background, Muslims and non-Western immigrants.

The fear, insecurity and anguish of both Jews and Muslims (as well as other disadvantaged groups) should be taken seriously in a way that does not stimulate victimhood competition. Although knowledge of the quantitative dimensions of the types of discrimination is relevant, a focus on establishing which is the largest or most pressing is unproductive. Instead, an assessment of similarities and differences between antisemitism, Islamophobia, racism and discrimination may help to develop common strategies.

Given the diversity of types, motivations and perpetrators of antisemitism the narrow focus on Muslims is unwarranted. Public debate on antisemitism should be more rational and evidence-based. In this connection it is important to note that Islamophobia shares characteristics with antisemitism and the two often go hand in hand (Ensel and Gans 2016, 542–3; Kalmar and Ramadan 2016).

In responses to crude manifestations of antisemitism there is frequently an urge to find a ‘quick fix’ in the form of Holocaust education, especially a visit to Auschwitz. Experts argue, however, that antisemitism education should not focus on the Shoah, but instead on the history and present-day lives of Jews.

In order to counter images of and discourses on Muslim–Jewish animosity, projects and activities in the field of meeting, dialogue and education should be initiated, continued and highlighted, not as exceptions but as normal practices. Studies of how such projects work in practice, rather than in theory, would help to improve such approaches.

Given that there is no straightforward correlation between refugees and the ideology the sending country adheres to, it would be interesting to examine how Syrian refugees reflect on their attitudes to citizenship and diversity, how these have been influenced by official Syrian ideology and how these change in their respective new home countries.


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Appendices

Methodology

At the beginning of the study, a number of refugee organizations were contacted to identify possible respondents and sources of information. The Foundation for Refugee Students (UAF) provided a number of useful contacts. With the Dutch Council for Refugees (VWN), a national NGO assisting asylum seekers and refugees, the following procedure was adopted to gather information from people working for its local branches. After conferring with staff members in the central office an e-mail with questions was drafted and distributed among the local team leaders. Three team leaders sent a reply, and one response is used in this report (NG.16). The text of the email can be found as Appendix 2. A number of other associations of refugees did not respond to requests for an interview. Two respondents argued that Syrian refugees had other things on their mind rather than antisemitism (e.g. after the fall of Aleppo in December 2016) (NG.14, NG.21).

Government institutions working with asylum seekers were also contacted for information. In the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment an officer responsible for antisemitism was aware of Jewish concerns around the issue but had no data about any factual incidents (G.01). Staff members from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) stated they had no data that was relevant to the research question, for example because it does not register ethnicity (G.03, G.04). The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) did not want to cooperate because of the reporting pressure put on the organization by regular inspections at a time of decreasing staff. It also stated it would not have the requested information as incidents in refugee centres are not categorized and cannot be searched automatically. Any incidents outside of centres were an issue of public order and therefore not reported by the COA (G.05). The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) did agree to an interview but did not offer data on antisemitism among recent refugees (G.02).

Communications took the form of formal interviews, informal conversations and e-mail exchanges. The duration of the interviews ranged from 20 to 90 minutes. Interviews were conducted in person in a location chosen by the interviewee or alternatively over the telephone. The interviewees were then contacted by e-mail or telephone to introduce the aim, scope and method of the study and the institutions mentioned. Most of the face-to-face interviews were recorded and later on partly transcribed; in all cases notes were taken.

A topic list was used during the interviews which included changes in patterns of antisemitism over the last few years, the impact of the arrival of large numbers of refugees, the attitudes of refugees towards Jews and others, existing contacts between Jews and refugees and desirable policies in the field. The topic list was amended for specific interviewees, such as Jewish organizations, educational institutions or NGOs, and according to initial reactions. If an interviewee had no information on refugee attitudes towards Jews, the interview was kept short.

Information was also gathered from experts contacted by e-mail asking specific questions on particular topics.
Appendices

70

Topic guides

Topic guides for interviews with authorities and NGOs
- Do you see antisemitism as a problem among (recent or longstanding) MENA migrants?
- What evidence do you base this view on?
- What actions did you or others take in response to this view?
- Do recent immigrants have anti-Jewish prejudices?
- To what extent do recent immigrants and refugees accept norms of tolerance in Dutch society?
- What is the role of social media in generating antisemitism?
- What is the role of the media and of politicians in promoting an open and balanced discussion on migrants, refugees and antisemitism?
- What action should government institutions or others take?
- Is there anything you consider important to be mentioned in this context?
- Who else should I interview about this subject?

Topic guides for interviews with Jewish organizations
- In your view, has there been a change since 2011?
- Do you see antisemitism as a problem among (recent or longstanding) MENA migrants?
- What evidence do you base this view on?
- What actions have you or others taken, for example in relation to the government?
- Do you know of any initiatives taken by Jews regarding actions with or for refugees?
- How have contacts between (recent) refugees and Jews evolved?
- What images about Jews and Israel arise from expressions or actions of refugees?
- To what extent do recent immigrants and refugees accept norms of tolerance in Dutch society?
- Is there a link between Islam and antisemitism?
- Are there other sources of antisemitism among migrants from the Middle East and North Africa?
- Do you see a link between antisemitism and Islamophobia?
- What is the role of social media in generating antisemitism?
- What is the role of the media and of politicians in promoting an open and balanced discussion on migrants, refugees and antisemitism?
- What action should government institutions or others take?
• Is there anything you consider important to be mentioned in this context?
• Who else should I interview about this subject?

**E-mail for circulation in VWN**
E-mail circulated among local team leaders of the VWN.

Dear colleagues,

The International Institute of Social History is investigating the impact of the large number of asylum applications over the past two years on antisemitism in the Netherlands. The study has been commissioned by the German foundation Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft. The researcher has contacted the National Office with the request that VWN should play a part in the research by passing on messages from people working in the local branches:

• Have you picked up from asylum seekers specific views on Jews and Israel? If so, of what kind?

• Have you picked up views about other groups such as Christians and homosexuals? If so, what kind of opinions?

• Do you know of any visits to memorial sites with asylum seekers?

• Have any meetings between asylum seekers and Jews been organized, for example in the context of activities?

Responses can be passed on to the National Office and are passed on anonymously to the researcher. In addition to this enquiry, the research consists of a short-term exploratory study based on existing reports and on interviews with various parties involved. After completion of the research, the conclusions will be shared with us.
List of interviewees and respondents

4.1 Interviewees

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4.2 respondents

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